REGIONAL ORDERS

Building Security in a New World

Edited by

David A. Lake

and

Patrick M. Morgan

13

Rethinking African Regional Security

Edmond J. Keller

In the international relations literature, Africa is generally considered to be a region where the member states face no external threats from each other, and therefore a region without a "security dilemma."[1] In the postcolonial era, Africa has generally been viewed by outsiders as an area where external threats were not the problem. To the extent that security is considered a problem on the continent, students of international affairs generally view this as the result of domestic conflict and individual insecurities (Jackson 1992, 93). Over the past two decades factors such as drought, famine, and internal wars have often led to human dislocations within African states as well as across their borders. However, it must be emphasized that in Africa's recent political history the incidence of interstate conflict has been much less common than domestic conflict. The reasons normally given for the generalized absence of problems of regional security include the following:

1. A security dilemma exists when threats or perceived threats to a country's sovereignty might force its leadership to enter into regional or extraregional alliances in an effort to ensure the security of its citizens and territory.

1. *African states tend to be resource-poor.* This condition explains why they seldom challenge the territorial integrity of their neighbors. They cannot afford to. This also makes them of little interest to non-African actors. As Brian Job (1992b, 17) has noted, to the extent that a threat exists, it is normally from autocratic regimes themselves rather than from some outside force.

2. *Third World countries like those found in Africa tend to be artificial creations,* cobbled together during the processes of colonization or decolonization. Consequently, regimes in those regions tend to lack the popular support that would be needed to act efficaciously in regional matters (Job 1992b, 17).

3. *African states tend to be relatively weak,* and are, therefore, unlikely to see the need to enter into regional security arrangements with their neighbors.

For the purposes of this discussion, the term "region" refers to a geographic area (e.g., Africa, Asia, Latin America). Before a region becomes a relevant arena for security purposes, the states in the area have to perceive themselves as being interdependent relative to security (Morgan, this volume; Job, this volume). States that perceive a mutual interest in protecting their national security through entering into regional security arrangements are, when the right circumstances obtain, prime candidates for forming "regional security complexes."[2] States in regions may belong to regional complexes that transcend the region, but they may also belong complexes that are regionally specific.

Regional security complexes are inspired by what Lake refers to as "security externalities," situations or factors emanating from outside a country or region that threaten national or regional security (Lake, this volume). Some security externalities are relevant only at the subregional level, but others encompass whole regions and give rise to regional security complexes. In Africa, domestic insecurities have increasingly come to present dilemmas for specific subregions, and some have generated continent-wide efforts to achieve collective security.

States might want to unite against a threat external to the region, or they might simply want to keep lines of communications open because this

2. Buzan (1991) defines "security complexes" as groups of states whose primary security concerns are perceived to be closely linked, creating a situation of interdependence among the states. This interdependence could originate in the competition among rivals, or it could emanate in a need to improve the comparative position of member states vis-à-vis external actors.

might reduce the possibility of conflict among themselves (Buzan 1992, 169). Buzan suggests that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) falls short of being a security complex, since that organization's main mission has histori- cally been to uphold the territorial integrity of its sovereign member states against the claims of others. However, he goes on to suggest that, based on the peacekeeping efforts of the Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia, it is more likely that Africa will in the future see more successful subregional security complexes (Buzan 1992, 184).

In recent years the OAU has taken steps to expand its role, and is now attempting to develop a capacity for managing regional insecurities even when they sprout from domestic conflicts.[3] The organization has aspirations of becoming the focus of a large regional order, but the reality of the situation is that the process has moved much faster and further at the subregional level. What seems to be emerging are loosely knit subregional multilateral collec- tive security arrangements with an emphasis on cooperative security. In other words, subregional security-management complexes are "nested" within the context of an aspiring continental security complex; and the subregional in- stitutions sometimes act on behalf of or in concert with the OAU security- management apparatus.

Africa could be conceived as being divided into at least four subregional complexes: North Africa, or the Maghreb; northeastern Africa, or the Horn; southern Africa; and West Africa. Each of these subregions has had a differ- ent historical experience, and to a large extent current subregional security dilemmas and security complexes can be linked to their respective pasts.

The states of North and northeastern Africa possess their own security complexes but at the same time belong to "nodes of security interdepend- ence" linking them both to a Middle East security complex (Buzan 1992, 182). For the purposes of this essay, when the term "Africa" is used, it refers to sub-Saharan Africa, rather than to the entire continent. However, North African states are significant players in the deliberations concerning the de- velopment of a continental security-management arrangement.

Patrick Morgan (this volume) offers a catalogue of ideal types of

3. The OAU is attempting to assume leadership in the development of a continent-wide ca- pacity for conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacekeeping. The thinking behind this project is that "[t]he security, stability of every African country affects every other African coun- try" (African Leadership Forum 1992). At the same time, it is clear that, should it be successful, it is going to have to approach the security problem from a subregional perspective and rely upon subregional security organizations in order to be effective.

security-management arrangements within regional security complexes. At one end of the continuum we find a regional balance of power, and at the other we find states in a region that are for all intents and purposes totally integrated. In between are great-power concerts, which involve great pow- ers maintaining regional security by accepting their mutual responsibility to do so; pluralistic security communities, which involve states that are not totally integrated but have a common understanding that no member will act violently against any other members; and multilateral collective security- management arrangements. By joining into an arrangement such as the lat- ter, the signatories agree to enforce peace and security in the region collec- tively, even if this involves armed intervention into a domestic or regional dispute.

In Africa, most member states of the OAU recognize that, more than at any other time in the postindependence era, they all confront subregional security dilemmas. Particularly, domestic insecurity in one state has a high potential to have a destabilizing effect in neighboring states, and therefore new approaches need to be developed to prevent such problems and to man- age them if they erupt. However, there is reason to question the viability of a continent-wide security-management arrangement for Africa. In the first place, the continent is huge, almost three times the size of the United States, and its states tend to be poor, weak, and underdeveloped. Second, significant state-to-state relations outside of the respective subregions are relatively re- cent, and the interdependence of all states on the continent and the need to develop cooperative security arrangements are only slowly becoming widely accepted.

The purpose of this essay is twofold. First, I want specifically to chal- lenge the assumption of scholars who argue that Africa is not characterized by a regional security dilemma (Jackson 1992). Although it seems to make sense to contend that Africa's security problems emanate from origins other than, let us say, the countries of Western Europe or the Americas, it is quite another to argue that African leaders do not perceive a regional security problem. Here I argue quite the contrary. Second, the essay attempts to make the case for more scholarly attention to state-to-state relations within regions and subregions and for analyses focusing on regional-subregional relations and on the relationship of individual states with regional and subregional organizations. Attempts to apply general theories of international relations to regional problems in areas like Africa often serve to hinder insightful and textured understanding of issues rooted in the idiosyncrasies of the area in question.

In some cases, the character of Africa's regional security problems is not *sui generis,* but in fact is fundamentally similar to that found in parts of the world such as Bosnia or India. For example, domestic inter- or intraethnic, religious, or regional tensions in certain areas have in recent years become transnationalized, resulting in security dilemmas that have drawn the attention of subregional, regional, and international actors in efforts to manage conflict. Because of the very artificial, multiethnic, and multicultural nature of modern African nation-states, they are vulnerable to domestic conflict that can grow into regional security problems. Domestic conflicts that spill across borders represent security problems for states in all parts of the world.

As alluded to above, international politics in Africa, particularly as it involves relations among African states, is at a relatively early stage of development. For example, in only a few instances have independent African states invaded the territory of neighbors for the purpose of territorial aggrandizement. Exceptions include Libya's incursion into Chad, and Somalia's incursion into the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Historically, in the early stages of international politics in Europe and the Middle East, states invaded their neighbors with the intention of seizing access to valued resources or in order to expand the aggressors' political community.

The rarity of interstate conflict in Africa is in part due to the recency of the creation of independent African states, and in part due to the fact that, until recently, domestic conflicts had been relatively low in intensity and had not spilled over their borders. However, with advances in communications technology, the increasing availability of weapons of mass destruction as well as small arms, and the internationalization of regional politics, African security dilemmas have become manifest.

In Africa, domestic conflicts in Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, Mozambique, and now Rwanda, to name only a few of the more salient cases, have created refugee flows and flows of armed rebels across national borders, thus regionalizing and even internationalizing what were once thought to be domestic conflicts (Weiner 1992). Therefore, leaders in Africa as well as in the international state system have begun to reconsider such issues as the notion of state sovereignty and the norms governing external intervention to address domestic conflicts. It is now clear that before African states can adequately approach their development problems, they are going to have to reduce domestic insecurities that have a high propensity to become regionalized and even internationalized.

In order for us to appreciate the regional security dilemmas of Africa, we have to understand (1) the historical origins of contemporary African

states; (2) the impact of the Cold War and its demise on some of Africa's most intractable problems of regional security; (3) the manner in which the UN has historically dealt with domestic as well as regional conflict in Africa; (4) the motivation for the creation of the Organization of African Unity and its subsequent activities in the areas of conflict management; and (5) the relative effectiveness of those activities.

The Origins of Africa's Regional Insecurity Dilemma

THE COLONIAL INHERITANCE

The states of contemporary Africa are largely multiethnic, artificial creations, the products of the European scramble for Africa in the late 1880s. In the regions they claimed, the colonial powers divided the peoples they found according to administrative convenience rather than with respect to precolonial sociopolitical arrangements. Consequently, during the colonial period, African peoples most often found themselves thrown together in their particular regions with other ethnic groups with whom they had had little, if any, prior political relationships. For example, Kenya comprises more than 40 distinct ethnic groups, Eritrea 9, and Tanzania 120. Similar patterns can be found in most of Africa's contemporary states.

In an effort to cast off the yoke of European colonialism after the Second World War, nationalist leaders in Africa accepted the fiction of an inherent national unity based upon the states created during the colonial period (Davidson 1992). The slogan in many places became "We must die as tribes so that we can be born as a nation." While most African societies have come to accept the legitimacy of colonially created states, in some cases groups claiming the right to national self-determination have risen to challenge such arrangements. Therefore, in addition to being preoccupied with asserting their hegemony and sovereignty, some modern African states have had to be preoccupied with ensuring and maintaining the territorial integrity of their respective polities (Young 1988, 31).

In the lexicon of international affairs, the term "security" generally refers to the insulation of a state from threats emanating from outside its borders. Individual states exist in regions, and internal disputes such as civil wars

can have a dramatic effect upon their collective, regional security. This threat can be a military one, but in Africa it often boils down to a wide variety of deprivations (e.g., drought, disease, pestilence). For example, drought and famine in Ethiopia in the mid-1980s created refugee flows across that country's borders with Kenya and Sudan (Keller 1992). If domestic problems spill over into a neighboring state and threaten the ability of that state to meet the basic needs of its own citizens, then the problems have been regionalized. However, in most cases it is armed conflict within neighboring states that has, in recent years, created refugee and arms flows that in turn heightened the instability and insecurity of entire regions. Take, for example, the anarchy that has been raging in Liberia since 1989, in Somalia since 1990, and most recently the troubles in Rwanda.

Africa, as a region, has historically perceived a vested interest in maintaining the collective security of the continent and its various regions, and the national security of individual member states. The OAU was specifically founded in 1963 in order to provide a vehicle for the effective resolution of disputes and violations of the territorial integrity of member states.

Within Africa, the artificial nature of colonially created states has always caused leaders to fear the balkanization of their states, particularly as a consequence of the actions of secessionists or irredentists. This can clearly be seen in the fact that the territorial integrity of member states is enshrined in Chapter III (3) of the OAU Charter. This principle was reaffirmed in a resolution of that organization in 1964, at a summit of the heads of its member states in Cairo, Egypt. The principle of *uti posside juris* was adopted by the body, and it was asserted that the colonial boundaries inherited by individual states at independence should remain inviolable (Amate 1986). This move was seen by most African leaders as a hedge against secessionism and irredentism. At the same time, it was an effort by the majority of the member states to avoid dealing directly with already existing disputes involving Somalia and Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya, and Ethiopia and the former Italian colony, Eritrea.[4]

The Eritrean war of national liberation, which culminated after thirty years in 1991, had similar roots. Eritrean nationalists claimed that their right

4. Although at the time of the creation of the OAU a border dispute involving Algeria and Morocco also existed, the North African region, as noted earlier, is in political terms much more a part of the Arab world than it is a part of the African region as I use that term here. In addition to the OAU, Arab regional organizations have also had influence in the course of this dispute. For this reason the border claims of Morocco and Algeria are not considered in this analysis. I concentrate on sub-Saharan Africa.

to self-determination was denied them by imperial Ethiopia when it violated the terms of a UN-sponsored federation involving the two countries (Habte Selassie 1989).

Various incidents involving Somali irredentists are based on the desire of ethnic Somalis living in Ethiopia's Ogaden region to be united with others in the Somali nation, which they claim was illegitimately partitioned during the colonial period (Laitin and Samatar 1987).

Some problems of regional security in Africa are fairly recent, being the product of civil wars and local rebellions that stop short of possessing revolutionary objectives. Others are long-standing problems that can be traced to the colonial legacy. In either case, the Cold War and its immediate aftermath greatly affected the persistence, scope, and intensity of such civil conflicts. Stein and Lobell (this volume) present evidence that the bipolar nature of the international system at the height of the Cold War and the ideological competition between the two superpowers had the effect of globalizing what had been only local disputes. Nowhere was this more evident than in parts of Africa. William Zartman (1989, 5) has further noted that before the height of the Cold War, African conflicts often lasted only until the exhaustion of current military stocks. But, since then, such conflicts, particularly in the Horn and southern Africa, have tended to be protracted.

The Cold War and Regional Security in Africa

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES

The Cold War competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union in Africa, as in other parts of the Third World (Stein and Lobell, in this volume), greatly contributed to several of the incidents of militarily based regional conflict. This can be clearly seen when we compare the experiences of the territorial dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia, the Eritrean war of national liberation, and the various conflicts in southern Africa that escalated after 1975. The roots of each of these conflicts are historic, but a new dimension was added during the Cold War.

Throughout the 1980s, the superpowers were heavily involved in supporting clients in the Horn of Africa. Over a thirteen-year period Soviet military assistance to Ethiopia is estimated to have been as high as $11 billion (Henze 1990, 105).

Following its 1977 break with Ethiopia, its client of twenty-three years, the U.S. administration of President Jimmy Carter embarked upon an "encirclement strategy," attempting to contain Soviet expansion in the Horn and Middle East by engaging in military alliances with Ethiopia's neighbors: Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, and Oman. In addition to assisting these countries in upgrading their military facilities and capabilities, joint military exercises became common. The territories of U.S. clients in the Horn were used as staging grounds for the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force, which was designed to facilitate the efficient projection of U.S. military power into the Middle East and Persian Gulf (Jackson 1982, 32). These developments caused Soviet clients in the region, Ethiopia and South Yemen, to come together in a show of solidarity and to resolve jointly to repulse any efforts on the part of the United States or its proxies to intervene in their affairs. The resulting tensions continued for almost a decade, and did not begin to abate until the Cold War began its meltdown in the mid-1980s.

In the process of pursuing what they felt to be their own vital interests, the superpowers contributed to an escalation of a regional arms race in the Horn. The Soviets and Americans jockeyed to check one another; the Ethiopians and Somalis tried to outfox each other. The consequences were momentous. The size of the Ethiopian armed forces grew from 54,000 in 1977 to more than 300,000 a decade later. By 1991, the Ethiopian army was estimated to be over 600,000 strong. Somalia's army swelled from about 32,000 in 1977 to 65,000 in 1987 (International Institute for Strategic Studies 1976–77, 1989–90). The growth of the military of Sudan was less dramatic, but internally, military activities over the decade of the 1980s grew significantly as the Ethiopian-supported Sudan People's Liberation Army was able to capture and control large portions of Southern Sudan.

Over the same period, Ethiopia's defense budget grew from $103 million to almost $472 million. Between 1977 and 1985 Somalia's defense expenditures rose from $36 million to $134 million, and Sudan's from $237 million to $478 million. This level and pattern of growth in military expenditures could not have taken place if the countries of the Horn had not been able to rely upon superpower patrons for ever-increasing levels of military assistance.

Ironically, the desire for more and more arms on the part of the countries in the region seems to have been more inspired by internal conflicts than by the need to protect the border zones of each country. The catastrophic defeat of the Somali army and the irredentist Western Somali Liberation Front in the Ogaden War of 1977–78 caused internal opposition to surface against Somali president Siad Barre. Over the next decade, the internal crisis escalated until the whole country was affected. The Barre regime was forced to abdicate in January 1991, and the Somali state was plunged into anarchy. The possible level of destruction was dramatically heightened by the availability of heavy as well as light arms and equipment left over from the largess of the superpowers during the Cold War.

The decade of the 1980s also witnessed an increase in the capacity and efficiency of the Eritrean national liberation movement. After having been routed by the Ethiopian army in the late 1970s, the Eritrean People's Liberation Army (EPLA) was able to regroup and, by 1987, began to make serious inroads toward liberating Eritrea from Ethiopian control. The success of the EPLA was enhanced by the fact that the Tigre People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement formed a united front, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF, operating inside the Ethiopian central highlands and with the logistical and tactical support of the EPLA, was able by 1991 to capture huge tracts of territory and totally to demoralize the Ethiopian army. In May of 1991, Ethiopia's president Mengistu Haile Mariam fled into exile, and his army of six hundred thousand totally collapsed. The EPRDF rebels were able to seize control of Ethiopia's capital, Addis Ababa, without any significant resistance.

By 1987, evidence existed that the Soviet Union was backing away from the Brezhnev policy of spreading the Soviet model throughout the Third World, and was interested in supporting political resolutions to internal wars in client states. Consequently, a combination of economic realities and Soviet pressure eventually encouraged Mengistu to retreat partially from his regime's dogmatic statist development strategy. By late 1989, Ethiopia was witnessing a cooling not only in Soviet support of its revolution, but also in support from allies such as East Germany and South Yemen, which were involved in their own process of political opening. The net result was that the Ethiopian regime could no longer rely upon its superpower sponsor for the assistance it needed to repress internal opposition. Ultimately, the regime collapsed. However, a power vacuum was averted because the forces of the EPRDF, with international support, were able to assume power and prevent the country from falling into anarchy, as had been the case in Somalia.

Solingen (this volume) has found that intractable coalitional strife within a ruling group, or no coalition at all, is the worst scenario for regional conflict. Internal conflicts that manifest themselves in fractious coalitional strife have the potential of spilling over into neighboring states. In the case of

Somalia and Ethiopia, the internal conflicts did not result in interstate disputes, simply because the two countries did not have the capacity to maintain war on two fronts—domestic and regional. However, a regional security dilemma was created for both countries by the uncontrolled flow of refugees into and out of their territories as well as the free flow of arms in both directions.

Regional security in southern Africa had been a problem ever since the early 1960s, when wars of national liberation erupted in the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, and since black opposition parties in South Africa such as the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress (PAC) were banned and driven underground. For more than two decades the Portuguese, with tacit support from NATO allies, doggedly attempted to hold on to their southern African colonies. Rebel groups came to rely upon the Soviet Bloc for military and political support against Portuguese colonialism. Given the unstable conditions in the neighboring Portuguese colonies, South Africa entered the fray in an effort to prevent conflicts in Angola and Mozambique from spilling into Namibia and eventually South Africa itself. South Africa initially supported the Portuguese, but later engaged in military actions in Mozambique and Angola for purely defensive reasons. After 1975, it came to fear that independent and stable Angola and Mozambique might make it easier for black liberation movements to wage war in South Africa itself.

Independent Angola and Mozambique quickly assumed active involvement in the Frontline African States organization, formed to press for the complete independence of all countries in the region. Whereas South Africa throughout the 1960s had periodically invaded or infiltrated black states in the region in an effort to undermine the planning and training of the armies of the ANC and PAC, after 1975 it projected its military into southern Angola and supported a destabilization campaign in Mozambique (Flannigan 1992). The presence in Angola was largely to crush the army of the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO), fighting for the independence of Namibia, and to support the effort of Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to overthrow the Marxist government in Luanda. The net effect of the military activities of South Africa in its efforts to maintain domestic order and security was an exacerbation of regional insecurity. This did not begin to change until the effects of the international sanctions and disinvestment initiated in the mid-1980s against South Africa began to have their effect. The international community had placed nominal sanctions against South Africa as early as the 1960s, but they

were ineffective. The latest sanctions, coupled with enlightened white leadership in South Africa, led to a reduction in that country's efforts to destabilize neighboring countries.

South Africa feared a Communist threat from its black-ruled neighbors. The threat posed by South Africa forced countries like Mozambique and Angola to turn to Marxist patrons for military, political, and economic assistance. Except for quietly providing military support to UNITA following the political ascendancy of the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) in the mid-1970s, the United States did not begin to become a major player in the region until the U.S. Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986. Following this, South Africa was pressured by the United States to find a political solution to its problems.

Despite these clear threats to regional security involving interstate conflict, most insecurity in Africa is domestic in origin. Yet, these domestic conflicts have contributed to regional insecurity, and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. This is a particularly grave problem for Africa because major outside actors have, since the end of the Cold War, become reluctant to intervene in the region. Lake (this volume) and Papayoanou (this volume) argue that the big powers no longer have an interest in competing for clients in the developing world, and are more likely to intervene and to be interested in minimizing conflicts in their own regions. The "distant partners" of the major powers are today far fewer, and presently none is to be found in Africa.

BRITAIN AND FRANCE

Even though we could not consider Britain and France superpowers in the strictest sense of the word, they are important in Africa because of their significant roles as the former primary colonizing powers on the continent and because of their continuing interests there. The role of Britain in its former African colonies since 1964 has been indirect at best, involving military training for African officers and private arms sales to African governments. In 1964 Britain intervened in Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda to put down mutinies against newly independent governments. The most obvious involvement of Britain in Africa during the postindependence period has been via private business activities and bilateral aid arrangements. Given this pattern, Britain appears to be of little relevance to a discussion of the role of external actors in regional security matters during the Cold War in Africa.

In contrast to Britain, France has until recently been extremely active in

carving out a role for itself in Africa through its economic as well as military activities. The disengagement of Britain and Belgium from active military involvement in Africa after the independence era by default left France the only European actor in the region willing to accept an interventionist role. In the early 1960s, France intervened to prop up regimes in the Congo, Cameroon, Gabon, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad. However, the French military presence on the continent dropped from 60,000 in 1960 to around 5,000 by the late 1960s. Also, direct military intervention in African domestic and regional affairs became less common. One particularly bold and controversial intervention to remove an African head of state occurred in 1979 in the Central African Republic (Smock 1993, 5).

In the 1970s and 1980s France extended its involvement beyond francophone Africa. Sheldon Geller argues (1992, 111) that this was in part because France felt it had a historic mission to be the most active European power in Africa and also to counter the expansion of the two superpowers on the continent. France seems most interested in maintaining political stability so as to protect French economic interests. This is one reason the leadership in France provided for restoring order in Zaire's Shaba province in 1977 and 1978, for intervening in Chad to halt Libyan expansionism between 1977 and 1980; and for attempting more recently to prop up the failed Hutu-dominated government in Rwanda before that government's overthrow in early 1994. However, for the most part, during and after the administration of President François Mitterand, France sharply curtailed its tendency to intervene militarily in African affairs.

Modalities of Conflict Management in Africa

Donald Rothchild (1996, 228) has noted that almost half (sixteen) of the thirty-five internal wars being waged throughout the world, with battle deaths exceeding one thousand per year, are currently taking place in Africa. The Cold War is over, and the superpowers are no longer there to step in to support one regional client or the other. Africa is generally being left to its own devices. The realities of the situation have encouraged African leaders to reconsider seriously the norms of external intervention for the purpose of settling domestic disputes. In the process the notion of state sovereignty is also being reexamined.

UN MODALITIES

The United Nations, like the OAU, has historically supported the idea of the inviolability of the national boundaries of African states that existed at the time of independence. Consequently, it has been unwilling to become involved in adjudicating boundary disputes between neighboring states. On the other hand, in cases where it was perceived that in certain territories the right of the people to self-determination was being denied, the UN has consistently engaged in diplomatic efforts to secure that right. For example, in the case of Namibia, after years of diversionary tactics and foot-dragging on the part of South Africa, the UN was able to negotiate a cease-fire between the protagonists, to establish a peacekeeping presence in the country, and to organize and supervise multiparty elections that led to Namibian independence in 1990. On the other hand, the UN and the OAU refused to recognize the right of the people of the former Italian colony, Eritrea, to self-determination until the forces of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front had vanquished the Ethiopian army on the battlefield in 1991. Only then did the UN agree to oversee the referendum that led to the creation of the independent state of Eritrea in 1993.

When, after a prolonged period of domestic instability in the Congo in the early 1960s, the UN decided to commit troops in an effort to restore peace, many observers seemed to believe that this action would serve notice that the organization would intervene anywhere on the continent where a Communist threat was perceived. However, the Congo operation proved to be unique and was never repeated. The Soviet Union, for example, acquired significant clients in Africa in the mid-1970s without UN objection. Even when internal conflicts threatened to dismember African states, the OAU seemed more concerned than the UN. I return to this point below, but for now the important point is that the UN as an organization finds it difficult to mediate disputes involving member states, particularly those disputes that are at a very intense stage or those that have proved intractable. Touval (1994) suggests that the problem is ingrained in all international organizations.

Despite its record in this area, in the 1990s the UN began to rethink the notion of state sovereignty and the norms of intervention in domestic disputes. Iraq's repression of its Kurdish minority following the Gulf War in 1991 prompted the passage of UN Resolution 688 authorizing direct UN intervention into Iraq's internal affairs in order to protect the Kurds. This was a clear indication of the international consensus on the legitimacy of

external collective action to halt domestic oppression as well as external aggression (Stremlau 1991, 659).

As the decade of the 1990s unfolded, the UN came to link food insecurity with regional conflict. In the spring of 1992 the organization committed peacekeeping troops to Somalia in an operation called UNISOM I. The primary motivation was humanitarian. The force was to clear the way for desperately needed food deliveries to an estimated 1.5 million Somalis threatened by war-induced famine. By December 1992, the idea of using UN peacekeepers in the Somali humanitarian effort had gained broad support in the UN, and the Security Council unanimously passed a resolution authorizing the deployment of a U.S.-led military force, UNITAF, to protect relief workers as they attempted to reach at-risk populations. Whereas the United States defined its role in strictly humanitarian terms, UN secretary-general Boutros-Ghali envisioned a wider role for UN forces: to disarm the armies of local warlords and to create an enabling environment for the restoration of a Somali national government. By May 1993 the United States declared its humanitarian mission a success and withdrew most of its 30,000 troops from the operation. However, a small contingent of U.S. soldiers remained under UN command in Somalia until March 1994 (Fromuth 1993). By the end of 1994, all UN forces were being withdrawn from the country; the international body had chosen to leave the processes of state reconstruction and political reconciliation to local and regional actors.

The lessons of UN involvement in the Somali humanitarian mission indicate that such actions are unlikely to remain strictly humanitarian and that political problems are invariably much more intractable than humanitarian ones. Within the UN community there appears to be a growing consensus that domestic conflicts that spill over borders cannot be ignored. At the same time, there is no agreement that it should be the UN itself that intervenes. Consequently there is emerging support for the strengthening, with the assistance of multilateral and bilateral donors, of regional conflict-management capacities. This thinking not only applies to regional and domestic conflicts in Africa. For example, Pervin (this volume) suggests that a modified concert seems to be developing in the Middle East because outside actors such as the UN and the major powers are now more interested in letting regional actors find their own solutions to their problems. Morgan (this volume) suggests that to the extent that the major powers will in the future be interested in regional or domestic conflicts in places where they have no direct interests, they will tend to encourage the pursuit of regional conflict-prevention and -resolution efforts.

OAU MODALITIES

African states are increasingly defining domestic conflicts that spill across borders in collective security terms. There has always been an inclination for African states to intervene collectively in some of the more serious conflicts, but there has not always been the capacity. The first major OAU peacekeeping effort of an inter-African force occurred in Chad in 1981–82. From the very beginning the action seemed doomed to failure. It was underfinanced and plagued by logistical problems. The OAU turned to the UN for assistance, but was refused on the grounds that it was inappropriate for the organization to make extensive financial or operational contributions to an effort that would not be carried out under the UN's own political authority and military direction. Ultimately, the burden of the Chad mission was borne mostly by OAU member states.

The most successful inter-African peacekeeping effort to date has been that mounted by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Nigeria took the lead in establishing this force in the summer of 1990 for the purpose of restoring peace and order in Liberia, which was at the time gripped in a bloody civil war. The novelty of ECOMOG lay in its regional origin and character, not in the mission it undertook. After five years of "peacekeeping," the West African units of ECOMOG were augmented by troops from three East African countries. Some semblance of order was briefly restored in 1995, and preparations began for multiparty elections. However, before these efforts could bear fruit, Liberia again erupted into intense civil war, proving ECOMOG powerless to manage a conflict of such intensity. The war was again brought directly to the capital city of Monrovia in the spring of 1996, resulting again in massive human dislocation and refugee flows by land and sea.

The ECOMOG operation in Liberia has set a precedent, and its limited and fleeting success has fueled new discussion about the possibility of a permanent inter-Africa military to be deployed for the purposes of peacekeeping and peacemaking. This would represent a radical departure from past practice.

Although it was founded to manage conflict among member states and to represent their interests in international forums, the OAU has historically played more of a reactive role in addressing threats to national and regional security. The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration is theoretically responsible for settling disputes between member states, but it

has historically left that task to various ad hoc commissions and committees of the organization and to eminent persons. Moreover, the commission does not have a mandated role in conflict prevention. It is responsible exclusively for addressing interstate conflicts only after they have erupted; it has no role in the mediation of what are determined to be internal conflicts.

The manner in which the OAU has historically dealt with the border dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia is instructive. The first time the organization considered the problem was on the occasion of the second meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers in 1964. At the time, the UN deferred to the OAU to settle the dispute in this forum. The two adversaries were allowed to plead their respective cases. The Somalis claimed that Ethiopia's Ogaden region was a part of historic Somalia and that it had been acquired by Ethiopia in a colonial "landgrab." This claim rested on the assumption that the dispute predated the establishment of the OAU and the adoption of its charter. Ethiopia rejected this claim, arguing that the Ogaden was a part of historic Ethiopia.

Rather than settle the dispute once and for all, the OAU Council of Ministers merely appealed to Ethiopia and Somalia to abide by the OAU Charter and to settle their differences peacefully. Until 1973, the OAU refrained from again becoming involved in the dispute. It became involved again only when hostilities between the two neighbors reemerged. A good-offices committee was appointed, and it was able to arrange a short-lived and tenuous peace.

The first part of the 1970s witnessed the height of the Somali Revolution, and Somali nationalism took on an increasingly aggressive cast. In the context of this heightened sense of Somali nationalism, the desire to recover the "lost" Somali clans became more intense than ever before and was at the root of the Ogaden War of 1977–78. An OAU good-offices committee was again set up, but this time it failed. The dispute was temporarily settled on the battlefield, since the Ethiopians, with the assistance of their Eastern-bloc allies, were able to reestablish control over the Ogaden.

Ironically, the border dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia achieved a tentative resolution through the facilitation of the subregional technical organization, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). This organization was formed in 1986 by the governments of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda for the purpose of providing a subregional approach to the problems of drought and famine. At the first IGADD summit in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to begin direct talks to resolve their border problems.

Ad hoc committees of the OAU have been equally ineffective in conflict

resolution. They have no enforcement authority, and can only appeal to the disputing parties to adhere to OAU principles.

New Directions?

What has been made abundantly clear by the continuing armed conflicts in Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, and Angola, as well as the anarchy now raging in Rwanda, is that Africa will have to find new ways of addressing both domestic and regional conflicts. New institutions have to be developed in order to avert such debilitating conflicts and to resolve them once they erupt. Such a realization was reinforced between 1990 and 1996 by the actions of the activist UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who, much more than any of his recent predecessors, envisioned an interventionist role for the UN, and by the visionary leadership of OAU secretary-general Salim Ahmed Salim.

The situation in modern Africa, as it pertains to development of a collective security-management system, is unique. The threat to individual African states, as well as to Africa as a whole, is less external to the continent and less military than it is economic, environmental, and social. Economic insecurity results both from the disadvantageous position of African states in the world economic system, a position that is a part of the colonial legacy, and from official corruption and poor public management of the economy. Environmental insecurity is not only rooted in a long history of poor environmental management but also in periodic drought and famine, uncontrolled population growth, and low technological capacities for addressing serious environmental problems such as deforestation, desertification, and soil erosion. The social threats to African security include poverty, inadequate educational opportunities, gender and ethnic inequities, inadequate health care, malnutrition, and overall underdevelopment. The withdrawal of the superpowers and other rich and powerful states from significant involvement in the pursuit of development and politico-military stability on the continent has made African states vulnerable to implosion, creating a potential for subregional and even regional security dilemmas. These are the types of forces that seem to be driving the quest in Africa today for collective security-management systems.

In 1991, the African Leadership Forum, the OAU, and the UN Eco-

nomic Commission for Africa cosponsored a historic conference at Kampala, Uganda, to discuss the continent's problems. The five hundred conferees agreed that their countries are interdependent and that their respective national security situations were intertwined with regional security throughout the continent. In other words, many African leaders are now of the opinion that the security, stability, and development of every African country affects every other African country, and that Africa cannot hope to make progress toward development or democracy without creating the conditions and institutions necessary for lasting solutions to its security and stability problems. The final report of the gathering proposed the establishment of the permanent Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation (CSSDCA).[5]

The Kampala Document called for the establishment of continental peacekeeping machinery, and for the drastic lowering of military expenditures by African states. This theme was picked up by the OAU's Salim, and for the first time African leaders are confronting regional security issues and seriously considering how they might cooperate to reduce interstate as well as domestic conflicts and, in the process, create conditions conducive to democracy and sustained development.

At the 1992 OAU summit in Dakar, Senegal, Salim proposed an "OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Resolution." The following year, the African heads of state at their annual summit formally approved the establishment of this mechanism, even though it implied that member states might on occasion have to surrender their sovereignty in the interest of regional security. Early indications are that the member states of the OAU have not adopted an attitude conducive to the establishment of a Wilsonian multilateral collective security-management system. In other words, it is not clear whether the notions of state sovereignty and the norms of intervention will indeed be altered in the process of implementing this mechanism.

The resolution establishing the mechanism states: "The Mechanism will be guided by the objectives and principles of the OAU Charter; in particular, the sovereign equality of Member States, noninterference in the internal affairs of States, the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States, their inalienable right to independent existence, the peaceful settlement of disputes as well as the inviolability of borders inherited from

5. It is important to note that CSSDCA is largely an informal effort, privately funded, and with no official authority. Talks continue, but the plan has yet to be implemented. In fact, the idea has been co-opted by the OAU.

colonialism. It will also function on the basis of the consent and rely on the cooperation of the parties to a conflict" (African Leadership Forum 1992).

The primary objective of the mechanism is said to be "the anticipation and prevention of conflicts." In situations where conflicts have occurred, the mechanism is supposed to be responsible for undertaking peacemaking and peace-building activities. In cases of severe conflict, there is a provision for OAU cooperation with the United Nations.

Despite the ambiguities in the language of the resolution creating the mechanism, it greatly broadens the role of the OAU Secretariat and the secretary-general in coordinating inter-Africa peacekeeping efforts. The mechanism is built around a "central organ" headed by the secretary-general of the OAU. This new institution is the OAU's Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, elected annually, comprising a chairman and eight other members representing Africa's five regions, including North Africa. The bureau is empowered to act on behalf of heads of state in sanctioning any deployment of peacekeeping forces. In addition, the office of the secretary-general is strengthened by the creation of an "early-warning system" to monitor and analyze trends. The secretary-general can also rely upon a committee of eminent persons to engage in preventive diplomacy and upon the advice of African military and technical experts. Salim envisions that each African military will have specially trained units that could be deployed under OAU command.

A special fund has been established for the mechanism. It is made up of funds from the regular appropriations of the OAU and voluntary contributions from member states and from other sources within Africa. There are also provisions for receiving resources from outside Africa.

The United States is one of those extracontinental actors working with the OAU as well as with subregional organizations such as ECOWAS and IGADD to help them implement plans and procedures for enhanced African conflict prevention, peacemaking, and peacekeeping capabilities. Legislation in the form of H. R. 4541, the *African Conflict Resolution Act,* calls for the provision of material and technical assistance to help institutionalize conflict-resolution capabilities in Africa. This aid is to be provided to the OAU, subregional organizations, and national governments. Also, it provides for education and training in conflict resolution and peacekeeping for civilian and military personnel, and the strengthening of the mediation and reconciliation capacities of nongovernmental organizations in Africa. The projected cost over a four-year period is $60 million (U.S. House 1994).

There are a host of possible obstacles to the long-term viability of the

mechanism. Even though bilateral and multilateral donors have made contributions to the mechanism's fund, a chief obstacle continues to be funding. At its 1995 summit, the OAU made some tentative strides toward addressing some of its funding needs. The secretary-general was able to pressure a number of member states to pay dues that were in arrears, resulting in a $20 million infusion into the OAU coffers. A second major potential obstacle is the problem of commitment. At the Addis Ababa summit, however, all but a few leaders in attendance agreed to place their armed services on standby for possible intervention in increasingly unstable Burundi. These actions were preceded by the establishment of the Cairo Center for African Crisis Solving, which hosted a one-month training course on conflict prevention and management for twenty-eight military officers from fourteen African countries (Agence France Presse 1995).

Third, a related problem of commitment has to do with the depth of the new thinking in Africa on the norms of external intervention in domestic matters. Will the OAU mechanism be able to assert its assigned authority when crises emerge, or will it be obstructed by states who feel targeted? While African leaders seem to agree that the mechanism is needed, it is not clear just how most would respond if the OAU decided to intervene to manage disputes in their own countries.

In any case, the decision to intervene is not likely to be easily taken. However, when the OAU does decide to intervene, militarily at least, it might feel more confident intervening in smaller and weaker countries and might be least likely to intervene in larger and stronger states that are highly unstable but still coherent (e.g., Sudan, Nigeria). In states that have descended into chaos, intervention options for the OAU may be limited to the domain of humanitarian aid.

In the case of the most severe domestic conflicts occurring in subregions, the OAU has begun to work through subregional organizations such as ECOMOG in Liberia and IGADD in the mediation of the conflict in Sudan. However, experience has shown that good intentions are not enough. Neither IGADD nor ECOMOG has been able successfully to manage intense internal conflicts in their subregions, mainly because of limited resources available and the high level of mistrust among the protagonists.

Despite the obvious limitations of regional and subregional approaches in dealing with domestic conflicts that have become, or have the potential to become, the source of regional security dilemmas, Africa seems to have little alternative but to cultivate such approaches. The development of new mech-

anisms and modalities for collective security management will not be easy, but such new approaches must be found.

Conclusion

African states are confronted with subregional security dilemmas that are largely domestic in origin. Internal conflicts that grow from the colonial legacy of artificially created nation-states have in some subregions been exacerbated by the widespread availability of weapons of war left over from the Cold War. Throughout the continent domestic conflicts are increasingly spilling across borders, resulting in human dislocation, arms flows, and food insecurity. Such conditions strain the resources of already impoverished African countries and prevent progress toward democracy and self-sustained development. Such problems are now being seen as not only subregional but regional security dilemmas that demand the development of interlocking collective security-management systems linking the OAU with subregional organizations having common collective security interests.

Traditional modalities for addressing subregional as well as domestic conflicts in Africa are widely recognized as being inadequate under present circumstances. Both the UN and the OAU are now in the process of rethinking the notions of state sovereignty and the norms governing multilateral external intervention for the purpose of resolving these conflicts. This new thinking was inspired in part by the changes in the world order following the collapse of Communism and the end of the Cold War, and in part by the emergence of liberalizing regimes throughout the continent.

The OAU has established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution. Significantly, this new body is mandated to engage in preventive diplomacy in efforts to avert debilitating domestic and interstate conflicts. Should the OAU succeed in setting up an effective procedure for preventive diplomacy, this will represent a major breakthrough on behalf of African regional security.