
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OFFICE, ASSISANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3
PLANS DIVISION
INTERNATIONAL BRANCH

5 August 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCHUYLER

SUBJECT: Record of Conference Attended.

1. DETAILS

Date	Hour	Place	Agency
3 Aing	1600	Dept. of State	State-Army

- 2. SUBJECT -- Rearmament of Western Germany.
- 3. PARTICIPANTS

Colonel Henry Byroade, German Affairs, Department of State Lt Colonel V. P. Mock, International Branch, G-3 Major J.G.K. Miller, Jr., International Branch, G-3

4. RESUME

- a. Col Byrosde opened the meeting by reviewing certain of the recent conversations on the subject. He stated that there may have been some misunderstanding about the State Department position with regard to West German rearmament. He said that State Department is opposed to German rearmament unless the proper political formula and organizational framework can be provided which would make the proposal acceptable to European powers, particularly France, and which would jeopardize German internal political objectives. More specifically, State does not favor German national rearmament, but would favor under proper conditions Germany contributing to European defense.
- b. Col Byroade stated that recent public opinion poils in Germany have shown that the Germans themselves are opposed to creating a German army but indicated that they would be willing to serve in a European army. He stated that he expected the USSR to react to a rearmed West Germany by at least matching strength in East Germany. He indicated that, while speed in making a decision and in developing strength in Europe was essential, it would be politically unacceptable to make such a decision and then have the Germans wait for some time until equipment for their promised rearmament became available.
- c. Col Byroade then read the enclosed staff study, making



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
- (4) A country such as France and U.K. with overseas commitments would be allowed to dispatch forces to other areas subject to certain limitations and troops could be called back to national service in event of riots or similar emergencies;
- (5) The agency for higher direction of war would be a Combined Chiefs of Staff, probably composed of U.S., U.K., and France, which would report to the heads of States.
- (6) The Supreme Commander would have an integrated staff, on which German officers (including senior general officers) would be eligible to serve;
- (7) The largest German unit would be a regimental combat team, or a division; the highest German grade would be division commander; there would be no separate German General Staff:
- (8) The European Army would consist of units from the U.S., U.K., France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Germany.
- e. In further elaboration of his view, Col Byroads indicated that the command arrangements and procurement, dictated by the suprems commander in light of military requirements, were the heart of the plan and that a type of military integration was envisaged which would knit Europe more closely together politically and economically. (His proposal and reasoning closely follow Bruce's cable 523 from Paris, 28 July.)
- f. Col Byroads said that the following three questions were of the greatest political importance in the approach that should be used in attempting to establish a European Army with German participation:
 - (1) How does the proposed European Army affect the U.S.?
 As a corollary to this question, would a U.S. supreme commander in Europe be acceptable?
 - (2) How does the proposal affect U.S. forces in Europe?
 - (3) How does the proposal affect the future Combined Chiefs of Staff organization and the heads of state agency for the higher direction of war?
- g. By indirection, Col Byroade indicated that integration of small German units into larger Allied units would probably be preferred by the State Department as the approach to the German contribution to

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- (3) That Col Byroade's plan (see para 4 d (8) above, in particular) is really nothing more than the present Western Union organization expanded to include the U.S. and Germany. Consequently, although Byroade opposes the G-3 plan, he is really proposing quite similar with respect to the nations which would participate in a European Army. In this connection, Byroade said that he would keep NATO and Western Union, but would add the European Army concept to our defense plans for Western Europe.
- (4) That it would be wholly unrealistic to continue NATO and Western Union, with the complicated structure of those organizations and the tremendous amounts of equipment being furnished by the U.S. under MDAP to NATO countries, and at the same time to establish a separate European Army organization which would require tremendous amounts of MDAP equipment for the same identical countries which are receiving the equipment now under NATO
- (5) That it is agreed that something must be done to provide a combined command structure. However, such a combined command structure should be established under NATO and not under a Combined Chiefs of Staff for a European Army, as proposed by Byroade.
- (6) That the Defense Department and State Lepartment are in accord on the question of the size of the German units; i.e., both are agreed that the Ovision would be the largest German unit permitted.
- (7) That Colonel Byroade's supposition is too conservative with regard to the time required to furnish equipment for a German army after approval of the change in U.S. policy. Lt Col Mock and Maj Miller further stated that they believed that our present MDAP program could have enough equipment available for at least two or three divisions by the time the Germans could organize such divisions. They also stated they would check this matter further with General Lemnitzer's office.
- (8) That, regardless of Col Byroade's statement that public opinion polls indicate that the Germans are opposed to creating a Germany army, they believed that such could not be a true indication of German opinion. The Germans have traditionally favored adequate military forces and if the Western Powers do not permit the Germans to rearm to the extent necessary to defend themselves, they might be tempted to turn to the Soviets in the hope of obtaining the authority for creating such armed forces.



TOT SECRET

j. In a subsequent telephone conversation with Major Miller, Col Byroads stated that he is cabling Mr. McCloy to send Lt Col H.A. Gerhardt, Special Assistant to the High Commissioner, to Washington, arriving 8 August to assist State Department on this matter.

5. REMARKS:

- a. On h August Col Byroade furnished General Schuyler with a copy of the cable from Mr. McCloy on this subject. Col Byroade also informed General Schuyler that he was sending over a copy of his memorandum on the creation of an European Army.
- b. It is interesting to note that Col Byroade's remarks on the subject of European army, the cable from Mr. Bruce, and the cable from Mr. McCloy are all proposing substantially the same thing; i.e., some sort of a complicated European army set-up without explaining how it fits into the existing scheme under NATO and Western Union. In this connection, Col Byroade stated that he had talked to Mr. McCloy for over an hour on the telephone on this subject.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. That upon receipt of the Byroade memorandum, G-3 prepare a memorandum to General Gruenther summarizing the Byroade proposal for a European army and pointing out the reason why such a plan should not be accepted.
- b. That, in lieu of the Byroade plan, the G-3 plan should be approved.
- c. That G-3 recommend to General Gruenther that he have further discussions with either Col Byroade or other appropriate individuals in the State Department, to press for acceptance of the G-3 plan for rearmament of Western Germany.