MEMORANDUM FOR S/S

In a meeting this morning, at which Mr. Nitze, Mr. Byroade and Mr. Perkins were present, the Secretary reported on a conversation he had with General Bradley this morning regarding work resulting from the President's letter of Saturday. Work on this project has been assigned to Messrs. Perkins, Byroade and Nitze for the Department.

The Secretary went into some detail as to the discussion he had with General Bradley on the general problem of working relationships between State and Defense. He said that he urged on the General, need for very close coordination of political and military aspects of any given problem. I reported the details of this portion of the conversation to Mr. Webb and do not think any further distribution of it is necessary.

The Secretary discussed the memorandum which the JCS prepared as the result of the President's letter.

With regard to the first question (whether we were prepared to commit additional US forces to the defense of Europe) the Secretary said that he thought the JCS position was satisfactory.

With regard to the second question (whether we would support the concept of European Defense force, etc.), the Secretary said that he thought the JCS position was somewhat confused. He mentioned specifically that he did not know what was meant by "national bases" and by "controlled status". The Secretary said that General Bradley had said that the issue so far as national bases was concerned is who pays for the troops, who recruits the troops, who clothes them, etc. The Secretary said that the State Department had always recognized that there must be administrative headquarters. He said the real issue was the point in recruiting and supplying troops when we reached a danger point in so far as creating again the old German power.
With regard to question 3 (concerning the eventual appointment of a Supreme Commander) the Secretary said that he thought the JCS position was all right within limits. He did say that he thought the use of the word "eventually" was a bit strange.

With regard to question 4 (concerning the combined staff), the Secretary felt that the JCS position was acceptable.

With regard to question 5 (the European War Production Board), the Secretary reported that he and General Bradley had discussed this in some detail. The Secretary described to General Bradley what we had in mind here—an executive group under NATO which could make full use of American aid and serve as an international board to deal with certain problems. In response to General Bradley's question as to why we wanted both a Military Production and Supply Board as well as a European War Production Board, the Secretary said that we had feared that some people were so wedded to the old arrangement that they would not want to move on to something else.

With regard to question 6 (concerning US participation in European defense organs and the acceptance of responsibility for an American Supreme Commander, etc.), the Secretary either made no comments or I failed to make note of them.

The Secretary made no comments on question 7 (transformation of Standing Group into a Combined Chiefs of Staff organization) or on question 8 (regarding further steps to invigorate NATO).

The Secretary said that General Bradley and he had agreed that Mr. Matthews would get in touch with General Burns and set up a meeting between our three representatives and certain of the Defense staff, including General Gruenther.

The Secretary suggested that our representatives turn over to the NME representatives copies of the paper which we have prepared. He seemed to feel that we might prepare a paper which could be one which interpreted the JCS position. He thought this a better alternative than attempting to get the JCS to withdraw and revise its position.

The Secretary also mentioned that he would be glad to meet with Mr. Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at which time he would
want Messrs. Nitze, Byroade and Perkins present for a consideration of the results of the meeting between the representatives of the two Departments.

The Secretary also mentioned as a possibility, the submission to the President of a paper interpreting the JCS paper which would result in getting White House approval of an agreed interpretation of the JCS positions.

LDB