Appendix Five (Chapter Seven, Note 121)
The Question of East German Control of Access to Berlin

As noted in the text, the American government did not share the view that the East German authorities had to be prevented at all costs from exercising the controls on the access routes into Berlin which the Russians were already exercising. The basic U.S. view, in fact, was that the western powers could take measures that might involve a serious risk of general war only if access to Berlin was actually being threatened; if the East Germans exercised the controls, but did not interfere with access, that was a situation the western side could ultimately live with.(1) President Eisenhower, in particular, doubted whether public opinion would support strong action over issues like stamping of documents by the East German authorities. He did not accept the idea that dealing with East German guards would mean western recognition of the East German regime and therefore had to be ruled out; indeed, he played down the importance of the recognition issue, noting at one point "that we have in many ways already recognized two Germanies."(2)

U.S. officials were inclined to accept an arrangement called "Solution C," which basically would have permitted the East Germans to exercise the controls, as long as they did not interfere with access.(3) Secretary Herter, in fact, was ready in June 1959 to "accept turnover by Soviets to DDR of 'functions' relating to military traffic" as part of a Berlin settlement, and Eisenhower authorized him to proceed on that basis.(4)

The three western powers, moreover, had already agreed to accept a settlement based on the "agency principle" if the Soviets explicitly agreed to designate the East Germans as their agents for the purpose of exercising the controls. The allies also agreed that documents identifying the trains and convoys could be turned over to East German personnel at the checkpoints, even if no "agency" arrangement was acceepted. A "peel-off" procedure was worked out to permit a copy of the travel orders to be turned over to the East Germans. This marked a certain acceptance of the East German authorities; if the other side went along with it, it was (as one high State Department official pointed out in May 1960) a way of finessing the "stamping" problem.(5)


NOTES

1. See especially Berlin contingency planning group, March 9, 1959, and Eisenhower-Herter meeting, March 17, 1959, FRUS 1958- 60, 8:441-442, 493.

2. Eisenhower-Dulles meeting, January 29, 1959, ibid., p. 303.

3. See especially DOS Berlin History, 1:89, 3:32, 4:60-64.

4. Herter to Eisenhower, and Dillon to Herter, both June 9, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 8:860, 868.

5. Tripartite document on "Berlin contingency planning," April 4, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 8:586-587; DOS Berlin History, 1:114-118 and 2:107-109; Interdepartmental coordinating group on Berlin, May 23, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 9:529. On these matters in general, see also William Burr, "Avoiding the Slippery Slope: The Eisenhower Administration and the Berlin Crisis, November 1958-January 1959," Diplomatic History, 18:2 (Spring 1994), 177-205.