Appendix Three (Chapter Four, Note 88)
The United States, France and the German Question, 1953-54

As noted in the text, the U.S. government, with British support, decided in 1954 that Germany would be rearmed, even if the French rejected the idea. This decision to move ahead, if necessary, without France represented a major hardening of American policy. In mid-1953, the U.S. leadership had ruled out the idea of proceeding without France. The United States, it was then felt, needed both France and Germany. As Dulles pointed out in the NSC, "it was necessary to keep France on our side, and if we failed in the attempt to do so, a unilaterally armed Germany would prove useless to us."(1)

But by mid-1954, U.S. policy had toughened considerably. Although Dulles was still reluctant, Eisenhower was in the final analysis ready to move ahead without the French. "We could get along without France," he felt, "but not without Germany."(2) And the president's attitude proved decisive: the U.S. government was determined to proceed no matter what the French attitude was, and the British supported the Americans in this regard.(3) The French had in fact been warned that the U.S. government might go ahead without them as early as April.(4)
None of this, of course, means that Eisenhower had ceased to consider French participation as very important, and to a certain extent his tough attitude has to be understood as a bargaining tactic: he thought of the threat of U.S.-U.K. action as a means of bring "the French to their senses"; from the point of view of military geography, he still considered France "indispensable."(5)

 

NOTES

1. NSC meeting, August 13, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 7:502; see also Cutler memorandum, August 13, 1953, and policy statement on Germany, NSC 160/1, August 17, 1953, ibid., pp. 509, 513.

2. For Dulles's views: NSC meeting, September 24, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1266. For Eisenhower's views: Eisenhower-Dulles meeting, December 14, 1954, DDRS 1987/3224.

3. See U.S.-U.K. talks and Churchill-Eisenhower agreed minutes, June 27, 1954; Bedell Smith to Eisenhower, September 10, 1954; JCS to Wilson, September 22, 1954; Bedell Smith to Dulles, September 27, 1954; in FRUS 1952-54, 5:986, 988, 1002-1004, 1160- 61, 1249, 1278-79.

4. See Laniel-MacArthur meeting, April 14, 1954, DP/White House Memoranda/1/file 13/DDEL.

5. Eisenhower to Churchill, September 14, 1954, and Eisenhower to Hughes, January 11, 1955, Eisenhower Papers, 15:1299 and 16:1498.