

Security and Defence

EUROPEAN TROUPT

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Part 1:
February 1991

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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELNO 460
OF 071815Z MARCH 91
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW

MY 4 IPTS: QUADRIpartite MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS, BONN, 6
MARCH: SECURITY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
SUMMARY

1. UK CIRCULATES PROMISED PAPER ON SECURITY IN CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE. GENERAL A AGREEMENT THAT MEMBERSHIP OF NATO AND
SECURITY GUARANTEES UNACCEPTABLE. AGREEMENT TO CONSIDER
STATEMENT BY SPRING NAC INDICATING NATO'S INTEREST IN SECURITY
AND STABILITY IN EASTERN EUROPE. THICKENING OF BILATERAL
RELATIONS AND NATO/EAST EUROPEAN CONTACTS.

2. CHROBOG (GERMANY) SAID WE NEEDED NEW IDEAS ON HOW TO PROVIDE
FOR THE SECURITY OF CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. WE HAD
MADE IT CLEAR DURING THE 2+4 NEGOTIATIONS THAT WE WOULD NOT
EXTEND NATO BEYOND THE ELBE (SIC). WE COULD NOT THEREFORE OFFER
MEMBERSHIP OF NATO TO POLAND AND THE OTHERS. WE MIGHT HOWEVER
CONSIDER REFERRING TO OUR INTEREST IN THESE COUNTRIES IN FUTURE
NATO DECLARATIONS. FURTHER STEPS COULD BE TAKEN IN THE CSCE AND
THROUGH BILATERAL AGREEMENTS.

3. WESTON CIRCULATED A BRITISH PAPER ON THE SUBJECT AND RAN
THROUGH IT. WE HAD TO RESPOND TO THE REQUESTS FROM THE CENTRAL
AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FOR CLOSER RELATIONS WITH NATO.
THEY WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE EVENTUAL DANGER OF A REVANCHIST
SOVIET UNION OR RUSSIA, INSTABILITY IN THE SOVIET UNION WITH
POSSIBLE SPILL-OVER AND THE RISK OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN EASTERN
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. OUR AIM SHOULD BE FOR THE EAST EUROPEANS TO
BECOME PROSPEROUS, DEMOCRATIC AND WESTERN ORIENTATED STATES, WITH
THEIR OWN MILITARY FORCES STRONG ENOUGH TO DETER INTIMIDATION BUT
NOT TO PRESENT A THREAT TO THEIR NEIGHBOURS. MANY OF THE THINGS
WE COULD DO FOR THEM WOULD BE IN THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
FIELD, AND WERE NOT IN THE GIFT OF NATO OR THE WEU. BUT THE
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC APPROACH WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH BY ITSELF.
THERE SEEMED A PSYCHOLOGICAL NEED IN EASTERN EUROPE TO EXAMINE THE
MILITARY SECURITY DIMENSION. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN OUR
RESPONSE NOT TO OSTRACISE THE RUSSIANS. WE COULD NOT OFFER EAST
EUROPEANS MEMBERSHIP OR ASSOCIATE MEMBERSHIP OF NATO. NOR COULD
WE OFFER EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT SECURITY GUARANTEES. THEY COULD
NOT HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO AS A GROUP. NOR WOULD NATO
HAVE A PEACEKEEPING ROLE IN THE REGION. WE SHOULD GIVE FURTHER
THOUGHT TO A NUMBER OF OTHER POSSIBILITIES INCLUDING:

- A) NEGATIVE SECURITY GUARANTEES AS PROPOSED BY POLAND OR HUNGARY: OUR INITIAL VIEW WAS THAT THESE WERE NOT WORTH PURSUING.
- B) A NATO DECLARATION OF INTEREST IN THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE.
- C) MISCELLANEOUS CONTACTS BETWEEN NATO AND THESE COUNTRIES COVERING DEFENCE AND SECURITY ISSUES AS WELL BILATERAL CONTACTS BETWEEN WESTERN COUNTRIES AND INDIVIDUAL CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (HE LISTED THE UK PAPER'S EXAMPLES).

OUR INITIAL VIEW WAS THAT THE BEST WAY FORWARD WOULD BE TO
CONSIDER REFERRING TO OUR INTEREST IN THESE COUNTRIES IN THE
DECLARATION FROM THE SPRING MINISTERIAL NAC: A THICKENING OF
RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE: BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL DEFENCE
CONTACTS WITH THEM: AND PROGRESS ON CSCE CRISIS MANAGEMENT.

4. SEITZ AGREED. A SERIES OF VISITS BY EASTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS

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TO WASHINGTON WERE PLANNED, BEGINNING WITH WALES. THE POLES AND OTHERS WERE SEEKING BILATERAL DECLARATIONS. THE US WOULD HAVE TO ADDRESS SECURITY IN THIS CONTEXT. WE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO THE SOVIET UNION, BOTH IN THE 2+4 AND IN OTHER EXCHANGES, THAT WE WOULD NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM EASTERN EUROPE. WE MUST NOT PROVIDE A PRETEXT FOR HARDLINERS IN THE SOVIET UNION TO BUILD UP ANTI-WESTERN FEELING. NATO SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED FORMALLY OR INFORMALLY TO THE EAST. THE PRIMARY EASTERN EUROPEAN OBJECTIVE AND FORM OF REASSURANCE WAS THE REMOVAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. WE SHOULD THICKEN UP BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH INDIVIDUAL EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AS WELL AS NATO'S RELATIONS WITH THEM. WE MIGHT ALSO CONSIDER SEMINARS: EXCHANGES ON CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING: ROUND TABLE EXPERT MEETINGS: NATO TRAINING COURSES FOR EAST EUROPEAN OFFICERS IN CIVIL OVERSIGHT OF DEFENCE FORCES: INVITATIONS TO ATTEND THE NATO DEFENCE COLLEGE: ESTABLISHMENT OF ATLANTIC COUNCILS IN EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE SOVIET UNION ETC. THERE WAS SCOPE FOR INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS TO UNDERTAKE TRAINING AND EXCHANGE OF OFFICERS, POSSIBLY ACADEMY TO ACADEMY, DISCUSSION OF STRATEGY AND POSSIBLY EVEN IN THE LONGER RUN SOME SORT OF ARMS SALES RELATIONSHIP.

5. CHROBOG SAID WE SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER BILATERAL TREATIES CONTAINING NON-AGGRESSION ELEMENTS. SUCH TREATIES SHOULD ALSO BE CONCLUDED WITH THE SOVIET UNION. TMSIT (FRANCE) SAID SHE WOULD LOOK AT THE PROPOSALS IN THE BRITISH PAPER. FRANCE WAS NOT KEEN ON LINKS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE ALLIANCE AS SUCH. BUT SHE HAD NO MAJOR OBJECTION TO THE PROPOSALS SHE HAD HEARD. IT WAS AGREED THE DEBATE IN NATO SHOULD BE STEERED ALONG BROADLY THESE LINES.

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