STAFF STUDY

REARMAMENT OF WESTERN GERMANY

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the most appropriate method for providing for a controlled rearmament of Western Germany.

ASSUMPTION

2. For the purpose of this study, it is assumed that the Department of State and the Department of Defense are in entire agreement that Western Germany must be rearmed. Consequently, the problem involved is the method which must be employed to rearm Western Germany.

DISCUSSION

3. See Tab "A".

CONCLUSIONS

4. The Department of Defense should not accept the enlistment of German aliens into the U. S. Army or the utilization of German "service troops" in the U.S. Army in Germany as initial steps toward a controlled rearmament program for Western Germany.

5. The Department of Defense should no longer press strongly for the establishment of a federal police force for Western Germany. This study assumes that State and Defense are now agreed in principle that some form of rearmament for Western Germany is necessary. The idea of a "federal police force" as an initial step toward German rearmament appears to have undesirable political implications. Therefore, the Department of Defense should no longer press strongly for the police force but, instead, should bend all its efforts toward the authorization of a controlled rearmament program for Western Germany.

6. The Department of Defense should not concur in the establish-
and Western Union. To superimpose such a continental defense army on the complicated NATO and Western Union defense organizations would merely tend to complicate further an already confusing structure.

7. The Department of Defense should not concur in any plan to absorb German units into British, French, or other armies of Western Europe. Such a plan would not appeal to the nationalistic tendencies of the German people and would, at best, fall far short of our requirements for the utilization of German forces in the defense of Western Europe.

8. The Department of Defense should immediately press for the entrance of Western Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Simultaneously, a controlled rearmament program should be authorized for Western Germany to permit her to furnish her pro rata share of ground forces as her contribution to the collective security forces for the defense of Western Europe. The exact number of divisions which Germany should furnish to the NATO Organization and the exact nature of the controls can be determined only after consultation between the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, initially, and with NATO after Western Germany is admitted to that organization. However, for planning purposes, it appears that Western Germany should furnish in the neighborhood of 15 or 20 divisions by 1954.

**RECOMMENDATION**

That the above conclusions be approved as the Department of the Army position with regard to the general method to be employed in rearming Western Germany.
TAB "A"

DISCUSSION

1. In discussing the methods which may be utilized to rearm Western Germany, it should be borne in mind that the method employed must serve to enlist the active support of the German people for the defense of Western Europe and must be acceptable to the Western European nations, as well as the rest of the world. The peoples of the German occupied countries of Western Europe during World War II, and particularly the people of France, retain their fear of an armed Germany. This fear of the resurgence of Germany is also felt by certain other nations of the world. There is some basis for apprehension, since Western Germany possesses the capability of becoming militarily stronger than any of her non-Communist neighbors if German rearmament is uncontrolled. For this reason, any method devised for the rearmament of Western Germany must not only enlist the support of the Germans but must be endorsed by the Western European nations (particularly the United Kingdom and France) and by the other nations of the world.

2. One or more of the following measures might be employed to rearm Western Germany:

   a. Steps Short of Actual Rerarmament but Leading in That Direction:

      In this category, the enlistment of German aliens in the U.S. Army in Western Germany, the utilization of German "service troops," and the establishment of a police force (either a federal police force or a decentralized police force under laender control) have been discussed.

      (1) With regard to the enlistment of German aliens in
U.S. Army, world-wide, and the Lodge Bill further prohibits the enlistment of aliens in any country with which the United States is at war or which is occupied by U.S. troops. Therefore, the enlistment of aliens in the U.S. Army in Western Germany would require additional legislation. Furthermore, at best, the enlistment of German aliens in the U.S. Army, in a sense, would be making mercenary troops out of the Germans, would preclude the development of the national esprit which would be present in an all-German Army, and would undoubtedly be unpalatable to the West German Government and the German people.

(2) With regard to the utilisation of German "service troops" in the U.S. Army in Western Germany, it should be pointed out that General Handy is already utilizing some 22,000 labor troops, including "industrial police," technical units, and guard companies. These labor troops are not armed and trained as combat soldiers, nor would it be practicable so to arm and train them.

(3) With regard to the establishment of a Western European federal police force as the initial step toward German rearmament, it should be pointed out that Mr. Adenauer has recommended a federal police force of 25,000 men. In May 1949, the Western High Commissioners in Germany submitted an agreed recommendation to the Foreign Ministers that Western Germany be authorized to establish a 5,000-man police force. However, the Foreign Ministers took no action on this subject during the Foreign Ministers' Meetings last May and deferred the question for further study. On 30 July, 1950, in
of Staff, U.S. Army, G-3 recommended that a federal police force of at least 25,000 men, as recommended by Mr. Adenauer, be authorized for Western Germany. Within the last week, it has been indicated that the State Department is opposed to the establishment of a federal police force for Western Germany, as such a force would have the power of arrest and might develop into a "Gestapo-type" organization. It has been further reported that the U.S. State Department and the British and French Foreign Offices are agreed that authority should be granted for the establishment of a mobile police force of not to exceed 10,000 men, which may be quartered in barracks and which may be specially trained and equipped. It is contemplated that this new type police force of 10,000 men would be recruited at large or would be transferred from the existing police force (of 105,000) in the lander, as desired by the West German Government. The initial Department of the Army position with regard to the establishment of a federal police force was predicated partially upon the fact that the State Department would probably not concur in the idea of a controlled German rearmament program, whereas they might concur in the idea of establishing a police force and would agree to conduct conversations with the British and French on the subject. The Department of the Army position was also based partially on the fact that it might be difficult to sell to the French the outright rearmament of Western Germany. In any event, the Department of the Army has always viewed the establishment of a federal police force as a preliminary step toward rearmament.
In view of the fact that not only the U.S. State Department, but the British and French as well, appear to be looking with favor toward the controlled rearmament of Western Germany, it appears that the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense should no longer press strongly for a federal police force but, instead, should bend all its efforts toward the authorization of a controlled rearmament program for Western Germany. In summary, it is believed that the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense should: (a) not concur in the idea of enlistment of German aliens in the U.S. Army in Western Germany; (b) not concur in the utilization of German "service troops" as a step toward German rearmament; (c) no longer press strongly for a federal police force for Western Germany; and (d) press for an immediate controlled rearmament program for Western Germany.

b. The Establishment of a European Continental Defense Army:

The French have been reported to have recently made a proposal calling for a European continental defense army of 75 divisions and a corresponding Air Force, with the integration of Germany into the defense forces. This proposal was made in a speech by General Billotte, who claimed that he had received clearance from General De Gaulle on the subject. The Intelligence Division, U.S. Army, discounts General Billotte's remarks, as he no longer speaks with any military authority and is now in civilian status, writing for the French newspaper "Le Monde." Nevertheless, General Billotte's views are significant in that they may show a trend in French thinking toward the controlled rearmament of Western Germany. It would appear that
General Billotte had something like a "Schuman Plan" in mind for a European Army. While it is realized that such a plan has certain merit, it is believed that the following factors would make such a plan unfeasible:

1. It is not at all clear how such a force would be integrated in the existing North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Western Union. To superimpose such a continental defense army on the complicated NATO and Western Union organizations would merely tend to complicate an already confusing structure.

2. It is believed the only method which would receive enthusiastic support of the German people would be a system which would enable them to retain their identity and nationalistic tendencies in a Western German Army. Their identity as West Germans would be lost in any such "Schuman Plan" for the defense of Western Europe.

The Integration of German Units on a Proportional Basis with the French, British, and Other Armies of Western Europe:

Under this plan, the Germans would furnish a proportional number of units, which would be integrated with the existing Armies of the nations of Western Europe. For example, Western Germany might furnish a regiment, which would join a British or French division. It should be pointed out that this system would immediately raise the question of the command structure and would not only be undesirable to the Germans, but also would cause friction in the British or French units in which they were integrated. Furthermore, such a method of utilizing German forces would be no more appealing to the nationalistic tendencies than would the "Schuman Plan" idea discussed in paragraph b, above.