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The Special Case of the Horn of Africa

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The purpose of this chapter is to critically assess the respective security challenges of the United States, the countries of the Horn of Africa, and the sometimes interconnected, contradictory policies that have emerged in the era of globalization.¹ Although such challenges are present in all parts of the continent, the greater Horn region has been singled out for special attention in this book because of the high priority accorded it in the US global war on terror.² Globalization in the Horn is a multidimensional process with different impacts on the region and the wider international state system. This region is both linked and fragmented by its history and geostrategic location as the bridge between Africa and the Middle East. Its contemporary hybrid nature—made more visible in the conflicts over identity, ideology, and resources—demonstrates that globalization has long-term, far-reaching, regional and international repercussions.

During the first decade of the twenty-first century, the United States has selectively engaged with and disengaged from the countries of the Horn, all of which are also involved in intrastate and intraregional conflicts. These relationships tend to be conducted mainly on the basis of considerations of realpolitik, rather than on an appreciation of the interface of their respective national interests with those of the United States.³ In the post-Cold War period, US policymakers have changed their former focus on combating communism to accommodating the new threat of international terrorism. The older focus in the US policymaking process failed to pay adequate attention to “the interplay of the regional, social forces at work at a given moment of history.”⁴ The collapse of the Somali state triggered the global dispersal of its people. The multiple crises in the Sudan, the unraveling of the Ethiopia-Eritrea alliance, and the insertion of Djibouti into the “war on terrorism” all indicate the need for a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the impact of globalization in the Horn. In this chapter we examine how the Cold War militarized both the states and societies of the

Horn and seek to shed light on the complexity of the security challenges that characterize US-Africa relations, not only in the particular case of the Horn region but also with the other regions of the continent in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

The Horn of Africa and the United States

Although the United States never had close relations with any African country (Liberia excepted), the onset of the Cold War and the strategic location of Eritrea and Ethiopia astride the Red Sea led to US development of a strategic alliance with Ethiopia that lasted for twenty-five years. In fact, after World War II, Ethiopia became the cornerstone of US involvement in the Horn of Africa.⁵ Following the Italian fascist occupation of Ethiopia, which lasted from 1936 to 1941, the British reinstated Emperor Haile Selassie and assisted him in administering part of modern-day Ethiopia until 1952. However, after 1943, British influence and involvement in Ethiopia declined rapidly. The emperor systematically cultivated a relationship with the United States, and when the last vestiges of a British presence in Ethiopia disappeared, the United States stepped in as Ethiopia's main superpower patron.

Beginning with the inclusion of Ethiopia in President Harry Truman's Four Point Program, a reciprocal relationship developed between the two countries.⁶ The United States was interested in gaining a strategic presence in the Horn, and Ethiopia allowed it to establish a naval base and radio tracking station at Asmara, Eritrea. The presence of the Asmara tracking station enabled the United States to improve its ability to monitor the telegraphic traffic in the emerging communist bloc countries to the northeast. Ethiopia in turn received economic and military assistance from the United States. In May 1953, two diplomatic agreements were signed formalizing the relationship between the two countries: the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and the Agreement for the Utilization of Defense Installations within the Ethiopian Empire. A significant by-product of this new relationship was the political support Ethiopia received from the United States for its claims to Eritrea in the aftermath of the war.⁷

The US desire to maintain its access and presence in the region of the Horn led to its becoming more deeply involved in Ethiopia's domestic affairs than strategic planners had ever imagined. Thus, US policy concentrated on keeping Haile Selassie in power and on keeping the Horn relatively stable and free from communism. In this way, the strategic interests of the United States came to intersect historically with Haile Selassie's domestic and regional interests. A series of secret agreements between the two governments between 1960 and 1964 resulted in the modernization and dra-

matic expansion of the Ethiopian military. The stated purpose of this venture was to prepare Ethiopia to respond successfully to whatever military challenge might come from independent Somalia, which claimed the Ogaden and Haud regions of southeastern Ethiopia.⁸

The US presence in the Horn has to be considered against the backdrop of the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's pronouncement in the mid-1970s of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which established the Kremlin's commitment to support fledgling socialist states.⁹ Earlier, the United States and Ethiopia had held the balance of power in the Horn when the extent of armed conflict there involved armed militants in Eritrea and Somali irredentists, the latter aided by the government of Somalia. In the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union drew close to Somalia when the new regime of General Siad Barre proclaimed its commitment to governing on the basis of scientific socialism. Despite US displeasure with the military junta that overthrew emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 because of its gross violations of human rights, the United States felt compelled to "draw a line in the sand" against the expansion of communism in the Horn. The United States continued to maintain a relationship with Ethiopia despite its turn to the left under its new ruling military junta, the Derg. However, this changed with the election of Jimmy Carter to the US presidency in 1976. On assuming office, Carter did withhold military sales and grants to Ethiopia because of its human rights record, which led to a severing of the relationship between the two countries in April 1977. In the process the door was left open for the Soviet Union to step in as Ethiopia's main superpower patron. The United States countered by increasing its efforts to woo Somalia away from the Soviets.

From this point on, the United States saw its vital national interest as broadening its access and presence in the Horn. It actively considered direct military assistance to Somalia, though this assistance never became significant. What did become significant was the indirect military aid the United States provided via friendly third-party countries in the region (for example, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan).¹⁰ Also of significance was Carter's decision to pursue an encirclement strategy with regard to Ethiopia. This strategy was designed to provide countries surrounding Ethiopia with economic and military assistance and thereby to hold communism at bay in the Horn. The United States asked Kenya, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Oman to allow their territories to be used as staging grounds for the US Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), which could be used to project US military might into the Middle East and Persian Gulf.¹¹

In the process of pursuing what they perceived to be their own vital interests, the superpowers contributed to the escalation of a regional arms race in the Horn. While the United States and the Soviets competed for clients, the Ethiopians and Somalis stepped up their hostilities toward one

another.¹² Consequently, the military capacities of all the countries in the region, except for Djibouti, increased significantly between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s.¹³ What was also significant by the mid-1980s was the growth in strength and activity of the armed nationalists in Eritrea, the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), and armed opposition groups inside Ethiopia and Somalia.¹⁴ Their growth created a widespread sense of physical insecurity in the Horn, with devastating effects on human security in the region. Border tensions, civil wars, and the natural catastrophe of drought compounded the problems of Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia. The collapse of the Somali state demonstrated the multiple and deleterious effects of both the irredentist campaigns against Ethiopia and the civil war.

The End of the Cold War and Political Islam

The end of the Cold War was accompanied by the escalation of intrastate conflicts and an upsurge of environmental and humanitarian crises in the Horn. The events of the mid-1980s and early 1990s amply demonstrated the political, economic, and social repercussions of the end of the Cold War on intrastate and intraregional relations. In Sudan, the post-Numeiri regime (1985–1989) signaled the death knell of the prospects for pluralist democracy and secularist government. Numeiri's successors, Suwar al Dahab and Sadiq al-Mahdi, cemented the coalition of traditional and radical Islamists, and they embarked on a foreign policy path that relegated the United States to a secondary position vis-à-vis Sudan's new patrons in North Africa and the Middle East, Libya and Iraq, respectively. This course marked a defiant articulation of anti-Americanism that gradually culminated in 1996 in a break in diplomatic relations.

The regime of Sadiq al-Mahdi (1986–1989) was beset by the traditional rivalry between the two major sectarian parties and a civil-military coalition comprising militant Islamists who until this period had been kept on the periphery of the political arena.¹⁵ Political assassinations and acts of terror became almost commonplace in Khartoum. Also, unrest raged in Darfur, and the civil war in the south continued unabated in the absence of a real commitment to a just peace.¹⁶ It was during this period that the tribal militias of the Baggara¹⁷ of the west-central part of the country—precursors of the now infamous Janjaweed¹⁸ militia who operate in the Darfur region—were formed at the initiative of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi.¹⁹

The multiple crises that have engulfed contemporary Sudan—from the western borderlands of Darfur to the eastern Red Sea Hills and the war-ravaged southern regions—can be understood as the regionalization and internationalization of domestic problems long left unaddressed.²⁰ A coup d'état

that took place in 1989 led to the establishment of a theocratic Sudanese state. On the one hand, the theocracy was a culmination of the long struggle of Islamists against local communists and liberal capitalists, and on the other hand, it indicated the opening of a new chapter of open animosity against the West in general and the United States in particular.²¹

An escalation of violence in the late 1980s in Somalia between armed rebels and the government forces operating from inside as well as outside the country led to the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. As a result of treaties with the regime, the government forces as well as the various rebel groups all had access to arms from both the United States and the Soviet Union. More than any other country of the Horn, Somalia demonstrates the negative impact of the Cold War's simultaneous militarization and globalization of local and regional conflicts. The post-1969 modernizing Somali state under Siad Barre "banned" ethnic and clan-based affiliations as ways of mobilizing political support. It introduced "scientific socialism"²² as the only official ideology, which led to resentment on the part of the majority of inhabitants who continued to practice traditional forms of eclectic, Sufi Islam. The dominance of the country's strongman, Siad Barre, stultified the fluid socioeconomic and political modes of organization and resulted in the alienation of Somalis, except, of course, those enjoying the favors of the ruling elite. A result of this societal disengagement was the economic and political exodus of Somalis to the Middle East and Italy.²³ The growth of the Somali diaspora and the community's exposure to the outside world led to the creation of expanded links between Somalis in the homeland and in the rest of the world and in the process integrated all Somalis into the escalating process of globalization. It was done not only through remittances of foreign currency but also using modern communication technologies, new ideologies, and new concepts of political alignment.

In fact, the large-scale migration of Somali workers to the Middle East and elsewhere from the 1970s until the early 1980s led to the growth of a remittance economy (much like that of Sudan during the same period) and the emergence of a diasporic community with political clout.²⁴ However, the decline in the Middle East's oil boom led to a shrinking of remittances that had enabled many communities to survive while avoiding confrontation with the state. It was at this juncture that new converts to Wahabbi Islam, which came into the country through the Somali diaspora, clashed with the indigenous Ahmadiyya and Quadriyya *tarīqas* (religious brotherhoods), which were later expressed as interclan conflicts. The north, historically linked to the Wahabbis because of the preponderance of adherents of the Salhiyya (one of three Sufi orders that dominate Somali Islam, personified by the anticolonial hero Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan, who had studied in Saudi Arabia under Wahabbi tutelage), proved more amenable to the gradual Islamization of its society. Meanwhile, southerners viewed this

revival of faith-centered conflict as a continuation of internal differences among Somalis.²⁵

The growth of Islamic charities, established by adherents to local *ariqas* as well as new Somali converts to Wahabbism, loosened the hold of state institutions on both urban and rural communities.²⁶ These Islamic charities proved adept at evading the reach of the state and competed with Western nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), whose links with corrupt governmental institutions rendered them useless to the majority of impoverished Somalis struggling to survive on the margins of the state.²⁷ Such factors created a new political space that linked Somalis to the outside world and highlighted their subaltern relationship to the West. They also displayed the potential for political renewal and religious redemption in the revival of Islam.

In an environment where the boundaries of the Somali body politic had been shattered by violence, chaos, famine, and the ineffective yet disturbing presence of foreign troops, Somalis divided along clan lines, ideologies, and religious *ariqas* throughout the 1990s. They were plunged into a Hobbesian world, where communities were turned against each other in the pursuit of power, resources, and legitimacy. Submerged historical conflicts, which had been subordinated to the larger goals of pan-Somalism and nationalism, reemerged with the collapse of state institutions and superpower patronage. Such forces had held the country together for three decades. The north-south divide—between the former British Somaliland and Italian Somalia—exploded into full force, bringing with it the religious-cum-clan cleavages that had characterized the two regions' relationship in the colonial and post-colonial period.²⁸ Thus the "globalization" of Somali political and ethnoregional conflicts was accelerated by the UN-sponsored and US-led humanitarian intervention in 1992. This resulted in numerous new security challenges for the Somali state, the region, and the international state system.²⁹

By the turn of the twenty-first century, thousands of Somalis had fled to neighboring countries, spilling over the country's borders and presenting numerous security and economic challenges to the host countries.³⁰ Inside the country Somalis did not fare better, as they were victimized by the arbitrary violence meted out by warlord-directed youth gangs known as Mooryan,³¹ which, like the Sudanese Janjaweed, vied for control of territory and resources. As the Somalis became ungovernable, their traditional modes of consensus no longer functioned; so too did the universalizing ethos of Islam prove unable to unify the nation. Islamists continued to succeed in communal reconstruction projects, but they did not attract international attention until the events of September 11, 2001. Following this event, it was common for US policymakers to consider all radical Islamists as security threats.

On September 26, 2001, Al-Itihad al-Islami (Islamic Union), which had been in existence since the 1980s, was put on the US list of terrorist organizations, as well as the Somali company al-Barakat, a financial clearinghouse for diaspora remittances to the homeland using the age-old network of disbursement known as *hawala*.³² It appears that policymakers lumped the Islamists together as a "terrorist threat" without regard to their objectives or actions. They proved unable to decipher the factors that would result in either the "fusion" or "fission" of Somali communities.³³

Somalia, lacking a political center and beset by vying warlords supported by their regional and international supporters, demonstrates a key feature of a highly globalized society where "political space and political community are no longer coterminous with national territory, and national governments can no longer be regarded as the sole masters of their own or their citizens' fate."³⁴ If Somalis cannot effectively lead their country out of this morass and if the United States and the international community remain unwilling to contemplate a new role other than a watered-down version of encirclement by neighboring allies, they risk alienating Somali citizens inside and outside the country. In doing this, they lend credence to the call from militant Islamists for an Islamic alternative to Somalis' Hobbesian existence. It remains apparent that the key to reducing the multiple security challenges posed by an unstable Somalia lies within the Somali nation. US relations with other states in the Horn—notably Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Eritrea—also need to be conducted with an awareness of regional dynamics, particularly in light of the practice of incumbent regimes arming dissidents in neighboring countries.³⁵

In Ethiopia, the reduction of Soviet aid to the Marxist regime in the late 1980s gradually weakened the regime's capacity to win the war against the coalition of Ethiopian and Eritrean armed opposition groups. The regime took harsh reprisals against the Ethiopian officers who launched an abortive coup in 1989. The brutality against the coup makers had the unintended effect of turning the usually stalwart Ethiopian society against the regime's heavy-handed approach and fueled the wars in Eritrea and the central part of the country that had dramatically escalated in 1988–1989. The rural majority, from whose ranks were drawn the soldiery of the Ethiopian Armed Forces, quietly withdrew its support from the regime's unitary policies. Desertions became more frequent in the army, as well as defections to one of the guerrilla groups with bases in the northern, central, and southern parts of the country.

The US involvement in negotiations between the warring parties provided much-coveted legitimacy for the Ethiopian and Eritrean guerrilla groups and altered the balance of power between the Menghistu government and its opponents. A number of factors contributed to the establishment of new regimes in both areas and, in the case of Eritrea, a new state:

(1) the demise of the Soviet Union and its attendant consequences for client states, (2) the guerrilla groups' abandonment of their anti-American ideologies, and (3) rebel success in holding on to territorial gains from which the Ethiopian army was evicted. Key agreements were reached between the Ethiopian government and its main adversaries, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF)/Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), in numerous negotiations held in the United States, the Middle East, and Europe.

In May 1991, the victorious armies of the EPLF and EPRDF marched into the capitals of Eritrea and Ethiopia, respectively, after having secured an agreement for US assistance for postwar reconstruction. The guerrillas' long experience in dealing with international aid agencies as well as with the representatives of both the United States and the Soviet Union had provided them with knowledge of how to parlay their position as former so-called secessionists and terrorists to the laudable category of a "new breed of African leaders" now gaining influence on the continent.³⁶ Past recipients of Soviet largesse, they were now showered with praise as the saviors of their respective countries from both the old threat of communism and the new threat of Islamist terrorism emanating from neighboring Sudan. By 1991, it appeared that the lessons of the past, especially those learned from the cycles of US engagement and disengagement, had been understood and applied to their respective "national" interests by the Islamists of the Sudan, the warlords of Somalia, and the guerrillas-turned-statesmen of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Radical Islam, Regional Alliances, and International Terrorism

The end of Cold War competition between the superpowers in the Horn coincided with the emergence of a clash between secular and religious nationalism. This new global struggle was most pronounced with respect to how the secular state dealt with radical Islamists. Radical Muslims supported by the United States had succeeded in ousting the forces of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. The end result of this unlikely alliance between the multinational forces of the mujahidin—which included Africans—was the dissemination of jihad and the mujahidin's acculturation into the shadowy world of international terrorism.³⁷

The new leader of an international network espousing an anti-Western mentality and a radical transformation of Islam was a Saudi, Osama bin Laden, who upon his return home was regarded as a threat and stripped of his Saudi citizenship. He was granted asylum in Sudan in 1991, where he

stayed until 1996, when he moved his headquarters to Afghanistan. Bin Laden established a number of commercial enterprises as well as his global radical network, known as Al-Qaida.³⁸

Sudan's clear endorsement of radical Islam in 1993 landed that country on the US list of states harboring terrorists.³⁹ Bin Laden himself claimed to be committed to the purest form of Islam, and he asserted a preparedness to wage a holy war against its enemies, including the United States and Israel.⁴⁰ Bin Laden developed close relationships with similar groups, such as the Egyptian Islamic Group,⁴¹ also present in Sudan and associated with Hassan Turabi's Islamic Charter Front.⁴²

The increased appearance in the early 1990s of radical movements seeking to create Islamic states in such countries as Egypt, Eritrea, and Ethiopia had become a concern for the secular governments of the region. The danger became patently evident in 1995 with the failed assassination attempt against the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, in Addis Ababa on the occasion of the annual summit of the Organization of African Unity. The responsibility for the failed assassination attempt was placed squarely on Sudan's shoulders by Ethiopia, Egypt, and the United States. However, Sudan claimed it was not harboring these individuals, and therefore it could not honor a request to extradite them in order to stand trial. From that point on, relations between Sudan and its neighbors in the Horn became strained. Ethiopia and Eritrea, along with Uganda, began to support movements to bring down the Omar El-Bashir government.

The United States was also concerned over the growing influence of Sudan-based terrorist organizations, particularly Al-Qaida. In February 1996, fearing for the safety of US citizens, Washington made a decision to shut down the US embassy in Khartoum. Increased human rights violations by government troops and their associated militias led to Sudan being castigated by its European allies, which created the conditions for a possible international consensus that could strengthen the effects of US sanctions on Sudan. The National Islamic Front (NIF) government in Sudan came under increasing pressure to provide its global partners with concrete evidence that it did not harbor terrorists and that it would negotiate in good faith with the southern rebels to bring about a lasting peace. Diplomatically, the Sudanese government agreed to "turn over" bin Laden to the United States, but in fact it allowed him to move his network to the staunchly anti-American Taliban-led regime in Afghanistan.⁴³

From Sudan, bin Laden created a system of cells that dispersed throughout the Horn and East Africa. Cell members became active in local Islamic communities in the countries where they lived; they developed businesses, held jobs, got married, and had children. It was from cells on the coast of Kenya and Tanzania that Al-Qaida launched the deadly 1998

attacks on US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. When it was discovered that Al-Qaida had been behind these attacks, the United States assumed the complicity of Sudan and launched a cruise missile attack on a pharmaceutical factory near Khartoum suspected of producing key chemical ingredients that could be used in terror attacks.⁴⁴

Al-Qaida cells operated throughout the Horn and East Africa. That they were undetected by the various intelligence units of the countries in the region became evident when the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, was hit by a terrorist attack in November 2002. At the same time, terrorists attempted to bring down a plane filled with Israeli tourists with a shoulder-held surface-to-air missile.⁴⁵ The second attack drove home the urgency of developing the capacity to effectively combat terror in the region to the governments of the Horn, East Africa, and the United States. While domestic and regional horror hung over the carnage that the attempted plane bombing might have entailed, grassroots resentment grew among impoverished local communities who felt victimized by the global wars and “countertwars” taking place on their own terrain between the United States and its adversaries. The bombings of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam had clearly targeted symbols of US power in the world. The attempt on Israeli tourists in Mombasa further demonstrated how the Horn had become the site for the proxy battles between the United States, its allies, and its new enemies.

Thus far, the emphasis by analysts has been on “international terrorism,” but they have tended to ignore the impact of such issues on local communities and how grassroots perceptions affect US-Africa relations. Failure to understand local perceptions and responses to the US use of power within those countries may well have led US decisionmakers to overlook the ways by which “international terrorists” have gained footholds among the local populations. Misuse of aid funds by ruling elites resulted in the inflation of local currencies, which curtailed the buying power of the average citizen already suffering from low wages and chronic impoverishment. The George W. Bush administration’s dramatic policy shift—from one of disinterest in African affairs to the unprecedented declaration that African oil constituted “a strategic national interest”⁴⁶—left different African constituencies bewildered and feeling betrayed by the superpower that had promised to support economic development and democracy in the new millennium.⁴⁷ Although different constituencies responded differently to the socioeconomic and political reverberations of superpower policy decisions, the US support given to authoritarian regimes that joined the US coalition against “terror” may well have fueled local resentment. In doing so, the United States created the conditions for the emergence of a countercoalition of those who take umbrage at being victimized by the strategic priorities of an angry and threatened superpower.⁴⁸

US-Africa Relations After 9/11

Even though the United States has considered the Horn of Africa to be a major source of international terrorism for more than a decade, it made halfhearted efforts to combat terrorist activities until after September 11, 2001. In 2002, demonstrating its resolve to develop partnerships with the countries of the Horn and to assist them in developing the capacity to fight terrorism in the region, the United States created the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), to be headquartered in Djibouti. This collaboration represented a major shift in US policy, since until this time, relations with Djibouti had been minimal.⁴⁹ A military base was established for US personnel at Camp Lemonnier near the Djibouti International Airport. Some 1,800 troops are now based there, but an additional 400 task force troops are aboard the USS Mount Whitney, a so-called fighting command ship anchored in the Gulf of Aden. The mission of CJTF is to gather intelligence on an ongoing basis and to deter, preempt, and disable terrorist threats from wherever they may emanate in the region. Presently, the most serious threats would seem to be found in Somalia, Kenya, and Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula. In June 2003, President Bush announced a \$100 million package of counterterrorism measures to be disbursed over a fifteen-month period. Half of these funds were for coastal security programs and other border security programs, including those in Africa.⁵⁰

CJTF personnel have been involved throughout the Horn, operating as liaisons to governments and their security establishments. US military personnel work closely with counterparts in Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea, and Djibouti, providing counterterrorism training.⁵¹ In Kenya, for example, they provide support under the State Department’s antiterrorism assistance program, which has been in place since the 1980s, including detection and the disarmament of bombs, postblast investigation, VIP protection, crisis management exercises, and hostage negotiations.⁵² In addition to training, CJTF’s work involves information sharing. In the case of Ethiopia, the information shared relates to the “long porous border that exists between Ethiopia and Somalia to assist in locating potential places where terrorists may or may not attempt to cross.”⁵³ Cooperation with Djibouti grows in part out of US concerns about a threat from the activities of Al-Itihad, a terrorist group based in the former Somalia. As of early April 2004, the efforts of CJTF had begun to bear fruit. In testimony before the US House Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, terrorism expert and former US ambassador to South Africa Princeton Lyman noted that CJTF had recently reported the arrest of members of terrorist organizations in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Kenya, and Djibouti.⁵⁴

The United States now finds itself unable to ignore a new reality that emphasizes the garnering of local and regional support for what it calls the

“war on terror” and the need to acquire more reliable energy sources that would lessen its dependence on its traditional Middle Eastern oil-producing allies. Six years after the turn of the millennium, the United States finds itself supporting ruling elites who are manipulating US strategic interests in order to consolidate their objectives of security and access to resources.⁵⁵

The Horn’s geostrategic significance for US national interest during the Cold War has not receded. Rather, it has attained an important economic dimension with the development of Sudanese oil and the threat that global terrorists will close off access to new sources of energy. This convergence and divergence of domestic, regional, and international interests have led to the formulation of policies that may engender more conflict and therefore result in policies inimical to the US quest for secure access to energy sources and the elimination of the new threat of international terrorism. Contemporary “terrorists” in the Horn have taken the place of the previous “communist threat.”⁵⁶ This changed situation has prompted countries in the region to pass antiterrorist legislation and to issue public pronouncements that they are willing partners in the global war on terror. Since 9/11, the United States has increased its delivery of technical and military assistance to its allies in the Horn, predicated on their “willingness” to sign on to the US strategic priority of “combating global terror.”⁵⁷

Although some Africans might grant the urgency of the terrorist threat and the necessity that lay behind the alliances created during the 2001–2006 period, they nonetheless expressed doubts. For example, how is US assistance to the regimes of the Horn being utilized to “combat global terror”? What is the nexus between US aid to incumbent regimes and the security of both the states and societies of the region? Does the shift in US policy from emphasizing democratization and development (1992–2000) to securing strategic resources such as oil and enhancing the capacity of antiterrorist forces (2001–2006) signal a relapse to Cold War priorities of ensuring the stability and security of allied regimes?

At present, the United States is developing significant relationships with the countries of the Horn regarding regional and global security matters. Given the eruption of new and old conflicts that threaten to engulf the region in humanitarian crises as well as political imbroglios, US engagement—diplomatic, humanitarian, or economic—appears to be unavoidable. But in order to meet its objectives, the United States may need to revisit the not-so-distant past and reexamine lessons learned as well as lessons yet to be learned. A gross omission in the calculus of contemporary US policymakers dealing with the Horn remains the inadequate attention to the widespread problems of poverty and general human insecurity. It almost goes without saying that no state and no regime can be secure, the well-endowed antiterrorist alliance notwithstanding, if its citizens are mired in poverty and

perpetually insecure in their homes, lives, and livelihoods. The truth of that proposition is starkly evident everywhere in the Horn.

Poverty and Human Security

The countries of sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn of Africa are among the poorest in the world, with an average annual per capita income estimated at \$450. Among the countries under consideration, only Djibouti (\$900) is ranked among the middle-income countries of the world (but at the low end).⁵⁸ The other four range from Kenya (\$560) to Sudan (\$350) to Eritrea (\$160) to Ethiopia (\$100).⁵⁹ Such grinding poverty is at the heart of the human security dilemma. Poverty is closely related to a myriad of other social problems, such as disease and the lack of educational opportunity, adequate shelter, and food.

Food insecurity is intimately tied to environmental insecurity, and it is widely believed that these problems must be addressed simultaneously. An effective approach would involve a broad assault on interlinking issues of political and economic insecurity and a lack of social justice and equity throughout a given society. Food security requires that all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet their fundamental dietary needs for a healthy life.⁶⁰ Throughout the Horn, that is not the case.

Many people who live in the Horn suffer from chronic hunger, malnutrition, and dislocation brought on by natural catastrophes such as drought and flooding and manmade problems associated with war.⁶¹ Food insecurity is particularly severe in places that are being ravaged or that have recently been ravaged by civil wars and border conflicts. For example, a twenty-one-year civil war in southern Sudan created massive human dislocation and human misery in the south of the country.

In 2003–2004, Sudan had a record cereal crop, up 63 percent over the previous year’s harvest. However, over the same period a new civil war front opened in western Darfur Province, where more than 3 million people are affected and more than 1 million have been driven from their land and into exile as refugees.⁶² A recent UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) report indicates that people in the region have lost the bulk of their last harvest, and the next planting season will no doubt be negatively affected if the conflict continues.⁶³

During the thirty-year war for independence waged by Eritrean nationalists against Ethiopia, hundreds of thousands of Eritreans were driven into exile in Sudan. Since 1995, 100,000 have been repatriated by the United Nations. Most of these returnees are expected to be farmers, but they are immediately confronted with the fact that Eritrea is in the midst of a five-

year drought, and presently 2.6 million people, 60 percent of the population, face food shortages. This compares to 1.9 million who faced a food crisis in 2004. The root cause of this problem is clearly related to war—the war for independence and the more recent border war with Ethiopia. The border war has been over since 2000, but the Eritrean government remains on a military footing, stretching its meager resources in order to be prepared for the possible renewal of fighting. This situation naturally affects the ability of the government to address problems of food insecurity and poverty.⁶⁴

Civil unrest in the former Somalia is also at the heart of a current food security crisis. It is estimated that at least 123,000 people in the area face a food security crisis, with 95,000 people in a “critical emergency situation.” The main reason for this situation is a serious shortfall in the production of cereal crops.⁶⁵ A deeper examination of the food security crises, though, points to the larger issues of the absence of sovereignty, little coordination of the institutions of governance, and the inability of the current regime to obtain regional and international recognition. With sovereignty and the right to rule being contested by different groups and with these groups vying for international aid as well as recognition, US policy on Somalia has tended to fail to take the wider dimensions of the food security crisis into account. It focuses solely on humanitarian aspects and disregards the role of Somali society and its particular forms of democratic institutions.⁶⁶ As a consequence, it is unable to face up squarely to the failures of its 1992 intervention, which culminated in the withdrawal of US and UN forces in 1993–1994.

In 2003, Ethiopia experienced its worst dry spell since the devastating 1984–1985 drought and famine, in which 1 million people died of starvation. In this most recent drought, 14 million people were at risk of famine and malnutrition; that compares to 1 to 3 million in the average year. The food crisis was the result of the interplay of many factors:

- inadequate and erratic rains over short and long rainy seasons, which resulted in widespread crop failure in eastern and southwestern Ethiopia
- slow recovery from the 1999–2000 food crisis that impoverished many communities
- a rapid rise in grain prices
- the lack of short-season produce
- a shortage of seeds
- significant livestock deaths, and poor terms of trade for live-stock
- deterioration in the nutritional status of people living in the affected area⁶⁷

Another factor that must be taken into account is the historical inappropriateness of Ethiopia’s agrarian system.⁶⁸ Berhanu Abegaz argues that the

agrarian systems set up by the imperial as well as the Marxist regimes in Ethiopia led to a failure of the national economy and thus to abject poverty in rural areas. He goes on to argue that two-thirds of children are malnourished, and nearly half of the population falls below the national poverty line.⁶⁹

During the border conflict with Eritrea, the international donor community did not respond as readily to the food security needs of Ethiopia as the situation demanded. Although Ethiopia’s relations with donors had improved by 2003, other factors have placed a drag on development and consequently food security (for example, Ethiopia’s heavy debt burden, tensions over the final demarcation of the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the slow pace of trade liberalization, and charges of continued violations of human rights by the EPRDF government).

Given the warming of relations between Ethiopia and the United States, how has the United States responded to the current crisis of food security in Ethiopia? In late October 2002, the United States declared a disaster in Ethiopia as a result of the continuing drought situation. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) famine early warning system has noted a seventeen-year trend of insufficient rainfall in Ethiopia that has had a negative impact on crop production.⁷⁰ In 2003, the United States provided Ethiopia with almost a half billion dollars in food aid, accounting for half of the total donor contributions. However, this sum must be considered against the backdrop of Ethiopia’s non-food development assistance needs. Over the same period the United States provided Ethiopia with only \$55 million in nonhumanitarian assistance, and only \$6 million of that was for agricultural development.⁷¹

Donors and the Ethiopian government alike realize that Ethiopia’s problems with chronic famine are never going to be dealt with adequately unless its underlying causes (for example, poverty, poor health care, education, infrastructure, water, roads, soil erosion, and so forth) are addressed simultaneously.⁷² One Ethiopian official, Tewolde Egziabher of the Ethiopian Environmental Protection Authority, recently asserted that the Western donor community was in part responsible for the slow progress the country was making toward food self-sufficiency. For example, he said, Western governments and international financial institutions insist that government get out of the business of controlling the food supply and leave this task to the private sector.⁷³ In the process, according to one report, the Ethiopian government is being prevented from building granaries and food depots that could store grain from one year to the next.⁷⁴

The gap between US humanitarian assistance and developmental assistance to Ethiopia is obvious to even the casual observer. As noted earlier, what seems to drive US involvement in Ethiopia, as well as in the Horn in general, has more to do with perceived US national security interests related to international terrorist threats than with Ethiopia’s real needs. Ethiopia has

developmental needs at least equal to its security needs. It receives about \$1 billion a year in development assistance from all sources. It is estimated that to begin to see real progress, the country would need to receive at least \$5 billion in international development assistance each year.⁷⁵

Conclusion

In the context of the changed global environment since the end of the Cold War, the Horn of Africa has assumed renewed importance in the foreign policy calculations of the United States. International terrorists may find fertile ground in countries such as those located in the Horn of Africa, plagued by chronic poverty, underdevelopment, and social inequalities. It is imperative that the United States denies international terrorists the opportunity to use poor countries as incubators for their destructive agenda. Given the current circumstances, both the United States and the countries of the Horn should enter into a wider partnership to overcome vulnerabilities these countries face in coping with insecurity and lack of development.

More specifically, both the United States and the countries of the Horn must come to see the problems of political insecurity and human security in the region as being critically intertwined.⁷⁶ Poverty and underdevelopment inhibit not only the development of political democracy but also economic progress and human security in general. Unless these two dimensions of the security threat emanating from the Horn are simultaneously acknowledged, neither problem will be adequately addressed. It is interesting and important to note that the United Kingdom and France have gone on record making African poverty and environmental degradation as top priorities during British prime minister Tony Blair's tenure as the president of the Group of Eight (G8) in 2005.⁷⁷ Blair has promised to take the lead among the leaders of the major industrial powers to work toward the complete cancellation of African debt, not only for the countries most heavily indebted, but for all African countries. Doing so would involve increased trade with African countries and increased development assistance. The Bush administration has indicated that it is willing to be a part of this movement.⁷⁸

Although the United States has signed on to the Millennium Development Goals and set up the Millennium Challenge Account and Corporation, the requirement of strict conditionalities being applied to countries wishing to take part in its programs serves as an obstacle to the effective implementation of its ambitious goals.⁷⁹ Clearly, the policies of rich countries toward poor ones must be dedicated to enhancing all aspects of poor countries' security: physical, political, economic, and human. The United States and its partners in the G8 are key to the success of any efforts in this direction.

Currently, the United States is working with several countries in the Horn to improve their ability to root out and fight international terror in their region. Military and police officials are acquiring new skills, equipment, and technological know-how for this effort, and the United States is coordinating its own antiterror activities in the region. Even so, while increased attention is being paid to halt the spread of international terror in the Horn, much less is being done to address the problems of poverty, underdevelopment, and social inequalities. To be sure, these problems are enormous and not as easy to address as the military and intelligence challenges. Yet, unless international donors such as the United States make a concerted effort to commit substantial material, technical, and human resources, the root causes of domestic conflict and international terrorism in the region will continue to be major drags on political and economic development and democracy and thus on human security. Even if the international community makes the necessary commitment, not much progress can be anticipated unless the political and economic elites in the region demonstrate the necessary political will to put the needs of their citizens first, backed up by good governance and effective policymaking.

Notes

1. Although the definition of "the Horn of Africa" is contested, for our purposes we define it to include Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Somalia(s), and Sudan. We are aware of the wider political definition of the Horn, which includes contiguous countries such as Kenya (which has played a major role as a mediator in the various conflicts that have spilled over to East Africa), but have limited our analysis to the core members of the region.
2. See Jim Fisher-Thompson, "Panel Makes Recommendations to Fight Terrorism in Horn of Africa," US Department of State News, December 6, 2004, <http://alliafrica.com/stories/printable/200412060187.html>. This article refers to a conference held at Harvard University, November 4-6, 2004, titled "Examining the 'Bastions' of Terror: Governance and Policy in Yemen and the Horn of Africa." At that event, three former US ambassadors to Ethiopia recommended that the United States and its European and African allies attempt to facilitate cooperation among the countries of the Horn and Yemen in the global war on terror. That was said to be extremely important because of the strategic proximity of these countries to the "bastions of terrorism."
3. Policy analyst Michael Clough has pointed out the need for a real rather than rhetorical commitment from the United States to its African allies in order to extricate both from the impasse left behind by the Cold War. For details, see Michael Clough, "The United States and Africa: The Policy of Cynical Disengagement," *Current History* (May 1992): 195-197.
4. For more details, see Edmond J. Keller's analysis of how the preponderance given to ideological factors, combined with a lack of historical knowledge on interregional relations, led to outcomes that proved negative for US national interests. The same analysis holds true for contemporary relations between the United States and the countries of the Horn, which have led to similar "blindness" on policy-

making in Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. For details, see Edmond Keller, "United States Policy on the Horn of Africa: Policymaking with Blinders On," in Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar, eds., *African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 178.

5. See Harold Marcus, *Ethiopia, Great Britain, and the United States, 1941-1974* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

6. See Jonathan B. Bingham, *Shirt-Sleeve Diplomacy: Point 4 in Action* (New York: John Day Company, 1953).

7. Eritrea was an Italian colony from 1890 to 1941, an occupied territory administered by the British from 1941 to 1952, and a unit federated with the Ethiopian Empire from 1952 to 1962. The federation was abrogated when Ethiopia annexed Eritrea in 1962.

8. See David Newsom, "Testimony," in *Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Ethiopia* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1970). The United States also supplied Ethiopia with counterinsurgency training and on-the-ground advisers in connection with helping suppress the Eritrean movement for national independence after 1962. See George W. Bader, "Testimony," in *Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Ethiopia* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1970).

9. See Jeffrey Lefebvre, "Moscow's Cold War and Post-Cold War Policies in Africa," in Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 208.

10. This policy of using third parties with interests in the region in turn provided opportunities for anti-American regimes like Libya to provide support for political and armed groups considered hostile to US interests. For details, see Robert Anton Mertz and Pamela MacDonald Mertz, *Arab Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983), 86-88.

11. See Henry Jackson, *From the Congo to SOWETO: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960* (New York: William Morrow, 1982). Separate agreements were signed with each country. Kenya at the time had a mutual defense agreement with Ethiopia, and the agreement with the United States was seen by Kenya as more of a hedge against the communist threat.

12. Peter Woodward, *The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 151-159.

13. The size of the Ethiopian military grew from 54,000 in 1977 to more than 300,000 a decade later; by 1991, the Ethiopian army was estimated at more than 600,000 troops. Somalia's army swelled from about 32,000 in 1977 to 65,000 in 1987. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976/77-1989/90).

14. For more details on the Sudan People's Liberation Army Movement (SPLA/M), see Edgar O'Ballance, *Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 1956-1999* (London: Macmillan, 2000), 133-134.

15. The evolution of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood into the National Islamic Front, a movement with connections to the army, security, and other governmental institutions as well as bases in the wider community due to the establishment of charity organizations and Islamic banks, forced the Umma Party and the Democratic Union Party to present themselves as orthodox Islamic parties rather than representatives of the diverse constituencies that make up present-day Sudan.

16. Kamal Osman Salih, "The Sudan, 1985-1989: The Fading Democracy," in Peter Woodward, ed., *Sudan After Numeiri* (London: Routledge, 1991), 50-71.

17. Baggara is a collective name applied to the separate cattle-herding tribes of Sudan and eastern Chad. The Baggara peoples identify with their tribal names more often than with the all-encompassing term *baggara*. There are at least seven principal tribes, which include the following: Humir/Messiria, Rizaygat, Shuwia, Hawazma, Ta'isha, and Habbaniya.

18. The word *janjaweed* in Arabic means "man on horseback with a gun." Janjaweed militia are mainly members of nomadic Arab tribes who have long been at odds with Darfur's settled African farmers. The term has been synonymous with "bandit." Currently these militia are utilized by the central government of Sudan to fight Darfur rebels, and as such they are referred to as "patriots."

19. Ahmad Alawad Sikainga, "Northern Sudanese Political Parties and the Civil War," in M. W. Daly and Ahmad A. Sikainga, eds., *Civil War in the Sudan* (London: British Academic Press, 1993), 85. For an interesting interpretation of the Janjaweed as the transmogrification of the tradition of camel-raider banditry in Darfur (with counterparts in the Horn such as the Abyssinian *Shifita*), see Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim's essay, "Janjaweed: What's in a Name?" *Sudan Studies Association Newsletter* 24, no. 2 (September 2004): 15-16.

20. In addition to *Southern Sudan*, the term *South Sudan* is also being used to refer to the region beyond the *sudd*—the marshy swamp area—where conflict has raged since 1982. For details, see Jok Madut Jok, *War and Slavery in Sudan* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), xiv. For a comprehensive understanding of the multiple conflicts in Sudan, see Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* (Oxford and Bloomington: James Currey and Indiana University Press, 2003).

21. Donald Petterson, *Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict and Catastrophe* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999), 3.

22. *Scientific socialism* is a term that describes an ideological wish more than a reality. Proponents of this type of ideology use the term *scientific* in order to justify various political and economic measures designed to catapult societies from agrarian economies to state-based industrial economies by nationalization policies, the establishment of parastatal organizations, and so on.

23. In the mid-1980s, Rome provided a haven for some dissidents of the Barre regime and became a place where political networking was possible among the different diaspora communities.

24. For details, see Peter D. Little, *Somalia: Economy Without a State* (Oxford and Bloomington: James Currey and Indiana University Press, 2003), 147-150.

25. It is also worthwhile noting that the northern herders, who had long provided Mecca with sheep and goats for the sacrifice that marks the end of the annual pilgrimage (Hajj) often found religious renewal in their contact with Wahabbism. The political and economic impacts of this interaction require more scholarly scrutiny and would yield interesting insights into the layers of conflict characteristic of the modern Somali nation, which has not proven to be immune to internal and external friction despite its vaunted homogeneity.

26. Among those who could be characterized as converts to Wahabbi Islam are Jamaca Isnaax and the Salafi, established in the late 1970s and 1980s. See Roland Marchal, "Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War," in Alex de Waal, ed., *Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 119-120.

27. For a detailed discussion on state-society relations, see Donald Rothchild

and Naomi Chazan, eds., *The Precarious Balance: State-Society Relations in Africa* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987). See also John Markakis, *Resource Conflict in the Horn of Africa* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996), on the victimization of pastoralists by economic and political globalization of the Horn.

28. The parallels between the legacy of the Mahdiyya and that of the Salhiyya led by Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan have long been ignored. As a result, policymakers have focused on clan-style sociopolitical configurations while leaving aside the differences among the *tariqas*, which have given rise to different types of Islamist mobilization in the twenty-first century. For details, see Said Samatar, ed., *In the Shadow of Conquest: Islam in Colonial Northeast Africa* (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1992), 40–45, 61–70.

29. For a detailed discussion on the policies that led to international intervention and the collapse of the Somali state, see Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, eds., *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995).

30. The Somali diaspora, which has now developed an advanced transnational network of remittances and communications, is found in the farthest corners of the globe. The resilience of the community and its capacity to cross national borders testify to the permeability engendered by globalization as well as the threats posed by unregulated immigration and xenophobic reactions to the plight of displaced persons. For an understanding of the impact of social modes of human organization of contemporary Somalis, see Nuruddin Farah, *Yesterday, Tomorrow: Voices from the Somali Diaspora* (London: Cassell, 2000).

31. The Somali Mooryan differ from the Sudanese Janjaweed in that the former are visible in urban youth areas, whereas the latter are unacknowledged by their patrons. Both, however, have arisen because of the lack of employment and will present an enormously difficult challenge after the termination of hostilities, when their services will no longer be required.

32. Marchal asserts that to date no “hard evidence of any link between *al Barakaat* and *al Itrihad* [is] available” (“Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War,” 142). In fact, a recent BBC article titled “Telecoms Thriving in Lawless Somalia” presents a scenario where both clan and *hawala* networks cooperate in establishing communications in a stateless country. For details, see <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4020259.stm>. Nevertheless, *hawala*, the informal remittance networks, has been uncritically portrayed as an integral part of “Islamic terrorist networks” by popular works of literature published in the aftermath of 9/11. For a discussion of the linkage between global terrorist networks and *hawala*, see Douglas Farah, *Blood from Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror* (New York: Broadway Books, 2004), 113–116.

33. The words *fusion* and *fission* capture the complexity of Somali society and the futility of the readiness of US policymakers to believe that “terrorists have a haven in Somalia.” On the one hand, Somali society is fragmented, with many fissioned. On the other hand, Somali society is also unified in its sense of feeling besieged by its neighbors, the outside world, and the United States. It does not make sense to lump together all Islamists as terrorists because they seek to establish a sovereign state guided by Islam as a political and religious doctrine.

34. David Held and Anthony McGrew, “Globalization,” in Joel Krieger, ed., *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 326.

35. Salih Booker suggests an approach to “unbundling” Africa that in the case of the Horn has great relevance. For details, see “Thinking Regionally About

Africa,” *Current History* (May 1998): 200.

36. For a detailed discussion of this transformation of guerrillas into US allies, see Marina Ottaway, *Africa's New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction?* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1999).

37. Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 160.

38. See Princeton Lyman and J. Stephen Morrison, “The Terrorist Threat in Africa,” *Foreign Affairs* (January–February 2004): 77.

39. For years, Sudan had permitted groups perceived by Israel to be terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Islamic Group, to have offices in the country.

40. For details, see Roland Jacquard, *In the Name of Osama bin Laden: Global Terrorism and the bin Laden Brotherhood* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 35.

41. For the ideological underpinnings of political assassinations by Egyptian extremists, see Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 197–204.

42. For a concise analysis of the role of Turabi in the Islamization of Sudanese society and politics, see Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 178–184.

43. The Sudanese “offer” to turn bin Laden over to the United States is said to be a concocted “fable.” See Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (New York: Free Press, 2004), 140–142.

44. It was later revealed that the plant was actually producing aspirin. See David Shinn, “The Horn of Africa in International Terrorism,” Special Lectures, the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, DC, January 29, 2002, 3.

45. See Gilbert Khadiagala, “Kenya: Haven or Helpless Victim of Terrorism,” in *United States Institute of Peace Special Report: Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*, Special Report 113 (January 2004). The author notes that the core of the leadership of the Kenyan cell is made up of citizens of the Gulf states, Somalia, Pakistan, and the Comoro Islands. As in other cells, these individuals have assimilated into the local cultures of coastal communities.

46. A quote attributed to Assistant Secretary of State Walter Kansteiner during his visit to Nigeria in July 2002. For details, see Michael T. Klare and Daniel Volman, “Africa's Oil and American National Security,” *Current History* (May 2004): 226.

47. US promises of a balanced policy linking democracy and development were the basis of its policy in the post-1989 period. For details, see Herman Cohen, *Superpower Intervention in Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 16.

48. Olivier Roy makes a very important point about an “Islam of resentment” that is the basis for “acculturation.” We concur with Roy in his assertion that “Islamism is a discourse of protest and adaptation, thus of transition.” However, we go further to assert that if local discourse and perceptions are left unexamined, vast majorities of moderate Africans may join the “coalition of the resentful,” leaving US interests to be handled by discredited regimes. That is dangerous because the efforts to build up local intelligence to be used in the war on international terrorism depend greatly on the willingness of inhabitants to cooperate with state and intelligence authorities. The bombing of Mombasa provides an excellent reminder. For details, see Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 198–199.

49. To establish this relationship, the United States invested \$8.7 million. See Andrew England, "U.S. Officer Vows That the U.S.-Led Task Force Will Eradicate Terrorism in Horn of Africa," Associated Press Worldstream, December 17, 2002.
50. The US campaign against international terrorism in Africa recently opened a new front in the Sahel, a region that military officials fear could become the next base for Al-Qaida. Special operations forces are training military units from Mauritania to the Horn and providing them with pickup trucks, radios, and global-positioning equipment. See Craig S. Smith, "U.S. Training African Forces to Uproot Terrorists," *New York Times*, March 11, 2004.
51. Significantly, such a close relationship has not developed in the collapsed state of Somalia. The reason given is that there is no viable government there.
52. See Jim Fisher-Thompson, "Africa Countering Terrorism with U.S. Help, Official Tells Congress," US Department of State News, April 2, 2004.
53. See "Ethiopia: U.S. Force Commander in Horn of Africa Interviewed." UN Integrated Regional Information Network, Nairobi, February 21, 2003.
54. Fisher-Thompson, "Africa Countering Terrorism with U.S. Help, Official Tells Congress."
55. For a detailed analysis of resource-driven conflicts in this subregion, see John Markakis, *Resource Conflicts in the Horn of Africa* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996).
56. Even NIF-ruled Sudan turned over "terrorists" associated more with the ideological rivalry of the two superpowers during the twentieth century, while enabling the new generation of "global terrorists" to slip through its security net-work and seek asylum outside the continent.
57. See "African Policy," White House, www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/Africa.
58. Per capita income for lower-middle-income countries ranges from \$736 to \$2,935.
59. World Development Indicators database, World Bank, July 2003. Statistics for the collapsed state of Somalia are not available.
60. L. A. Thirupp, *Critical Links: Food Security and the Environment in the Greater Horn of Africa* (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 1999), 2-7.
61. It should be noted that poor and malnourished people are extremely susceptible to diseases such as HIV/AIDS, cholera, measles, malaria, and tuberculosis.
62. In an effort to explain Sudan's food insecurity, one has to factor in corruption in the food distribution process, as well as the lack of easy access to credit for individual farmers and farm communities.
63. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Press Release: Better Harvests Improve Sub-Saharan Africa's Food Supplies but Millions Still Need Food Assistance* (Washington, DC: FAO, April 7, 2004).
64. See Raymond Thibodeaux, "Bittersweet Homecoming for Thousands of Eritrean Refugees," <http://voanews.com>, April 4, 2004.
65. See Food and Agriculture Organization, *Press Release*.
66. Peter Little, *Somalia: Economy Without a State* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 167.
67. See Sue Lautze, Yacob Aktilu, Angela Raven-Roberts, Helen Young, Girma Kebede, and Jennifer Leaning, "Risk and Vulnerability in Ethiopia: Learning from the Past, Responding to the Present, Preparing for the Future" (Medford, MA: Feinstein International Famine Center, June 2003), 21; and USAID, "Food Security Crisis in Ethiopia and Eritrea," <http://usaid.gov/press/release/2002>.
68. For a detailed discussion of Ethiopia's agricultural potential and the lack of fit of the numerous regimes' policies, see Dessalegn Rahmato, "Neither Feast nor

Famine: Prospects for Food Security," in Abebe Zegeye and Siegfried Pausewang, eds., *Ethiopia in Change: Peasantry, Nationalism, and Democracy* (London and New York: British Academic Press and St. Martin's Press, 1994), 192-193.

69. See Berhanu Abegaz, "Escaping Ethiopia's Poverty Trap," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 42, no. 3 (September 2004): 314.

70. See US Agency for International Development, "USAID Ethiopia Drought Fact Sheet #15, FY 2003," August 27, 2003.

71. See CARE, "Breaking the Cycle in Ethiopia: CARE Reaffirms Commitment to Overcome Poverty," August 6, 2003.

72. Ibid. In August 2003, the president of CARE asserted, "With adequate resources, we can break the cycle of poverty in Ethiopia. We can help farmers and pastoral communities to recover from the current acute crisis by providing food assistance, seeds, tools, veterinary medicines, and livestock. And if donors provide funds for projects with five-to-ten-year timeframes, we can also address the roots of Ethiopia's poverty and vulnerability."

73. Barry Mason, "World Hunger Report: 842 Million Starve in the Midst of Plenty," *Axis of Logic*, www.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/article_5998.shtml.

74. Ibid.

75. Professor Jeffrey Sachs, head of the Columbia University Earth Institute and the UN Millennium Project, has argued that instead of donor assistance being doled out without any consideration of the real needs of the country, the equation should be turned around and based not on what donors are willing to give but on what the real needs of the country are. See "Ethiopia: Interview with Jeffrey Sachs, UN Special Adviser on Millennium Goals." IRINnews.org, <http://irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=35634>.

76. Policymakers dealing with the countries of the Horn are therefore urged to look at security from what Buzan has called the "integrative perspective." For details, see Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991).

77. See "Prime Minister Addresses Business Leaders: Tony Blair's Keynote Speech About Africa and Climate Change to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland," www.britainusa.com/sections/articles/show.asp?ArticleType=I&Article_OD=6260. Blair has noted that in order for the Millennium Development Goals to be met, the international community must mobilize at least \$25 billion in development assistance for Africa alone by 2015.

78. See "Africa Policy," White House, www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/africa (June 2003).

79. Ibid.