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By	EE NARA Date 4/11/92

9/11/50  
C-16

G-3/Plans Div/Int'l Br/52971  
Maj Miller/ca

OPS 091 Germany TS(1 Sept 50)

1 Sept 50

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: A Plan for the Development of West German Security Forces

1. Pursuant to verbal instructions of General Gruenther to General Schuyler, 1800, 31 Aug, the inclosed study was prepared by International Branch. The objective was to provide a counter-proposal to State Department draft on establishment of a European defense force (inclosure to JCS 2124/13) which could be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at their meeting 1 Sept and would provide guidance for the Operations Deputies in their meeting with State with reference to the President's 8 questions on this subject. (JCS 2116/200

2. Copies of the enclosed study furnished by hand to General Gruenther for further distribution to the Operations Deputies at 0800, 1 Sept. Generals Bolte, Gruenther, & Collins were briefed on the subject and General Collins indicated his approval of the study for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

COORDINATION.

G-2 informed, Col Sykes, X-54165

G-4 informed, Col Parsons, X-75479

J. G. K. M., Jr.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

1 September 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Davis  
Admiral Duncan  
General Edwards

Subject: A Plan for the Development of  
West German Security Forces

Attached is a suggested positive approach to the problem of rearming Western Germany, which I urgently request that the Chiefs be prepared to consider at this morning's meeting in order that the Operations Deputies, when they meet with State Department representatives this afternoon, will be able accurately to reflect the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

cc to General Bradley

ALFRED M. GRUENTHER  
Lieutenant General, GSC  
Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans

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The Necessity for a West German Contribution to European Defense.

1. The active and effective integration of the people of Western Germany into the defense of Western Europe and of their homeland would add materially to the assurance that Western Europe can be held against Soviet invasion. The early provision of adequate security forces in Western Germany, even in the light of the new U. S. program of increased military assistance for the countries of Western Europe, will contribute decisively to Allied military power in Europe. Without West German forces it will not be possible to hold the Ruhr, which is vital to Western Europe. The U. S. cannot afford to jeopardize its own security and that of Western Europe by not utilizing all of the forces that can be made available for European defense.

European Framework for Increased Defense.

2. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the appropriate framework for promoting the integrated collective defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area. Within this organization there should be established in the near future a combined staff to perform operational planning, and, in the event hostilities occur, to provide the agency of command of the Allied forces. The U. S., with the concurrence of other NATO nations, should furnish the Chief of Staff. The combined staff should consist of representatives of all NATO countries, including countries which may later join NATO. The U. S. should participate fully in all NATO defense agencies, to include active participation in all of the Regional Planning Groups.

3. When appointed, the Chief of Staff should receive his direction from the NATO Standing Group. Possibly it may never be necessary to change this arrangement in peacetime. On the other hand, after the European nations have increased their forces in being and additional U. S. forces are available for commitment to Europe, it may be advisable to transform the Standing Group into a Combined Chief of Staff organization or similar Allied organization for the higher direction of war in the NATO area. Such an organization should have the power of allocating forces among the regions of NATO.

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\*(Note: Paragraphs 4 and 5 below are quotations from the JCS Decision on Enclosure A, JCS 2116/20)

\*4. There should be eventually a Supreme Commander within NATO for the defense of Europe. His specific authority and the geographic limits of his command would have to be determined after further study. This commander should be an American but should not be appointed as a commander at this time.

\*5. The Military Production and Supply Board should be strengthened so as to be able to provide the necessary guidance for military production and supply. The U. S. is prepared to accept the responsibility of an American Chairman of the strengthened Military Production and Supply Board.

6. A strengthened NATO containing an appropriate combined staff would make the present separate "Western Union" organization unnecessary. At an appropriate time it appears desirable that "Western Union" should be absorbed into the invigorated NATO.

The Program for West German Security Forces.

7. U. S. and Allied policy should be changed to encourage the immediate integration of the people of Western Germany into the security arrangements of Western Europe and to permit the early contribution by Western Germany to its own defense and to that of Western Europe. This change in policy should provide for the following: (a) The immediate provision of adequate security forces for Western Germany, including police forces adequate to counter the threat from the East German indigenous forces; and, (b) The initial steps toward entry of Germany into NATO at the earliest practicable time.

8. With regard to security forces, the West German Government should be authorized to establish a training command under a German commander, possibly with the title, "Inspector General, German Security Forces." This commander and a small staff should be responsible for the administration, organization, equipping and basic training of the German security forces. Initially, Western Germany should be authorized to organize about two to four infantry divisions, and eventually a total of about ten to fifteen divisions should be authorized. Weapons and supplies for the German forces would be provided in part by other NATO countries, clothing and light equipment from the German economy, and the

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deficiencies, particularly in heavy items, from the U. S. Military Assistance Program.

Controls on the German Contribution to European Security.

9. The control measures described below appear logical and appropriate from a military point of view. Inspections by the Allied Force Commanders would be necessary to insure the enforcement of the controls.

a. Size and Composition of Forces.

- (1) Western Germany should not be permitted to have an Air Force or Navy.
- (2) French armed forces in being in France should be proportionally greater than the German security forces in being in Western Germany.
- (3) The largest German unit should be the division. German divisions, upon completion of their basic training, should be allocated to each of the Allied Forces in Germany. The advanced training of the German units should be accomplished under the respective Allied Force Commanders.

b. Controls on German Military Production.

- (1) German industry should provide only light transportation and equipment. Tanks, heavy weapons and other heavy equipment for German forces should come from other sources. In order properly to exploit the potential of the Ruhr, Germany should provide substantial quantities of steel and iron for fabrication in other European countries' munitions factories.

c. Additional Detailed Controls.

- (1) There should be no German General Staff, but an administrative and training staff only.
- (2) A maximum rank for German commanders should be established at about the division command level.