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EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines,

July 21, 1997

By BAN NARA, Date 3/15/04

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NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR WALTERS FROM AS SEITZ

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, GE

SUBJECT: BAKER/GENSCHER MEETING FEBRUARY 2

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THERE FOLLOWS A REPORT ON SECRETARY BAKER'S MEETING FEBRUARY 2 WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER. THE SECRETARY HAS ASKED THAT YOU REVIEW THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS DISCUSSION WITH HORST TELTSCHIK IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE CHANCELLERY AS WELL AS THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IS FULLY UP TO DATE ON THE STATE OF OUR DIALOGUE ON THESE ISSUES. THE SECRETARY WOULD APPRECIATE A REPORT ON YOUR DISCUSSION WITH TELTSCHIK PRIOR TO HIS WEDNESDAY MORNING (FEBRUARY 7) ARRIVAL IN MOSCOW.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2008-0620-MR
Zu 4/7/09

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3. BEGIN TEXT.

4. SECRETARY BAKER MET FOR TWO HOURS WITH HANS-DIETRICH FEBRUARY 2. THE MESSAGE GENSCHER BROUGHT WAS THIS: GERMAN UNIFICATION IS A FAST-MOVING TRAIN, AND ONLY THE PROSPECT OF UNIFICATION CAN STABILIZE A RAPIDLY DETERIORATING SITUATION IN THE GDR. THE MODROW GOVERNMENT CAN MAKE IT TO THE MARCH 18 ELECTION BUT ONLY JUST. AFTER THE ELECTION, THE FRG WILL MOVE PROMPTLY TO NEGOTIATE A TREATY WITH THE SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT WHICH WILL SPELL OUT THE PATH TO UNIFICATION. (THEY WILL NOT DISCUSS UNIFICATION WITH MODROW.) GENSCHER BELIEVES THIS IS THE ONLY WAY TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION AND STAUNCH THE FLOW OF EMIGRANTS FROM EAST TO WEST.

5. GENSCHER CONFIRMED THAT NEUTRALITY FOR A UNIFIED GERMANY IS OUT OF THE QUESTION. THE NEW GERMANY WOULD REMAIN IN NATO BECAUSE NATO IS AN ESSENTIAL BUILDING BLOCK TO A NEW EUROPE. IN STATING THIS, GENSCHER REITERATED THE NEED TO ASSURE THE SOVIETS THAT NATO WOULD NOT EXTEND ITS TERRITORIAL COVERAGE TO THE AREA OF THE GDR NOR ANYWHERE ELSE IN EASTERN EUROPE FOR THAT MATTER (HE MADE THIS POINT WITH THE PRESS AFTER THE MEETING).

6. GENSCHER SPENT A LOT OF TIME ELABORATING ON HIS RECENT SPEECH. HE PUTS GREAT EMPHASIS ON THE CSCE PROCESS WITH A VISION THAT CSCE ULTIMATELY BE THE VEHICLE TO NEW SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN ALL OF EUROPE. HE THEREFORE ATTACHES GREAT URGENCY TO THE FORTHCOMING CSCE SUMMIT AS A WAY BOTH TO REASSURE THE SOVIETS AND INTENSIFY THE PROCESS BETWEEN A 1990 SUMMIT AND A 1992 SUMMIT. HE SEES THE 1990 SUMMIT AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO REAFFIRM THE FINAL ACT, FINALIZE THE

ELECTIONS PROPOSAL UNDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS BASKET (AT OUR REQUEST), DISCUSS UNIFICATION IN GENERAL TERMS, IDENTIFY ISSUES FOR THE 1992 SUMMIT, AND LAUNCH SEVERAL EFFORTS TO INSTITUTIONALIZE CSCE. OVERALL, THIS AMOUNTS TO A

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SUBSTANTIAL PREPARATORY APPROACH. ASIDE FROM THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS, HE SEES THE THICKENING OF CSCE AS THE WAY FOR THE SOVIETS TO "SAVE FACE."

7. THE SECRETARY TOLD GENSCHER THAT ALL THE SIGNALS WE SEE INDICATE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE VERY NERVOUS ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. HE DESCRIBED OUR THREE ESSENTIAL POINTS ABOUT A CSCE SUMMIT AND GENSCHER AGREED WITH THESE. THE SECRETARY ALSO SAID HE DID NOT THINK THE CSCE PROCESS ALONE WOULD SATISFY THE NEED FOR THE SOVIETS TO FEEL INVOLVED AND ESSENTIAL TO THE PROCESS OF UNIFICATION. THE SECRETARY AND GENSCHER AGREED THE FOUR POWERS ACTING ALONE WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE. THE SECRETARY RAISED AS ONE POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE THE IDEA OF A TWO-PLUS-FOUR MECHANISM. GENSCHER SEEMED NOT TO HAVE THOUGHT ALONG THESE LINES, BUT WAS OPEN TO THE IDEA THAT SUCH A MECHANISM MIGHT COME INTO PLAY AFTER MARCH 18. GENSCHER STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT WE MUST NOT LET WORD OF THE IDEA SEEP OUT BEFORE THEN BECAUSE HE DID NOT WANT TO BE SEEN AS PRESSURING THE GDR.

8. THE SECRETARY ALSO TALKED TO GENSCHER ABOUT ENHANCING THE US-EC RELATIONSHIP AND HE WAS VERY POSITIVE. HE SAID HE WOULD TALK TO HIS KEY COLLEAGUES AND SUGGESTED THE US AND FRG WORK TOGETHER TO DEVELOP IDEAS HE MIGHT PURSUE WITHIN THE EC. HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE QUALITY OF THE US-EC RELATIONSHIP BE MEASURABLY MORE DISTINGUISHED THAN ANY EC-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. THE SECRETARY ALSO EXPLAINED OUR PROBLEMS WITH THE EBRD. GENSCHER UNDERSTOOD, BUT SAID WE SHOULD NOT DO ANYTHING THAT MAKES THE SOVIETS FEEL DISCRIMINATED AGAINST.

9. END TEXT. BAKER

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