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Book Reviews and Responses

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Book Reviews and Responses

Book Review Forum: The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress

David M Andrews (ed), *The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress: US–European Relations after Iraq*, Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 2005, ISBN 0521849276 (hbk), ISBN 0521614082 (pbk), 304 pp

Reconfiguring Alliances

Several contributors to this excellent collection of essays stress the intensity and novelty of the crisis that affected the Atlantic alliance in 2002 and after. According to Marc Trachtenberg, the cold war trans-Atlantic rifts, unlike those of the early 21st century, did not involve the parties questioning ‘each other’s basic honesty’ (225). The point is made in several essays that the Iraq invasion merely brought to the fore various simmering and long-standing resentments, all made more difficult by the absence of shared cold war security interests. The US–European ‘bargain’ – mutual security, burden-sharing, European acceptance of American leadership, and US acceptance of European integration – does indeed seem to be unravelling.

The main tensions in the volume, heroically but not convincingly downplayed by David Andrews, relate to the intensity and extent of the trans-Atlantic crisis, as well as to the issue of where to apportion blame. Hubert Zimmerman is reasonably optimistic about the prospects at least for US–German reconciliation. Georges-Henri Soutou sees little sign of the US mending relations with France. David Andrews concludes that the alliance can be saved, despite the ‘simultaneous fading of strategic clarity and erosion of domestic support’ (256). Trachtenberg’s lament for the future of the alliance is striking in its sharpness. Wade Jacoby defends the strategic rationale for NATO, while noting the foolhardiness of presuming the maintenance of a pro-American ‘new Europe’ in the east. On the question of blame, Elizabeth Pond locates it firmly in the George W Bush White House and Pentagon. More persuasively, Geir Lundestad and several other contributors emphasise the fundamental importance of post-1989 geopolitical shifts, along with changes in French and German politics. Marc Trachtenberg’s defence of the US line on Iraq will fail to convince many Europeans, but adds to the value of this book in stimulating academic debate, not least in the student seminar room.

My general criticisms are few. From the current perspective, with the uncertainty surrounding the future expansion, budget and constitution of the EU, some comments in this volume on the likely trajectory for European integration seem a little naïve. The collection could have profited from the inclusion of a chapter on the sidelining of the EU in post-9/11 diplomacy. More seriously, there is no real attempt in these essays to situate the trans-Atlantic rift in terms of possible future geopolitical reconfigurations. Like everything else, the war on terror will not last for ever. It is slightly extraordinary in this connection that the word ‘China’ does not figure in the book’s index.

On the particular issue of US–UK relations, the essay by William Wallace and Tim Oliver is outstandingly good and very informative. Regarding the domestic background, however, the authors rather neglect the role of domestic Muslim opinion. On Blair's decision for war, the authors brilliantly capture its highly personal nature, and also link it to Blair's personal (sofa-style) mould of governing. Yet it is not entirely clear why they raise his 'personal conviction that Saddam Hussein's regime was a threat to global security' (152) over other considerations. Blair's decision seems rather to have emerged from a complex mixture of motives and drives: worries about Saddam and weapons of mass destruction, certainly; but also the assumption that positioning the UK close to the US was both likely to lead to better policy and to accrue to Britain's benefit. British support for the war on terror was also, of course, linked to the overlap between Blair's belief in the liberal, 'post-Westphalian' interventionism of the 1990s and the tougher policies outlined in the 2002 US National Security Strategy.

Wallace and Oliver do not speculate much about the future, beyond the opinion that London will be deluding itself if it hopes for anything in the way of 'partnership' or even any significant modification of US policies. My own conclusion from reading these fine essays is that the alliance will be fundamentally reshaped in the immediate future, with bilateral complexity a clear and unavoidable feature of future trans-Atlantic relations.

John Dumbrell
University of Leicester

Fallacies on the Trans-Atlantic Rift

There are many books on the crisis in trans-Atlantic relations; all are welcome when they shed fresh light on a troubling feature that impinges on all countries in the Euro-Atlantic space. Most welcome will be new findings on the causes of the rift, explaining state behaviour and suggesting novel solutions for mending it. How does the David M Andrews volume perform against these criteria? The volume's essays originate from a seminar series at the European University Institute in Florence. For it, and for the book, Andrews assembled a number of highly respected experts on EU–US relations from six different countries, historians and political scientists.

In his introduction, the editor sets the tone for the book by stating, 'We believe that the project of building and maintaining an Atlantic community is at risk as never before' (1). During the East–West conflict, a trans-Atlantic bargain existed according to which 'European governments supported, or at least refrained from actively opposing, American policy activism around the world, while the US supported, or at least refrained from actively undermining, a series of regional and global arrangements that underwrote Europe's regional prosperity and international influence'. (1) This argument is repeated several times – but is it correct? I think not, and I join some of the authors who mention the German–French Treaty of 1963, the dollar and the oil crises in the early 1970s, and Kissinger's abortive 'Year of Europe' initiative. From this slanted start the editor pushes the authors to compare the happy times of the cold war with the ugly present, neglecting a sophisticated analysis of today's crisis. Also missing is a central puzzle that individual chapters attempt to answer.

Fortunately, some of the authors step into this void. In a broad historical sweep, Geir Lundestad looks into the reasons for the fundamental shifts in the trans-Atlantic relationship. He identifies three primary reasons: lack of a unifying factor that terrorism does not provide, American unilateralism, and the political weight of the EU. Marc Trachtenberg joins him in his finding that the Europeans no longer depend on the US as much as they did during the East–West conflict, nor does Washington need European allies and their territory for strategic reasons. Miles Kahler identifies two stabilising factors – American public opinion and economic interdependence – and a catalyst for change: domestic politics, especially domestic polarisation. Other authors, such as Elizabeth Pond, put much blame on American unilateralism, and on the self-confidence France and Germany currently display vis-à-vis the US.

Most authors hint at a central structural factor that should have been examined in greater detail: that the US since the collapse of the Soviet Union is the only global power. It acts as a global hegemon and sees little need for allies' support in order to fulfil its chosen mission of bringing freedom and democracy to the world. The 9/11 terrorist attacks underscore this feeling of America as a 'lone warrior', but the entanglement in Afghanistan and Iraq again emphasises the value of allies – provided they accept American leadership.

Overall, this collection has a number of very good and solid essays that will survive the day. But they are written from an 'old Europe' or from an American perspective that leaves out a great deal of today's European viewpoint. Though Wade Jacoby deals with the CEE states, he cannot make up for this deficiency; his piece is very weak on facts and only scratches the surface. For most authors, NATO is an unknown beast – do they believe it is already dead? One might also have asked which role NATO played in the past – and could again in the future, such as serving as a central transmission belt between Europe and America.

The editor has missed the chance to make a unified theme of many interesting contributions, and to develop suggestions as to what the states in the Euro-Atlantic area should do to end the crisis and bridge the gap. Hope is just not enough either in the real world of politics or in summarising an academic book.

Helga Haftendorn
Free University Berlin (emeritus)

The Indispensable Atlantic Partnership

This book addresses whether the Atlantic alliance can survive the huge structural change of the collapse of the USSR. However, most of the contributions seem to look at the 'massive diplomatic failure' of the crisis over Iraq as a fatal blow that finally fitted with deterministic realist theories. In 1993, Kenneth Waltz predicted the alliance's *imminent* collapse, a comment reminiscent of John Maynard Keynes's assertion that 'in the long run we are all dead'. There is little scientific value in asserting that alliances disappear in the long run, unless we focus on the fundamental question regarding such alliances' transformation into international regimes. John Mearsheimer's or Waltz's predictions, based on over-simplistic theories, have already been proven wrong. Deeper reasons than mere 'attitudinal inertia' (66) exist for NATO's survival. 'For half a century', writes David M

Andrews, 'the realism of Theodore Roosevelt was married to the idealism of Woodrow Wilson, a union that survived (if only barely, on occasion) many a crisis' (65). The readers will find many arguments in favour of this survival, despite the dominant pessimistic tone of the book.

Two papers (by Elizabeth Pond and Marc Trachtenberg) deal with the Iraq crisis. Trachtenberg's piece is an emotional and somewhat disillusioned but strong pleading of Bush's policy of regime change. It is a valuable contribution discussing fundamental and enduring issues in the trans-Atlantic debate such as the role of international law or the concept of Just War, but it misses the key point of the future of the Atlantic partnership. That is well put by Hubert Zimmermann in his discussion of the relationship between burden-sharing and power-sharing, or by William Wallace and Tim Oliver arguing that the Americans must give something in return to the British to make the 'special relationship' work. Trachtenberg states the wrong dilemma, writing, 'Sooner or later, the Europeans are probably going to have to deal with the issue of whether they would really like the US to withdraw ... And if, after due consideration, they conclude that they would like the Americans to stay, they might want to grapple with the very difficult problems of the new world we now live in in a more serious way than they have so far' (231). There is no future for the Atlantic alliance if the only choice for the Europeans is to say 'yes' or 'no' to an American leadership in which, to paraphrase Schröder, consultation consists in getting two hours advance notice of a call revealing that 'we are marching in' (145). To survive, the Atlantic alliance has to be framed differently and will require leadership on both sides of the Atlantic, which is difficult. As explained by Zimmermann, 'The major danger for the Alliance is not to be found in the new strategic environment. Quite the opposite: the biggest threat lies in unleashing domestic forces that undermine adherence to common norms and institutions' (151). Some of the most interesting insights of this book are precisely related to the relationship between foreign and domestic policies.

To conclude, most (not all) of the key factors for revitalising the Atlantic partnership can be found in the book. First, most Europeans, not only Germans, would agree on 'common interests based on shared threats perceptions', particularly failed states, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and international terrorism. The Israel–Palestine problem is more complex, since perceptions across the Atlantic have differed significantly for decades. Again I agree with Zimmermann that 'the culminating point of trans-Atlantic collaboration might eventually take the form of a lasting solution' to this problem. Another central problem regards the future of Russia and other key former Soviet republics, such as Ukraine, which is missing from the book. Again, the Americans and the Europeans need to constructively accommodate their differences to achieve Eurasian structural stability.

Second, Americans and Europeans continue to need each other. In 2002, Helga Haftendorn argued, 'today the United States can easily do without NATO' (231). After Afghanistan and Iraq, Americans have become aware of the limits of unilateralism and know they need Europeans and specifically 'old Europe'. No more than in the past would they accept a European Union as a counterweight, but a deeply divided Europe decreases, not increases, American leverage in world affairs, hence the concern after the French and Dutch rejections of the European Constitution.

Conversely, Europeans need Americans. Europe faces a range of uncertainties demanding caution. Also, the Baltic States and central European states are

behaving like Italy after World War II, described by Leopoldo Nutti quoting Ambassador Roberto Ducci: 'the richest and farthest master is always the best' (177). As early as 1969, Henry Kissinger wrote, 'We have sought to combine a supranational Europe with a closely integrated Atlantic Community under American leadership. These are likely to prove incompatible' (5). In the foreseeable future, the most important issue is not whether a United Europe could threaten American primacy, but what kind of leadership could maintain an Atlantic partnership that always was 'troubled' (Kissinger) but remains in the general interest of international society.

Thierry de Montbrial
French Institute of International Relations

The Grim Reality

The contributors to this volume, like the book's reviewers, hail from both sides of the Atlantic. David M Andrews and the editors of the *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* are to be complimented for calling upon specialists from an array of fields and nations to collectively examine the ongoing crisis in trans-Atlantic relations. One of the challenges in producing an edited volume of quality is to pose significant questions and ensure that the various contributors stay on point. Here, *The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress* succeeds handsomely. Collectively, this diverse group of scholars paints a grim and accurate picture affording little reason to be optimistic about the future. Indeed, one of the refreshing aspects of this book is the absence of a reform agenda promising to restore Atlantic relations to the more cooperative times now long past. In the US, organisations such as the New York Council on Foreign Relations have published studies outlining the challenges confronting the Atlantic community, followed by a set of recommendations that, if adopted, will facilitate the return of multilateral cooperation. On the whole, Andrews and his colleagues avoid this trap. With the exception of Hubert Zimmerman's optimistic and hopeful assessment, the authors present compelling evidence, drawn from both cold war history and events since 9/11, leading to the inescapable conclusion that the current crisis in trans-Atlantic ties is not so much a crisis but the increasingly accepted norm in relations between North American and European governments.

While the book is thoughtfully organised and uniformly well written, the volume has several weaknesses. The sub-title, *US-European Relations after Iraq*, led this reader to believe that much of the analysis would concentrate on recent conflicts. Instead, the book's country-specific chapters dwell excessively on the cold war. The book's likely audience will include individuals well versed in this history. These readers would have benefited if the authors had focused on contemporary events. I do not mean to marginalise the contributions of the volume's historians who are well equipped to comment on present conditions and should be encouraged to do so. At least one of the authors had the chance to update their chapter up to February 2005. In this light, it would appear the book misses an important opportunity to comment more extensively on events in the 18 months following Washington's invasion of Iraq.

A significant and perplexing problem is the omission of important topics. NATO is the pivotal institutional link among members of the Atlantic community but discussion of the Atlantic alliance is truncated and limited throughout the book.

NATO's current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq illuminate striking differences among member states as to the purposes and goals of the organisation. NATO has designated alliance operations in Afghanistan the organisation's top priority. Even a cursory review of the mission reveals a limited commitment among members and critical disagreements about future operations. Had the various authors incorporated analysis of these missions into the chapters, their arguments and conclusions would have been enhanced. In addition, the volume neglects serious assessment of the EU's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Tensions between NATO and the ESDP are well known and likely to grow in the future. The book's limited focus on NATO, ESDP and the military capabilities gap is a major shortcoming.

Finally, a word on two of the American contributors: Miles Kahler and Marc Trachtenberg. Kahler argues that the crisis within the Atlantic community is directly linked to increasing partisanship and ideological battles within US politics. Specifically, Kahler bemoans the Republican Party's continuing rightward drift and embrace of unilateralist policies. While some critics may find Kahler's focus overly deterministic, I found this an important addition to the debate and largely compelling. At the other end of the spectrum we find Trachtenberg's bold, even brazen, essay which unapologetically defends the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq. Trachtenberg's thoughts on deterrence theory are provocative and open to debate. His assertion that the UN Charter 'gave the United States pretty much a free hand to use force whenever it liked' (218) is intended to provoke and succeeds. In many ways this essay is worth the price of admission, and is sure to spark lively debate in classrooms – it certainly will in my own.

Richard Rupp
Purdue University Calumet

The Structure of Things – Response to Dumbrell, Haftendorn, de Montbrial and Rupp

Over the past year the mood music accompanying the trans-Atlantic relationship has improved considerably. The second administration of President George W Bush has been far more humble, as a matter both of choice and of necessity, than was its first-term incarnation. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's January 2005 pilgrimage to European capitals, followed by the immense symbolism of an American president visiting first NATO headquarters and then Berlaymont, the seat of the European Commission, did not go unnoticed. There is also a bit more humility in Europe, especially now (in November 2005), with both the EU's constitutional treaty and the Paris suburbs in flames. Talk of defying an imperial US is more subdued; and when European officials have something bad to say about their American counterparts, they generally say it privately, not publicly.

Though welcome, these changes in diplomatic style derive in all instances from weakness, not strength. Bush is humble because he has been humbled, both in Iraq and at home; Chirac is likewise on the defensive, and Schröder is gone. Can the weakness of national leaders be relied upon as a lasting source of Atlantic strength? Probably not. Meanwhile, the essential policies of these countries have changed very little since *The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress* was written – which is striking, since the book project began when Atlantic relations were at a historic nadir.

It is in this context – improved trans-Atlantic manners but sustained dissonance in national policy substance – that the review forum on this book takes place. The reviews are for the most part balanced. Richard Rupp finds the ‘grim and accurate’ tone of the volume ‘refreshing’ while lamenting its historical emphasis. Thierry de Montbrial considers the book excessively pessimistic, but at the same time finds in it many arguments for the alliance’s eventual revitalisation; he also appreciates the volume’s sustained attention to the interplay between foreign and domestic politics. John Dumbrell generally commends the volume, though he would have preferred a greater focus on ‘possible future geopolitical reconfigurations’. This suggestion, though, is coupled with criticism of some authors’ remarks on the likely trajectory of European integration – remarks written before the French and Dutch ‘no’ votes of summer 2005 – suggesting that our overall caution in this respect may have been wise.

Helga Haftendorn’s comments, on the other hand, are bewildering. Though generally one of Europe’s more perceptive commentators on Atlantic affairs, her remarks here suggest that she did not have time to fully digest the book before reviewing it. For example, she writes that ‘a central structural factor ... should have been examined in greater detail: that the US since the collapse of the Soviet Union is the only global power’. In fact, this was the subject of Chapter 3 in the volume, entitled ‘The United States and Its Atlantic Partners’. Readers of the *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* will recall that an article by the same name appeared in the journal’s October 2004 edition – a shortened version of the book chapter – alongside, ironically, an article by Helga Haftendorn. For those who missed the former article, some of its main points bear reiterating here.

While structural theory is ill-suited to explaining the actions of particular states at particular times, attention to system structure can provide a useful backdrop to a wider analysis encompassing historical, intellectual and other trends. In the volume, I focused on the relations between the US, the Soviet Union and the major Western European powers during the cold war, with particular attention to West Germany as a focal point in the bipolar conflict. Though the resulting analysis cannot be elaborated upon here, two principal observations emerged.

First, absent a common foe, previously suppressed tensions within the Atlantic community are bound to play a more prominent role than in the past. This is not to say that the Atlantic partnership will necessarily deteriorate further; indeed the breakdown in Atlantic relations surrounding the invasion of Iraq was in many ways a stunning aberration. But from the standpoint of structural theory, the central point of this episode was that Washington, Paris and Berlin could afford to indulge in relatively cavalier behaviour precisely because the stakes of their partnership were so greatly reduced. The bipolar distribution of power that reigned throughout the cold war encouraged certain behaviours; the shift to a different distribution of power encourages others. The challenge for the allies in the future, therefore, will be to cooperate absent the discipline once imposed by their respective international situations.

Second, the foreign policy of the US reflects the country’s geographic insularity and democratic openness. Even during the cold war, when faced with a deadly opponent, the US was at times barely able to sustain its commitments to its Atlantic partners. No longer threatened with nuclear annihilation for failures in the management of the Atlantic alliance (as was the case during the bipolar struggle), we should not expect Washington to behave as if that condition still existed.

The conjunction of these two points – that interests, and especially security interests, within the alliance are less convergent now than during the cold war, and that in any event US foreign policy tends to lack discipline – suggests that stormy seas are ahead for the Atlantic partners. The remainder of the book placed this general observation into historical context and fleshed out its implications for a series of critical bilateral relationships within the alliance, including Washington's relations with Paris, Berlin, London, Rome, Warsaw, Prague and Budapest.

One reviewer notes inattention to China as part of this framework. For my part, the more significant oversight was the omission of chapters dealing with the domestic politics and foreign policies of Russia and Turkey; these countries' internal politics are far more likely to shape the alliance than are developments in Beijing. The continued transformation of NATO from an arrangement for collective defence to an instrument for selective offence – first in the Balkans, now in Afghanistan – depends most critically on how Moscow's experiment with democracy evolves. One should not rule out the possibility that the balance of threat will shift again, and behaviour with it.

David M. Andrews
Scripps College

Transatlantic Cooperation Beyond NATO – Response to Dumbrell, Haftendorn, de Montbrial and Rupp

What might continue to hold the West together, or, more to the point, reconstruct the trans-Atlantic relationship? Not just the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: it is useless to repeat 'NATO! NATO!' ceaselessly as if it were a religious incantation. These days NATO is widely seen in Europe – at least in France, Germany and Italy – as the expression and instrument of American hegemony over the continent. For their part, the Americans are now ambivalent or undecided whether NATO is the best conduit to promote their interests: in Iraq they decided that the mission defined the coalition. But at the same time their continuing fixation with NATO has contributed to their pressure on the EU to admit Turkey, in order to ensure a coextension of the EU with NATO and thus to prevent the emergence of a real European security identity. (I take eventual Turkish entry into the EU as a given, though in the long term it will probably drive the EU even further away from the US – despite the American conviction to the contrary.)

None of this is to say that NATO is unimportant or not worth saving, despite the end of the cold war. Rather, it would be worthwhile to consider very seriously Chancellor Schröder's remarks and suggestions at the Wehrkunde Conference in Munich in February 2005: that NATO no longer serves as a place to discuss trans-Atlantic problems, and that therefore there is need for a new and efficient and more balanced system of consultation between the US and the EU. After all, what Kissinger stated (albeit clumsily) in 1973–4 remains true: decisions by the EU affect American interests (and vice versa), and there is therefore need for a system of timely consultations.

Of course, deep structural forces should keep the West together. These include a common democratic outlook; a set of values that are basically the same, despite the present discourse (certainly as seen from the Taliban they are the same); and deep roots in a common cultural world. True, there are local idiosyncrasies; but

these are part of a debate within the West. (Some of my American friends believe in the so-called 'French model' much more than I do.) But structures are not enough to shape events and policies. One also needs what Schopenhauer called 'Will and Representation': a common or at least compatible representation of the world, and a common or at least converging will to act in the same direction. If both exist, ways to organise the trans-Atlantic cooperation in institutional terms (in a rejuvenated NATO and also alongside it in new structures) will be found.

During most (though not all) periods of the cold war there was enough convergence in terms of will and representation on both sides of the Atlantic to allow for cooperation. There were differences – some not that different from the current debates between Mars and Venus – but they could be overcome. This was after all the whole point of the Harmel report in 1967, or NATO's double-track decision in 1979: in both instances diverging views about the evolution of the Soviet system, and about the respective role of détente and military preparedness, could be combined into a common, workable policy. That could happen because the idea of the 'West', of an Atlantic community, was largely if not universally accepted. This idea was promoted by many (though certainly not all) scholars and members of the media, and political leaders were ready to take those notions into account. Today, by contrast, Europeans more frequently employ the expression 'the West' to mean 'the rich West' as opposed to the deserving poor countries, a discourse in which deprivation is seen as the main cause for terrorism.

As a result, though there still exists an objective Atlantic world (although some would even dispute this), subjectively there is today no such thing as an Atlantic community. Nor will it be revived as it once was: America looks now more than ever towards all parts of the world, while Europe focuses on its south and east. But common values and objective interests remain, and some of these could be perceived in a convergent way. Examples include the fight against terrorism (where behind the scenes convergence is already largely the case); the problems of the Middle East; the problem of the place of China in the international system; and the problem of maintaining the living standards of the old industrial societies in a globalising world while balancing this interest with growing environmental problems.

The trans-Atlantic relationship may therefore be reconstructed, provided one addresses current problems rather than contenting oneself with reaffirming the tenets of the first Atlanticism of the World War I, when the Round Table promoted a trans-Atlantic union of English-speaking people (an idea that still lingers...); or of the 1950s, when Soviet communism was a clear and direct menace. We need scholars and opinion-makers willing to tackle the intellectual job of assessing these new issues; we need political leaders able to convince the electorate that, at least for most of them, a balanced trans-Atlantic cooperation would be a positive force, and also able (which is more difficult) to erode the many prejudices and conflicting views that today prevent a spirit of true cooperation across the Atlantic. In order to foster such developments, which cannot be taken for granted, an emphasis on security above all other problems – and on NATO above all other institutions – will not be enough.

Georges-Henri Soutou
University of Paris IV - Sorbonne

What's the Deal? – Response to Dumbrell, Haftendorn, de Montbrial and Rupp

Most people seem to take it for granted, without giving the matter all that much thought, that the Western alliance is worth saving. Well, is it? What sort of relationship should America and Europe have? Is an alliance – a *military* alliance – the right kind of relationship for them to have, given the political realities that exist today?

It seems to me that for those of us who are interested in trans-Atlantic relations, questions of that sort are absolutely basic. Alliance commitments need to be taken seriously. In allying itself with Europe, the United States is guaranteeing the security of the European countries. It is committing itself to come to their aid if they ever get into serious trouble again. And isn't it fair to ask: what exactly is America getting in exchange? If the answer is 'not much', then why should America remain in Europe? A *military* relationship like the Atlantic alliance, moreover, can work only if it has an adequate *political* base – that is, only if the allies, by and large, agree on basic issues of foreign policy, or at least that is what I would argue. If the allies are not basically in agreement on the political side, would a military alliance really make sense?

It seems to me that we should not shy away from questions of that sort. But it is simply a fact – and you can see it quite clearly in at least one of the comments here – that people (especially Europeans) do not like it when some of us (mainly Americans) define the issues that way. I say that for the Europeans to pursue an anti-American policy will inevitably put their alliance with the United States at risk, and that in considering what sort of policy to pursue they might want to give some thought to the question of whether they would really like to see America withdraw from Europe.

Thierry de Montbrial rejects that argument. He seems to think that I was arguing that Europeans should be forced 'to say yes or no to an American leadership' that has no interest in genuine consultations with Europe. That, of course, is not what I said, but that kind of reaction is understandable. A country that thinks in terms of power – a country that assumes that the terms of the relationships it enters into should have something to do with relative power, that 'who needs whom' should have a lot to do with 'who gets what' – is bound to be accused of bullying when it acts on that assumption. And it is not hard to see why the European countries should want total independence in the political sphere, but still expect America to bail them out if they ever get into trouble again.

My own feeling, though, is that things just do not work that way, at least not in the long run. If the Europeans think they can pursue an anti-American policy and still expect the United States to defend them when the time comes, they are in for a rude awakening, whatever texts remain formally in effect. Fundamental political forces just cannot be swept under the rug. Romantic ideas about a 'community of democratic states' and so on might keep them in check for a while, but ultimately political behaviour is based on interest, and, the way America's interests are developing, the United States might well look for allies in other parts of the globe. An eventual US alliance with Russia or China or both, for example, based on common opposition to Islamic extremism, is by no means out of the question.

People, of course, do not like to hear these things, but I think it is irresponsible to assume that such developments can simply be ruled out.

Note that none of this depends on a judgement about policy – that is, about George W Bush's or Jacques Chirac's or Gerhard Schröder's policy. I am just talking about the way the international system works. I am simply assuming that power and interest still play fundamental roles in shaping the course of events. Even if I were a European deeply opposed to the Bush strategy in Iraq, I would still analyse things in these terms. But I am also enough of a realist to believe that, other things being equal, it is to everyone's interest to have as many friends and as few adversaries as possible. It is for that reason, at least to my mind, that the Western alliance is worth saving – but only if an adequate political basis for it can be found. Political unity, however, rests not on deals that leaders strike behind closed doors, but on a genuine meeting of the minds. And it is in that area, I think, that we in the academic community (and I am including here the readers of this journal) can play a real role. Given what is at stake, it is important that we put all the clichés aside and deal with these issues in a serious and scholarly way. But when I look at the political behaviour of the intellectual class in both America and in Europe in recent years, I have to admit that I do not see much chance of that happening.

Marc Trachtenberg
University of California at Los Angeles

Thomas L Friedman, *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*, New York, Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, ISBN 037292884, 488 pp

Erik Andre Andersen, Birgit Lindsnæs and Stig Ree (eds) (ed), *På vej mod nye globale strategier: Offentlige goder og menneskerettigheder*, Copenhagen, Jurist- og Økonomforbundets forlag, ISBN 8757411816, 500 pp

Riad Ajami, C Edward Arrington, Falconer Mitchell and Hanne Nørreklit (eds) *Globalisation, Management Control & Ideology, Local and Multinational Perspectives*, Copenhagen, DJØF, ISBN 8757410003, 312 pp

The World Is Flat is a fascinating book capturing one of the great swings of civilisation. It is written in a smooth, elegant and lucid style, combining analysis with personal experience. Thomas L Friedman hits the nail on the head with his description of globalisation, its consequences, imperatives and options. He leaves the reader in no doubt that globalisation stands for higher growth and higher total wealth than any other model the world has ever seen. The frequently quoted example is that 400,000 American Internal Revenue Service returns were prepared in India last year. Another example (not mentioned in the book) is that 20,000 American high school students are helped by Indian math teachers, generating revenue of US\$2 billion per year.

Friedman's dictionary tells us that the world has seen three great waves: Globalisation 1.0 started in the year 1492 with Columbus and ended around 1800. It was controlled by nation states jumping into the international fry. Globalisation 2.0 has been with us from about 1800 to date. The keywords are 'multinational

companies' and 'Western countries'. Globalisation 3.0 is taking off now. It is about individuals operating, thinking and acting globally, and it may well take place outside the Western nations that have been at the helm since 1492.

The author makes ten points in relation to globalisation which are the flywheels for a world dominated by competition and moulded in the shape of American capitalism. First, he tells of how, in 1989, walls (the Berlin Wall) came down and windows (the computer system) came up. Second, he tells of how the IT bubble in the second half of the 1990s channelled enormous funds into wiring the globe, thus providing the infrastructure for informatics and communication. Friedman's other eight points basically flesh out what the new technology means for companies and people removing barriers, introducing transparency and new rules for the competitive game. All points are described clearly and are easily understandable, even more so thanks to the convincing anecdotal evidence. That is not a weakness of the book; it is its strength. Undoubtedly, Friedman's observation, descriptions, and decoding confirm the views of the upper class, intellectual, international segment of society, which Friedman himself belongs to.

The result constitutes a convincing case for globalisation as the model for the 21st century: invincible, almighty, sweeping everything aside in its stride. At the same time, one wonders about the geopolitical consequences of the seminal shift from the Western world to Asia – unquestionably the part of the world which is catching on to globalisation fastest. I do not want to criticise Friedman for not covering this aspect, since no author can or should discuss everything and focusing upon a one or two major themes is the ultimate art of transmitting your message. Apparently Friedman sees the world as a whole or perhaps he sees the global political and economic steering system unchanged in the 21st century. Yet, this is unlikely. As China and India gain economic speed they will want a say in how to run the world, and that will require American acquiescence. Some of the existing and sometimes abundantly obvious American preponderance must be shared with the newcomers: a tough strategic decision for any American president, and one that seems unlikely to be taken by the incumbent one.

In the chapter 'Geopolitics and the Flat World', Friedman presents his philosophical premises. He does not enter into the global decision-making process but takes the view that the stronger and indispensable supply chain – the fact that no nation state can cope alone outside globalisation – makes conflicts much less likely. Two examples – and good ones – are pushed under the nose of the reader. The rejection by Taiwan's population in 2004 of a more belligerent attitude vis-à-vis China reflected hesitation towards the policy put forward by President Chen Shui-bian for a referendum paving the way for independence. The population of Taiwan wanted none of this because their economy was so intricately associated with China that it would suffer dramatically if a conflict arose. The second example is India's softer stance against Pakistan in 2002, when India's policy makers became aware for the first time of India's role as a host country for IT outsourcing. India's role in the global supply chain would suffer if other partners in the supply chain started to worry. In short, both Taiwan and India suddenly glimpsed the limitations on foreign and security policy that emerge as soon as you have found a place in the sunshine of globalisation. This leads Friedman to coin the Dell theory of international politics: no two countries that are both part of the same major global supply chain, like Dell's, will ever fight a war against each other as long as they both remain part of that global supply chain.

Maybe, maybe not. The same point was made before 1914, when it was argued that the world had become so economically interwoven that a war was unthinkable. And yet, the unthinkable happened. The argument also leaves out the burning question of what to do with the nation states that are not members of a global supply chain. It would be fascinating to enter into discussion about the diminishing role of the nation state. In today's world, the military threat is not directed against the nation state but against the functioning of communities, networks, supply chains, demand circles operating inside the nation states. Yet, precisely because of globalisation, they have very little to do with the nation state as such.

The catchphrase 'The world is flat', which Friedman takes from a conversation with an Indian businessman about the levelling of playing fields, is brilliant. It reveals that not only is globalisation synonymous with distribution of labour, competition, higher productivity, but it also changes the settings for the global economy. It can be put in few words: there are no hiding places; competition becomes harsh; it may be nasty and sometimes ugly.

This is where Friedman's book stumbles. Its primary and almost exclusive focus is the sunny side of the street, and it does not enter into a discussion of the worrying implications of globalisation. Report after report highlights increasing inequality; outsourcing is fine except for those losing their job or income and too old or otherwise unable to acquire other skills; Wal-Mart is great except for those (and they are counted in hundreds of thousands, maybe millions) small shopkeepers and shop assistants who have the carpet pulled from under their feet. When Friedman speaks of globalisation 3.0 being about people, he overlooks that this is primarily relevant for the higher echelons of society. The majority of the population may use IT, but they cannot do so in an international context. Globalisation 3.0 actually dichotomises nations and communities between those taking an active part in globalisation and identifying themselves as 'internationals', and those who use IT as a tool in their daily work but are mentally still located inside the national box.

Globalisation is the best model ever bestowed upon the world. Handled and controlled in the right way it will ensure unprecedented growth and welfare to millions and millions, indeed to the large majority of the global population. But – and this is an important 'but' – handled in the wrong way, it confines the increasing wealth to a smaller and smaller share of the population, almost exclusively limited to countries that are already rich. According to the UN 2005 Human Development Report, 460 million people living in 18 of the poorest nations were better off 15 years ago than today. Recent figures show that economic inequality has risen strongly in countries such as the US, China and Korea. These countries may all have grown richer, but a larger part of the wealth is in the hands of just 10% of the population. For many, globalisation stands for a confrontation between economics (growth, wealth, durable consumer goods) and identity, built up over the centuries and firmly rooted in ethnicity, religion or language. There may be limits to how much of their identity they are willing to sacrifice to allow a smaller part of the population to get richer.

This is not a trivial problem. It is a slap in the face that cannot be ignored. It becomes a deadly threat to globalisation because most of these people think rightly or wrongly that globalisation is to blame. The rising inequality turns

globalisation into a catalyst for confrontation between those having too much and those having too little, thereby threatening the very future of globalisation.

Friedman's book is an accolade to globalisation. But it overlooks its built-in tendencies to run amok, its potential distortions and abuses. Growth, wealth, productivity, rising real incomes are not the be all and end all; the distribution of income to secure a rising living standard for the large majority must be addressed. Globalisation produces unquestionably higher growth than alternative models, but it is still an open question whether wealth is distributed sufficiently equitably to ensure political and popular support in the long run. *The World Is Flat* enumerates in an almost breathtaking way the advantages of globalisation, to the extent that we may be blinded to its deficiencies until it is too late.

The book *På vej mod nye globale strategier* is, unfortunately, in Danish and so currently mainly accessible only to a Nordic audience.¹ It starts off with Paul A Samuelson's essay from 1954, arguing that public goods make the market economy tick more efficiently. Twenty-one essays dig deeper to reveal how public goods in a global context can make our societies more resilient, more coherent and better. These essays thus offer a counterweight to Friedman's rather one-sided approach. One could say that Friedman's book has the answer and leaves no room for doubt, while it is the strength and the weakness of *På vej mod nye globale strategier* that it takes the opposite approach and gives the reader unanswered questions and doubts about globalisation itself and the role of public goods.

Globalisation, Management Control & Ideology consists of an overview and 14 essays. The book is thoughtful and brings into the open that globalisation is a mixed blessing requiring adroit management when the drive for economic efficiency encounters local values. As said in the introduction, 'There is certainly a richer mosaic of global life than economic calculations can contain' (12).

The book takes the opposite angle from Friedman's and argues that globalisation, or 'modern systems', mostly originated in the US but are now confronting local values and norms, thereby creating tension between the exigencies of globalisation and the preferences of local people. The book tries to provide some answers but leaves the thoughtful reader with more questions and uncertainty, which is not a bad thing after Friedman's cocksure presentation.

Friedman's book is a must. But many of us would do well to read books like *På vej mod nye globale strategier: Offentlige goder og menneskerettigheder* and *Globalisation, Management Control & Ideology, Local and Multinational Perspectives* to get an idea of the limitations, constraints, backlashes, distortions or even dangers and risks embedded in globalisation – so conveniently forgotten in Friedman's description.

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¹ An English translation of the book will be published in 2006.

The Dignity of Difference in the Face of Global Markets – Response to Jørgen Ørstrøm Møller

Economic activity, global or otherwise, operates under a social obligation to justify itself as contributing to the pursuit of the good and just life for those affected by its practice. Entangled in a complex web of cultural, political, social, legal, institutional and indeed moral diversity, the challenge of justifying globalisation in the context of varied pursuits of the good and just life is massive indeed. A thin, veiled rhetoric of efficiency gains, stable currencies and national competitiveness provide us with limited justification.

These Western markers of progress are alien to many within the global community; they are also contestable within even the Western contexts in which they are embedded. The pressure of structural demands imposed by a high-velocity system of work and interconnected markets has resulted in environmental degradation, growing gaps between the rich and the poor, crises of public finance, and a stressed-out, overtaxed and overworked middle class. Of greatest significance is the plight of the poor. Their inability to breathe life into the promised connectedness of work and the good life is dramatic indeed. Globalisation may be able to demonstrate that its superior productivity makes it possible to make some better off without injuring others, but the empirical fact is that it has not actually done so, at least in any substantial way. The Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz captures the problematic pathos in the title of his intriguing text, *Globalization and Its Discontents*.

In *Globalization, Management Control & Ideology*, we set out from two initial presumptions. First, we embraced the notion that all purposive human activity, including the economic, must refer its legitimacy back to moral discourse, back to validity claims about its contribution to the good and just life. In this context, we only care about the markers of the economic – production, value, etc – because we sense that they make life better. Thus we rejected the notion that disciplines like economics can define the terms of their own legitimacy internally. Second, we should respect global differences in ideologies, that is, appreciate and capture local values, cultures, desires and institutions.

From these presumptions, we elicited chapters from authors across the globe with the hope that the text itself would yield a range of perspectives on the relation between globalisation processes and local concerns about preferences for the good and just life. Those local concerns are perhaps best expressed as ideologies; and, as the text concludes, the promise and the problems of globalisation are better addressed through the hope for redemption of pluralistic ideologies as they confront the structural imperatives and singular ideology of global markets:

Globalization is seen as the victory of one ideology, the modern capitalist control ideology, over the other ideologies, modern as well as traditional. Although this ideology has welfare-oriented advantages it also creates serious problems... We need globalization as a tool to compare ideologies instead of reducing all ideologies to one ideology thereby simply eliminating ideological differences. We need a globalization that supports a democratic decision making process. We need globalization to create inspiring comparisons and connections of ideological practices and ideas so that the world emerges as a global and immensely plural think tank to solve the ideological validity problems. (306)

In order to obtain a balanced and useful view of globalisation, one should employ a holistic set of standards that should include not only areas of economic growth, but ideas of human progress and the promise of the good life. Even from a solely economic perspective, the idealisation of globalisation as a force of equality is problematic. Both intra-national and inter-national monetary inequalities are rising. In the US, the 13,000 richest families now have almost as much money as the 20 million poorest. Even more staggering, a UN report concluded that the world's 200 richest people have more money than the lowest 40% of the population, or 2.4 billion people. More than half of the world's population still lives off less than US\$2 a day, despite ideas of a 'global' economy.

Thomas L Friedman is an insightful journalist, and his book makes great use of metrics in his argument for globalisation as a force of economic progress. His economic calculus of globalisation does not represent a full index of human progress, however. The blind spots in his work reflect the ways in which local cultures and values, which should be the basis for a mosaic of global life, are overshadowed in favour of calculations of wealth and profit. Friedman is partially right in his assertion that in the global economy, 'individuals and small groups of every color of the rainbow will be able to plug and play'. But even those select individuals allowed to 'play' potentially do so at a cultural cost. Globalisation, ideally, ought to embody inclusion for most, or all. Currently, in both economic and cultural ways, it has not delivered. The promise of globalisation is immense; so are the challenges.

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Christopher Coker, *The Future of War: The Re-enchantment of War in the Twenty-First Century*, Oxford, Blackwell, 2004, ISBN 1405120428 (hbk), ISBN 1405120436 (pbk), 176 pp

Herfried Münkler, *The New Wars*, Cambridge, England, Polity Press, 2005, ISBN 0745633366 (hbk), 192 pp, ISBN 0745633374 (pbk), 224 pp

Christopher Coker sets out from the Romantic premise that industrialisation, while offering improvements in material welfare, sapped the human spirit through alienation from the means of production and creeping uniformity in consumption. Precision and replication were enemies of the soul. War did not escape this phenomenon. Offering a cultural analysis of warfare in instrumental, existential and metaphysical terms, he goes on to show how industrialisation drove its disenchantment to a mid-20th-century nadir. The beginnings of

re-enchantment are traced to the rising importance of intelligence in warfare, the growing embeddedness of military personnel in artificial systems of data capture and processing, and a consequent re-evaluation of the expert warrior relative to the purely destructive capability of weapons systems. The raised value of the warrior to the state is matched by a recovery of self-esteem, drawing now not so much on loyalty to king or country as on the greater autonomy of the contemporary warrior, relatively free to choose and be judged by the cause for which he fights. In strictly technological terms, Coker sees the future of warfare in the greater integration of warrior and technology, in the biological manipulation of specialised combatants and in recourse to performance-enhancing drugs. His hope – for this is a self-proclaimed manifesto – is that the new technology will reduce war neither to an entirely predictable exercise in mechanised combat, in which lives are no longer at risk, nor to the wholly sacralised war of the terrorist, but some intermediary form in which values are at stake and humanity is in play, albeit in heavily qualified forms.

While there is much of interest here, Coker fights on a very narrow front with what seems to be a hastily assembled force, drawn largely from previous engagements. The penultimate page of an admittedly short book would have been an odd place to announce that the discussion is limited to war between developed societies had this not been implicit from the start. Yet this compromises the inquiry, since war seems currently to be the characteristic form of conflict resolution only within or between relatively poor and underdeveloped countries or, occasionally, the means by which the US and its allies discipline states less powerful than themselves, while symmetrical high-intensity combat of the kind assumed throughout this study is rare indeed. This restriction of topic would matter less if the main argument were carried forward more convincingly. The path, however, is strewn with distractions. Some of these may only affect the scholar, or anyone else who wants to follow up the wonderfully eclectic feast of reading that Coker offers. Shakespeare is inaccurately quoted (62). An only half-convincing discussion of genetics may leave some readers uncertain whether the human ‘germline’ is an unfamiliar scientific concept or a misprint for ‘geneline’ (76). Checking a seeming transcription error (113: ‘gauged’ for ‘gouged?’) in a passage taken from a book by Ian Ousby is made more of a chore by lack of any indication of the work Ousby was quoting (not citing!). The original date of publication of works cited in later editions is seldom provided, even when it is decades earlier. The frequency with which quotations are sourced to intermediate works rather than their ultimate source suggests a magpie disposition and an unscholarly disregard of context.

All of this might be thought the responsibility less of author than of a publisher, who, in this instance, seems to have abandoned any responsibility for copy-editing. More serious are the intellectual distractions that abound throughout the book, and may be divided into digressions and imprecisions; a single example of each sufficing to give the general flavour. As the slow evolution of precision bombing is traced it is enough to be reminded of the inaccuracy of B-17s. The pendant, about the way this led to the death of aircrew, let alone the poetic images culled from Jarrell and Dagerman, while intrinsically interesting, does not advance the argument one jot. More serious than mere digression is imprecision. Coker notes the well-known yet still counter-intuitive phenomenon that, in combat, some combatants seem almost to avoid harming their enemies,

while others excel at such a task. But if 1% of World War II fighter pilots accounted for at least 35% of enemy aircraft kills (103), it cannot simply be assumed that these few pilots were unusually aggressive. Quite the contrary, it may have been their superior defensive skills or cooperative tendencies that allowed them to live long enough to become thoroughly competent in their trade, mere survival also helping account for their higher scores. But there is no discussion of the point. As too often, the illustration is left to do the work of the argument.

For all its under-theorised and underdeveloped allusiveness, the Coker manifesto is a feast set out from a well-stocked larder by an open-handed host, and it is perhaps a little ungenerous to complain about the quality of the picnic cutlery or ask why the gillies were not invited. It is perhaps merely a more mundane temperament that will lead some to prefer the more polished and historically sensitive sociology of Herfried Münkler. In a book of which the sole weakness is the irreducible discontinuity and repetition that remain when a series of papers are fused into a single argument, Münkler devotes himself to understanding precisely the kinds of wars that least interest Coker. For all its shortcomings, the phrase 'new wars' is adopted as a shorthand for outbreaks of public violence that may continue for years or decades, in which sophisticated weaponry is not decisive and where more or less competent states are pitted against disaffected armed groups that characteristically live by their violence and may have no ambition to take over the state.

Not the least virtue of this book is that it offers to the anglophone reader a glimpse of the richness of contemporary German scholarship in security studies. A second merit is Münkler's treatment of the Thirty Years' War. The easy course here would have been a neo-medievalist comparison in which the contemporary world is regarded as regressing, under the pressures of globalisation, to a pre-modern condition. Yet while it is true that many contemporary states cannot claim a monopoly over the use of public violence within the territories they claim and may have little more legitimate authority than some armed bands, so that there are powerful resemblances to the worlds of German military enterprisers or Italian *condottieri*, there are also some very clear distinctions to be drawn. Münkler uses comparison to emphasise these differences rather than to play up the more superficial similarities. He is especially strong in unravelling the economics of new wars. Fought with light weapons and unemployed youths, even children, these struggles are cheap to conduct and represent for many the best chance of survival and the only realistic source of social status. At another level, continuing irregular warfare can batten on to resource extraction firms through extortion or kidnapping, or else develop into a permanent economic system through its control of international trade in drugs or persons. In both instances it has clear impact on the rich world of North America and Western Europe. Distant wars cannot be ignored, for they affect the mundane security of the West. This said, Münkler is aware that the growing number of new wars at the interstices of vanished empires is yearly making heavier demands on the US and the diminishing number of its allies willing to share the burden, a project made more difficult, since 2001, by neoconservative rhetoric and US unilateralism. Münkler distinguishes clearly between the US and European strategies in the face the new wars. The European strategy of reinforcing the state as an institution in order to deprive terrorism of its base can easily appear nostalgic; conversely the American campaign to strike directly at terrorism through special operations and financial regulation informed

by intelligence and boosted by occasional demonstrations of massive military superiority is unlikely to be conclusive. Münkler concludes that we are heading into 'turbulent and eventful times' (137), but offers a much more practical and well-crafted intellectual armoury to help us through them than does Coker.

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Bernard-Henri Lévy, *War, Evil, and the End of History*, Hoboken, NJ, Melville House, 2004, ISBN 0971865957, 400 pp

With *War, Evil, and the End of History*, Bernard-Henri Lévy – or 'BHL' as the philosopher-cum-celebrity is called in France – has produced a creative literary inquiry into ideas and revolutions, wars and meaning. It features staccato sentences and paragraphs entirely consisting of rhetorical questions, along with illustrative metaphors ranging from 'black holes' to 'cauldrons' and 'soup stock'. In a novel fashion, the book is in two parts. In the first part, which is an account of the author's experiences of war in Angola, Sri Lanka, Burundi, Colombia and Sudan, Lévy flags out 57 themes which are then elaborated on in the second part. The second part, entitled 'Reflexions', is a collection of philosophical, literary and autobiographical segments each relating to some aspect of the first part. In this radicalisation of the concept of the endnote, Lévy forces the reader to make a decision that fundamentally affects the experience of the text: does one read it from front to back or should each reference be followed, each 'reflexion' read when its number appears? The first choice produces *War, Evil, and the End of History* as a linear text, while the second turns it into a rhizomatic, disassembling study; perhaps a manifestation of Lévy's thesis on the 'disappearance of meaning'? (128). This ambivalence between a linear cogent narrative and a disruptive collection of aphoristic philosophical excursions needs to be endured throughout the book.

In an attempt to bring silenced voices to the surface, Lévy introduces the reader to many people in his journeys through what he calls the 'black holes': Angola, Sri Lanka, Burundi, Colombia and Sudan. We meet Faustin, 'the man of the reconstructed Tutsi corpses' who travels Burundi in search of the bodies and limbs of Hutu violence (229). We encounter UNITA and MPLA soldiers. We discover the pretty Srilaya, a woman who was supposed to be a 'Black Tiger', a Tamil suicide bomber, but is now on the run from her former compatriots. In an interesting passage of the text, relegated to one of the final 'reflexions', we also meet Massoud. Weaving itself through these different stories is the coherent picture of these forgotten wars as terrible phenomena, as conflicts that either were never meaningful or have lost their meaning. Lévy states that war as a meaningless event is hard to understand because it goes against the entire Western tradition. In a way, he is right: nothing seems quite as senseless as the wars that he describes and on which he reflects. It is, however, hard to accept a philosopher stating that the 'disappearance of meaning is a fact' (128).

For his thesis to work, Lévy has to conjure up nostalgia for the 'old anti-fascist war' and imbue it with a legitimate meaning that is in contrast with these new, senseless wars. Yet, it is not apparent that World War II always had a simple anti-fascist meaning; more probable is that this meaning has retroactively quilted the memory of the event. Furthermore, even if these wars are meaningless today

(which most protagonists would dispute), with enough time between these wars and the analyst, we could expect a hegemonic narrative to emerge – the meaning of the conflicts will have become determined. The victorious body politic will have either claimed that the war was the suppression of a violent rabble, or it will say that the war was the glorious triumph: the revolution of a political order. In either case, the radical nihilism that a foreign commentator might have experienced during the fog of war would be at great odds with what these wars *will* mean once the fog has cleared. Grafting Hegel and Foucault, one might respond to Lévy that the writing of a history of the present gives us the End of History. The insanity of the present always seems like the end of the progression of human history and political development. Yet, it is only in and through a coherent disciplining and representation of the past that political meaning is stabilised. It is always already the End of History.

Lévy appears most convincing when he writes about himself. In one section he reflects on 1968 and tells of late hours he spent with Louis Althusser, who was plotting the ‘subversion of intellectual power in France’ at that time (192). His assessment of the period has a confessional tone to it: ‘the best of us (the most brilliant, the most learned, but also it should be said, the ones who pushed the demands for morality furthest) ended up inventing for themselves false wars waged with false weapons against phantom enemies’ (193). The book also has bursts of brilliance; worthy of mention are the ‘reflexions’ in which Lévy casts Foucault as an exemplary journalist, and another entitled ‘Hegel and Kojève in Africa’, in which he juxtaposes the End of History thesis with his African experiences. And yet, much of this philosophical footwork is undertaken to arrive at and justify a few plain statements, some of which could stem from the current White House administration. Examples of these are Lévy claiming that the single objective of democracies is ‘to take the responsibility of naming the adversary’ (international terrorism) ‘and provide ourselves with the means – at once military, political, and moral – to conquer him’ (314). Another would be his description of Muslim fundamentalists as a soup ‘where scraps of distorted Islam, the stench of fascist hatred of the West ... bits of badly digested Marxism-Leninism, a real fascination for all kamikazes ... all bubble together in a stock of the cult of the death and martyrdom’ (201).

This presentation of Muslim fundamentalists is suspect when read in conjunction with Lévy’s anti-fascist nostalgia. The most telling and least convincing gesture in Lévy’s text is his presentation of suicide attacks as ‘irrationality, pure vertigo, the taste of death for death’s sake’ (146). The suicide bomber is presented as pathological; his actions are represented as politically meaningless. Contrast this to the meaningful ‘anti-fascist’ who ‘resolves to shed blood’ but ‘only in desperation and in the hope’ that this will loosen ‘the vice that condemns him to death’ (179). This politicisation of meaning, along with Lévy’s apparent Eurocentrism, jeopardises the validity of his thesis on the ‘meaningless ... forgotten ... wars’.

So, Lévy has written a commendable, daring and problematic inquiry into war. In his struggle to deal philosophically not just with horrendous reoccurring violence but with its apparent lack of meaning, we are offered a glimpse of the *impossibility* and *necessity* of explaining this phenomenon.

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Gary Hart, *The Fourth Power: A Grand Strategy for the United States in the Twenty-First Century*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, ISBN 0195176839, 187 pp

Pleading for a more principled US foreign policy in the spring of 2004, Gary Hart wrote, 'we believe, above all else, in freedom . . . We believe that democracy is the best system to guarantee that freedom' (36). Apparently, such pleas did not fall on deaf ears. In January of 2005, in his second inaugural address President George W Bush declared, 'The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.'²

While Bush did not read Hart's *The Fourth Power: A Grand Strategy for the United States in the Twenty-First Century*, he might have done well to do so. Gary Hart, a former Democratic senator from Colorado and presidential candidate, as well as a prolific author of more than a dozen books on US history and politics, is perhaps most importantly known as the co-Chair of the Commission on National Security/21st Century that correctly predicted massive terrorist attacks on US soil as early as 1998. In his latest book, which largely echoes and elaborates on the Commission's report, Hart weighs in on America's grand strategy by discussing America's place in the world and offering a proscriptive course of action.

Articulating grand strategy is a favourite pastime of academics and kings and in its modern form dates back to the early 19th century. Carl von Clausewitz, the godfather of grand strategy, wrote that tactics were about winning battles, strategy about winning campaigns and wars, and grand strategy about choosing which wars to fight. Dismayed by current alternatives, Hart offers his own grand strategy.

According to Hart, the US over the last decade has not maintained a coherent picture of its goals. Alarmed by both Bill Clinton's ad hoc approach to foreign affairs as exercises in 'arbitrariness, inconsistency, confusion and ultimately contradictory behavior' and Bush's 'theological approach to security issues' (49), Hart instead advocates harnessing America's 'fourth power' (12). Reminiscent of Joseph Nye's soft power principle, this 'fourth power' maintains that it is only by channelling the power of US principles, in addition to America's political, military and economic might, that the US can truly achieve national and global security and the promotion of liberal democracy.

Hart makes the case that this is a particularly dangerous time to be in a strategic drift, as the US is in danger of substituting the global war on terror for a grand strategy. Articulating a grand strategy is of the utmost importance especially in the present-day turbulent political landscape. The economic revolutions brought about by globalisation and technological change have eroded state sovereignty; further challenging the Westphalian system is the changing nature of conflict, where states no longer dictate the where, when or even why of battle. In the face of these profound and revolutionary changes, it is a mistake to substitute the war on terrorism for the challenges the US now faces. As Hart astutely points out, even if international terrorism were to disappear tomorrow, America's problems would not.

But if the threat to the US is real, as it surely is, it needs a name. The major failing of this book is that Hart fails to specify the nature of the challenge the US

² See <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural/>>.

faces. If it is both different and larger than simply terrorism, and is part of revolutionary changes affecting the world, what exactly is it? During the cold war, the threat was both clear and defined. Yet, in the present war on terrorism, this is less true; the challenges the US faces in Iraq are very different from those it faces in China or Venezuela. Is the US fighting a war against Islamic fundamentalism or is it a sustained effort to preserve American influence and power abroad? These critical questions are not addressed by Hart in this book.

Additionally, for someone who is urging the American people to return to their more virtuous republican history, Hart should be more careful with his historical facts. In several places, his desire for a formulaic and idealised republican America clashes with the reality of a more complicated history. When Hart calls for a return to the American tradition of 'transparency in international diplomatic dealings', he would do well to remember that before the Continental Congress declared its intentions owing to 'a decent respect to the opinions of mankind' (31), they first sent out a secret delegation to undertake negotiations with France. Similarly, while Hart dismisses Bush's 'scheme of remaking the Middle East to our liking' as 'contrary to America's traditional principals' (99), he ignores that Woodrow Wilson's 'making the world safe for democracy' and Truman's rebuilding of Germany and Japan under the Truman and Marshall Plans were designed specifically to remake former adversaries into allies. When Hart claims that 'pre-emptive invasion ... undermines ... our history as a benign power' (39), he might want to check that assertion against Mexican, Cuban, Philippine and Iranian history; in all of those countries US has intervened, and not always benignly. Finally, when Hart asserts that American history offers little precedent for Bush's foreign policy principles of aggressively imposing good and eradicating evil in the world, he might want to re-read the speeches not only of Ronald Reagan, but also of Franklin Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt and, stretching back to the 19th century, Henry Clay.

Hart challenges us to think and offers a valuable contribution to stimulate the debate on US foreign policy. Just as the cold war's ideological and existential threat of communism challenged America to live up to its values and show that capitalism offers people a better life than communism, so too does this new turbulent era of world affairs offer America another opportunity. Hart is very right when he says that the power of American principle is just as strong as the power of its military. If the US is constantly challenging the rest of the world to embrace freedom and oppose tyranny, it must be ever mindful of its own power of example.

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Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, ISBN 0199258422, 278 pp

That legitimacy is a nebulous concept has not limited its repeated invocation in recent debates surrounding the wars in Kosovo and Iraq, the war on terror, and the notion of humanitarian intervention. Though traditionally neglected by international relations theorists, legitimacy is the subject of a number of nascent studies in the fields of international law and international political theory.

The product of three years' research, Ian Clark's contribution is a theoretically sophisticated, historically rooted and timely work that justly proclaims itself the most comprehensive treatment of the concept of legitimacy yet attempted in an international relations context.

The title itself is doubly revealing: First, the book does not concern the legitimacy of the international system, but rather legitimacy as it functions *in* international society. It is therefore concerned with legitimacy qua defining the shifting principles of rightful membership and rightful conduct, and not, primarily, more traditional questions regarding the legitimacy of institutional authority. Second, the notion of international society plays a key role in anchoring the overall argument. Clark's principal contention is that principles of legitimacy not only denote the existence of international society, but in fact *constitute* international society (6). Accordingly, the book's purpose is twofold: to give a cogent *political* account of legitimacy, and to strengthen English School theory by providing an essentialist account of international society.

The first half of the book is taken up with an historical overview. Clark posits the discovery of the New World as a watershed in sparking European debate about the nature and limits of international society, and then traces the emergence of the concept of international legitimacy to Westphalia. Subsequent chapters track the development of the principles of rightful membership and rightful conduct through the differing contexts of the peace settlements of Utrecht, Vienna, Versailles and the dual settlement of 1945. The second half of the book then turns to a theoretical analysis of legitimacy in contemporary international society, starting at the end of the cold war, when the 1945 settlement principles, and the standard of consensus required to maintain them, reappeared in circumstances of US hegemony.

The theoretical account includes brief case studies of Kosovo and the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars. Individual chapters are devoted to rightful membership, consensus and the relationship between legitimacy and the norms of legality, morality and constitutionality – 'the realm of political conventions and informal understandings'. The penultimate chapter explores the relationship between legitimacy and equilibrium, in particular, unipolarity and the possibility of 'just disequilibrium'.

The theory itself is complex and nuanced. Legitimacy is characterised as:

a compound of various ingredients. Specifically, it is an amalgam of sundry normative claims. It is mediated through a quest for consensus. And it is influenced by distributions of power. (252)

Legitimacy is a first-order category: it possesses no separate normative content of its own, and is not co-equal with the second-order norms of legality, morality and constitutionality. Distinguished from and constrained by those norms that inform its second-order activities, legitimacy can thus be conceived as 'the political space marked out by the boundaries of legality, morality and constitutionality' (20). International society is therefore constituted by a community of states in recognition of being bound to changing principles of legitimacy. Belief in such boundedness is revealed through state practice of legitimation activities. However, recognition of principles of legitimacy obligates states to adhere to 'the project of a viable international society, rather than to any one norm in particular' (24). When norms conflict – such as was claimed regarding the Kosovo intervention: that its morality overruled its illegality – the appeal to legitimacy is made through *the practice of legitimacy*, otherwise known as legitimation. This attempt to demonstrate conformity with key principles of legitimacy is

characterised by political contestation and the pursuit of consensus, and is 'constrained by existing, if *shifting*, norms' (30). This shift in the normative content of second-order norms is itself effected over time through the practice of legitimacy: 'although appeal is indeed made to individual norms, their application is politically contested and consensually mediated' (25).

The strength of Clark's analysis is its emphasis on the political nature of international legitimacy, and this distinguishes it from traditionally jurisprudential, rule-driven accounts. That the attainment of legitimacy is a practical political activity renders misguided and futile any attempt to reduce legitimacy to sets of codified principles: 'legitimacy is a *social* property – not an attribute of an action' (254). Legitimacy is therefore a matter of how international society perceives a particular action, and not reducible to the formalisations of jurisprudence or moral philosophy. The legitimacy, or failure to achieve legitimation, of an action is revealed through legitimacy costs incurred by protagonists as a consequence of the perceived illegitimacy of their actions. In contrast, perceived legitimacy is equated to stability – 'political equilibrium' – and is characterised by the absence of legitimacy costs (247). In qualifying the legitimacy of actions as a matter of degree, Clark argues, 'we are led to acknowledge the essentially political, and hence *indeterminate*, nature of legitimacy' (255, emphasis added).

Rooting legitimacy squarely in the political realm, equating its core principles with the existence and constitution of international society, and conceiving of legitimacy as a barometer-cum-conductor of second-order norms makes for a tightly argued and cogent account. If there is any weakness to the work, it is that this structural rigidity confines the concept of legitimacy in an inflexible frame.

There are two primary issues of concern: One, the move to equate principles of legitimacy with the constitution of international society raises the question of its exclusivity. There is no account of what form legitimacy might take at the most expansive level of community, namely the global. If legitimacy is a matter of the perceptions of international society – typically the economic and military elite – and also a matter of defining the limits of that society, then the so-called 'rogue' states would find themselves not only the recipients of controversial actions, but also excluded from the constituency that forms the basis of legitimacy ascription. Clark will respond that the core principles of legitimacy denote accepted principles of membership and conduct in a community *qua* international society, and therefore necessarily exclude states that are considered to fall short of such requirements. The question remains, however, whether the concept of legitimacy in international relations can and should be restricted to this narrow political space.

A second problem concerns the notion of indeterminacy. If the social and political nature of legitimacy renders its attribution to any action a category mistake, it is not clear that the term 'legitimate' retains any explanatory or normative utility, especially when further complicated by the indeterminacy of the social *fact* of international societal perceptions of actions. Furthermore, we cannot reasonably expect to find any greater degree of determinacy in either subsequent perceptions of such acts, or, more importantly, in the attempt to locate the derivation of – *prima facie* consequential – legitimacy costs. If so, this has the unhappy outcome of rendering the attainment of legitimacy in inter-state conduct indeterminate at *any* time of serious discord. Since discord can be fairly claimed a necessary condition of any inter-state conduct forcing the question of its own legitimacy, Clark's indeterminacy thesis, coupled with the

claim that the proper practice of legitimacy denotes political equilibrium and stability, lends the overall argument a hint of tautology – tempting the infamous remark '[w]hereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent'.

In fairness, *Legitimacy in International Society* enlightens considerably more than it confounds. Moreover, legitimacy being a classic and resurgent political concept in times of apparent normative upheaval, debate on legitimacy is unlikely to stifle. The clarity that Clark's research brings to this opaque and abstruse concept should be applauded and deservedly placed at the centre of contemporary debate on legitimacy in international relations.

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