“Racial Democracy” in the Americas:
A Latin and US Comparison

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Abstract

The “racial democracy” (Iberian Exceptionalism) thesis claims that racial prejudice in Latin America is not only lower than that found in the United States, but is essentially absent altogether. We explored the plausibility of this thesis by the use of both explicit and implicit prejudice measures among Blacks and Whites from the United States and three Caribbean nations (the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico and Cuba). In general, the results showed significant racial prejudice against Blacks and in favor of Whites in all four nations. African-Americans were the only respondents not to show significant implicit prejudice either in favor of or against Blacks. In addition, North Americans (i.e., respondents from the United States) displayed both lower implicit and explicit racial prejudice than respondents in each of the three Latino nations. Overall, the results clearly contradicted the thesis of racial democracy and suggest that Latin America may not be nearly as egalitarian as some have argued.
“Racial Democracy” in the Americas:

A Latin and North American Comparison

The thesis known as “Racial democracy theory” (also referred to as Iberian exceptionalism) argues that, relative to the United States, the nations of Latin America are largely free of the ferocious racial prejudice that has characterized race relations in the US for most of the 19th and 20th centuries (see Degler, 1986; Freyre 1951; Hoetink, 1967; Pierson, 1942; Tannenbaum, 1947). Racial democracy theorists base these conclusions upon the fact that, compared to North America,¹ the nations of Latin America experienced a marked absence of post-manumission institutionalized racism (e.g., segregation & Jim Crow laws), a general absence of race-based group violence (e.g., lynching, race-base hate crimes), or racial protest, and a strikingly high rate of miscegenation. It is argued that, the extent to which racial inequality is still discernible in Latin American societies, this inequality is almost exclusively due to the residual effects of past racially contingent resource allocation and not to the effects of ongoing racial prejudice.

Racial democracy theorists attribute Latin American’s racial egalitarianism to three major factors. First, unlike the European colonists of North America, the Iberian conquerors of Latin America had the experience of living under the political and social hegemony of the Moors, a dark-skinned people, for nearly 800 years. Having experienced these dark-skinned conquerors as their political and cultural “superiors,” the Iberian colonists could not then regard the dark-skinned African and Indian slaves as sub-human with the same degree of celerity as the North American colonists found possible. Second, contrary to the Calvinist and Puritan doctrines of North American Protestantism, Catholicism regarded Native Americans, and even African Slaves, as people with souls and equally beloved of God; thus, the Catholic conquerors were less
aversive to intermixing with them. Finally, in contrast to the colonists of North America, the early Latin American colonists did not venture into the New World with intact families. As a result, the Iberian colonists established sexual and emotional relationships with the Indian and African slave women rather quickly, creating a more positive attitude toward those of African descent and resulting in the high rates of miscegenation we see today in Latin America (Degler, 1986; Freye, 1946, 1951). As a result, they argue that broad based social movements like the Civil Rights movement in the US were not necessary because of the more egalitarian nature of race relations in Latin America.

However, the thesis of racial democracy in Latin America has come under increasing attack by critical race theorists. Given the fact that Whites enjoy discernible advantages over Blacks in areas such as health, education, income, profession, status and political power in many of the Latino countries—including Brazil, Mexico, Columbia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Panama, Costa Rica, Peru, Bolivia and the Dominican Republic (see Minority Rights Group, 1995; Wade, 1997)—the critical race theorists argue that the only exceptional thing about Latino race relations is the success with which Latin American nations have promulgated the myth rather than the reality of racial equality (Hanchard, 1994; Nobles, 2000; Marx, 1998). Critics argue that proponents of the racial democracy thesis make the mistake of viewing race relations in Latin America through the prism of the racial dynamics found in the United States. As a result, racial democracy theorists have been insensitive to the distinct forms of racial exclusion that is practiced in Latin America. For example, Latin American countries have a history of ‘whitening’ privileges and laws that give jobs, land, tax breaks and other benefits to European and Asian immigrants in an effort to decrease the relative portion of Blacks in Latin societies (Moya-Pons, 2000; Marx, 1998; Nobles, 2000; Wade, 1997). Rather than trying to eliminate
people of African descent through informal violence (e.g., pogroms), high rates of imprisonment or execution, Latin America nations have opted to attenuate African influence via the process of dilution (Nobles, 2000). Critics argue that the goal of both North and Latin America is still ultimately the same: White hegemony. Thus, “racial democracy” is seen as nothing but a myth functioning to maintain the very thing it denies—racial oppression (Twine, 1998). Among other ways, this is accomplished by installing identification with and allegiance to the nation as a whole rather than to specific racial groups, thereby impeding the development of group-based social mobilization needed to confront real social grievances (Hanchard, 1994; Marx, 1999). Further, they argue that in the post-Civil rights era in the US with the advent of more race conscious policies and a recognition of formal disadvantage comparisons of race relations in Latin America with the US do not always favor Latin America (Hanchard 1994; Marx 1999; Degler 1986). They argue that the lack of social movements based upon race and the denial of racial inequality has created a discursive space where overt racism flourishes but is denied due to the myth of racial democracy. In contrast, the US while still struggling to overcome the legacy of racial inclusion has had to consciously address the lack of incorporation of blacks in all areas of political, social, and economic life.

Nonetheless, critical race theorists have generally neglected to support their arguments by actually comparing the racial attitudes of Latin and North Americans empirically. It is quite possible that the economic and social disparities between Blacks and Whites are merely the persistent legacy of slavery, and have nothing at all to do with ongoing racial prejudice. Moreover, even if racial prejudice continues to exist in Latin America, it is still possible that a weaker version of the racial democracy thesis is still valid. This is to say that, while still existent,
One way of resolving this controversy would be to compare the racial prejudice of North and South American populations by use of standard survey instruments and explicit racial attitude measures. Although the use of explicit self-report racial attitude measures has been the standard means of assessing racial attitudes for the past fifty years, this technique may not be the most appropriate method of assessing racial prejudice. As is well known, explicit measures of prejudice suffer from the major problem of social desirability and self-presentation bias (e.g., Carver, Glass, & Katz, 1978). When faced with explicit, highly sensitive and potentially inflammatory racial issues, respondents often feel under considerable pressure to provide more politically acceptable responses than might be warranted (see, e.g., Crosby, Bromley & Saxe, 1980; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; see also Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997; Dovidio & Fazio, 1992). As a result, the use of explicit measures have lead American race relations researchers to conclude that racial prejudice has been in a continuous decline over the past 40 years, while less obtrusive techniques (such as experiments and priming studies) indicate no such decline (Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980; Wittenbrink et al., 1997). The social desirability problem may be particularly troublesome within a Latin American context, where the promulgation of “racial democracy” as a dominant ideology has been widespread, even among the laity (Hanchard, 1994; Marx, 1998). On the other hand, the lack of a consistent movement challenging racist discourse and practice may render Latin America behind the US in terms of consciousness about racist discourse and practices. Therefore, there are fewer explicitly anti-racist discourses, consciously positive images of blacks, and less social pressure to conform attitudes and discourse to socially desirable practice. On the other hand, there have been fewer
formal barriers to racial equality. However, the gap between actual prejudice and what can be measured remains a methodological problem.

One increasingly popular solution to this social desirability issue in racial attitude research is to use implicit rather than explicit measures of prejudice. Implicit measures of prejudice are designed to measure racial attitudes in subtle ways that limit the effects of normative pressures to display non-prejudiced responses. This is accomplished by tapping into the more automatic, over-learned and non-conscious aspect of group evaluations (Blair, 2001; Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz 1998; Greenwald et al., 1998; Wittenbrink et al., 1997). Implicit measures of prejudice usually compare the efficiency with which participants associate positive versus negative information with targeted social categories. Thus for example, by comparing the time participants take to pair ‘bad’ with ‘Black’ and ‘good’ with ‘White’ versus the time taken to pair ‘good’ with ‘Black’ and ‘bad’ with ‘White,’ one can determine which set of pairings comes more easily to mind. If Bad-Black/Good-White pairings are more cognitively accessible than the opposite association, then respondents can be regarded as racially prejudiced against Blacks relative to Whites.

Since their initial development in the early 1980s (e.g., Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983), implicit attitudes measures have been used widely to assess a variety of implicit (automatic) attitudes, including prejudice against Blacks, women, and generalized outgroups (see Blair, 2001). Furthermore, these implicit prejudice indices have not only been found to predict other attitudes, but actual behavior, such as expressed hostility as well (see e.g., Bargh, Chen & Burrow, 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997; Correll, Park, Judd & Wittenbrink, 2003; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; Payne, 2001). In a culture embedded with racial stereotypes and a long history of racism, such as the United States, it has been consistently found that Whites find it easier to
associate ‘Black with Bad’ and ‘White with Good’ than the reverse (see reviews by Blair, 2001, and Greenwald & Nosek, 2001; see also Banse, Seise, and Zerbes 2001; Kuehnen et al., 2001; McConnell & Liebold, 2001). However, since these measures have never been used comparatively, it is difficult to assess the degree to which social learning might affect implicit associations on race. While many suggest a mix of “political correctness” and real social learning affect explicit measures of racism, it is unclear whether there might be a measurable social learning effect created by racial movements and policies in implicit associations. Comparative analysis allows us to examine the arguments of racial democracy as well as to examine the context effect of the Civil Rights movement and its related policies that were never implemented in Latin America.

In order to explore the empirical plausibility of the racial democracy thesis, in this paper we will compare levels of both explicit and implicit prejudice in the United States and three countries of Latin America: Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba. The three Latin American nations selected have many cultural and historical similarities that are relevant for questions of “race.” First, all three Latin nations have had a similar pattern of Spanish conquest. Second, like the rest of Latin America, these three countries share a similar history of racial slavery. Although slavery began in the early 16th century, abolition did not occur until the 1800s in any of the three nations. Also, none of the countries have had major mass movements for racial equality. Lastly, these three countries predominantly have a White/Black racial composition that allows for the study of race relations between those of African and European ancestry—the indigenous populations were annihilated shortly after conquest in all three nations (see Duany, 2001; Humboldt, 1990; Moya-Pons, 2000).
Additionally, each country was selected to test specific aspects of the racial democracy thesis. Since the socialist revolution of 1959, and its assumed deep commitment to an egalitarian society and the confrontation of racism both at home and abroad, some have claimed that Cuba represents a society in which racism has been all but eliminated (de la Fuente, 1995). To test the notion that miscegenation is a pre-cursor to racial democracy, we have chosen as our second country the Dominican Republic. It is among the nations with the highest level of miscegenation (i.e., 73%) between people of European and African descent to be found anywhere in the Western Hemisphere, even in comparison to Brazil (World Factbook, 1999). Finally, to assess the limits of Latin America’s racial democracy, we have chosen Puerto Rico because it is the only country in Latin America that is presently under U.S. control, and has been since the Treaty of Paris in 1898. It seems reasonable to suspect that Puerto Rico has absorbed much of the general political values and racial ideology prevalent in the continental U.S. However, all the factors that supposedly have lead to Latin America’s racial democracy are also part of Puerto Rico’s history.

There are two versions of the Iberian exceptionalism or racial democracy thesis that might hold. If the strong version of the racial democracy thesis is correct, we should find little if any racial prejudice in the three Latin countries. If the weak version of the racial democracy thesis is correct, while racial prejudice in these three Latin countries will be significantly greater than zero, it should still be significantly less than that found in the United States.

Method

Participants

We recruited fifty participants from Cuba (14 females and 36 males), forty-seven from Dominican Republic (21 females and 23 males), fifty-eight from Puerto Rico (32 females and 26
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males), and sixty-four from the United States (18 females and 46 males). All participants were recruited from a major metropolitan city within each country, Havana, Santo Domingo, San Juan, and Los Angeles, respectively. Non-probability convenience samples were used and the participants were recruited in commercial areas (e.g. malls, commercial promenades). Because of the sensitivity of this research topic in Cuba, a snow-ball sampling procedure was used for this sample. The average age was 33 for Cuba, 27 for the Dominican Republic, 29 years old for Puerto Rico and 36 for the United States.

Materials and Procedure

Explicit Prejudice

Explicit prejudice was defined by the use of the same two-item scale within each nation. The items were: a) “Blacks are less intelligent than other groups,” and b) “Blacks are less capable than other groups.” Each question had a seven category response scale ranging from “7-Strongly agree,” to “1-Strongly disagree.” For such a short scale, the reliability of the scale was acceptably to very high across all four nations: Dominican Republic (\( \_ = .90 \)), Puerto Rico (\( \_ = .94 \)), Cuba (\( \_ = .74 \)), USA (\( \_ = .84 \)). The reliability within the total sample as a whole was = .87.

Implicit Prejudice

Two native researchers helped to assess the respondents’ implicit prejudice scores within in each country. One researcher performed the assessment task, while the other recruited the participants and kept interruptions during the experiment to a minimum. The researchers set up a table with two chairs opposite each other, one for the participant and one for the researcher conducting the experiment. The researchers used a stopwatch to time the participants throughout the various phases of the experiment.
Implicit racial prejudice scores were obtained using a slight variation of the Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald et al., 1998). We used normal playing cards with photographs of “Black” and “White” Latin American (for Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic and Cuba) or American (for the United States) faces as well as drawings representing something “good” and something “bad” affixed to them (see Appendix). There were a total of thirty-two photographs, sixteen White and sixteen Black, taken from Latin American and American high school yearbooks. The people in the stimulus photographs were all dressed the same, males with a similar tuxedo and women with similar ballroom gown, and all had similar expressions on their faces (equally smiling or serious), and were broadly matched for physical attractiveness, all in an effort to control for the socio-economic status, attractiveness and likeability cues that attire and facial expression might emit. After pilot testing several symbols in Latin America and the United States, a circle with two dots representing the eyes and either a concave-upward parabola or a concave-downward parabola representing the mouth were considered the best symbols of the evaluation ‘good’ and ‘bad’ cross-culturally (see Appendix). There were sixteen cards with the same ‘good’ drawing affixed to them and sixteen cards with the same ‘bad’ drawing affixed to them, thirty-two cards in all. All photographs and drawings were printed in black and white.

Participants were told that they would be participating in an “association task to see the ease with which they associated good or bad with black and white faces.” In the first phase participants were asked to provide basic demographic information about themselves (e.g. gender, age, and race). In Latin America, a participant was coded as White if the participants self-categorized as ‘Blanco,’ Mulatto (or mixed-race) if they self-categorized as either ‘Trigueño,’ ‘Indio,’ or ‘Mulato,’ and as Black if the participants self-categorized as either ‘Moreno’ or ‘Negro.’ In the United States, participants were placed into three initial self-identified

In the second phase, participants were asked to familiarize themselves with the photographs and evaluation cards. They first had twenty seconds to become familiar with the sixteen White faces and sixteen Black faces. These sixteen faces were arranged in a four by four matrix and printed on an 8½” X 11” sheet of paper. Approximately half of the subjects were first given the White faces to inspect and approximately half first given the Black faces to inspect. Next, they had ten seconds to familiarize themselves with the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ drawings, where approximately half of the subjects were first given the ‘good’ drawing and approximately half first given the ‘bad’ drawing. These drawings were arranged in a four by four matrix and printed out on an 8½” X 11” sheet of paper.

In the third phase of the assessment, the participants practiced single sorting into piles. The participants were given 8 well-shuffled cards, four with Black faces affixed to them and four White ones. They were timed on how fast they placed the Black faces on their left-hand side (or their right-hand side) on a table and the White faces on the opposite side. The placement of the cards was counter-balanced across participants. The participants were instructed to sort the cards, “as fast as you can while being as accurate as you can.” They were similarly timed on how fast they sorted eight evaluation cards, four ‘good’ and four ‘bad’.

In the final and critical phase, participants engaged in double sorting into piles (the association task). The participants were given all 64 cards well shuffled (the 32 photographs of
the Black and White faces and the 32 good and bad evaluation cards). They were timed on how fast they placed either the Black faces or the good evaluation cards on one side (on the left-hand side or the right-hand side) and either the White faces or the bad evaluation cards on the opposite side. They did this twice (the first time was for practice) while being told to sort “as fast as you can while being as accurate as you can.” Following that task, the participants engaged in the opposite pairing when asked to double sort again. That is, they were timed twice on how fast they placed either the Black faces or the bad evaluation cards together on one side and either the White faces or the good evaluation cards together on the opposite side. The left- and right-hand side placement of the pairings, as well as which set of pairing the participants would do first, was counter-balanced across participants. Implicit racial prejudice was calculated by subtracting the time (in seconds) taken to sort stereotypic pairings (i.e., ‘Bad-Black and Good-White’) from the time taken to sort the counter-stereotypic pairings (i.e., ‘Good-Black and Bad-White’), using the second set of timings of this last phase. Positive difference scores indicate more facile stereotypic associations than counter-stereotypic, and thus higher implicit racial prejudice against Blacks relative to Whites; zero difference scores indicate that both association were equally accessible and are interpreted as showing no racial prejudice; negative differences scores are interpreted as implicit prejudice in favor of Blacks. The four phases of the experiment took an average forty-five minutes.

Results

Construct validation of explicit and implicit prejudice

Before proceeding to the substantive questions of the study, we first made some effort to establish the construct validity of both the explicit and implicit measures of prejudice. While the explicit prejudice measure has a substantial degree of face-validity, we decided to explore its
construct validity in a more “objective” manner in order to be in a better position to assess the
construct validity of the implicit measure of prejudice in comparison to the construct validity of
the explicit measure. In both cases, our validity criterion was “racial/pigment” category. We
reasoned that if the explicit, anti-Black racism measure was valid, there should be a “racial”
difference in these explicit racism scores. In particular, those classifying themselves as “Black”
should have significantly lower explicit racism scores than those classifying themselves as either
“White” or “Mulato” (or ‘lightbrown-skinned’ African-American). Using a one-way analysis of
variance with this three category racial classification scheme (i.e., White, Mulato/lightbrown-
skinned, Black), the results were consistent with expectations. There was a significant overall
difference in the level of explicit anti-Black racism (i.e., $F(2,213) = 6.15$, $p < .003$, $\_ = .23$), and
the contrasts between “Blacks” and the two other racial categories were highly significant (i.e.,
$M_{Whites} - M_{Blacks} = .821$, $p < .004$; $M_{Mulato/lightbrown-skinned} - M_{Blacks} = .967$, $p < .003$).

We repeated the same analyses with respect to the implicit measure of prejudice. Using
the same three “racial/pigment” categories, the nature of these group differences was also
consistent with expectations. The overall differences between groups was highly significant ($F$
(2,211) = 5.91, $p < .003$, $\_ = .23$), and the contrasts between Blacks and the two other groups
were also highly significant (i.e., $M_{Whites} - M_{Blacks} = 9.93$, $p < .001$; $M_{Mulato/lightbrown-skinned} - M$
$\_ = 7.95$, $p < .007$).

Altogether, while the explicit and implicit prejudice measures were not found to be
correlated with each other ($r = .04$, n.s.), a common finding in the implicit prejudice literature
(see Blair, 2001), using ”racial/pigment” group membership as our validity criterion, both
measures showed evidence of construct validity.

Strong racial democracy thesis

The...
Our first substantive question concerns the absolute levels of racial prejudice in the Americas and can be regarded as a test of the strong version of the racial democracy or Iberian exceptionalism thesis. While evidence of implicit racial prejudice against Blacks has been found in more than 30 thirty studies in the United States (see review by Blair, 2001), the strong version of the racial democracy hypothesis would expect this prejudice to be absent in Latin America.

Because of the small number classifying themselves of ‘Negros’ in Cuba and Puerto Rico, in order to make North American and Latin American comparisons most comparable in all consequent analyses, consistent with the “one-drop rule” in the United States, we classified all respondents with any discernible degree of African heritage into the same “Black/Brown” group. This simply meant combining the “Mulato” and “Negro” categories for the Latin American respondents, and ‘light-skinned’ and ‘dark-skinned’ African-Americans in the United States America. We then tested the strong version of the Iberian Exceptionalism thesis within these “White” and “Black/Brown” categories for each of the four samples.

Because the scores on the implicit prejudice measure can be regarded as defining a ratio scale with a meaningful zero-point (i.e., 0.00 = absence of implicit prejudice), the implicit prejudice measure allows us to test the strong version of racial democracy (Iberian exceptionalism) thesis. To test this thesis we conducted a series of one-sample t-tests against the null hypothesis that the level of implicit prejudice within the Latin nations would be zero, while being significantly greater than zero among Whites in the United States.

We started first with the respondents in the United States and found, consistent with the overwhelming body of previous research, that European Americans had a level of implicit prejudice against Blacks which was significantly greater than 0.00. This is to say, it was easier for them to associate positive things with Whites and negative things with Blacks than the
reverse ($t(1, 26) = 2.69, p < .02$; see Table 1). However, while African-Americans showed a very slight tendency towards pro-Black/anti-White implicit prejudice, this tendency was not statistically greater than 0.00 ($t(1, 32) = -.68, p > .05$).

We found that same general trend for across the all three Latin American samples as well. Whites had levels of implicit prejudice against Blacks which were significantly greater than zero within each nation: Cuba, $t(1, 23) = 4.56, p < 10^{-3}$; Dominican Republic, $t(1, 8) = 2.84, p < .02$; and Puerto Rico, $t(1, 29) = 4.21, p < 10^{-3}$ (see Table 1). Furthermore, and in contrast to the results found for the United States, this anti-Black prejudice was also shared by those with discernible degrees of African heritage (i.e., “Mulatos” and “Negros”): Cuba, $t(1, 25) = 4.08, p < 10^{-3}$; the Dominican Republic, $t(1, 37) = 2.58, p < .02$; and Puerto Rico, $t(1, 26) = 3.54, p < 01$. Therefore, these data appear to clearly contradict the strong version of the Iberian exceptionalism thesis. Not only can evidence of implicit anti-Black racial prejudice be found among Latin American as well as North American Whites (i.e., Whites from the United States), but also among Latin Americans of “color.”

**Weak racial democracy thesis**

Inspection of Table 1 also appears to contradict the weak version of Iberian exceptionalism. As we can see in Table 1, there was not a single case in which the implicit prejudice scores were higher in the USA than in any of the three Latin countries. To see if these nationality differences were statistically reliable, we submitted the data to a $4 \times 2$ ANOVA in which the implicit prejudice scores served as the dependent variable, and nationality (USA, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, & Cuba) and “race” (White vs. Black/Brown) served as the independent variables.
First, further supporting the construct validity of the implicit prejudice measure, the results of the ANOVA analysis showed a significant effect for “race,” in that Whites had significantly higher implicit prejudice scores than Blacks/Browns ($F(1, 206) = 8.14, p < .01; \_ = .32$). Secondly, there was no significant race x nation interaction ($F(3, 206) = .51, p = n.s.$). This indicates that the degree to which Whites had higher anti-Black prejudice levels than Black/Browns was essentially constant across nations.

The ANOVA results also showed that nationality was indeed reliably correlated with implicit prejudice ($F(3, 206) = 7.82, p < 10^{-3}, \_ = .19$). Planned comparisons revealed that the only significant differences among the nations were found in the contrasts between the North American sample on the one hand, and the three Caribbean samples (i.e., the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and Cuba) on the other hand. However, all three of these contrasts clearly contradicted the weak version of the Iberian exceptionalism thesis. Implicit racial prejudice was found to be significantly lower in the United States than in the Dominican Republic ($p < .001$), Puerto Rico ($p < .01$), or Cuba ($p < .001$).

Finally, the weak version of the Iberian Exceptionalism hypothesis was also explored by use of the explicit prejudice and the same type of two-way ANOVA used above (see Table 2). While there was no significant main effect for “race” ($F(1, 208) = 1.91, p > .10$), there was a relatively powerful main effect for nation ($F(3, 208) = 16.01, p < 10^{-3}, \_ = .43$). As can be seen in Table 2, once again the major national division was between the North American sample, on the one hand, and the three Latin American samples on the other hand. This picture was confirmed by inspection of the Scheffé post-hoc comparisons. These showed that the North American sample was significantly less prejudiced than either the Cuban or Dominican samples, while there was no significant difference between the North American and Puerto-Rican
samples. Furthermore, the Puerto-Rican sample also had a significantly lower explicit prejudice average than did the Cuban sample. As with the implicit prejudice measure, there was no interaction between nation and “race” ($F(3, 208) < 1$).

Since it is now known that even implicit measures of prejudice can be subject to contextual effects (see Wittenbrink, Judd & Park, 2001), it is possible that the relatively low level of implicit racial prejudice found in the United States is largely due to the relatively intense degree of racial discourse this nation has experienced over the last 45 years and resultant pressure towards “political correctness.” If “political correctness” is a substantial factor affecting these results, there is strong reason to believe this factor will have its strongest influence on the explicit rather than the implicit, and less controllable measures of racial prejudice. Thus, if the weak version of the Iberian Exceptionalism hypothesis is correct, once one controls for explicit racial prejudice (and thus for “political correctness,”), the Latin American samples should show lower levels of implicit prejudice than found in the North American sample. To test this idea, we ran a two-way analysis of covariance examining implicit prejudice as a function of nation and “race,” after controlling for the effects of explicit prejudice.

Rather than supporting the Iberian Exceptionalism thesis, the results of this covariance analysis contradicted this thesis. While the effect size for nation was somewhat attenuated after controlling for explicit prejudice (i.e., $\_\_\_ = .30$ versus $\_\_\_ = .49$), the results continued to show a significant main effect for nation ($F(3, 204) = 7.03, p < .001$). Furthermore, post-hoc contrasts showed that the American sample had significantly lower implicit prejudice scores than each of the other three Latin American nations at the 0.01 level or beyond. Furthermore, and in contrast to the uncorrected implicit prejudice analysis above, after controlling for levels of explicit prejudice, there was now also a significant effect for “race,” showing that Whites had
significantly higher implicit prejudice scores than Blacks ($F(1, 204) = 6.91, p < .01; \_ = .18$). This latter finding is also important because it provides further support for the construct validity of the implicit measure. This is to say that one would expect Blacks to have lower levels of implicit prejudice against Blacks than would White, even after controlling for social desirability and “political correctness” effects. The lack of a race x nation interaction indicated that these “racial” differences were consistent over nation ($F(3, 204) < 1$; see Figure 1).

Finally, to assure ourselves that the national differences found were not a function of the differing ways in which non-Whites classified themselves within the four nations, we also computed an analysis of covariance (controlling for explicit prejudice) and using only those respondents who self-categorized as unambiguously “White” within each nation. The results of this analysis continued to display statistically significant cross-national differences ($F(1, 84) = 3.55, p < .02; \_ = .33$). Furthermore, the pair-wise contrasts also continued to show significantly lower levels of implicit prejudice among Whites in the United States than among Whites in Latin-America (however, the contrast between North American and Puerto Rican Whites was only marginally significant, i.e., $p < .06$).

Discussion

The main purpose of this study has been to explore the empirical validity of the Iberian exceptionalism (or racial democracy) thesis using explicit and implicit measures of racial prejudice. When exploring potentially explosive and sensitive topics such as racial prejudice, it is well known that explicit measures of prejudice can be quite sensitive to social desirability and self-presentation effects in a way that implicit measures are not (e.g., Crosby, Bromley & Saxe, 1980; Greenwald et al., 1998). Because these self-presentational and context effects might well
vary across nations, concentrating upon implicit rather than explicit racial prejudice would seem to be a more fruitful approach to these cross-national comparisons.

Use of the implicit measure of racial prejudice provided no support whatsoever for the Iberian exceptionalism thesis, neither in its strong nor weak forms. Not only was significant implicit racial prejudice against Blacks found among Whites in all the nations examined, but with the exception of African Americans, this anti-Black prejudice was found also among Latin Americans respondents with discernible African heritage as well (i.e., Mulattos and “Negros”). While showing less anti-Black prejudice than Whites, the fact that Latin American Blacks also had a tendency to exhibit significant levels of anti-Black prejudice is consistent with notion that a certain degree of prejudice against members of subordinates groups is consensually shared by both members of dominant and subordinate groups alike within hierarchical social systems (see e.g., Sidanius, Levin, Federico & Pratto, 2001; Ridgeway, 2001; Jost, Burgess & Mosso, 2001). Furthermore, even though the explicit and implicit measures of prejudice are suspected of assessing slightly different psychological processes - at least under certain conditions (see Blair, 2001) - and the fact that the two measures of prejudice were not found to correlate in this study, both indices converged on the same general conclusion regarding the Iberian Exceptionalism thesis; In direct contradiction to the “racial democracy” claim, both indices suggested higher levels of anti-Black prejudice in Latin America than in north America.

Altogether, these findings seem to present us with something of a paradox. While it seems relatively well established that explicit racism has had a substantially less ferocious history in the Caribbean than in the United States (see e.g., Freye, 1951; Twine, 1998), this regional difference does not appear to be reflected in either explicit or more unconscious forms of prejudice within contemporary populations. Not only was both explicit and implicit prejudice
in the Caribbean higher than in the United States, but it is also noteworthy that the level of both forms of racial prejudice in “socialist” (ostensibly classless) Cuba appeared no less severe than that found in either the Dominican Republic or the American controlled island of Puerto Rico. Furthermore, despite the very high level of miscegenation in the Dominican Republic, respondents in this sample also failed to exhibit particularly low levels of either explicit or implicit prejudice. This finding is consistent with the recent observation that racial prejudice and pigmentocracy are quite compatible with relatively high levels of interracial marriage and miscegenation (see Sidanius, Peña, & Sawyer, 2001). While it is not possible to attach any absolute interpretation to any given level of explicit prejudice, this limitation does not quite apply in the case of our index of implicit prejudice. Here, a score of 0.00 really can be defined as the absence of implicit racial prejudice. Given this, our findings also appear to suggest that neither the elimination of the class-struggle (as in Cuba), nor the creation of high levels of miscegenation (as in the Dominican Republic), is a sufficient condition for the elimination of implicit and unconscious racial prejudice.

Nonetheless, we are still forced to reach these conclusions with a certain degree of tentativeness and caution. First, we must keep in mind that this study used non-probability samples. Whether or not these results would also hold within probability samples from each nation is a question that remains to be seen. Secondly, despite the suggestion that implicit, and assumedly unconscious racial prejudice is higher in the Caribbean than in North America, the extent to which this implicit prejudice expresses itself in actual discriminatory behavior is also an open question that needs to be settled by future research. Third, it is entirely possible that, on both the implicit and explicit measures, we are capturing the effects of the Civil Rights
movement. While one might attribute the lower levels of explicit prejudice in the US to “political correctness,” driven by the Civil Rights movement and the myriad of anti-racist organizations and discourses, the implicit measures are more likely to reflect the degree to which these discourses perhaps affect individuals on a sub-conscious level. Furthermore, the national differences in implicit prejudice held even after controlling for levels of explicit prejudice and what is assumed to be associated “political correctness.” While there may be racial resentment brought on by protest, race specific policies, minority incorporation etc., on balance and in comparison to countries that have had no such movements, we are led to conclude that the lower levels of prejudice in the US as compared to Latin America are probably genuine and not merely artifactual. This interpretation is consistent with the conclusions of political scientist Taeku Lee, who argues that Civil Rights protests changed the opinions of many whites in the US about Blacks (Lee 2002). Fourth, while the choice of these particular three Latin American countries is potentially heuristic, a good deal of further research remains to determine the extent to which these findings generalize to other nations across the Caribbean and Latin America.

These qualifications notwithstanding, the results are still important because, as far as we know, this study reports the first use of implicit attitude measures within either Puerto Rico, Dominican Republic, or Cuba and suggests that Latin America may not be nearly as egalitarian as some have argued. The results also may speak to the power of anti-racist social movements in determining both implicit and explicit prejudice. That is implicit prejudice is perhaps affected by the intervention of anti-racist discourse and policies specifically bringing racial inequality to consciousness. They also suggest that the implicit and explicit measures of racial prejudice may have a more indirect relationship to historic or current racial barriers and inequality than previously thought. We are thus left with a more complex picture of the portrait of racial orders
in the US and Latin America, and one that provides mixed indicators of which model is more egalitarian. As Degler noted in his classic work,

Perhaps the time has now come to recognize that today (1971) comparison of race relations in the two countries is not always favorable to Brazil. For one thing, as we have seen in this book, Brazil is not devoid of color prejudice or discrimination. For another since World War II, race relations and attitudes in the United States have strikingly altered (Degler 1986).

This conjecture may now be true more than ever after almost forty years of living with the fruits of the Civil Rights movement, with no such corollary in Latin America.
References


Appendix

“Good”

“Bad”
Table 1

Mean and Standard Deviations (in Seconds) of Implicit Racial Prejudice Scores by Nation and Participant’s “Race.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Participants’ Race</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3.78 (7.29)*</td>
<td>-0.85 (7.18)ns</td>
<td>1.38 (7.55)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>14.79 (15.89)***</td>
<td>9.80 (12.24)***</td>
<td>12.20 (14.19)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominican Rep</td>
<td>21.56 (22.74)*</td>
<td>9.79 (23.44)*</td>
<td>12.04 (23.53)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>10.70 (13.94)***</td>
<td>6.85 (10.06)*</td>
<td>8.81 (12.20)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean (Standard Deviation); * p < .05, ** p <.01, *** p < .001, where Ho: _ = 0; ns = not significant.
Table 2

Mean and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of Explicit Racial Prejudice by Nation and Participant’s “Race.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Participants’ Race</th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Whites</td>
<td></td>
<td>Blacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1.41 (1.06)</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>3.29 (1.88)</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>1.59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominican Rep</td>
<td>2.75 (2.47)</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>1.72 (1.33)</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Implicit Prejudice (Adjusted Means)

Dominican Republic  Cuba

Nationality

Whites
Blacks
Figure Captions

Figure 1 - Implicit Prejudice (corrected for Explicit Prejudice) as a Function of Nationality and “Race.”
Footnote

1 By the terms “North America” and “North American,” we will be referring to the United States and residents of the United States and not Canada or Canadians. This is simply done to allow for less clumsy language.
2 Note that in the analyses to follow, this three category “racial” variable will be regrouped into a two category “racial” variable.
3 One person declined to answer the race question within the Dominican and American samples.
4 The same type of difference was also found between light-skinned and “Black” (dark-skinned) African-Americans.