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HICOG

FRANKFURT

EYES ONLY FOR MC CLOY FROM BYROADE

This cable has no rpt no distribution on Wash end. Just prior to receipt your 962 I had written a paper on how the formation of a "European Army" might be approached without much consideration as to why such a concept must be adopted. You have now supplied the missing portion with great clarity in ur 962 and our thinking seems to fit so closely together that knowledge of my paper at this time and in this informal fashion may serve to advance the concept between us before departure of Gerhardt. My paper has not as yet been considered by Dept.

It was developed without much regard to existing organizations or machinery in an effort to present a theoretical solution from which one could work backwards with a compromise between the theoretical and what is already in existence. Text of paper follows:

Code Room: Please quote the attached paper including titles.
AN APPROACH TO THE FORMATION OF A "EUROPEAN ARMY"

I. The Basic Elements

The basic elements involved in the formation and control of armed forces are (1) recruitment; (2) procurement and supply; (3) organization; (4) general staff direction and command; and (5) over-all direction by governments and heads of States. In our planning for bringing into being a European army with real strength and direction of purpose and still maintain its truly international aspects, we must approach the problem by analyzing its characteristics in each of these fields.

(1) Recruitment

Recruitment would obviously have to be conducted on a national basis inasmuch as the organization outlined in No. (3) below indicates that the Combat Elements of the European Army would consist of National Units. This aspect of the problem seems to have no great significance and the system to be worked out should cause no difficulty.

(2) Procurement and Supply.

Procurement and supply is one of the vital elements in the concept of the European Army as this aspect must be approached on an international basis. This seems a necessity in view of its effect on German participation as well as its essentiality to insure a practical implementation of the "balanced force" and "common defense" concepts. There should be a common fund approach for the equipment and supply of these forces based upon the general theory of contribution in proportion to national assets. There should be common direction of procurement to insure against wasted or misdirected effort. Procurement for the common force should be directed so as to obtain the greatest amount of effective equipment in the least possible time and with the least possible cost. There would be two exceptions to this general rule. One would be to take into account the vulnerability of the production area in relation to the position of hostile forces. The other general exception, and this is most important, is that procurement should be so adjusted that the
(3) **Organization.**

The higher organization of Field Army and Corps should present no difficulty and is a matter for decision of the over-all Commander. Thought would have to be given to the organization of lesser units. For maximum efficiency it would clearly be undesirable to carry the international aspect of the European Army below the lowest possible completely balanced ground fighting unit. Depending upon the compromise obtained by considering the present organization of the various international armies involved, this could conceivably be the equivalent of the U.S. Regimental Combat Team. There should be no hesitation to consider national contribution in the form of Divisions if this were considered to provide for greater effectiveness. A maximum rank should probably be established for German Commanders and ranks higher than Division Commander should probably not be considered. The German contribution to the European Army would of course be in terms of ground units only, with other nations providing the naval and air contingents, including that of tactical air force.

All military contingents stationed in Europe must be a part of the European Army. This would produce at least two complications. Firstly, certain European nations such as France may need the service of her own forces to cope with internal developments within her own borders. Secondly, it would be necessary to have some arrangement that would allow an agreed withdrawal of units of the U.S., UK and France in Europe that might be needed to fulfill commitments outside of Europe. Germany, having no overseas commitments, would have no loop-hole in which to withdraw her forces. As regards internal use of forces, such arrangements could undoubtedly be made without greatly impairing their readiness to fulfill their assigned roles in the over-all plan. These two problems do not seem to furnish insurmountable obstacles. Any concept other than the assignment of all military contingents in Europe to the European Army would result in a Command of little strength and would probably in the end resemble a Foreign Legion which would appear to be aimed only at securing German participation.
which would include full American participation. Inasmuch as the General
Staff is inherently without true Command responsibility there should be no
hesitation on the full utilization of German nationals in this Staff, including
high positions. This Staff must not be a figure head organization echoing
duplicate organizations within the individual countries. It should provide
the key functions of procurement, supply and training supervision. It should
serve the over-all Commander with all of the essentials for Field direction.

There must be a single Commander with sufficient delegated authority
to have complete jurisdiction (of the type delegated by the Combined Chiefs
of Staff in the last war to Eisenhower and MacArthur) over his various
international units. Until such a Command set-up can be established, it is
futile to expect little more than chaos in event of real trouble in Europe.
The acceptance of such an arrangement by other nations (and by ourselves) is
clearly out of the question unless an American Commander can be named for Europe.

(5) Over-all Direction by Governments and Heads of States.

This is a vital problem and probably the most difficult of the
entire concept. The essential problem here is that we are trying to find a
formula for a federated Army in Europe without having a federated group of
states. The over-all Commander in Europe must obviously report to a group of
Military superiors. The dilemma is to find a workable substitute for the
Combined Chiefs of Staff organization of World War II which will give proportional
representation to the various nations involved. As a practical matter it
would be preferable to consider only the US, UK, France, Germany and Benelux
forces in the European Army. Whether similar arrangements could be made in
the Northern and Southern regional group areas is questionable. In
the last analysis, it may not be feasible to leave out any nation of NATO
with forces in Europe. On the other hand, a CCS organization composed of
only the five nations listed above would in itself probably present an
unsatisfactory situation. It is clearly necessary for the United States
to maintain a dominant voice in any such arrangement.
under which it was based (control over her world-wide commonwealth positions) has rapidly diminished. Unlike the last war, the French obviously could not be excluded from a revamped CCS. Also a Chief of Staff of German forces of this stature outside of the European Army organization (in Bonn) would be most undesirable. Perhaps the only workable solution would be a grouping of the Chiefs of Staffs of the US, UK and France. Some sort of organization of the other nations involved, in the form of an advisory committee, might be feasible. This is a matter which needs a great deal of study in order to insure that the United States would not lose the capability of enforcing prompt decision. As among the US, UK and France, a formula or equation approach to giving the US a predominant voice would obviously be out of the question. In such an organization the predominance of the United States would be only that inherent in its position of greater power and resources.

The organization thus far discussed pertains to the mechanism which would carry out the combined will and direction furnished by the heads of government for prosecution of the war effort. It is an agency which would automatically react to attack but one with no power of final decision on the questions of (a) a declaration of a state of war; (b) a decision to launch an initial offensive attack against the enemy or (c) the over-all global strategic concept of carrying out the war effort. These questions are all reserved for the heads of governments and in some cases, if not all, the decision in (a) above at least requires in addition parliamentary approval. In event of direct attack the difficulties inherent in decisions (a) and (b) become largely academic and parliaments react to a situation of fact already in being. It is conceivable, however, that the Western world could be confronted with a situation in which seizing the offensive would be obviously necessary in order to prevent undue destruction from a known planned attack by the enemy. While normally such a situation would allow time for consultation of heads of governments and parliaments it is also conceivable that, given weapons of the present age, this might not be the case. It would seem, therefore, that a previously
in the remainder of this section, i.e. the nations who are to take upon themselves the responsibility of basic decisions in the security field for the entire free world. In the last analysis such a choice probably will have to be without the consent and approval of all concerned and is a question which should be faced. The consequences of uncertainty on a question such as this would lose very valuable time at the outbreak of an atomic war.

Once beyond the decision that a state of war has been reached, question (c) above comes into play. This function was performed during the last war by Churchill and Roosevelt, later joined by Stalin, through the mechanism of two or three power meetings. This procedure probably would be followed again by the heads of the appointed governments as described above. Extraneous layers of formal committees for the direct prosecution of the war effort such as present defense and Foreign Minister arrangements would probably prove unwieldy and confusing, but they would of course serve in such meetings as advisors of the heads of State.

II. THE APPROACH.

Section I above sketches a theoretical approach to the formation of European defense forces. There has been no effort to justify such an approach. Much could be written to substantiate such an approach to European security and how, if properly accomplished, it could further economic and political integration of Europe rather than hinder, which would have been the case probably up until the present time. The creation of such a force should provide a tremendous psychological stimulant to a security conscious Europe as well as to provide a solution for the use of German manpower in the most acceptable and effective manner. It is in effect a Schuman Plan approach in the Military field and its acceptability, like the Schuman Plan for coal and steel, would have to depend upon the practicability of working the plan out in detail. Such an approach, if feasible, would allow German participation in the defense of Europe with minimum adverse effects to our objectives in Germany. It also might allow
If such an approach were accepted the timing of an appropriate public announcement should depend almost entirely upon the question of the availability of equipment regardless of the early need for some such stimulus in Europe. It would probably prove disastrous to have premature announcement followed by a long period of inability to provide anything substantial on the ground. The planners must therefore have as their first basic data the capability, in terms of time interval, of providing equipment for Western Europe as a whole. This estimate should be based upon spreading of procurement of military equipment throughout Western Europe as well as in the United States. For planning purposes, such an estimate should also be based upon the fact that Germany, under such a scheme, would be allowed to produce any item of military equipment except heavy weapons and ammunition.

If any such plan as that outlined in this paper is acceptable for further study, it should be held with the greatest possible security precaution, bearing in mind that it might be most desirable for France, rather than the United States, to propose such a scheme and that for its acceptance in France the instigation of the plan should not appear to come from US sources. It would also be extremely important that rumors of such a scheme, accurate as well as distorted, should not reach the Germans prior to consultation with their Chancellor. We must bear in mind that in the question of military forces or even procurement in Germany we must deal with Germany as an equal, as action in these fields must be purely voluntary on the part of the Germans. If we handle unwisely our approach to the Germans it is entirely possible that German reception may not be that which we desire.

The US should not attempt to formulate such a plan in detail. We should only concern ourselves at this stage of the effect of such a plan upon our own national interests. The aspects of the problem which fall in this category seem to be (a) the question of an American Commander in Europe; (b) the effect of such an arrangement upon US forces in Europe; (c) the complications of a
how the details of the plan could be pieced together. At that point, assuming
acceptance between us, a high level and extremely frank approach should be
made to the German Government. All of the above should be in the utmost
secrecy and announcement should be timed as indicated above in relation to
our combined capabilities of putting the plan into effect in Europe.