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US Policy in the Horn: Grappling with a Difficult Legacy

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Africa has never been central to US foreign policy. As Peter Schraeder comments, "US policies from the founding of the American Republic in 1789 to the end of the Cold War have been marked by indifference, at worst, and neglect, at best. Africa has been treated as a *backwater* in official policymaking circles, compared to the time and resources allocated to other regions considered to be of greater importance."¹ Others have argued that the United States has consistently followed a "hands off" policy toward Africa, only becoming engaged with African countries when it was perceived by US policymakers that the country's vital national interests were at stake.² Accordingly, a consistent axiom of US foreign policy has been that the United States has no permanent friends or enemies, but only permanent interests—a line of argument that is supported by the evolution of US policy toward the countries of the Horn of Africa.³ In this case, when the United States could benefit geostrategically by "engaging" or "disengaging" with one or another country of the Horn, it took the necessary steps to do so.⁴ Moreover, US engagement in the Horn has depended largely on its foreign policy needs with countries outside of Africa.

Prior to the onset of the Cold War, the only significant American presence in the Horn was in Ethiopia. But, at the height of the Cold War, as US interests shifted toward countering the Soviet Union's efforts to secure a physical presence in the region, its key alliances shifted to the countries surrounding pro-Soviet Ethiopia, such as Sudan and Somalia. With the end of the Cold War, alliances have once again shifted, and, after a brief period of disengagement, the United States appears now to be reengaging with the countries of the Horn in the new war on international terrorism. As in the past, the reengagement by the United States in the Horn is selective, as demonstrated by the different levels of engagement with Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the former Republic of Somalia. Moreover, the type of engagement by the United States has also changed and been refined. In its recent

engagement, rather than direct support to government, the United States focuses on providing logistical support and military training to ostensibly enhance peacekeeping capacity, direct and indirect mediation of interstate and intrastate disputes, and support for democratic forces in civil society and democratic institution-building. The reason for this shift, as in the past, has more to do with perceived US vital national interests—*outside Africa*—than with a desire to help African states to help themselves.

This chapter traces the involvement of the United States in the Horn— from engagement, to disengagement, to reengagement. It begins with outlining the rationale behind the US engagement with Ethiopia at the start of the twentieth century—highlighting the domestic consequences of such engagement. The chapter continues by documenting the effect of changes in US foreign policy guidelines on its relationship with Ethiopia and the other countries in the region and the relationships among the countries of the Horn. As this chapter shows, the policies of US involvement in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia—despite conflicting strategies and objectives—have slowed the development of democracy, worsened the political and military insecurity in the region, exacerbated the proliferation of arms, and contributed to the silencing of civil society.

Ethiopian-US Relations: From Strategic Ally to Strategic Enemy

Ethiopia has always been the cornerstone of US policy toward the Horn of Africa. Although the United States and Ethiopia have had diplomatic relations since 1903 and concluded treaties of arbitration and conciliation as far back as 1929, a close relationship did not emerge until after World War II.⁵ In the aftermath of the Italian fascist occupation of Ethiopia, which lasted from 1936 to 1941, the British reinstated Emperor Haile Selassie and until 1952 assisted him in administering part of modern-day Ethiopia. The Ethiopian emperor determined that events like the Italian occupation should not be repeated and felt that his best means for ensuring this was to secure the close support of the United States, the rising superpower. For its part, the United States had, since the early 1940s, covered a base at Asmara in Eritrea, the Kagnaw Station,⁶ along the Red Sea, where it could establish a link in a worldwide radio communications network.

The establishment of the Kagnaw Station and securing access to the Red Sea led to significant involvement by the United States in the foreign and domestic policies of the Horn. In particular, US engagement led to its embroilment in the guerrilla wars waged by Eritrean nationalists that were supported by radical Arab regimes. This involvement led to a much longer and sustained involvement in domestic and regional affairs than US strategic

planners had ever expected. At its peak, US policy centered on keeping Haile Selassie in power and keeping the region relatively stable and free from communism. Thus, the strategic interests of the United States came to intersect historically with Haile Selassie's domestic and regional interests. The United States, with only occasional reluctance, committed arms and other military assistance to help the emperor put down internal upheavals and fend off the irredentist designs of ethnic Somalis in the Haud and Ogaden.

The partnership with the United States began in the early 1950s with two agreements signed in May 1953 that formalized the new relationship between the United States and Ethiopia: the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and the Agreement for the Utilization of Defense Installations Within the Empire of Ethiopia. Following these agreements, the United States, in effect, guaranteed Ethiopia's security. In fact, by 1975, the total US military assistance to Ethiopia amounted to almost \$280 million. Besides receiving military assistance from the United States after 1953, the Ethiopian military benefited from the presence and activity of a US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), which was established in 1954 to work with the Ethiopian military down to the battalion level. By 1970, the total number of MAAG personnel exceeded 100. American personnel were also involved in officer training at two Ethiopian military academies.⁷ In addition, over the same period, Ethiopia received \$350 million in economic aid in the form of technical assistance, capital goods, and food. This assistance contributed significantly to the military capacity of the Ethiopian state, as well as to its efforts at economic development.⁸ With these economic and military arrangements, the United States and Ethiopia started as mutually dependent partners, advancing each other's foreign and domestic goals in the subregion. US aid guaranteed that the emperor could step up the modernization of his military and use it as a more effective instrument of domestic control, while the United States had use of the Kagnaw Station.

US assistance also helped Ethiopia advance its military and political influence in the subregion. Significantly, a series of secret agreements between the two governments from 1960 until 1964 resulted in the modernization and dramatic expansion of the Ethiopian military. The stated purpose was to prepare Ethiopia's defenses for the assumed Somali threat.⁹ In addition, between 1953 and 1976 some 3,978 Ethiopian military personnel—more than half of all African soldiers in the same category—were sent to study in the United States, at a cost of almost \$23 million.¹⁰ The United States also supplied Ethiopia with counterinsurgency training and advisers to help suppress the Eritrean movement for national independence after 1962. It is difficult to form an accurate estimate of the extent of that help since the US government tried to conceal its role by referring to the advisers

as members of "Civic Action Teams."¹¹ The scale and character of US military involvement in Ethiopia served as the catalyst for the development of a low-intensity arms race in the Horn involving Eritrean liberation movements, Somali irredentists, the government of Somalia, and Ethiopia. However, in this era prior to the Brezhnev Doctrine, which established the Krenlin's commitment to support fledgling socialist states, these insurgency movements could not gain ground, as Ethiopia held the balance of power in the Horn.¹² Later, this chapter shows that with the advent of the Cold War and the proxy wars fought between the two superpowers, instability in the region began to escalate.

Still, despite the close Ethiopian-US relationship, its permanence was always in doubt. In order for it to continue, each side had to perceive that the benefits outweighed the costs. By 1970, with only eight years left on the lease of the Kagnew Station, the United States was beginning to reconsider the necessity of its presence in Ethiopia. The Eritrean region had become extremely unstable and the strategic need for maintaining the Kagnew Station seemed less compelling. The Soviet Union was now building an Indian Ocean fleet, and the Western powers felt that it was necessary to counter that challenge on equal terms. With this in mind, the United States leased the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia from the British government in 1966 and made plans for the construction of a large naval facility to be completed on the island by 1973. Accordingly, from 1971 to 1976, the number of US personnel based at the Kagnew Station was trimmed from over 3,000 to less than 40.¹³ Indeed, by 1976 it was obvious that the United States perceived that its interests had ceased to mesh with Ethiopia's, adding to the vulnerability of the faltering imperial state.

Haile Selassie was deposed on September 12, 1974, and succeeded by what was to become a Marxist-Leninist military junta. The social revolution that followed Selassie's fall created widespread unrest both at the center of the country and in the periphery. The new regime resorted to what ever means it felt necessary to maintain itself in power and to pursue its "scientific socialist" development strategy, while at the same time trying to maintain good relations with the United States. Even as the need for the Kagnew Station diminished, a US presence in Ethiopia remained valuable to the administration of President Gerald Ford. Because of its proximity to the Middle East, Ethiopia continued to be regarded as a key to blocking the full implementation of the Soviets' Brezhnev Doctrine in the region.¹⁴

As the social revolution unfolded in Ethiopia, the international community began to decry what appeared to be gross violations of human rights on the part of the new regime. This issue became an electoral campaign issue in the 1976 US presidential campaign. The ultimate victor in that election, Jimmy Carter, declared that his administration would not provide military assistance to countries like Uruguay, Argentina, and Ethiopia because of

their human rights records. Even though the previous administration of President Gerald Ford had not acted firmly toward Ethiopia because of its poor human rights record, beginning in 1975 it did delay the delivery of badly needed military aid. With Carter about to take office in January 1977, the complete cutoff of US military aid to Ethiopia became a real possibility. The junta was desperate, and it turned to Turkey, Yugoslavia, China, Vietnam, Libya, and Czechoslovakia for its arms needs. In December 1976, the Soviet Union signed an agreement with Ethiopia for the delivery of \$100 million in military supplies.¹⁵ At the time, however, Ethiopia appeared to have no intention of completely turning away from the United States, but merely sought to supplement US military aid.¹⁶

Realignment and US Policy Toward the Horn of Africa: 1977-1989

On assuming the US presidency, Jimmy Carter moved swiftly to establish human rights as the centerpiece of his foreign policy, with serious consequences for Ethiopia and the region. On February 25, 1977, the United States announced that because of continued gross violations of human rights by Ethiopia and other governments, US military aid to those countries would be reduced over the following six months. Simultaneously, the United States and other Western countries began to apply economic pressure on Ethiopia.¹⁷ Sensing that the Ethiopian military regime was vulnerable because it was waging internal wars on multiple fronts, the army of the Republic of Somalia invaded the Ogaden in support of the irredentists' claims of Somalia living there. In six months, Somali forces came to occupy a large portion of southeastern Ethiopia. However, with the help of Soviet, Cuban, and Yemeni forces, the Ethiopians were able to recapture their lost territory by early 1978.

US-Ethiopian relations broke down entirely in April 1977, when the government of Ethiopia demanded that the United States completely pull out of the Kagnew Station, end all of its MAAAG activities, and cease any other official activities except for maintaining its embassy. The embassy staff was to be reduced to only essential personnel. This move seems to have been a direct reaction to Carter's announcement that the United States would move closer to Somalia—it was the beginning of Carter's "encirclement strategy," designed to entice Ethiopia's neighbors with military and economic development aid. Separate agreements were reached with Kenya, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Oman¹⁸ to allow their territories to be used as staging grounds for the US Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), which could be used to project US military power into the Middle East and Persian Gulf.¹⁹ In late 1981, Operation Bright Star, a mock RDF exercise, was

staged in the region, causing Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Libya to enter into an alliance and declare their intent to jointly resolve to repulse any efforts by the United States or its proxies to intervene in their affairs.

Inadvertently, Carter had provided an opening for the Soviets to adopt Ethiopia as a client state in the Horn in addition to their involvement in Somalia—fueling instability in the subregion. Initially, the Soviets continued to supply arms to both Somalia and Ethiopia, while attempting to negotiate peace between the two sides. The United States responded by intensifying its own efforts to woo Somalia away from the Soviets. The strategy was twofold: (1) to consider direct military assistance to Somalia and (2) to encourage indirect aid to that country from third-party countries in the region friendly to the United States (such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan). The result of Carter's policy shift, and its continuation by the Reagan administration, resulted in increasing the instability in the region by sparking an arms race that would facilitate interstate wars and encourage insurgency movements in the region. In the end, this policy proved to be fatally flawed and contributed to escalation of an arms race from which the Horn has never recovered.

After Carter lost his bid for a second term, his successor, Ronald Reagan, expanded the encirclement strategy in the Horn, and throughout the 1980s, the two superpowers postured against one another through their respective clients. From 1977 to 1987, the armies of the countries in the Horn grew tremendously. The size of the Ethiopian armed forces grew from 54,000 in 1977 to more than 300,000 a decade later. Somalia's army swelled from about 32,000 in 1977 to 65,000 in 1987. The growth of the military of Sudan was less dramatic (numbering 52,100 in 1977 and 58,500 in 1987, with fluctuations reaching as high as 71,000 in 1981 and 1982),²⁰ but in the 1980s, internal military activities grew significantly as the Ethiopian-supported Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) was able to capture and control large areas of southern Sudan. In the same period (1977–1987), the Ethiopian defense budget grew from \$103 million to almost \$472 million. From 1977 to 1985, Somalia's defense expenditures rose from \$36 million to \$134 million and Sudan's from \$237 million to \$478 million. This level and pattern of growth in military expenditures could not have taken place if the countries of the Horn had not been able to rely upon superpower patrons for increasing levels of military assistance. It is estimated that throughout the entire greater Horn region—Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and Kenya, excepting Djibouti and Eritrea—from 1981 to 1987 a total of \$7.5 billion in weapons were delivered.²¹

While the Soviet Union and the United States jockeyed to check each other, the countries of the Horn—in particular Somalia, Ethiopia/Eritrea, and Sudan—seem to have been inspired primarily by internal conflicts rather than by the need to protect the border zones of each country. In

Somalia, the devastating defeat of the Somali army and the irredentist Western Somali Liberation Front in the Ogaden War (1977–1978) caused internal opposition to surface against Somali president Siad Barre. Over the next decade, the internal crisis escalated until the entire country was in turmoil; Somalia has remained without a central government since 1991, after the defeat of Barre. The 1980s also witnessed an increase in the capacity and efficiency of the Eritrean liberation movements and internal conflicts in Sudan.

After being routed by the Ethiopian army in the late 1970s, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) was able to regroup and by 1987 began to make serious inroads toward liberating Eritrea from Ethiopian control. The success of the EPLF was enhanced by the fact that the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPRDF). (The TPLF remains the most influential party in the EPRDF.) In May 1991, Ethiopian president Mengistu Haile Mariam fled into exile, and his army of 600,000 collapsed. On May 24, 1991, EPLF guerrillas entered Asmara, extending their control from their rural strongholds to the capital. Four days later, on May 28, the EPRDF was able to seize control of the capital, Addis Ababa, without significant resistance. Many of the weapons used by the Ethiopian army at this time found their way into the black market in Somalia and Djibouti, as fleeing soldiers sold their arms to anyone willing to buy them and in the process, fueled and expanded the military activities of Afar rebels fighting the government of Djibouti.²²

External forces fueled Sudan's internal conflict. Sudan had been a client of the Soviets until the failed communist coup in 1971 by General Jaafar al-Nimeri prompted the government to develop closer ties to the United States and to present Sudan as its trusted ally. Nimeri made regular trips to Washington, pledging to help the United States build a "high wall against communism" in the Horn. For its part, the United States not only provided Sudan with substantial military and economic aid, but also supported Sudan in its dealings with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Concurrently, Nimeri moved quickly to make peace with the SPLA, which had been waging war against the government of Sudan since the 1970s, and to moderate his policies.

Despite Nimeri's efforts to reach out to the SPLA and acquiesce to internal demands, he began to lose support on the domestic front. Hardline Islamists began in 1977 to demand that the Addis Ababa Agreement, which had ended Sudan's civil war in 1972, be reviewed, and also that the government be reorganized on the principles of *sharia*, or strict Islamic law.²³ By the early 1980s, Nimeri had begun to capitulate to the demands of the fundamentalists, even as his regime and his military were seen by the general population as weak and dependent on the United States. Nimeri was overthrown in a popular uprising in the spring of 1985. The new civilian

regime of Sadiq al Mahdi expanded the policies designed to make Sudan an Islamic state. However, it too was overthrown by the Sudanese military in June 1989 with the support of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Sudan moved closer to radical Islamists in the Middle East. That move caused the United States to condemn Sudan for harboring terrorists.

Selective Reengagement in US Policy on the Horn of Africa

President George H. W. Bush's Africa policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s established the parameters for the shift in US policy from disengagement at the time of the ending of the Cold War to one of limited and selective engagement. The shift was partly a response to the humanitarian crisis in the Horn after the collapse of the Republic of Somalia, and partly based on the United States' perceived need to establish a broader strategic presence in the region. The United States thereafter increased its role as a long-standing mediator in the region. In fact, the disengagement of the Soviet Union from Ethiopia that had begun in 1989 was facilitated by the United States' role as the most visible arbiter of conflict in the Horn of Africa.²⁴ This signaled a shift from the fifteen-year-old policy of engaging with the countries surrounding Marxist Ethiopia for the purpose of containing the Soviet Union in the region.

However, the terms of reference for the United States' reengagement changed; in the post-Cold War period, the United States linked development aid to the recipient's record on human rights, political reform, and economic growth. By 1991, US assistant secretary of the Bureau of African Affairs, Herman Cohen, could announce the new US ultimatum of "no democracy, no aid."²⁵ Such statements celebrated the "triumph" of liberalism over communism; however, the ultimatum was only applied selectively in Africa; subsequent actions by the United States—which followed the earlier patterns—did not effectively adhere to the tenet that only "democratic" regimes would get aid. As such, the United States was perceived as only supporting a limited version of democracy, raising suspicions of its motives in the region and limiting the progress of political reform.

In the end, US reengagement did not produce the democratic transformations hoped for by the US government or the civil society groups in the Horn. In Eritrea and Ethiopia, wholesale acceptance by the United States of Isaias Afewerki and Meles Zenawi as "new leaders" obscured the human rights abuses and political marginalization taking place. In Somalia, the absence of a cohesive leadership over the territory led to the fragmentation of the nation into fiefdoms under rival warlords and thwarted US efforts to identify any acceptable "new" leader. Meanwhile, in Sudan, the Bashir-Turabi

regime was avowedly anti-American, thus necessitating the severance of diplomatic ties and the imposition of sanctions on the country. Viewed from a regional perspective, US reengagement yielded mixed results owing to a misreading of the realities on the ground. Notably, the factors that the United States hailed as harbingers of reform—namely, new leaders in Ethiopia and Eritrea and changes in Sudan—were not as significant as initially hoped. The lessons learned from that experience have yet to be translated into coherent guidelines by Washington.

The first stumbling block to US reengagement with its traditional ally, Ethiopia, emerged with the growing dissension of numerous Ethiopian political groups who felt marginalized by the EPRDF and challenged the authenticity of US claims to uphold democracy. Ethiopian opposition groups demanded a guaranteed forum to enable them to participate openly in the politics of post-1991 Ethiopia.²⁶ The EPRDF's refusal to accommodate dissent from groups other than those within its constellation of liberation groups signaled difficulties on the road to democracy and undermined the assertion by the United States that democratic reform would be rewarded with development assistance. The second difficulty in the reengagement phase occurred when the new Eritrean government refused to adopt US-supported democratic ideals and suppressed civil society's voice.

US Engagement with the New Ethiopia

In 1991, the reengagement of the United States with transitional Ethiopia was premised on the commitment of the new leadership, spearheaded by the EPRDF, to political reform, sustainable economic development, and multi-partyism. During their first two years, Ethiopia's new rulers made a smooth transition from rough-edged guerrillas proclaiming Marxist principles to statesmen conversant in the lexicon of democracy. The United States provided aid for postwar economic reconstruction as well as constitution-making, civic education, and establishment of civil society groups. The Inter-Africa Group, staffed by cosmopolitan Ethiopian returnees with close ties to Ethiopia's political groups, was regarded as an ideal interlocutor between the new regime and a population unwilling to trust the "nationalist" credentials of what had been considered a ragtag army bent on dismembering "historic" Ethiopia.

Ethiopia's new regime, however, did not provide evidence of democratic reform. The Ethiopian elite were especially suspicious of the cooperation between the two major guerrilla armies—the EPRDF and EPLF; the Ethiopian intelligentsia viewed it as an ominous sign that the democratization process would, once again, become hostage to the interests of ruling African elites and their US supporters. Notably, the TPLF/EPRDF and EPLF

also considered their alliance a short-term tactical strategy, rather than the platform for regional cooperation that it was made out to be by Afro-optimist scholars and members of the US policymaking circles.²⁷

In particular, ordinary Ethiopians viewed the "two cousins"—EPRDF's Meles Zenawi and EPLF's Isaias Alwerki (also from the Tigrigna ethnic group)—as imposing their vision on the majority of non-Tigrigna-speaking Ethiopians. This rearticulating of old communal hostilities and dynastic rivalries between Amhara and Tigrigna peoples provided an undercurrent of unresignedness about the new leaders.²⁸ To Ethiopian communities without any affiliation to either the Amhara or Tigrigna ethnic group, their exclusion from the top decision-making strata of the EPRDF led to both a festering mistrust of the claims to pluralism in Ethiopia and a questioning of American support for Ethiopia's "democracy."²⁹ Finally, the United States' embrace of the EPRDF—which excluded other political movements—led to a sense of betrayal by a majority of Ethiopian nationalists who regarded the United States to be not a guarantor of democracy but a "patron" of military victors. When the EPRDF-led coalition government announced a proposal to establish a federal system based on ethnicity and to acquiesce to the EPLF's demand for an international referendum to enable Eritreans to determine their political destiny, the majority of Ethiopian nationalists—who opposed secession and disapproved of ethnicity as a basis for federalism—reacted with hostility. Both proposals were regarded as a sellout of the nation's patrimony: a unified Ethiopian legacy consolidated by nineteenth- and twentieth-century emperors (the chronology of which has been elaborated in Chapter 5 by Dominique Jacquin-Berdal and Aida Mengistu). The Ethiopian elite argued that it too should be allowed to have a voice in the decision on Eritrean secession, even though Eritrean independence was a *de facto* reality by late 1991. The US and UN backing for the referendum, scheduled for April 1993, added to the bitterness of Ethiopian nationalists who had lost countless lives in defense of what they perceived as their country's territorial integrity.³⁰

Despite the continued pressure of Ethiopian opposition groups, the government of Meles Zenawi reiterated that war did not necessarily result in unity. The resentment of much of the Ethiopian public did not deter the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) from pursuing its vision of a viable "ethnic" federal system minus Eritrea.³¹ With yesterday's "enemies of the nation" at the helm of government, citizens swallowed their bitterness and anxiously sought assurances that the United States would guarantee the emergence of a democratic system. Their fears were well grounded since both the TGE/EPRDF in Ethiopia and the new government in Eritrea continued abductions of political opponents as well as incarcerations of new dissenters and former officials of the Mengistu government. As the EPRDF held its first, albeit flawed, national elections in 1992, there was no

follow-up by the United States on the threat to use aid as a deterrent to incipient dictatorship. Ethiopian opposition groups, inside and outside the country, brought this omission to the attention of the architect of the US ultimatum, Herman Cohen. His response was that "while Ethiopia has a long way to go before it has true democracy, the Ethiopian political system has become far more open and liberalized than under Mengistu."³² A high level of sympathy for the "new leaders" hid any anxieties that policymakers may have had of Washington's commitment to the new policy of engagement and political reform.³³ The ultimatum of "no democracy, no aid," enunciated so confidently in early 1991, was quickly deflated as the United States came to accept new regimes that emphasized the virtues of development over true democracy and human rights. The view of political stability as the sine qua non for development—a key concern of realpolitik-centered policymaking of the Cold War era—reemerged as the new regimes formulated the basis for reestablishing alliances in the post-Cold War period.

US Engagement with Eritrea

Eritrea took pride of place in both Bush's and Clinton's African policy. The Provisional Government of Eritrea (PGE)/EPLF got things done efficiently and enjoyed a high level of legitimacy from the majority of the populace. Unlike the TGE in Ethiopia, the PGE/EPLF regime was unencumbered by any pretense of setting up a coalition government. The victorious EPLF leadership had no plans to include the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)—which it had defeated with the help of the TPLF—in the governance of the new country.³⁴ The marginalization of the ELF, previously associated with Pan-Arabism and some Islamist movements, was accepted by both American and longtime Eritrean supporters of the EPLF. In fact, the forthright rejection by Eritrea of "alien" modes of governance and confidence in establishing a "self-reliant" Eritrea was considered a positive factor, which endeared them to policymakers who had been exhausted by other African leaders' patrimonial demands. The liberated populace of Eritrea, too, embraced the victors. Indeed, no one questioned (at least in public) why the EPLF delayed immediately declaring independence until 1993.

Although the EPLF was a beneficiary of US aid from the outset, its official rhetoric reflected a brash contempt for US visions of democratic development, regarded as "imperialist." In Eritrea, the US ultimatum of "no democracy, no aid" was blunted by the PGE's refusal to accept \$26 million from USAID claiming that any conditionalities, even establishing democratic institutions, were "crude enticements" camouflaging an imposition of American power.³⁵ The general public was more welcoming of the US presence—after eliciting some form of apology that the United States was wrong to side with the Ethiopian Empire in the 1950s—and continued to be

hopeful that the brash new leaders would bring about a dynamic economy and an accommodating political framework for its citizens. The majority of urban dwellers perceived the reengagement with the United States in a positive light, due to nostalgia for the "good old Kagnaw days"—which they associated with a busy port and steady revenues generated by activities from the US base, rather than with a realignment with the United States' ideological values.

Despite the United States' contribution to the democratization project,³⁶ Eritrea's rulers continued to be discomfited by the liberal democratic rhetoric of US policymakers, and "capacity-building"—a term which Eritrean policymakers interpreted to mainly mean "infrastructural development/economic employment"—remained a term they preferred over "democratization" in Eritrea. This unwillingness to buy into even the language of the new policy continued to lead to tension in US-Eritrean relations. Then, in February 1994, the EPLF recast itself as a new political organization and announced to its civilian citizens that it no longer operated through its clandestine (Maoist/Marxist) party and renamed itself the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). Voting for the new leadership was conducted using electronic methods—which enhanced the PFDJ's image, but did nothing to allay grassroots fears that behind the carefully orchestrated transformation was a realignment of EPLF hardliners that pushed out more moderate nationalists.

However, the Eritrean government continued to move away from any semblance of a Western-style democratic system. Nonetheless, US officials who were aware of these developments remained blinded by the persuasiveness of the rhetoric of the regime, which now called—privately—for a developmental model of state-building borrowed from Singapore, South Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Political reform was also slow; the PFDJ drew out the constitution-making process over three years, from 1994 to 1997, but failed to implement it as the supreme law of the land despite its ratification by the Constituent Assembly in May 1997.³⁷ Indeed, even a decade after its liberation from Ethiopia, the PFDJ government had yet to deliver even the minimal concessions to democratic institutions that would enable its citizens to participate in national affairs, other than to rubber-stamp the National Assembly's resolutions.

Nonetheless, US officials who were aware of these developments appeared to be persuaded by the government's rhetoric. Indeed, despite the Atwerki regime's close ties with the PRC, the muzzling of democratic institutions, and nagging questions about PFDJ officials' tours to Iraq and Iran, US policymakers believed in the American ideological victory over those of their communist rivals, choosing to ignore these issues. The silence of the United States on these developments in Eritrea also discouraged grassroots organizations and civil society groups from overtly criticizing the regime's

policies of monopoly over *all* aspects of citizens' lives; the PGE/EPLF was rarely criticized openly for the micromanagement of all national and civil society projects. As a result, citizens and the budding civil society groups became emblematic symbols of a transitional Eritrea while in reality they were shut out from meaningful participation in national reconstruction projects. Fear of governmental reprisal as well as the culture of conformity that was deeply entrenched in postwar Eritrea discouraged civil society groups from becoming dynamic actors contributing to the nation's democratization. Notwithstanding audible voices of reason cautioning US officials against neglecting the aspiration of citizens—such as that of Stephen Morrison, who sought balance between the new "hands-on" policy and linkage to leaders and fulfilling the US promise of "no democracy, no aid,"³⁸ the two representatives of a "new generation of African leaders" emerged as the heroes of their nations and were portrayed in the United States as hard-working and self-reliant personalities—a far cry from unsavory dictators like Mengistu, Siad Barre, and Idi Amin.

Thus, even though US observers were aware that the elected Ethiopian regime was adept at orchestrating public support for its policies,³⁹ there were many other developments that were seen as concrete results of US investment in democratization of the country. For instance, the government of Ethiopia ratified and implemented its constitution (with numerous lapses and arbitrary arrests) and could boast of two (flawed but nevertheless well-executed) elections.⁴⁰ In Eritrea, criticism was staved off by reminding the United States and other Western donors of their "collective guilt" in colluding with Ethiopia to derail Eritrean aspirations for self-determination.⁴¹ Ultimately, however, US credibility as a supporter of democratizing governments was eroded due to the undemocratic policies enacted by the new governments of Atwerki and Zenawi.

Things Fall Apart: A New War and Old Hostilities

The eruption of the border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998 finally shook US policymakers and scholars of the Horn of their optimism and also brought out the degree of anti-American sentiment in the region.⁴² The US government realized that given the opportunity to select their pace, the Eritrean guerrillas-turned-statesmen would not gradually embrace an appropriate democratic framework.⁴³ In particular, the Eritrean team accused the United States of being a power which believes in "easy fixes and in ramming solutions down our throats."⁴⁴ It appeared that earlier insistence by the United States to delay Eritrea's declaration of independence in May 1991 had fueled an already existing reservoir of anti-Americanism.⁴⁵ Only when, in September 2001, Isaias Atwerki imprisoned hundreds of dissidents, including

a group of parliamentarians asking for the implementation of the 1997 Constitution and two national employees of the US Embassy in Asmara did the United States finally rebuke the slow pace of democratization. The Eritrean government angrily dismissed the US protests—leading to a souring of relations.

A shift in Eritrean attitude and a moderation of its anti-American rhetoric only emerged in 2002 when the PFDJ leadership, facing internal outrage and diminishing aid, sought to maintain its hold on power by inviting the United States to use its ports as military bases for the war on terrorism.⁴⁶ Yet, despite the Eritrean government's attempts to regain US bases (and thereby strengthen its hold on power to counter grassroots opposition to the constant state of mobilization and rise of organized opponents to its hegemony), Gen. Tommy Franks, commander of the US Central Command at the time, laid to rest rumors that Eritrea had been "chosen" by the United States as the optimal host for US counterterrorist campaigns. General Franks stressed that US troops are "based in Djibouti. They are not based in Eritrea."⁴⁷

At present, the United States has considerably disengaged from Eritrea—even with its geostrategic location for conducting the war on terrorism. In contrast, the US military presence in Djibouti by late 2002 involved 3,200 troops being trained in desert warfare in anticipation of a war with Iraq.⁴⁸ By 2004 the abrasiveness of the PFDJ's anti-American rhetoric as well as its refusal to either release US Embassy employees or bring to court the constitutional dissidents held incommunicado since 2001 resulted in a hardening of US policymakers against their most unreliable ally in the Horn. The beginning of a shift of US policy from selective engagement to one of disengagement in Eritrea was finally signaled by the ousting of Eritrea from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and placing its vast remittance network under official scrutiny.⁴⁹

Whither Somalia?

Somalia, after a decade of anarchy, remained a "no man's land" until the preparations for counterterrorism jogged "official" memories that an assessment of US policy toward the collapsed state of Somalia was overdue.⁵⁰ The United States began its reengagement with Somalia with a humanitarian intervention to address the conflict-induced famine and displacement in the country. More recently, Somalia has become an important ally in the US war on terrorism.

Somalia's economy collapsed in the aftermath of the Ogaden War of 1977, fueling preexisting domestic dissatisfaction with the patronage politics of the Barre regime. A number of armed opposition groups were established in this period and increased in the 1980s, providing the impetus for

what would later emerge as warlordism in Somalia.⁵¹ Ethiopia's expulsion of the Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1991 led to that organization's confrontation with the regime's troops and the devastation of the northern regions associated with this group. Secession by a portion of the former British Somaliland, which has yet to acquire international recognition after a decade of separate existence, can be traced to the heavy-handed attempt by the government in Mogadishu to retain control. The combination of a massive famine in the countryside and havoc caused by Siad Barre's troops precipitated the decline of his rule. In January 1991, Siad Barre's regime collapsed, but his clan-based loyalist guards continued to fight, further pushing the country into anarchy in which armed marauders established their own zones of rule. By 1992, Somalia's descent into Pyrrhic anarchy was hastened by a split between the two cofounders of the United Somali Congress, due to a unilateral declaration of a provisional government by Ali Mahdi—a step vehemently opposed by Gen. Mohamed Farah Aideed. Somalia's starving population was caught in the crossfire between the two warlords, and an estimated 300,000 died in the sporadic violence while the famine claimed even more lives. It was under such circumstances that humanitarian intervention as a preemptive step to counter the spiraling violence in the region—due to refugees and arms transfers—was introduced as a key element of American policy in the post-Cold War period.

The Bush administration committed itself to Operation Restore Hope (ORH)—a humanitarian intervention—after the UN Security Council passed Resolution 794 on December 3, 1992, authorizing the deployment of 24,000 American troops to secure ports and roads to ensure the delivery of famine aid to Somalis.⁵² ORH was envisioned as a stopgap measure to use American troops to secure roads and ports to enable international delivery of food aid to the starving population. Once this objective was met, ORH was intended to be phased out and to be replaced by UN forces whose objectives were to be to facilitate negotiations between the armed groups in order to reestablish state institutions and social order. US disengagement from ORH was to begin after the UN completed training personnel to take over the peacekeeping forces.

American troops landed on the shores of Mogadishu, in a highly publicized humanitarian campaign, on December 9, 1992, and began securing areas for delivery of food aid. Initially, ORH succeeded in meeting its objective of delivering needed supplies, and friendly Somali crowds welcomed US troops until firefights erupted between the warlords who quickly demanded to control the disbursement of the food aid. Thus, in order to deliver the food to the areas controlled by the warlords, the United States and the UN were forced to acknowledge the strongest of the warlords as key political players in a chaotic Somalia. On March 26, 1993, the UN passed Resolution 814 to establish UNISOM II, signaling the beginning of

the transition from a purely humanitarian operation to the political phase of seeking to reconcile the key actors.⁵³ In June, Aideed's forces unleashed a propaganda war, which portrayed continued presence of alien groups as an attempt to recolonize the country, and urged Somalis to resist external meddling. The angry war of words was followed by an ambush of a Pakistani contingent of UNISOM II on June 5, which resulted in the death of twenty-four Pakistanis and the wounding of three Americans and one Italian. The following day, the UN passed Resolution 837 authorizing UNISOM II to launch a military response against Aideed's forces in retaliation for the ambush.⁵⁴

The following four months (June to October 1993), devoted to a man-hunt of Aideed and his collaborators, irrevocably altered the original mandate for US reengagement in Somalia based on the motivation of meeting humanitarian needs. With the change of mission, the population no longer welcomed US troops. Differences on how to manage the escalating tensions between UN and US officials also were exacerbated by the lack of coordination between US troops and those of UNISOM. On October 3, 1993, three American helicopters were shot down by Aideed's militia members, killing 18 soldiers and over 300 Somalis.⁵⁵ The Clinton administration was forced to end the US-led humanitarian intervention abruptly amidst growing public anger.⁵⁶ US troops were evacuated by March 1994, and one year later, the UN followed suit, ending the brief interlude of US reengagement with Somalia.⁵⁷

After ignoring the former Somalia and its problems for almost a decade, the United States has begun some limited reengagement because of its own perceived national interest in combating international terrorism.⁵⁸ As an outgrowth of the new attempt to establish relations with Somali leaders that would allow the United States to monitor and engage would-be terrorists, the United States has, since the fall of 2002, been participating in negotiations designed to lead to the reestablishment of an internationally recognized Somali state.⁵⁹ Peace talks sponsored by IGAD in 2002, with UN, EU, Arab League, AU, and US backing, continued in the Kenyan town of Eldoret. The talks included not only political elites, but also a record number of women, youth, and civil society organizations. The United States is a signatory to the Eldoret Framework, providing not only observers but also financial assistance for the talks. Given the unstable politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle Eastern countries, the United States now realizes that political stability and peaceful social relations in the Horn are essential to international security.⁶⁰

However, the inclusion of Somalia in the counterterrorist agenda in early 2002 indicates, once again, that the United States seeks engagement without necessarily having a clear picture of the motivations of state and nonstate actors in the Somali(s). Tellingly, the congressional hearing of February 2002 summarized US goals as follows:

The short-term goal of course is to remove the terrorist threat that might or might not exist in Somalia. . . . A mid-range goal, but one we are starting to work on now, is looking at how Somalia threatens the region and the neighborhood. The third area is . . . long-term challenges and long-term governance issues. Where is Somalia going to be in 4, 5, 6, 10 years from now?⁶¹

"What is to become of Somalia and Somalis?" was the question asked by the anticolonial Somali religious leader Muhammad Abdille Hassan—dubbed the Mad Mullah by the British more than 100 years ago⁶²—and is now being asked by the United States. Although the United States stepped in to fill the vacuum left behind by the Soviet Union in 1977, the emphasis was on short-term access to counter the loss of disengaging in Ethiopia, without replicating the investment of resources that had gone to building a political and economic relationship. The more recent engagement of the United States in the 1990s—the first in the Horn after the Cold War—demonstrated the untested policy of multilateral intervention and the use of force in the fulfillment of humanitarian objectives.

US policymakers' tendency to view US-Somali relations as secondary to its other relations in the Horn has led to a miscalculation of Somalia's importance to the stability of the Horn. The notion that the recalcitrant Somalis (first as "primitive pastoralists," then "irredentists," and lastly, "terrorist-hosting warlords") can only be handled through regional proxies, such as Ethiopia, Djibouti, or Eritrea, must be reassessed to understand the consensus of Somali leaders that anarchy is preferred to subordination to neighboring states.⁶³ While the attention of the world was riveted on the exodus of frustrated US and UN forces, the northern part of the country quietly seceded from the defunct Somali state, triggering annexationist impulses from Djibouti and Ethiopia countered by Eritrea and Sudan.⁶⁴

Sudan: To Disengage or Reengage?

In contrast to Ethiopia, US policy in the Sudan has historically rested squarely on its utility as a geostrategic base to defend US interests in the Middle East. US policymakers were constantly frustrated in their efforts to end the North-South conflict by Sadiq-al-Mahdi, who implemented sharia law and initiated a rapprochement with Libya. Despite the numerous internationally and regionally sponsored peace initiatives to resolve the North-South conflict, the Khartoum government remained impervious to any US ultimatum or enticement until 2000. Nevertheless the United States maintained a steady but low profile in the efforts to ensure open channels for humanitarian aid supported by a domestic faith-based constituency, which lobbied strongly on behalf of southern Sudanese victims of Khartoum's policy of "arabization and Islamization."

The “blindness” in this part of the Horn were the inability or unwillingness of US policymakers to acknowledge the grievances of the non-Arabized and non-Islamic communities inhabiting both the North and South. Inadequate US attention to the SPLA leader, John Garang, reflected an unbelievable degree of indifference to the outrage felt by southerners as well as the Nuba and Fur communities, stigmatized by the experience of slavery and treated as second-class citizens. The victims of Afro-Arab racism were united by their desire for socioeconomic and political equality. They were also divided by their religious beliefs that made any idea of rule by a non-Muslim anathema to some. Garang’s insistence on a secular and multiethnic, united Sudan did not receive the attention it deserved. Rather, Garang’s articulation of these democratic principles—which reflect the emphasis on multi-partyism and secularism—were treated with disbelief both by Northerners and Southerners.⁶⁵

To date, despite the protocols and agreements leading up to the wide-ranging Comprehensive Peace Agreement (December 2004),⁶⁶ US policymakers have emphasized the religious divide while skirting the “racial divide” separating opponents and supporters of the Khartoum regime. Whether it was out of deference to domestic sensitivities or blindness to the existence of an ideology of Afro-Arab supremacy over those populations claiming only Africanness, US policymakers could only reiterate the need for negotiations and humanitarian aid. SPLA’s American Christian supporters appear to be filling the gap by portraying the conflict as both a spiritual and racial struggle for the emancipation of Africans from their bondage to Muslim Arabs. Debates about self-determination and contentious issues such as ownership of oil resources, while looming large in the background, remain muted.

Notwithstanding the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, both the regime in Khartoum and the SPLA and associated allies inside and outside the country must still contend with their domestic and foreign political opponents. The failure of the avowedly Islamic National Islamic Front (NIF) led by the strongman Gen. Omar Bashir, the president of Sudan, and the inscrutable intellectual Hassan al-Turabi to impose a radical Islam in Sudan has led to social unrest as well as growing dissent and instability. The NIF regime’s open support of Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War cost the Sudanese government dearly—both diplomatically and financially. It joined the list of rogue states and its loan applications were rejected—although the closure of the US Embassy in Khartoum in January 1991 was rescinded in March 1991 after the NIF indicated willingness to normalize relations. In response, US policy did not become more proactive and provide direct support for the SPLA. Rather, the United States opted to use its regional allies to encircle it and ostracize it in regional dealings.⁶⁷ The older framework of containment put in place to combat the spread of communism in Africa was

reconfigured to tackle the new threat to US interests—Islamic fundamentalism. Although the “freezing out” of Sudan by the Ethio-Eritrean alliance worked for five years, the eruption of the border war between the two erstwhile allies led to a rapprochement between Sudanese and Ethiopian leaders, effectively breaking the earlier isolation. The Clinton administration and its “new breed of African policymakers” pursued a policy of isolating the Sudanese regime and rewarding the Ethiopian and Eritrean regimes.⁶⁸ The discovery of oil in southern Sudan, where American economic interests coincided with the Bush administration’s quest for a diplomatic victory in Africa, led to a pursuit of a dual policy of selective sanctions and economic linkages. The giant of the Horn—which had always taken second place to Ethiopia in US policymakers’ hierarchy—thus emerged into the twenty-first century as owner of resources considered valuable by the United States.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement has provided hope for a peaceful resolution of this long conflict. The agreement has been praised for addressing both parties’ primary concerns, laying out the principles agreed to and a framework for a transitional process, and further elaborating on two contentious issues in the negotiations: relations between the state and religion and the right to self-determination for the peoples of southern Sudan.⁶⁹ In particular, it acknowledges that Sudan is a multiethnic, multi-racial, and multireligious society, providing a legitimate framework for the exercise of freedom in the articulation of diversity in the political and socioeconomic spheres of the New Sudan envisioned in the postconflict period.⁷⁰ Equally important, six years following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the negotiated peace plan allows for an internationally monitored referendum for southern Sudan to decide on self-determination.⁷¹

Revenue-sharing was agreed to by the two major participants in the peace process—namely the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A—in May 2004.⁷² The identification of the two beneficiaries of the revenue-sharing arrangements—which excluded other political actors, such as the rival groups in Darfur—triggered violent clashes between the Khartoum government and marginalized groups both in the West and East. The National Democratic Alliance, a constellation of opposition groups embracing traditional sectarian parties and armed groups with headquarters in neighboring Eritrea, was excluded as was also the Umma Party, which had withdrawn from the NDA. The armed groups in Darfur—the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)—were mired in their own interneine fighting, which led to the signing of separate peace agreements relating to reforms in the structures of governance.⁷³ The Abuja talks of July 5, 2005, led to a possible compromise based on the establishment of a “regional autonomy,” which would protect minorities’ landownership rights. These talks were followed by agreements for reconciliation by the leaders of the SLM/A and JEM.⁷⁴

The key lesson US policymakers learned in Sudan is that unilateral efforts—whether in the military or diplomatic arena—rarely succeed while multilateral efforts, which combine both regional and international mediators, have a better chance of doing so. Only the Sudanese government can determine to adhere to the agreement or renege on it. But its signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement provides a basis on which to possibly build a sustainable peace. The issue of choice—a democratic exercise—is the linchpin of the agreement.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

US policy in the Horn (1941–1991) reflects four decades of a “hands-off” policy with “binders on,” except where it was determined that vital US national interests were at stake. For example, to secure a listening post in Eritrea in a worldwide land-based communications network, the United States adopted Ethiopia as a client for more than two decades. Also, when the Soviet Union attempted to establish a beachhead in Ethiopia based on the Brezhnev Doctrine, the United States pursued its encirclement strategy to counter the Soviet Union in the Horn. The latest shift occurred in the fifth decade of US involvement in the Horn, and coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union. From 1991 to 2001, the United States pursued a new policy of selective reengagement, based on its own perceived strategic needs. This hands-on policy has succeeded in breaking the tradition of unconditional support for repressive client regimes but has yet to be crowned with success.⁷⁵

The United States’ inability or unwillingness to either entice or enforce compliance with its ultimatum of “no democracy, no aid” must be urgently examined, amended, or excised if the credibility of US policymakers is to be preserved in the Horn. The question that will be addressed in the near future as the United States embarks on the next phase of its war against terrorism is whether democracy will be a casualty of the new era. To date, it appears that US policymakers are cautiously seeking to maintain a balance between the linkage of democracy and development aid without necessarily sacrificing national interests. However, the United States’ declaration of the Sudanese government’s brutal repression of the rebellion in Darfur and the targeting of civilians as “genocidal” without necessarily taking the steps required by the Genocide Convention points to another troubling continuity of selective engagement.

The resistance of key actors in the international community—the UN, the AU, and the EU—to this new US role as both a “peacemaker” in one part of the Horn—southern Sudan—while waging a war of unilateral intervention

in Iraq indicates that the decade of America’s uncontested hegemony is under challenge by both traditional allies and outspoken enemies. How US national interests will be defined globally will thus lead to either the consolidation of the new hands-on policy or its replacement.

The question that the countries of the Horn must ask is: What is in it for us if we engage the United States in the region? Particularly in this era of globalization, avenues have to be found by local policy elites to clearly articulate their interests not only in terms of their individual national interests, but also in terms of regional security needs. The United States should be ready to respond positively to clearly articulated plans to strengthen the African Union as well as IGAD in their capacity to keep the peace in the region, to mediate effectively when disputes occur, and to strengthen democratic institutions and national and regional economies. For the countries of the Horn to be successful in negotiating a fair deal with the United States, they are going to have to be led by a bold, visionary, transparent, and honest leadership class that puts the popular will ahead of individual or narrow group interests.

Notes

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2. Elliot P. Skinner, “Historical Framework Paper” (Washington, DC: National Summit on Africa, 1998).
3. The Horn of Africa comprises the countries of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan.
4. Donald Rothchild, “The Impact of US Disengagement on African Intra-state Conflict Resolution,” in *Africa in World Politics: The African State System in Flux*, eds. John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (Boulder: Westview, 2000), pp. 160–187.
5. Harold Marcus, *Ethiopia, Great Britain and the United States 1941–74* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).
6. Edward Korry, “Testimony,” in *Hearings Before the US Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976).
7. In keeping with the hierarchical nature of imperial Ethiopia, Harrar Academy served the academic elite of the military, which graduated “gentlemen cadets,” and the Holeta Academy included well-trained graduates who would later resent the two-tiered military structure. Mengistu Haile Mariam, who presided over the demise of the ancien régime, was a graduate of the latter.
8. Edmond J. Keller, “United States Foreign Policy on the Horn of Africa: Policymaking with Binders On,” in *African Crises Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy*, eds. Richard Sklar, Gerald Bender, and James S. Coleman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 178–193.
9. David Newson, “Testimony,” in *Hearings Before the US Senate Subcommittee on US Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Ethiopia* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1970).

10. United States Department of Defense (US DOD), *Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction, and Military Assistance as of 1981* (Washington, DC: US DOD, 1981).
11. George W. Bader, "Testimony," in *Hearings Before the US Senate Subcommittee on US Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Ethiopia* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1970).
12. Jeffrey LeFebvre, "Moscow's Cold War and Post-Cold War Policies in Africa," in *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security*, eds. Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 208.
13. Marina Otaway, *Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 50–53.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Robert D. Gray, "Post-Imperial Ethiopian Foreign Policy: Ethiopian Dependence," *Proceedings from the Fifth International Conference on Ethiopian Studies* (Chicago, 1978), p. 807.
16. Edmond J. Keller, *Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People's Republic* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 204.
17. Colin Legum and Bill Lee, *The Horn of Africa in Continuing Crisis* (New York: Africana, 1979), p. 52.
18. Kenya and Ethiopia had already signed a defense treaty in 1964 with the specific objective of protecting their mutual borders from Somali irredentist claims over the area administered by the British colonial administrators as the Northern Frontier District. Such treaties enabled both Ethiopia and Kenya to come to each other's aid and to maintain control over their permeable borders.
19. Henry Jackson, *From the Congo to SOWETO: US Foreign Policy Towards Africa Since 1960* (New York: William Morrow, 1982).
20. Consecutive issues of *The Military Balance*, International Institute of Security Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance, 1990* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977–1989).
21. Terrance Lyons, "The International Context of Internal War: Ethiopia/Eritrea," in *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security*, eds. Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), p. 87.
22. Authors' fieldnotes: Asmara and Addis Ababa, 1991–1992.
23. Ann Mosley Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 55.
24. Herman Cohen, *Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).
25. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
26. Gebru Tareke, *Ethiopia: Power and Protest* (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 206–212.
27. John Young, *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People's Liberation Front, 1975–1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 152–159.
28. Editorials and articles as well as political cartoons in the privately owned newspapers during 1991–1994 reflected an antipathy to the vision of ethnic federalism and being "ruled" by groups that did not respect the historic unity of Ethiopia.
29. Tareke, *Ethiopia: Power and Protest*, pp. 206–212.
30. Theodore M. Vestal, *Ethiopia: A Post-Cold War African State* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1991), pp. 5–7.
31. Edmond J. Keller, "Ethnic Federalism, Fiscal Reform, Development and Democracy in Ethiopia," *Journal of African Political Science* 7 (June 2002): 21–50.

32. Cohen, *Intervening in Africa*, p. 56.
33. For a very instructive study on dictatorships and the "sympathy" for them, see Ronald Wintrop, *The Political Economy of Dictatorship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
34. Mohammed O. Abo-Bakr, *Democracy and Political Pluralism in Eritrea* (Cairo: Egyptian Office for Publication, 1998).
35. For details see Yohannes Okbazghi, *The United States and the Horn of Africa: An Analytical Study of Pattern and Process* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997).
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37. Berket Habte Selassie, "The Disappearance of the Eritrean Constitution and Its Impact on Current Politics in Eritrea," *News.Asmarino.com* (January 20, 2001, available online at <http://news.asmarino.com/Articles/2001/01/bhs-20.asp>).
38. Peter Rosenblum, "Irrational Exuberance: The Clinton Administration in Africa," *Current History* 101 (May 2002): 197.
39. Marina Otaway, *The New African Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction?* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1999).
40. See *An Eviction of the June 21, 1992 Elections in Ethiopia* (Washington, DC: African American Institute and the National Democratic Institute, 1992) and Terrance Lyons, "Closing the Transition: The May 1995 Elections in Ethiopia," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 34 (March 1996): 121–143.
41. Collective guilt in the Eritrean context is understood to mean a sense of betrayal by the United Nations, the West, and others in the international community.
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43. Most analytical scholars seem to have been disabused of any hope for democratization in the post-2000 period where human rights violations have continued unabated.
44. PFDJ, "Interview with President Isaias Afwerki."
45. Cohen, *Intervening in Africa*, pp. 41, 54. See also Okbazghi, *The United States and the Horn*, pp. 189–191.
46. Alex P. Kellogg, "War Justifies All: Donald Rumsfeld Courts a Repressive Government in the Horn of Africa," *The American Prospector Online* (December 17, 2002); Judy Sarason, "Eritrea Pushes to Get US Base," *Washington Post* (November 20, 2002).
47. "Horn of Africa: US Admits Sending More Troops," *IRIN News Org* (October 30, 2002, available online at http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=30661&SelectRegion=Horn_of_Africa&SelectCountry=HORN_OF_AFRICA).
48. See Sarason, "Eritrea Pushes to Get US Base."
49. John Oynke, "Eritrea Out of AGOA Accord," *The East African Standard* (Nairobi) (April 1, 2004, available online at <http://zete.delina.org/runzete.asp?quSt#131>).
50. Countless conferences and many prescriptions have been offered but none have yet come to terms that the body politic that was Somalia has, since its infestation by warlords, undergone a transformation so alien to the concept of modern

- states that it requires thinking outside the usual alternatives: (1) impose a leviathan, (2) bring about a victory of one warlord, or (3) let the problem be solved by any regional power able and willing to achieve the task of taming the Somali Frankenstein. For different perspectives on the Somali crisis, see Mohamed Sahnoun, *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1994); Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, *State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention and Strategies for Political Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995); and I. W. Zartman, ed., *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict "Medicine"* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).
51. The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSF) was established in Ethiopia in 1978. The Somali National Movement (SNM) and the United Somali Congress (USC) emerged after 1981.
52. UN Security Council, 3145th meeting, "Resolution 794 [Somalia]" (S/RES/794) (December 3, 1992).
53. UN Security Council, 3188th meeting, "Resolution 814 [Somalia]" (S/RES/814) (March 26, 1993).
54. UN Security Council, 3229th meeting, "Resolution 837 [Somalia]" (S/RES/837) (June 6, 1993).
55. Helen Fogarassy, *Mission Improbable: The World Community in a UN Compound in Somalia* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1999), pp. 138–140.
56. Edmond J. Keller, "Rethinking African Regional Security," in *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*, eds. David Lake and Patrick Morgan (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 310.
57. The cost of this brief reengagement has been estimated to be \$1.6 billion and the loss of 151 lives. UN, "Somalia—UNOSOM II: Facts and Figures" (available online at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosom2factx.html), accessed March 23, 2005).
58. "Somalia: No Proxy Peace," *Africa Confidential* 40 (October 8, 1999): 8.
59. J. Stephen Morrison, "Somalia and Sudan's Race to the Fore in Africa," Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, *Washington Quarterly* 25 (Spring 2002): 191. A government of Somalia was elected in Kenya in 2005 and is in the process of establishing itself in the country.
60. *Ibid.*
61. Subcommittee on African Affairs, *Somalia: US Policy Options* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002), p. 5.
62. These words are attributed to Sheikh Mohamed Abdille Hassan, a religious anticolonial leader who fought against the dismemberment of Somalia. For more details and analyses see Said S. Samatar, *Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism: The Case of Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) and Abdi Sheik-Abdi, *Divine Madness: Mohammed Abdille Hassan (1956–1920)* (London and New Jersey: Zed Press, 1992).
63. "Somalia: Building Blocks," *Africa Confidential* 40 (September 24, 1999): 7. The need for reassessment of the Somali "problem" as viewed by the realpolitik policymakers of the Cold War years has been pointed out by scholars and policymakers. For analyses on the period 1991 to 1995, see John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), p. 171. See also Ahmed I. Samatar, ed., *The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal?* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), pp. 137–138.
64. For different perspectives on the unacknowledged Republic of Somaliland, see Gerard Prunier, "Somaliland: Birth of a New Country?" in *The Horn of Africa*,

- ed. Charles Gordon (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 64–71; Abdi Samatar, "Warlord Games," *BBC Focus on Africa Magazine* 10 (January–March 1999): 26–27; Adam M. Hussein, "Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?" in *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, ed. I. William Zartman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp. 79–82.
65. For a better understanding of the racial undertones of the conflict and its intentional and unintentional misreadings see Cohen, *Intervening in Africa*, pp. 64–66; John Garang de Mabior and Mansur Khalid, *John Garang Speaks* (London: KTI Ltd., 1987), pp. 91–125; Bona Malwal, "Sudan's Political and Economic Future: A Southern Perspective," in *The Horn of Africa*, ed. Charles Gordon (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 97. The leader of the SPLA is now Salva Kiir, following the death of John Garang in a helicopter crash in southern Sudan in July 2005.
66. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed on December 31, 2004, by the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army, is the collection of agreements and protocols reached by these two parties from July 2002 until May 2004. These agreements and protocols include the Machakos Protocol (July 2002), the Agreement on Security Arrangements (September 2003), the Agreement on Wealth Sharing (January 2004), the Protocol on Power Sharing (May 2004), the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile States (May 2004), and the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei Area (May 2004). The Comprehensive Peace Agreement also includes the Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire Arrangement and the above protocols' and agreements' implementation modalities.
67. M. Ehasan Ahari, "Rogue States and NMD/TMD: Policies in Search of a Rationale?" *Mediterranean Quarterly* 12 (May 2001): 84–87.
68. Rosenblum, "Irrational Exuberance," pp. 196–197.
69. See "The Conflict in South Sudan and the IGAD Peace Process," *IGAD News: Intergovernmental Authority on Development* (December 2002).
70. See *The Machakos Protocol*, Machakos, Kenya (July 20, 2002), Part C, Articles 61–66.
71. Comprehensive Peace Agreement, January 2005 (available online at <http://www.unmis.org>).
72. "Sudan: Details of Peace Protocols Signed This Week," *IRINNews.org*, May 28, 2004 (available online at <http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=4131&selectRegion=EastAfrica&selectCountry=SUDAN>).
73. International Crisis Group, *The AU's Mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps*, Africa Briefing No. 28, Nairobi, Brussels, July 6, 2005.
74. African Union, *Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur*, Abuja, July 5, 2005 (electronic version); "Darfur Rebels Agree to Stop Infighting," *Agence-France Presse*, July 19, 2005, reproduced on Sudan.net (available online at <http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/11924.html>), accessed July 21, 2005); "Darfur's Rebel Groups Reach Deal," *BBC News*, July 19, 2005 (available online at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/1/news/11924.html>), accessed July 21, 2005).
75. The State Department's rebuke of the Eritrean government's incarceration of reformist parliamentarians who demanded the implementation of the constitution ratified in 1997 is an encouraging sign that democracy may still be worth fighting for by citizens of the Horn.