THE ETHNIC DIMENSION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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THE ERITREAN NATIONAL QUESTION

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On May 29, 1991, Isaias Afwerki, Secretary-General of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), announced the formation of the Provisional Government of Eritrea, in which a long and bitter struggle by the people of Eritrea for their right to self-determination had culminated. The primary objective of this new government was to lay the foundation for a referendum to decide on the future of Eritrea as a political entity. Secretary-General Afwerki called upon the United Nations to "shoulder its moral responsibilities [to conduct a free and fair referendum on Eritrean self-determination] without further delay."

The Eritrean conflict had ended abruptly, its resolution facilitated by a dramatically changed international political climate as well as by the weakened resolve of the regime of Ethiopia’s Mengistu Haile Mariam to prosecute the war. The Soviet Union had served notice on Mengistu that it would no longer provide Ethiopia with massive amounts of military assistance, and, without this aid, winning the war would have been impossible. At the same time, the administration of U. S. President George Bush reversed its long-standing policy of treating Eritrea as Ethiopia’s internal problem and therefore as inappropriate grounds for any external diplomatic intervention. By the end of 1990, U. S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen was serving as a third-party mediator in talks between Mengistu and the EPLF. However, by May of 1991, the Ethiopian regime had suffered a loss of both domestic and
international legitimacy, and its military had lost the will to fight. The conflict ended on the battlefield before a negotiated settlement could be reached. Confronted with this reality, Assistant Secretary Cohen asserted, “If [the Eritreans] want to exercise the right of self-determination, there’s nobody who’s going to stop them. . . . The United States isn’t going to stop them or allow them.”

The prospect of an independent state of Eritrea challenges the international community to rethink its assumptions about the sanctity and inviolability of the boundaries of multiethnic nation-states in much the same way that the breakup of the Soviet Union has challenged such assumptions. Eritrea had long been viewed by the international community as nothing more than a province of Ethiopia, rather than as a nation whose roots date back to antiquity. The Eritreans, on the other hand, have, since 1962, claimed the same right to self-determination as the other fifty-odd multiethnic states of Africa that are the legacy of European colonialism.

The purpose of this essay is to examine the roots of the Eritrean conflict, to briefly discuss why the diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict failed, and to consider the international implications of an independent Eritrea.

THE ROOTS OF THE ERITREAN STRUGGLE FOR SELF-DETERMINATION

Modern Ethiopia is as much a product of the nineteenth-century “scramble for Africa” as is Kenya, Nigeria, or Zaire. Although the Amhara and Tigre people who inhabit the highland core of the country, who provide the cultural underpinnings for this multiethnic state, can trace their origins as a unified state as far back as 3,000 years ago, the present polity was formed and consolidated in the mid-to late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During this period, successive emperors, through conquest and diplomacy, acquired peripheral areas to the south, east, and west. This period of expansion coincided with the partitioning of the rest of Africa among European colonizers. Emperor Menelik II was instrumental in negotiating treaties which set the geographic boundaries of the country as we know them today, except for Eritrea.

The regimes of both Emperor Haile Selassie and Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam had claimed that, until it was occupied by the Italians in the 1880s, Eritrea had been known as the region of Medre Bhari or Mereb Mellash and was a part of “Greater Tigre, the cradle of Abyssinian or Ethiopian civilization.” On the other hand, the Eritrean nationalists argue that although Eritrea was part of the ancient Axumite Empire, no territorial connection between Eritrea and the Abyssinian state has existed since that time. Furthermore, they claim that almost all of Eritrea was
independent, or subject only to tribute payment to non-Ethiopian empires (i.e., the Funj, the Ottomans, and the Egyptians), after the fall of Axum.

There was no Eritrean state per se until the late 1800s, when it was established by Italy. Although Ethiopia claimed to have historical rights to the region, at the time of the “scramble,” it did not have effective control of Eritrea. In fact, Emperor Menelik II had conceded Italian hegemony over the region in the late 1800s. Any effort to lay effective claim to the territory would have been costly in military terms and would almost certainly have jeopardized the security of the highland core of Ethiopia as well as the newly incorporated areas of the south and east.

The Italians coveted not only Eritrea, but Ethiopia itself, and, in 1896, an Italian military expedition attempted to penetrate the Ethiopian highlands. However, Emperor Menelik II had been anticipating such a move and was able tomarshall a defensive force sufficient to overwhelm the Italians at the historic Battle of Adowa. The Italian defeat at Adowa and the subsequent signing of the Treaty of Addis Ababa clearly established the boundaries of the colony of Eritrea. From this point on, the Italians set about building Eritrea into a viable economic entity which could serve the interests of the Italian metropolis. Italians were encouraged to settle in the colony and to develop its agricultural and industrial potential. As a matter of administrative convenience, the colony was divided into governmental units on the basis of ethnic factors.

By the 1930s, Italy was ruled by the Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini, who considered avenging the humiliating defeat of Italian forces at Adowa to be his sacred duty. He also claimed to have a moral obligation to civilize the backward Abyssinians. Mussolini’s troops succeeded in subduing the forces of Emperor Haile Selassie I in 1936, driving the emperor into exile. However, Italian control over Eritrea was short-lived. The Fascist forces occupying Ethiopia were routed by a British-led Commonwealth force with the support of Ethiopian and Eritrean guerrillas, who were already operating within the region. The emperor was reinstalled, but the British maintained administrative control over Eritrea and other territory in the region which had been occupied by the Italians.

The British had tried to enlist the support of the Eritreans against the Fascists even before the Second World War. They pledged to push for Eritrean self-determination if the Eritreans fought against the Italian Fascists. During the Fascist occupation of the Horn of Africa, the British raised Eritrean hopes even higher by bombarding the region with leaflets which appeared to support self-determination for Eritrea. Once the war was over, it quickly became apparent that Eritrean self-determination was not in the offing. At the 1946–47 Paris Peace Conference, a formula was worked out for the disposition of former Italian colonies in Africa, including Eritrea. Throughout the conference, the Ethiopian government strongly emphasized its claim to Eritrea, noting both Eritrea’s historical
connection with Ethiopia and Ethiopia's unequivocal need for access to
the sea. Emperor Haile Selassie and his government worked diligently
and effectively in international circles to secure support for Ethiopia's
claim to Eritrea.

Despite what was at least circumstantial evidence that the independence
movement in Eritrea had considerable support, the United States seemed
to be evading the need for a referendum or plebiscite. In 1949, American
consular officials in Asmara, Eritrea, had informed Washington that an
estimated 75 percent of the people of Eritrea supported independence,
while there was "no real sentiment" for federation of any kind with
Ethiopia. However, the desire to support Ethiopia, and thus to have a
base in Eritrea, seems to have been the primary concern for the Truman
administration, as for more recent presidents. The United States became
the architect of U.N. Resolution 390 (V), the Federal Act, that laid the
foundation for the federation of Eritrea and Ethiopia. The American
degation to the United Nations was effective in organizing support for the
resolution, and when the vote was taken on November 20, 1950, it was
overwhelmingly affirmed. In return for U.S. efforts in this regard, Ethiopia
attempted to prove its own worth as an ally. For example, in 1951, Ethiopia
committed an elite military unit to fight in the Korean "police action"
alongside American troops. Perhaps more importantly, Haile Selassie
used his close association with the United States to firm up his own
position vis-à-vis Eritrea. In return for American support of Ethiopia's
claim to Eritrea, the emperor offered not only the possibility of a U.S.
military base at Asmara, but also a stable and reliable ally against com-
munism in the strategically important Red Sea area. Even before the
United Nations had begun its deliberations on the disposition of Eritrea
and the other former Italian colonies, the United States and Ethiopia had
agreed to a quid pro quo, that is, to give each other what they desired
most.

In the immediate aftermath of the Italian defeat, the British remained
in Ethiopia and assisted the emperor in reestablishing his authority. Even
as he was accepting their support, however, Haile Selassie was fearful of the
intentions of the British. Beginning in 1943, after a secret meeting in
the Suez between the emperor and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Haile Selassie systematically cultivated a relationship with the United
States. A lend-lease agreement between the two countries had been con-
cluded as early as 1942, and over the next decade they agreed to more
extensive relations. For example, in June 1951, the two countries signed
a technical-cooperation agreement designed to facilitate the "interchange
of technical knowledge and skills and in related activities designed to
contribute to the balance and integrated development of the economic
resources and productive capacities of Ethiopia." When the British completely withdrew from Ethiopia (and Eritrea) in
1952, the Americans were quick to seize the opportunity to become Ethiopia's superpower patron. The most important agreements relating to the Ethiopia/United States alliance were concluded in 1953, when two pacts were signed: the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and the Utilization of Defense Installations within the Empire of Ethiopia Agreement. As a result of these accords, the United States was able to establish Kagnew Station, the American military facility and radio tracking station, in Eritrea, thus cementing a political, economic, and military relationship between the United States and Ethiopia that was to last for almost twenty-five years.

American interests in the region were mainly geo-strategic ones. On the one hand, the United States wanted to check the advance of communism and, on the other, it wanted to be able to safeguard Israeli interests in the Middle East. The vehicle for attaining these goals was to be the Kagnew Naval Air Station at Asmara, a multimillion-dollar facility housing a radio tracking station that was part of a worldwide network maintained by the United States in order to monitor the Soviet Union in the days before the development of satellite technology. The facility was also used for U.S. naval communications and, by means of its high-frequency transmitter, for diplomatic telecommunications. After 1960, Kagnew Station, along with a U.S. Navy installation at Massawa, was greatly expanded. By 1970, the United States was spending about thirteen million dollars annually to operate these bases, which were staffed by about 3,200 American service personnel and their families.

The United States's perception that maintaining a presence in Eritrea served a vital national interest led it to support Haile Selassie's policies in Eritrea almost without question. This had disastrous consequences for the cause of Eritrean self-determination. The United States, with only occasional reluctance, committed arms and other military assistance to the emperor so that he might put down internal rebellion, particularly after Eritrea was annexed by Ethiopia in 1962. A series of secret agreements reached between 1960 and 1964 resulted in the modernization and dramatic expansion of the Ethiopian military. The main justification given for this degree of military development was the ever-present threat to Ethiopia from Somalia arising from their dispute over the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. In addition, however, some of this American aid was used to bolster Ethiopia's military capability in Eritrea. For this purpose, the United States supplied Ethiopian forces with counterinsurgency training and on-the-ground advisers to help suppress the nationalistic yearnings of a sector of the Eritrean population. For example, in 1964, two years after the outbreak of an armed rebellion in Eritrea, a fifty-five-member counterinsurgency team was sent by the United States to train Ethiopian troops in techniques that could be used to combat the Eritrean independence movement. In 1971, the government of Haile Selassie, its days
now numbered, asked the United States to help improve the "firepower" of its forces fighting in Eritrea by providing helicopters and the most up-to-date rifles. Some U.S. officials expressed concern that this might signal the beginning of a radical militarization of the Horn. However, there was no obvious attempt on the part of the Nixon administration either to resolve the Eritrean problem through diplomacy or to pressure the imperial regime into moderating its policy toward Eritrea. (I shall return to this point below.) The point here is that Haile Selassie had effectively cultivated his political and military relationship with the United States at least partly in order to maintain control over Eritrea.

In terms of his domestic policies, Haile Selassie had been equally effective. The Federal Act called for an autonomous Eritrean government consisting of legislative, judicial, and executive branches. This government was to have responsibility over domestic affairs, foreign affairs, external trade, defense, and communication, while currency would be the responsibility of the "federal" (Ethiopian) domain. An Imperial Federal Council, composed of equal numbers of Ethiopian and Eritrean representatives, was to govern and to oversee the drawing up of a constitution during a transition period that was not to extend beyond September 15, 1952. Significantly, there was no provision for the drafting of a genuinely federal constitution.

Eritrean political organizations, on one side of the issue or the other, emerged as early as 1944. By 1952, three main parties dominated the Eritrean political scene: the Unionist Bloc, comprised mainly of Christian Eritreans who favored complete union with Ethiopia; the Democratic Party, which had formerly been the Independence Bloc and which favored an independent Eritrea; and the Muslim League of Western Province. In the elections for the first Eritrean Legislative Assembly, the Unionists won thirty-two seats; the Democratic Party, eighteen; and the Muslim League, fifteen. Three seats went to splinter groups. Subsequently, a ruling coalition of Unionists and Muslim League members was formed. On the assumption that Eritrean autonomy was protected, the assembly ratified the new constitution. In addition to having the authority to govern themselves, the Eritreans were allowed to fly their own flag and to retain Tigrinya and Arabic as their national languages, rather than Amharic.

Throughout the constitutional discussions that took place between 1950 and 1952, Haile Selassie had vigorously lobbied to ensure that the Unionists, whom he could influence, secured the most important positions in the new government. Such maneuvers continued throughout the period of federation and facilitated the emperor's efforts to undermine Eritrean autonomy. The systematic destruction of the federal relationship was subtle but calculated. Haile Selassie smashed autonomous institutions and instituted policies which pulled Eritrea further and further into Ethiopia's
orbit. Among his first moves in this direction was to force some Eritrean industries to either close down or move their operations to Addis Ababa. The year 1952 was a watershed not only because it marked the beginning of the federation, but also because it was the year in which the Eritrean constitution was suspended. A year later, all trade unions were banned; four years later, political parties were banned, and the Eritrean Legislative Assembly “temporarily” suspended. At the same time, the imperial regime replaced Arabic and Tigrinya, the languages of instruction in schools, with Amharic. In 1958, the “Ethiopianization” of Eritrea went one step further when a blatantly unrepresentative assembly voted to eliminate the requirement that both Eritrean and Ethiopian flags fly in public places, requiring only the latter. The next year, the Eritrean code of laws was voted out of existence and replaced by the Ethiopian code. The final act in the de facto dissolution of the federation occurred in 1960, when the assembly voted to rename the Eritrean Government the Eritrean Administration. By this act the formal annexation of Eritrea by Ethiopia in 1962 was rendered anticlimactic.

There is some question as to whether the assembly was coerced into accepting the dissolution of the federation. What is clear is that Haile Selassie used a combination of political acumen and coercion to effect his claim over Eritrea and to incorporate it as a province in the Ethiopian Empire. When Eritrean nationalists questioned the legality of abrogating the federal constitution, the Ethiopian government replied that the Eritrean Legislative Assembly had “voted” for union with Ethiopia. The Eritreans countered by claiming that the “vote” had been coerced and that, in any case, the assembly had no authority to unilaterally decide on union without conducting a referendum on the issue by the Eritrean people.

ARMED STRUGGLE AND THE GROWTH OF ERITREAN NATIONAL IDENTITY

The Eritrean nationalists’ demand for self-determination is not based on claims of a common national culture or of ethno-linguistic affinities that can be traced back to antiquity. The movement is multiethnic and also represents various ideological and religious persuasions. Each of Eritrea’s nine distinct ethnic groups is represented in the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front’s leadership as well as in its rank and file. The EPLF and other Eritrean nationalists argue that the tie that binds Eritreans is a common history of Italian colonial domination within the boundaries of what we now know as Eritrea. The birth of the modern “nation” of Eritrea, then, can be traced only to the beginnings of Italian colonialism in the late 1880s, but this sense of a modern national identity has intensified
over the more than thirty years of Eritrean armed resistance to Ethiopian rule.

The armed insurrection that began in 1962 did not end until mid-1991, when the EPLF claimed victory on the battlefield. Successive Ethiopian governments had attempted to solve the Eritrean problem militarily. From its very inception, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) accepted Ethiopia’s claim to Eritrea as valid. The notion of a war of national liberation against a non-European, African imperialist has been consistently rejected as baseless. While Eritrean nationalists were able, over the years, to secure assistance from various North African and Middle Eastern countries as well as from nearby Sudan and Somalia, Ethiopia succeeded in keeping Eritrea off the OAU’s agenda by diplomatic means. This left Eritrean nationalists little choice but to prosecute a war of national liberation.

The most serious challenge confronting the national liberation movement from the very beginning was the need to develop a base of popular support and a cohesive military force. Initially, the most prominent rebel organization was the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), which had close ties to several Arab countries. The ELF divided Eritrea into five military regions and gave regional commanders a great deal of latitude over military activities in their respective zones. By 1967, Haile Selassie had recognized that his regime was pitted against an increasingly sophisticated revolutionary movement. Consequently, with American and Israeli assistance, Ethiopia launched a massive military offensive, not only decimating Eritrean guerrilla units, but also uprooting civilians, who fled as refugees to Sudan. Over the next several years, internal ELF disputes over strategy and tactics led to its fragmentation and the founding of another independence organization, the EPLF, in 1970.

By 1971, the cumulative effect of various Eritrean groups waging separate guerrilla campaigns against Ethiopian forces had amounted to such a serious threat that the emperor declared martial law in the region. In addition, he was forced to deploy about half of his army to contain the struggle. In January 1974, Haile Selassie’s forces suffered a crushing defeat by the EPLF, thus severely affecting army morale and exposing the ever-weakening position of the imperial government. This devastating defeat contributed to the overthrow of Haile Selassie’s regime and gave hope to Eritrean nationalists that they could achieve independence militarily.

RESOLVING THE ERITREAN NATIONAL QUESTION

Like its prior imperial regime, Ethiopia’s new military regime attempted to resolve the Eritrean question on the battlefield, refusing to compromise on the issue. The EPLF, however, once it had become the predominate
Eritrean liberation organization, attempted on numerous occasions to bring about a negotiated settlement to the Eritrean problem. In 1980, the EPLF offered a clear, seven-point proposal, the heart of which was an internationally supervised referendum on Eritrean self-determination. This was a bold, conciliatory, and forward-looking proposal. Over the next decade, the EPLF continued to stand by its proposal, but the Mengistu regime either ignored the EPLF or did not bargain with it in good faith.

After the fall of Haile Selassie, relations between Ethiopia and the United States began to turn sour. In part, this was because advances in satellite technology had allowed the United States to reduce its dependence on land-based radio tracking stations, so there was no longer such an overwhelming need for a military station in Eritrea. In addition, American concern over the increasingly leftist leanings of Ethiopia’s military regime and its apparent lack of respect for fundamental human rights was growing.

During the U.S. presidential campaign of 1976, human rights was made a centerpiece of candidate Jimmy Carter’s platform. When he took office in 1977, Carter moved swiftly to utilize military as well as economic aid as instruments in the implementation of his human rights policy. In particular, Carter attempted to use military aid as leverage by which to gain improvements in Ethiopia’s human rights performance. Rather than yield to American pressures, however, the Mengistu regime turned to the Soviet Union for military assistance. By December of 1977, the Soviets had begun to provide not only massive amounts of military equipment, but also military and technical advisers. Over the following thirteen years, the Soviets provided Ethiopia with an estimated thirteen billion dollars in military aid.

Between late 1977 and mid-1978, the Derg lost most of Eritrea, retaining control of only the capital, Asmara, the port cities of Assab and Massawa, and some small towns. Despite being nominally controlled by the Ethiopians, these urban areas were merely enclaves under siege by Eritrean forces. While preparing a counteroffensive, the Derg simultaneously attempted to negotiate with the EPLF, but these talks failed. In May 1978, this counteroffensive was launched when government forces, with Soviet, East German, and Yemeni support, pushed their way out of their Asmara garrison. Over the next year, more than 120,000 regular and militia troops pressed the offensive, gradually reclaiming 95 percent of the land that had been taken by the EPLF or the preceding ELF forces. For the next decade, the Eritrean nationalists had to make do with hit-and-run guerrilla campaigns.

The setbacks of the late 1970s and 1980s did not lead to the demoralization and collapse of the Eritrean movement; on the contrary, the intensification of the struggle seemed to broaden and deepen the Eritrean
national consciousness, enabling the nationalists to develop an army that was strong enough to win on the battlefield, if necessary. The strength of Eritrea's steadfast opposition to its incorporation into Ethiopia was dramatically underscored in March of 1988 when the EPLF launched a massive military offensive against Ethiopian troops stationed in the region. The scale and power of the attack caught the Ethiopian regime completely off guard. More than 18,000 Ethiopian soldiers were captured or killed in several weeks of intense fighting. Over the next three years, successive defeats at the hands of the EPLF and the newly created umbrella organization of opposition forces fighting inside Ethiopia, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, caused the Ethiopian military to become severely demoralized. In May 1989, a coup d'état almost succeeded in overthrowing the Mengistu regime. However, one consequence of this abortive coup was that many senior military officers in the Ethiopian military defected to the side of the opposition, some taking their troops with them.

The drought and famine from 1983 to 1986 had served to sensitize the international community to the relationship between such natural disasters and man-made calamities like war. It was apparently his awareness of this connection that inspired former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to attempt to broker a peace settlement between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The opening for this effort was provided by the EPLF itself. In 1989, Secretary-General Isaias Afwerki made a historic diplomatic tour of Europe and the United States. The thrust of his message was that even though the EPLF was now in a position to liberate Eritrea militarily, the nationalists would prefer a negotiated settlement with U.N. involvement. From this point on, Western leaders were able to talk directly to the Eritrean leadership, and they found that, contrary to their initial perceptions of the EPLF as nothing more than a band of Communists or fanatical Islamic rebels, these were reasonable and pragmatic men.

The worsening conditions inside Ethiopia and the prospect of completely losing Eritrea forced President Mengistu to agree to peace talks with the EPLF, first with the assistance of former President Carter and later with that of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Cohen. However, this became yet another case of "too little, too late" once the EPLF had achieved its military victory in May of 1991. Significantly, when the EPLF announced the formation of its provisional government on May 29, 1991, it was careful not to make a unilateral declaration of independence. Instead, a referendum on the future status of Eritrea was set for 1993.

ERITREA IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

The spin-offs of superpower rivalry in the Horn of Africa between 1977 and 1990 greatly exacerbated the scale and destructive effects of the
Eritrean conflict. The Organization of African Unity’s characteristic refusal to attempt to resolve what it perceived as “internal wars” also contributed to the devastating consequences of more than thirty years of fighting. The international implications of this conflict are clear: unless a permanent resolution of the Eritrean question occurs, the issue of Eritrea’s status will continue to reverberate internationally.

The superpowers, the OAU, and the United Nations have special roles to play in the process of finding a permanent solution to the Eritrean problem. The first steps were taken by President Carter, Assistant Secretary of State Cohen, and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, who cut off Soviet military aid to Ethiopia. However, since diplomatic initiatives failed, it seems appropriate for both the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations to take up the issue and become actively involved in organizing and monitoring, or sanctioning, the 1993 Eritrean referendum. There is no need to continue to uphold the principle of the inviolability of Ethiopia’s borders since the new government in Addis Ababa supports an Eritrean referendum and is prepared to “lose” Eritrea.

The time appears right for an OAU and U.N. reassessment of the rules of the game as applied to nation-state borders in places like Africa and the Soviet Union. While this may not be an issue for all parts of Africa, it is certainly the issue for Eritrea. The potential for an Eritrea-like situation also exists in such places as Mozambique, Somalia, Angola, Senegal, Chad, Sudan, Rwanda, and Liberia, among others. Conflicts in those regions already demonstrate the need for Africans to find ways of forthrightly dealing with both domestic and regional conflict. Despite the OAU’s tendency to react only to disputes involving member states, it would seem that the organization could assume more of a leadership role in resolving all forms of serious civil conflict on the continent. OAU involvement could aver at least some of the destruction and human suffering resulting from protracted armed struggles that are finally resolved only by military force, as happened in Eritrea.

Given the emerging “New World Order,” the superpowers would seem to have a vested interest in seeing to it that they never again find themselves polarized by ideological competition and conflict in the developing world. Their future roles might be as providers of assistance to places like Eritrea not only in the form of good offices, but also in the form of economic incentives (e.g., debt relief, technical assistance, etc.) to help a region recover from war, notably, from its human and environmental degradation. For example, the major powers could provide incentives to encourage the development of the economic integration of Eritrea and Ethiopia, which might set the stage for a lasting peace between them. The OAU should take the initiative, but the superpowers should be ready to provide the political and military support needed to make this happen.
NOTES