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## Africa and the United States: Meeting the Challenges of Globalization

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The onset of the current period of globalization seems to have been coterminous with the ending of the Cold War. Since the early 1990s, the world has witnessed profound changes in economic relations; in the use of various forms of transportation; and in medical, electronic, and satellite technology, all of which have served to bring the various parts of the world closer together. At a very fundamental level, what we mean when we use the term *globalization* is an increase in worldwide interconnectedness.<sup>1</sup> In many ways it is a good thing, in that it can serve to accelerate the pace at which countries of the developing world are able to address their problems relating to governance and human rights, economic development, poverty reduction, various health scourges such as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, and human security in general. At the same time, these changes have served to expose the challenges facing countries like the ones we find in Africa, as well as their vulnerabilities. For example, at the same time that African countries have been drawn in as independent competitors in the world economic system, the rules of the game have changed. Regional trading blocs, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), European Union (EU), and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and virtual economies have emerged, with African countries finding themselves threatened with rapid marginalization. The challenge facing African leaders was to accept this fate passively or to gear up to protect their countries' positions in the globalization process.<sup>2</sup> In other words, the most serious challenge presented by the process of globalization for Africa was to find ways to engage it and make it work for their betterment.

On the African continent today, debate continues over the merits of the globalization process. Some argue that the negative aspects of the process far outweigh the positives for Africa's peoples. The concern over the nega-

tives of globalization has created strange bedfellows from the left and the right, from advanced industrialized countries on the one hand to nonindustrialized countries of the third world on the other. A good example of such critical alliances could be seen in protest groups that have emerged to raise the consciousness of leaders in the World Trade Organization (WTO) about the unfair advantage rich countries have over poor ones when it comes to setting rules and regulations relating to international trade.

The WTO, among other things, is dedicated to setting the terms by which countries participate in worldwide trade. Countries that belong to the organization must give up a certain amount of their sovereignty in setting economic policy so as to harmonize trade processes throughout the world. Some observers see that as a good thing, but others are very afraid of what they see as a drift toward one world government, a government that is out of reach and unaccountable to citizens of countries most affected by decisions taken by the WTO.<sup>3</sup> This view is held especially in poor countries such as the ones we find in Africa. The general argument made by globalization opponents in poor countries is that it creates more losers than winners.<sup>4</sup> The broad challenge that African countries face is both integral to the new international order. They have developed an interdependent relationship. They both need each other as markets, and the United States needs such critical African natural resources as petroleum and the continent's partnership in the fight against international terrorism. Africa needs US development assistance in all areas, its technological know-how, and its technological assets. The question facing both Africa and the United States in this newest era of globalization is: How will they relate? What adjustments in their relationships will be made to accommodate the interests of both African countries and the United States? Will it be business as usual, with African countries in the position of dependent supplicants, or will a relationship emerge that is akin to a genuine partnership? Of course, Africa would prefer the latter, but can it ensure that result? That is certainly the hope of the newly formed African Union (AU), as well as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Will the United States be able to balance its traditional foreign policy based on its perceived vital national interests with the real need to broaden and deepen interstate cooperation to include, as equals, some of the poorest and least developed countries in the world? These are questions we will address in this volume. This chapter is intended to frame the analyses provided in the chapters that follow by providing a historical perspective on US foreign policy interests in Africa, particularly with respect to the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations; to outline African interests; and to do so within the context of five major challenges the continent now faces.

### Background to a Changing Relationship

Africa has never been central to US foreign policy. Although some US involvement in the continent can be traced to 1789, official US attitudes and policies toward Africa have been marked by at worst indifference and at best neglect. Africa was historically treated as a backwater in official policymaking circles, as measured by the time and resources allocated to Africa in comparison with other regions of the world.<sup>5</sup> The United States established an independent Liberia on the west coast of Africa in the 1840s as a possible resettlement option for freed slaves and others of African descent residing in the United States but exerted little effort to treat Liberia as an official US colony. However, the United States displayed an economic interest in opening up the Liberian interior and its natural resources to US businesses such as the Firestone Rubber Company. Some observers have noted that US policies toward Africa have historically followed a "hands off" approach, that is, until the onset of the Cold War.<sup>6</sup>

During the Cold War, US foreign policy makers defined its vital national interest as fighting and containing communism wherever it appeared. In pursuit of this vital interest, a consistent axiom of US foreign policy has been, "We have no permanent friends or enemies, but only permanent interests." This attitude could clearly be seen in the policies of the United States toward modern Africa. When the United States believed it could benefit in a geostrategic or material manner by "engaging" or "disengaging" with one or another African country, it took the necessary steps to do so.<sup>7</sup> As Ruth Lyob and I elaborate in Chapter 5, prior to the onset of the Cold War, the only significant presence the United States had in sub-Saharan Africa was in Ethiopia, but at the height of the Cold War, US interests shifted toward countering the Soviet Union's attempt to secure a physical presence in the Africa region, and in the process its key alliances favored the countries surrounding pro-Soviet Ethiopia.

In 1957, for example, then vice president Richard Nixon traveled for twenty-two days around the African continent to assess whether the United States needed to pay more attention to Africa in light of the growing divisions between East and West after the onset of the Cold War. On his return home, Nixon recommended that President Dwight D. Eisenhower create a separate Africa Bureau within the State Department. Within the US government, concerns about the possible vulnerability of Africa to the spread of communism intensified under the Kennedy administration.<sup>8</sup> However, this new attention did not amount to more than monitoring situations; most countries in Africa received no great outpouring of material or military assistance.

Partly in an effort to head off the penetration of communism into mineral-rich Congo-Kinshasa (later Zaïre and now the Democratic Republic of

Congo, or DRC) and southern Africa, the United States developed special relationships with Congo-Kinshasa and South Africa. Congo-Kinshasa came to be characterized by the brutal kleptocratic dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko. For geostrategic reasons, however, the United States tolerated Mobutu and his excesses and did what it felt it had to do to keep him in power, at least until the mid-1990s.<sup>9</sup>

A US Cold War anticommunist stratagem could also be found in southern Africa, where the apartheid regime in South Africa often publicly proclaimed race relations an internal affair, and the most important objective of US policy was to assist South Africa in containing communism in the region. President Jimmy Carter attempted to put pressure on South Africa to reform its regime in the late 1970s. Then, when President Ronald Reagan assumed office, he followed a policy of quiet diplomacy toward South Africa under the rubric of "constructive engagement." While the United States often complained about the immorality of the apartheid system of separation of the races and separate development, it was not until the late 1980s, and then under the leadership of the US Congress (which debated and then passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986) that real pressure on the apartheid government and direct US support for South African civil society began to have a noticeable effect.<sup>10</sup>

In sum, beginning with the Cold War, the United States followed a policy of "selective engagement" toward Africa.<sup>11</sup> It selectively engaged those countries where it felt US national interests were involved. Nowhere was this truer than in Ethiopia. Suffice it to say for the moment that in the 1970s the Soviet Union proclaimed the Brezhnev Doctrine, a policy designed to support fledgling socialist states throughout the third world. The most immediate targets of this policy were countries such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Yemen, Angola, and Mozambique. As a consequence, the focus of US containment strategy in Africa shifted once again. This was not a shift in purpose but in clients. Also, this change was mainly noticeable in the Horn of Africa. The Carter administration came to pursue an encirclement strategy in the Horn, designed to woo Ethiopia's neighbors with military and economic development aid. Kenya, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Oman were asked to allow their territories to be used as staging grounds for a rapid deployment force (RDF) that could project US military power into the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Agreements were also signed that called for joint military exercises involving US military personnel and that of its new clients.<sup>12</sup>

By the late 1980s, the Soviet Union reconsidered the pursuit of the Brezhnev Doctrine, resulting in its strategic withdrawal from support of African clients. Initially, the US administration of President George H. W. Bush vacillated between a policy of disengagement and selective engagement with Africa. It allowed the State Department's Africa Bureau to attempt to find political solutions in African conflict areas such as Liberia and the Horn of Africa. Officially, however, most US efforts were aimed at

promoting and supporting democratic forces throughout the continent, although relatively modest amounts of material support were devoted to such purposes.

Herman J. Cohen, Bush's assistant secretary of state for African affairs, was instrumental in negotiating the demise of the Marxist regime in Ethiopia and establishing in its stead a successor regime headed by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).<sup>13</sup> In addition, Cohen was able to get the EPRDF to agree not to oppose a referendum on Eritrean independence. However, he was less successful in Liberia, in part attributable to Libya's support of rebel forces aiming to topple the US-backed regime of President Samuel K. Doe. These troops seriously challenged the peacekeeping forces of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Despite Cohen's initiatives, the overall thrust of George H. W. Bush's approach to Africa was one of selective disengagement.<sup>14</sup> One dramatic exception was the human catastrophe in Somalia. In this case, growing concern over its drought and famine prompted Bush in December 1992 to send US troops to lead the humanitarian mission to Somalia authorized by the UN.

From a humanitarian perspective, this policy was a good one, but as the UN-sponsored Operation Restore Hope proceeded, politics increasingly impinged on the humanitarian mission. The climax of this intervention for the United States came in October 1993, less than ten months into the Clinton administration, when eighteen US soldiers were killed in Mogadishu.<sup>15</sup> The immediate response of the Clinton administration was to move back into a cautious mode of disengagement.

Within less than six months, it became clear to the Clinton team that Cold War assumptions and rationales would not work for the administration in Africa. In April 1994 the genocide in Rwanda erupted. This event highlighted the fact that the lack of a proactive Africa policy would leave the United States unprepared to respond effectively to international crises within Africa. President Bill Clinton decided that, at least on his watch, the United States would not be taken by surprise and would not be guilty of neglecting potentially explosive situations such as that which occurred in Rwanda. Toward this end, he created three new institutions in his government: the Office of the Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues<sup>16</sup>; the Atrocities Prevention Interagency Working Group<sup>17</sup>; and the African Crisis Response Initiative, which was designed to build African capacity for peacekeeping with US assistance.<sup>18</sup>

### Clinton's Partnership with Africa

From this point on, it became clear that the Clinton administration was committed to a new partnership with Africa. This approach caused some

controversy within the administration, but the dominant voices favored this new approach. To show this new commitment, in June 1994 the administration held the first White House Conference on Africa. It was the beginning of efforts to look at Africa from a broad perspective rather than on a selective, case-by-case basis. At this conference, President Clinton proclaimed that it was the policy of his administration "to unleash the human potential of the people of the African continent in ways that [will] lead to a safer and more prosperous world. A better life for them and a better life for us."<sup>19</sup>

In 1995 the administration demonstrated what this new policy might mean, applying serious pressure on the autocratic regimes in Sudan and Nigeria to submit to reform. Also in that year, late commerce secretary Ron Brown led a large US private and public sector delegation to the African-American Summit in Senegal. Brown went on to announce that the United States was going to construct economic relationships with Africa through an invigorated emphasis on trade and investment. In the following year, the administration launched the first substantive engagement with Congress on the proposed African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).

However, not until Clinton's second term did this "new partnership" begin to take clear form.<sup>20</sup> Madeleine Albright replaced Warren Christopher as secretary of state, and Susan Rice succeeded George Moose as assistant secretary of state for African affairs. Rice was a political appointee rather than a career foreign service officer, and she seemed more able to think creatively. Her approach fit well with what Clinton wanted to do in Africa.

Following the untimely death of Commerce Secretary Brown, Clinton demonstrated that he would actively attempt to implement the economic and trade strategies that Brown had envisioned. The president went on to launch a sweeping economic policy initiative to accelerate Africa's integration into the global economy—the President's Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa. The approach came to involve all government agencies concerned with commerce and economic policy. Following an initial visit to Africa by First Lady Hillary Clinton in 1997, almost every cabinet officer also traveled to the region.

Under the leadership of Assistant Secretary Rice, the administration pursued a two-pronged strategy to increase the importance of Africa as a trading and strategic partner. First, it sought to accelerate Africa's integration into the global economy by promoting economic development, democracy, respect for human rights, and conflict prevention and resolution. Second, it sought to address security threats emanating from Africa, including terrorism, international crime, trafficking in drugs, and illicit arms.

In 1998, President Clinton made his first visit to Africa, launching a number of new initiatives associated with his Partnership for Economic

Growth and Opportunity. However, in that same year, the security threats faced by Africa and the United States in Africa were brought fully to the fore when the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya were bombed by terrorists in August, killing 253 people. In addition, a border dispute erupted between Eritrea and Ethiopia; the civil war in Angola resumed; and a civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo escalated, eventually involving seven African countries supporting either the government of the DRC or its opponents. What began as a ray of hope for Clinton's new partnership turned into a dark shadow as many parts of Africa fell into chaos. Yet as his administration wound down, Clinton continued to push his African agenda. In 1999 he supported and participated in the National Summit on Africa. In 2000 the Clinton administration designed and executed the first-ever "Month of Africa" at the UN hosted by US ambassador Richard Holbrooke. Also in 2000, the administration shepherded the approval of the African Growth and Opportunity Act through Congress. As he left office, Clinton signed the Global AIDS and Tuberculosis Relief Act.

### George W. Bush and Africa

The rhetoric of the current Bush administration as far as Africa is concerned does not differ much from that of the Clinton administration, but it is clear that this administration has a much narrower view of US national security interests than that of its predecessor. A Bush administration policy document states:

In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the U.S.—preserving human dignity—and our strategic priority—combating global terror. American interests and American principles, therefore, lead in the same direction: we will work with others for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace and growing prosperity.<sup>21</sup>

In other words, realist principles are paramount, but some moral considerations might serve those interests and therefore should be pursued. For example, prior to his 2003 visit to Africa, Bush announced a \$15 billion package to tackle the African AIDS pandemic, and in 2004 the administration inaugurated the \$1 billion Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). The MCA is intended to increase US foreign aid to Africa by 50 percent by 2007. The countries selected to benefit from the account will be those that meet certain economic and political criteria.<sup>22</sup>

The Bush administration's Africa policy is said to comprise three interlocking strategies for the region:

- First, countries with a major impact in their neighborhood, such as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia, are seen as anchors for regional engagement and require focused attention. It is obvious that South Africa and Nigeria are seen as major players because of their size and economic significance. Ethiopia and Kenya are valued mainly for their strategic importance in the so-called war on terrorism.
- Second, the Bush administration seeks coordination with allies, friends, and international institutions. It is seen as essential for constructive conflict mediation and successful peace operations.
- Third, Africa's capable and reforming states and subregional organizations are seen as being in need of strengthening, as the primary means to address transnational threats on a sustained basis. The administration believes that if Africans are capable of fulfilling such a role, it is less likely that the United States will be drawn directly into solving African problems.

In short, the Bush administration sees its Africa policy as being strategic in approach, with clear priorities of supporting subregional organizations; engaging the newly created African Union; combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which is an international security issue; and promoting good governance, economic reform, health, and education.

What is most important about the current Africa policy is how it is driven by neorealist considerations of national interests. For example, Bush has threatened to withhold military assistance to some thirty-five countries that refused to sign an agreement with the United States exempting Americans from prosecution before the International Criminal Court. As of 2003 only four African countries, Gabon, Gambia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone, had consented to this agreement, but Nigeria and South Africa had not. The refusal of the last two is significant because Nigeria has oil and South Africa is the most industrialized country on the African continent, possessing a robust economy. In addition to Nigeria, at least twenty-two African countries have oil, which makes them of particular interest to the United States. African oil currently accounts for 15 percent of US imported oil, and that amount is expected to jump to 25 percent in the next decade.<sup>23</sup> Another important fact to consider is that only three African countries are members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Those countries that are not members of the cartel may be more agreeable to striking deals with the United States, which could be particularly important given the ongoing crisis in the Middle East. In the process of deepening an economic relationship with Africa, the United States hopes to enhance its ability to fight international terrorism. At the same time, in a demonstration of its reluctance to rely solely on economic power, the United States exercises caution by committing its troops to Djibouti and other countries.

The Bush administration's handling of the Liberian crisis provides another indication that Bush has placed narrowly defined national security interests ahead of any other considerations in formulating US policy on Africa. Bush applied public political pressure on President Charles Taylor to step aside in Liberia, but despite the historical connections between the United States and Liberia, he committed a small number of US peacekeepers and then only very briefly. Instead, he provided monetary and other support for Nigeria to take a lead peacekeeping role, in keeping with the administration's desire to assist African states in leading regional peacekeeping efforts.

### **Africa and Globalization: Where Does It Want to Be?**

In the broadest sense, the primary challenge that African countries face is to produce more winners than losers. The challenge is complex and formidable, and to meet it, African governments and African peoples must take note and act accordingly.

More specifically, from a policy perspective, this book considers five major areas of challenge: (1) the HIV/AIDS pandemic; (2) the debt crisis, along with trade issues; (3) human security and development; (4) domestic and regional conflicts; and (5) democracy and human rights. At a fundamental level, poverty and poorly developed systems of education on the continent affect all these policy areas, and that is implied in whatever I say here. Let us look at each of these policy areas separately.

#### *The HIV/AIDS Pandemic*

Nowhere is the HIV/AIDS crisis as devastating as in Africa. As Sandra F. Joireman notes in Chapter 7 and Donald Rothchild in Chapter 11, in 2003 the disease affected 25 to 26 million people on the continent. Infection rates for the disease in adults in Africa range from as high as 39 percent in Botswana to as low as 0.1 percent in Mauritius. The average for sub-Saharan Africa is 9 percent for all adults. Nearly 70 percent of all adults infected with HIV can be found in Africa, and 80 percent of the affected children worldwide are located in Africa. Since 1980, 5–10 million adults have been infected, and the disease has spread four times as fast in Africa as in other parts of the world. In 2001 alone, 2.2 million Africans succumbed to the disease.<sup>24</sup>

The HIV/AIDS pandemic and its almost uncontrollable nature run rampant in resource-poor African countries, which are unable to devote the kind of massive resources needed to prevent, treat, and bring the disease under control. A recent study estimates that in 1997, public health spending for AIDS alone exceeded 2 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in

seven of sixteen African countries sampled, a staggering figure considering that total spending for health on the continent is between 3 and 5 percent of GDP.<sup>25</sup> Whatever is spent is not enough. In addition, trade barriers make it difficult for African countries to purchase cheaper generic drugs for treating their HIV/AIDS-affected populations.

The public health challenge facing Africa, then, is to bring this dreaded disease under control. Signs point to steps taken in this direction. For instance, Senegal and Uganda have been singled out for their exemplary AIDS education, prevention, and treatment projects. Tanzania is poised to follow suit. Moreover, countries have sounded a worldwide AIDS alert that views the AIDS pandemic as a threat to their own national security. Governments in Europe and the United States are committing resources that can be used to combat the problem in Africa. The UN and nongovernmental organization (NGO) groups such as the Global AIDS Alliance have taken a major lead. Although in his 2003 State of the Union address President Bush committed \$15 billion to fight AIDS in Africa and the Caribbean, this pledge seems far from having any immediate benefit for the countries in Africa with the most need.<sup>26</sup> AIDS is not only the major health challenge facing African leaders but also a major social and human security challenge.

#### *The Debt Crisis and Trade Issues*

Africa is a continent mired in debt (see Chapter 9 by Thomas Callaghy in this volume). The fact that African countries must devote so much of their annual GDP to debt servicing and repayment reduces the amount available for tackling such social problems as communicable diseases, poverty, and underdevelopment. Rich countries, wanting to create conditions conducive to the expansion of trade, have recently realized that for them to penetrate the untapped economies of the third world, they must help poor countries reduce their debt burden. In 1996 the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) launched a project to help poor countries address their debt crises. This project, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, initially targeted forty-one countries (thirty-three in Africa) for debt relief. The first countries to receive assistance under the plan (for example, Uganda and Mozambique) realized almost immediate benefit. HIPC freed up resources that could be used to tackle some of their most pressing problems, such as in the areas of public health and social and economic development. Although eighteen of the thirty-three African countries have benefited from this assistance, critics claim that such aid is too little too late and advocate bolder measures.<sup>27</sup>

As Fantu Cheru discusses in Chapter 10, the African Growth and Opportunity Act, a centerpiece of both the Clinton and current Bush administrations, also addresses Africa's position in the global economy. The act is

intended to open the US market more fully to African exports. Thirty-eight African countries may participate in this program, but only twenty-two have ever exported anything under AGOA. Eighty-one percent of African exports in 2004 came from only seven countries (Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Angola, South Africa, and Nigeria). In 2004, oil accounted for 73 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's total exports to the United States, followed by nonpetroleum mineral resources, mainly platinum and diamonds at about 9 percent, and apparel at 4.9 percent.<sup>28</sup>

African countries want a dramatic increase in trade with the United States and are inhibited by protectionist US policies and the restrictive quotas it places on African imports. Now African countries must not only increase debt relief and gain more favorable terms of trade in the international marketplace but also manage their resources wisely so as to advance their developmental objectives.

#### *Human Security and Development*

The IMF projected that the economies of sub-Saharan Africa would grow by 5.6 percent in 2006, and they did, up from a rate of 5.2 percent in 2005. Even though these figures seem robust and promising, these rates of growth are well below what would be needed for African countries to develop fully and alleviate poverty. Moreover, the forecasters stress that almost all African countries remain highly vulnerable to changes in primary commodity prices. As a result, growth will be largely concentrated in oil-producing countries expected to benefit from high prices for years to come. Export prices for most primary products, such as coffee and other agricultural products, are expected to remain low.

At a fundamental level, the challenge facing the countries of Africa can be subsumed under the rubric of "human security" (see Chapter 6 by Caroline Thomas). Traditionally, the concept of "security" has been couched in neorealist terms relating to protecting the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of nations. That continues to be a legitimate concern for scholars and policymakers alike, but at the current state of human development it is clear that an alternative or even complementary conception of security needs to assume critical importance. In the strictest sense, the security of states depends on whether their citizens feel unthreatened. The world offers ample evidence today that political instability can easily cross borders, undermining national, regional, and even international security. A conceptualization of security centered primarily on the individual or community can be understood as human security. This notion grows from the assumption that human beings have common needs, problems, and issues no matter what part of the world they live in (that is, poverty, the spread of communicable diseases, environmental degradation, the loss of faith in

institutions, population pressures, and economic crisis). It is imperative that we view these concerns in terms of global trends and forces that affect the individual. These trends include such processes as the depletion of nonrenewable resources; drug trafficking; human trafficking; the rapid spread of communications technology; the rampant growth of capitalist markets with no controls to avoid the excesses of the capitalists; poverty, inequality, and human misery; and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In Chapter 8, Cyril Obi highlights the close relationship between virtually unregulated oil exploitation, environmental degradation, and abject poverty. Chapter 5 addresses environmental forces, bad policies, and poverty within the context of food insecurity.

Human security, then, primarily relates to the safety and well-being of people everywhere, including Africa. It has been found that a sense of insecurity among certain groups invariably leads to group conflict and political instability. The threats involved may relate to the physical well-being of individuals and groups, but they might also—and often do—involve a perception that values are being threatened. Although this list does not exhaust the range of issues that relate to the human security dilemma in Africa today, it gives a good indication of the scope and intensity of the problem. As in the past, African states are attempted to reverse the tide of human insecurity. Various mechanisms designed to do so are either now in place or on the drawing board (e.g., the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Resolution, the African Union, and the New Partnership for Africa's Development). It remains to be seen, however, whether Africa can solve its human security problems alone. Some observers insist that given the global dimensions of the human security problem, global actors must become committed to its resolution. In other words, rich countries like the United States should step up their efforts to tackle poverty (defined as negative development or development in reverse) in Africa.<sup>29</sup> Reversing this trend would increase the ability of African countries to help themselves and participate more fully in the global economy. Such a change would help African security as well as security in the world at large.

The World Bank and other multilateral and bilateral aid agencies are now paying more attention than in the recent past to the need to attack poverty while still pursuing the objectives of spreading the market and encouraging free trade.<sup>30</sup> They are providing new monies for nutrition and family health projects, for governmental efficiency promotion and capacity building, and for tackling various forms of corruption. These measures tend to have wide support in the donor community, which is good for African development. It must be acknowledged, however, that Africa's recipient countries continue to be unhappy with the conditions that accompany developmental assistance, even when the aims of these conditionalities are well intentioned. Such development assistance is seen in many African circles as

smacking of outside control and orchestration, rather than the result of auto-centric development decisionmaking on the part of Africans themselves.

In addition to being generally afraid of the possible negative effects of globalization, African leaders have viewed AGOA with mixed emotions. It does open up the US market for some African products, but there is a consensus among African leaders that not enough markets have been opened. It does create the possibility of increasing amounts of direct foreign investments in their economies by US firms. But unless the countries that stand to benefit can reform their education systems, increase their levels of technological capacity, and improve the investment climate for foreign firms, there will be no economic takeoff. The challenge, then, is for African governments and business communities to create a culture of entrepreneurship and commitment to local and regional development in their general populations.

But a blot on the landscape is the threat of international terror, a strategic political challenge to human and national security of equal concern to Africa and the United States (see Chapter 3 by Princeton Lyman in this book).<sup>31</sup> The vulnerability of African countries to international terrorism was made abundantly clear in 1998 with the bombing of US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. Those events were followed by similar incidents in Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. The September 11, 2001, plane hijacking and bombing of the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in the Washington, DC, area made it clear that an international network of terrorists violently opposed US culture and values and its dominant role in world affairs. Poor countries friendly to the United States but with relatively weak security systems are most vulnerable to international terror. The United States has a vital interest in strengthening the military and intelligence capacities of poor countries like the ones we find in Africa. For their part, African countries could measurably improve their ability to solve problems of peace and security with the aid of the United States.

### Domestic and Regional Conflict

The period since 1995 has witnessed ever-increasing incidents of intense conflict on the African continent. Sierra Leone endured a civil war involving rebel groups opposed to a democratically elected government. Coups and a civil war erupted in the historically peaceful Côte d'Ivoire. Rebel groups across the subregion organized their own militias and paid for them through the illicit trade in diamonds and other natural resources drawn from enclave economies.<sup>32</sup> In the case of Sierra Leone, the world community attempted to impose sanctions on this practice, but with very little positive effect. Also, a UN peacekeeping force was dispatched to bring the situation

under control, but a semblance of order was not restored until Britain decided to commit "boots on the ground" with orders to "root out the bad guys."<sup>33</sup> Similarly, France committed its military to Côte d'Ivoire to attempt to stabilize the situation there. However, in both countries, the peace is tenuous.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the bankrupt government of the now-deceased Laurent Kabila enlisted the aid of the neighboring states of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe in an effort to resist the attempts of numerous opposition groups, aided and abetted by forces from Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda, to overthrow his government. Rather than a decisive victory, a stalemate resulted. The UN eventually brokered a cease-fire and peace talks among the warring parties and dispatched a peacekeeping force of 10,800, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo, MONUC) to the eastern region of the country. However, those numbers are small, given the size of the country and its widespread population. A transitional constitution went into effect in April 2003.<sup>34</sup>

In Sudan, a civil war pitting the Arab-Muslim north against the largely non-Arab, largely Christian, and animist south is finally on the verge of ending. The UN has not directly intervened, but the subregional organization, the Intergovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD), made an effort to broker a peace that eventually began to bear fruit toward the end of 2002. The problem there is exacerbated by the Khartoum government being propped up by corporate profits from the exploitation of oil fields. For its part, the opposition Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) was able to hold its own and forced a mutually hurtful stalemate to develop. Complicating the civil war between the north and the south was the eruption of another war front in the western region of Darfur between African Muslims and Arab Muslims.<sup>35</sup> The government of Sudan, with the aid of 20,000 militiamen (Janjaweed) that it recruited, armed, and sponsored, is engaged in a scorched-earth policy and ethnic cleansing in the form of forced migration. The world community has attempted to apply various forms of pressure, even threatening to withdraw support for the peace agreement between the SPLAM and the central government, but these measures have had no effect. Consequently, Sudan may sink deeper and deeper into political instability.

In the eastern part of the Horn of Africa, a devastating border conflict has festered between Ethiopia and Eritrea since the summer of 1998. What was unusual and ominous about this conflict is that it was as high-tech a war as Africa has ever seen. Some of the most modern military hardware available today was employed by both sides. The question is, does this situation have any implications for the future? In a very short time, Eritrea grew

its small army to 250,000, and Ethiopia expanded its armed forces to 350,000. Both sides bought and bartered for sophisticated weapons from wherever they could get them—tanks, aircrafts, and anti-aircraft equipment.<sup>36</sup> It is estimated that at the height of this conflict, which lasted for only about a year, Ethiopia was spending about a million dollars a day to maintain the war effort, amounting to between \$2.9 and \$3.1 billion.<sup>37</sup> It is impossible to calculate how much in dollar terms the war cost Eritrea. However, there is little doubt that the cost was considerable, despite the fact that the per capita income of both countries is among the lowest in the world. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) brokered a peace in 2000, and the UN established the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), a peacekeeping mission that has been occupying a buffer zone between the two countries. It also set up the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC). In April 2002, the commission issued its report. Even though both sides had agreed to accept the findings of the EEBC as binding, Ethiopia refused to do so, and a stalemate has developed in the final demarcation of the border zone.<sup>38</sup>

A recent World Bank report shows clearly that domestic and regional conflicts in Africa have blunted and reversed growth prospects for all Africa's war-torn countries.<sup>39</sup> The challenge is for African leaders to move away from war and toward peace and thereby create an environment conducive to development. The UN and the OAU, along with bilateral aid agencies, spend a good deal of time trying to figure out how to keep the peace in Africa, but very little time has yet to be devoted to making and building peace. That is the challenge, to create social and economic conditions and institutions that steer countries away from both internal and regional wars.

### Democracy and Human Rights

For the foreseeable future, the prospects for further democratization of African countries are mixed. Since 1990, we have seen the mushrooming of multiparty systems and elections that have been at least nominally democratic. However, for just as many countries as have had successful "second democratic elections," that is, elections that demonstrate progress toward democratic consolidation, we have also seen places where democratic reversals or incumbent elites have perverted the democratic process.<sup>40</sup> For example, in Côte d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe in 2000, flawed elections led directly to protracted civil strife. In Kenya, although the National Rainbow Coalition was able to loosen the grip of the Kenya African National Union on the reins of government in 2002, it has been unable to agree on a new constitution that would give more authority to parliament than the presidency.



Elections in Senegal in March 2000, Mauritius in September, and Ghana in December each resulted in peaceful transfers of power, and that is a good sign. But it is hard to say for sure that Africa will not return to autocracy. At the same time, ironically, it is because of the forces of globalization that one can optimistically say that it is likely that Africa's future will be continually in the direction of more democracy. The growth in the links between domestic civil society groups in Africa and similar groups throughout the world, as well as advances in information technology and the growing emphasis on the need for a free press in Africa, are creating environments in which democracy and human rights can take root. These words, democracy and human rights, are on the lips of everyone in Africa, whether they have good or bad things to say.

For this challenge to be successfully met requires the emergence of a cohort of enlightened African leaders determined to create sustainable, consolidated democracies committed to good governance and basic human rights. This process can be helped along if the international community continues to contribute to the development of democratic institutions on the continent, such as independent judiciaries and a free but responsible press, and continues to provide support for civil society elements committed to people's empowerment.

### Conclusion

It is clear that despite brief interludes during the struggle against apartheid in South Africa and then during phases of the Clinton administration, Africa has never been central to US policy. President Clinton sought to facilitate the access of US capital into African markets in the form of trade and private investments, but he realized that this effort could succeed only if a simultaneous effort was made to alleviate poverty on the continent, to promote good governance and democracy, and to make Africa more peaceful and secure. US national security interests were imbedded in Clinton's policies, but he was flexible and seemed to be able to balance US needs and objectives with those of its African partners. The current Bush administration, however, seems to have reverted to the historical US position of selective engagement with some parts of Africa and not necessarily the continent as a whole. A good example of this attitude can be seen in the US courtship of countries in the Horn of Africa, Botswana, and West Africa to establish a US military presence that could be used to respond more effectively to crises relating to international terrorism in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

The Bush administration rhetorically supports new institutions such as the African Union and the NEPAD, but it remains to be seen whether these

words will be backed up with real resource and political commitments. If there is going to be any real leadership in the US Africa policy under Bush, it will largely have to come from Congress and from international non-governmental organizations.

### Notes

1. See Jibrin Ibrahim, "Notes on Globalization and the Marginalization of Africa," *CODESRIA Bulletin: Special Issue*, nos. 3-4 (2002): 3-7.
2. In testimony before the US House of Representatives, International Relations Committee, African Affairs Subcommittee, June 25, 2003, President Toumani Toure stated: "While rich countries and international financial institutions press for minimizing 'market distorting' government subsidies in African countries, often at enormous human cost, the most massive interference with international agricultural markets comes from European and US subsidies to rich farmers. This issue has gained new attention in recent years, as the World Bank has critiqued rich country governments and Europe and the US have pointed their fingers at each other's offenses. But there has been little progress in changing this double standard." Toure went on to say that enormous damage is being done to African agriculture around the continent by the \$300 billion of US and European subsidies. See [www.house.gov/international\\_relations/afhear108.htm](http://www.house.gov/international_relations/afhear108.htm).
3. To be sure, globalization today has far-reaching benefits for some: (1) goods and services, capital, technology, and labor all move more freely across borders; (2) in those countries that actively participate in the global economy, standards of living in the general population tend to rise; (3) globalization has in general led to benefits in the areas of governance and culture (e.g., democracy, human rights, gender equity, popular empowerment); and (4) through advances in information technology in the context of increasing human freedoms, the state's monopolistic hold over information from outside its borders has been severely weakened, if not broken, particularly in states with historically authoritarian regimes. See Jan Nederveen Pieterse, *Globalization and Culture: Global Melange* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004); and Netherlands Development Research Council, *Coping with Globalization: The Need for Research Concerning the Local Response to Globalization in Developing Countries* (The Hague: RAWOO, 2000).
4. Examples of such an argument include that, first, the gap between rich countries and poor ones continues to rise. For instance, the difference in average income levels between the world's poorest and richest countries in 1960 was 30:1, by 1990 it was 60:1, and by 1997 this gap had grown to 74:1. Second, within loser countries the gap between the rich and the poor has also been on the rise, with certain pockets plugged into the world market emerging marginal winners, whereas other individuals and groups trapped in the cycle of subsistence production and poverty are relegated to the role of perpetual losers. Third, the rapid depletion of natural resources and environmental degradation are taking a greater toll in poor countries than in other parts of the world. Fourth, countries—particularly poor ones—are losing control over governance and culture. See John H. Dunning, *Making Globalization Good: The Moral Challenges of Global Capitalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); David Held and Anthony McGrew, eds., *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000); Anthony Giddens, *The Global Third Way Debate* (Oxford: Polity, 2001); Walden Bello, *The Future in the Balance: Essays on Globalization*

and *Resistance* (San Francisco: Food First, 2001); Ibrahim, "Notes on Globalization," 6; Joseph Stiglitz, "Unevenly Yoked: Has Globalization Dealt Africa a Bad Hand?" Yale Global, [yaleglobal.yale.edu/index.js](http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/index.js); and Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002).

5. Peter Schraeder, "Reviewing the Study of U.S. Policy Towards Africa: From Intellectual 'Backwater' to Theory Construction," *Third World Quarterly* 14, no. 4 (November 1993): 776.

6. See Elliot P. Skinner, "Historical Framework Paper Written for the National Summit on Africa," Washington, DC, National Summit on Africa, 1998, 1.

7. Donald Rothchild, "The Impact of U.S. Disengagement on African Intra-state Conflict Resolution," in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Africa in World Politics: The African State System in Flux* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000), 160–187; and Donald Rothchild, "The U.S. Foreign Policy Trajectory on Africa," *SAIS Review* 21, no. 1 (Winter–Spring 2001): 178–209.

8. See Henry F. Jackson, *From Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960* (New York: William Morrow, 1982).

9. See Georges Nzongola-Ngajala, *The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila—A People's History* (London: Zed Press, 2003), 160–163.

10. See Timothy D. Sisk, *Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 101.

11. See Ruth Iyob and Edmond J. Keller, "U.S. Policy in the Horn of Africa: Continuity and Change," in Dorina Bekoe, ed., *East Africa and the Horn: Confronting Challenges to Good Governance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005).

12. See Edmond J. Keller, "United States Foreign Policy on the Horn of Africa: Policymaking with Blinders On," in Richard Sklar, Gerald Bender, and James S. Coleman, eds., *African Crisis Areas in United States Foreign Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 178–193.

13. Herman J. Cohen, *Superpower Intervention in Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).

14. See Donald Rothchild and Nikolas Emmanuel, "The Process of U.S. Decisionmaking on Africa," in Ulf Engel and Gorm Rye, eds., *Africa and the North* (London: Routledge, 2005).

15. See Gilbert M. Khadiagala, "The United States and Africa: Beyond the Clinton Administration," *SAIS Review* 21, no. 1 (Winter–Spring 2001): 259–273; and Edmond J. Keller, "Rethinking African Regional Security," in David Lake and Patrick Morgan, eds., *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 310.

16. See David J. Scheffer, Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, US Department of State, "Human Rights and International Justice," address at Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, October 23, 1998.

17. See David J. Scheffer, "War Crimes and the Clinton Administration: International Justice, War Crimes and Terrorism: The U.S. Record," *Social Research* 69, no. 4 (Winter 2002).

18. See "Briefing on African Crisis Response Initiative," *News Briefing: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense*, Department of Defense (July 29, 1997).

19. See "Remarks by the President to the White House Conference on Africa," White House: Office of the Press Secretary, June 27, 1994.

20. "Remarks by President Clinton to Conference on US-Africa Partnership for the 21st Century," Department of State, Washington, DC, March 16, 1999.

21. "Africa Policy," White House, [www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/africa](http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/africa) (accessed May 2003).

22. In March 2002, at an international aid conference in Monterrey, Mexico, President Bush proposed the Millennium Challenge Account. According to Bush, the criteria for MCA grants would reward those countries that root out corruption; respect human rights; adhere to the rule of law; invest in better health care and better schools; and have more open markets and sustainable budget policies. See "Africa: Millennium Challenge Account," *Americans and the World: Public Opinion on International Affairs*, [www.americans-world.org/digest/regional\\_issues/africa/africa](http://www.americans-world.org/digest/regional_issues/africa/africa) (accessed April 2, 2002).

23. See "Bottom of the Barrel: Africa's Oil Boom and Prospects for Poverty Reduction: A Catholic Relief Services Report," [www.catholicrelief.org/get-involved/advocacy/policy\\_and\\_strategic\\_issues/oil\\_report\\_full.pdf](http://www.catholicrelief.org/get-involved/advocacy/policy_and_strategic_issues/oil_report_full.pdf) (accessed June 2003).

24. See "HIV and AIDS Statistics in Africa," [www.avert.org/subadults.htm](http://www.avert.org/subadults.htm) (accessed December 2002).

25. See UNAIDS, "AIDS Epidemic Update" (December 2000); and John Stover and Lori Bollinger, "The Economic Impact of AIDS," *The Policy Project: The Futures Group International* (March 1999): 1–14.

26. Rather than keeping the focus on Africa and the Caribbean, Bush almost immediately announced that this initiative would be "global" in scope. See Salih Booker and Ann-Louise Colgan, "US Policy Toward Africa 2004," [www.progress.org/2004/fpi45.htm-22k](http://www.progress.org/2004/fpi45.htm-22k) (accessed January 2004).

27. See Shabla Shapiro and J. Michael Trueblood, "The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): Does It Really Present Opportunities?" Economic Research Service, US Department of Agriculture, paper presented at the International Conference on Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO (Capri, Italy), June 23–26, 2003.

28. *US-Africa Trade Profile*, Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce, 2005.

29. See Paul Collier, et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

30. See "World Bank President Highlights the New Debt Debate," [www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/headlines/vit\\_wolfensohn.shtml](http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/headlines/vit_wolfensohn.shtml) (March 2004); and Jeremy Branstetter, "World: IMF, World Bank Say UN Poverty Reduction Plan at Risk," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, [www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/4/939BB1F-1F11-42BE-8441-694BDF96F148.html](http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/4/939BB1F-1F11-42BE-8441-694BDF96F148.html) (accessed April 26, 2004).

31. See also Princeton L. Lyman and J. Stephen Morrison, "The Terrorist Threat in Africa," *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 1 (January–February 2004): 75–86.

32. See David K. Leonard and Scott Straus, *Africa's Stalled Development: International Causes and Cures* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003).

33. See "The Global Menace of Local Strife," *The Economist*, May 24–30, 2003, 23.

34. United Nations Press Release, "Security Council Extends Democratic Republic of Congo Mission until 30 July 2004, Raises Troop Level to 10,800," *Security Council*, 4797th Meeting, July 28, 2003.

35. See Human Rights Watch, "Sudan: Massive Atrocities in Darfur: Almost One Million Civilians Forcibly Displaced in Government's Scorched-Earth Campaign," [www.hrw.org](http://www.hrw.org) (accessed April 2, 2004).

36. See Takeste Negash and Kjeil Tronvoll, *Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrea/Ethiopia War* (Oxford: James Curry, 2000), p. 2.

37. See Befekadu Degefe, Berhanu Nega, and Getahun Tafesse, *Second Annual Report on the Ethiopian Economy*, vol. 2, 2001–2002 (Addis Ababa: Ethiopian

Economics Association/Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute, 2002), 42-48.

38. See Edmond J. Keller, "Understanding Conflicts in the Horn of Africa," in Chandra Lekha Sriram and Zoe Nielsen, eds., *Exploring Subregional Conflict: Opportunities for Conflict Prevention* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004).

39. See Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap*, 1.

40. See Edmond J. Keller, "Political Institutions, Agency, and Contingent Compromise: Understanding Democratic Consolidation and Reversal in Africa," *National Political Science Review* 7 (1999): 96-115.