Representing the Worker: The Worker–Intellectual Alliance of the 1980s in South Korea

Author(s): Namhee Lee


Published by: Association for Asian Studies

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25075904

Accessed: 18-07-2015 00:12 UTC
Representing the Worker: 
The Worker-Intellectual 
Alliance of the 1980s 
in South Korea

NAMHEE LEE

On July 6, 1986, the Korea Daily (Chosŏn ilbo) carried a one-sentence item at the bottom of its social page: a twenty-three-year-old female student from Seoul National University by the name of Kwŏn had sued a detective of the Puch'ŏn Police, charging him with sexual torture during her recent detention ("Susagwan 6 myŏng kobal" [Six Detectives Sued], July 6, 1986, 11). This small news item was to rock Korean society for months. It was shocking that a young woman would go public with an accusation that was more likely to damage her own reputation than that of the accused.1 Furthermore, she had voluntarily quit a prestigious university to work in a factory.

While the mass media and the government provided the public with mostly tantalizing and "subversive" elements of her case, alternative narratives began to circulate almost immediately from court proceedings, statements of defense lawyers, and the newsletters of a citizen support group that was organized soon after the suit ("'Uridŭl ŭi ital,' Kwŏn-yang ŭi chihkkin chŏlmŭm" 1987, 567–81). What gradually emerged from these accounts was a composite portrait of a South Korean undongkwŏn of the 1980s. Literally meaning "those who are in the [democratization] movement sphere," the term undongkwŏn applied both to individual activists and to the democratization movement as a whole, whose articulated goal was to bring democracy, justice, and reunification to Korea. The term was often used outside the democratization movement to indicate disapproval; the state used it to emphasize its undesirability, equating the undongkwŏn with antistate and procommunist elements. Individual activists rarely used the term without a mixture of self-deprecation and irony,

Namhee Lee (nlee@humnet.ucla.edu) is Assistant Professor of Modern Korean History in the Department of Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of California, Los Angeles.

I would like to thank Andre Schmid for his encouragement in the earlier phase of this article, as well as Ann Waltner and the three anonymous Journal of Asian Studies reviewers for their comments and suggestions.

1There were several cases of rape and sexual abuse of female students by police as a routine tactic to intimidate students and keep them from demonstrating. Female students were forced to stand naked and submit to body searches, and they were subjected to verbal abuse and even brutal beatings (Asia Watch 1985, 104–5). It was not until the Kwŏn case became public that these students too went public with charges of such abuses.

© 2005 by the Association for Asian Studies, Inc.
as the implications of the term shifted often between positive and negative, between conviction and doubt. Although the term had variegated and conflicting receptions in Korean society, it nevertheless captured the Zeitgeist of the 1980s.

Although her decision to go public with the charge of sexual abuse was indeed unprecedented, Kwôn was only one of an estimated three thousand undongkwôn in factories in the mid-1980s. Like most of the others, she had forged her identification card in order to obtain a factory job, thereby becoming a “student/worker” and “disguised worker” (wijiang ch'iwipja), a criminal by law. Kwôn In-suk thus became an emblematic figure of South Korea in the 1980s, embodying the passion, the ideals, and the conflicting legacies of the 1980s’ democratization movement. At that time, thousands of university students and intellectuals plunged into the world of the factory worker, forgoing university diplomas, job prospects, and middle-class lives in the hope of bringing about “revolution.” Like Kwôn, at times these individuals had to endure extreme ordeals and insidious accusations.

The intellectuals’ Gramscian aspiration to be connected with the workers was not of course unique to South Korea. Their models are numerous in history, the earliest perhaps being Errico Malatesta, the famous Italian anarchist who joined the Italian International in 1871 after abandoning medical school at the University of Naples and apprenticing himself as an electrician and gas fitter (Levy 1987, 159). Closer to our time, the Guinean revolutionary leader Amílcar Cabral exhorted the intellectuals to “commit suicide as a class [and] be reborn as revolutionary workers” (1969, 110). In China the worker-intellectual alliance had been a pronounced feature from the May Fourth Movement of 1919 until the Communist victory of 1949 (Perry 1992, 154–55). In France of 1968, the working class was the “indispensable agency of revolution” for various groups (Brown 1974, 77–121).

The effort of intellectuals to remake themselves as workers remains the most distinctive as well as most problematic feature of the South Korean democratization movement of the 1980s. The few existing Korean accounts of the democratization movement do not treat the alliance in its own right, however, and even the best

2 The exact number of students and university graduates who went into factories is difficult to determine, especially since most of them fabricated their identities in order to get factory jobs. In fact, the government’s statistics are notoriously unreliable. Both the government and labor activists claimed that the actual number of students in factories was higher than the figures reported by various government agencies; this number of three thousand is an estimate from a source intimate with the South Korean labor movement (Ogle 1990, 99).

3 As many university students and graduates became labor activists in the early 1980s, terms denoting their university background began to circulate within the social movement and in public as well, such as “student/worker activist” (hak-ch’ul undongga) or “intellectual/worker activist” (in-ch’ul undongga). Here, I use “intellectuals” narrowly to denote anyone with a university background, regardless of whether he or she received a diploma.

4 University graduates were not legally barred from working in factories, but starting in the early 1980s they were regarded as potential instigators in labor disputes and were weeded out in the application process. Thus, they resorted to forging their identity papers, a criminal offense in South Korea. Not every university graduate working at a factory, however, was an activist. It became increasingly difficult for college graduates to get white-collar jobs after 1985, so many started to look for work in factories. Due to age limits in production work, often these graduates used young people’s names and forged identification cards.

5 The government charged that the undongkwôn were exploiting even sex for their revolutionary cause, and Kwôn’s charge of sexual torture was a form of conscientization and a “strategy to undermine the public authority of the government” (‘Undongkwôn, konggwôn-nyûk muryûkkha ch’aekdong’ [‘Undongkwôn, Plots to Incapacitate Public Power’], Chosôn ilbo, July 17, 1986, 11).
account of the labor movement presents the alliance exclusively in the context of the labor movement and as the unambiguous reflection and product of sociohistorical conditions (Koo 2001). This article attempts to show the alliance as a product of a complex web of discursive practices that arise not only in the specific sociohistorical structure of the 1980s but also in the "political culture" of the undongkwon in the post–Kwangju Uprising period. The democratization movement's privileging of the ideological position of labor and the exalted position of the worker betrayed a certain ambiguity of the undongkwon's own stance vis-à-vis the working class. Therefore, the alliance was beset with the intellectuals' conflicting aspirations between Gramscian ideas of organic fusion and Leninist vanguardism, and labor at times became a purely discursive and symbolic figure for both the undongkwon's raison d'etre and the condition of possibility of its revolutionary project.

The 1980s' South Korean labor movement was one of the most successful labor movements in recent history. Intellectuals had a central role in its development. Their representation of workers, however, can be considered untenable and politically illegitimate, the privileged speaking for the presumed voiceless. Current discussions on undongkwon in South Korea, for example, are thoroughly critical along these lines. Although this criticism is valid, I argue that engaging in this criticism without further analysis is also to some extent historically irresponsible. The intellectuals' various efforts in remaking themselves as workers deserve a careful interrogation of issues relating to the "politics of representation."

The purpose of this article is not to provide a comprehensive or systematic analysis of the intellectuals' role in the labor movement in South Korea, but to raise questions such as the following: What is at stake in critically probing the intellectuals' representation of workers in the social movement, a movement that by the late 1990s had undergone a profound transformation requiring a radical redefinition of visions, claims, and practices? In the context of the demise of the social movement and the accompanying shift of social paradigms in South Korea and in the intellectual context of the "post-Foucauldian" tendency to view representation as inherently suspect, what are the political and intellectual imports of bringing up the issue of representation? How might such a discussion attend to both the potency and the problematic of the undongkwon's experience as individual and social transformation?

This article consists of three parts. The first part briefly discusses the historical context of the alliance of the 1970s, then presents the sociopolitical conditions and the undongkwon's inner dynamics in the post–Kwangju Uprising period as contributing to the particular form of worker-intellectual alliance of the 1980s. The second part of the article examines what I call the "discourse of moral privilege" as one of the predominant discursive practices of the undongkwon in the alliance. The third part considers the undongkwon's representation of workers in the alliance both specifically in anecdotes, testimonies, and documents and, at the end of the paper, broadly in the context of contemporary debates of representation.

Historical Context

Alliance of the 1970s

The distinctive nature of the South Korean worker-intellectual alliance is historically constituted—that is, the workers with whom the intellectuals sought to become partners in revolution had a historically specific process of proletarianization.
The formation of the postcolonial working class from the outset contested the ideological foundation of the country’s state building, anticommunism, and capitalist development (see Choi 1993). Three aspects of the historical development are relevant here.

First, the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948 was completed with the concomitant decimation of the once-militant labor unions, which were completely rooted out by right-wing groups supported by the United States Military Government, which ruled South Korea from 1945 to 1948 (see K. Kim et al. 1985, vol. 1; Koo 1990, 677). This experience marked future efforts to mobilize labor as “communist agitation,” and even moderate trade unionism was regarded as politically suspicious (Koo 1990, 677). Workers in the 1970s, therefore, not only were a generation removed from the militant labor mobilization of the immediate post-1945 period but also were without any social or collective memory of such a movement.

Second, the South Korean state played a crucial role in allocating economic resources and regulating nonmarket forces for rapid development. One of the consequences of this interventionist policy in the industrialization process was its suppression of labor. The state set wages, regulated the labor supply, and repressed trade unions, leaving workers with little or no protection (see, among others, Song 1991a).

Third, there was no form of labor organization in the 1970s other than the thoroughly regime-controlled Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) (Han’guk nodong chōhap ch’ong yŏnmaeng), an undemocratic, hierarchical body which throughout its history had failed to represent the interests of workers (Sŏ 1988, 179–216). The FKTU’s predecessor, the General Federation of Korean Unions (Taehan nodong ch’ong yŏnmaeng), was created by conservative politicians who envisioned it as a counterforce against the politically active and militant National Council of Korean Trade Unions (Chosŏn nodong chōhap chŏng’uk p’yŏnggiuhoe) (see K. Kim 1986, 128–43). During the First Republic (1948–60), the FKTU became an instrument of the ruling Liberal Party, as well as the object of political spoils as “labor aristocrats.”

The FKTU as a political instrument of the ruling party continued throughout the Yushin period (1972–79), during which the Park Chung Hee regime held society together through terror and intimidation. Indeed, the FKTU was one of the first groups to issue a statement of support for the Yushin Constitution, even organizing its own “agitation team” to urge each union to promote Yushin. Under the slogan of “labor-management cooperation,” the FKTU abandoned any pretense of working on the economic issues of workers (Chang 1985, 135). Furthermore, the FKTU became the instrument of the regime’s suppression of labor unions—the case of Tong-il Textile being the prime example (see Ogle 1990, 84–86).

In this context of severe working conditions, a repressive labor regime, historical suppression of the labor movement, and the workers’ lack of organizational resources, South Korea’s intellectuals assumed an unduly large role in the labor movement. In the 1970s and the early 1980s, intellectuals, university students, and Christian labor organizations such as the Urban Industrial Mission (UIM) (Tosi sanop sŏn’gyohoe) and Young Catholic Workers (Jeunesse ouvrière chrétienne [JOC]; K’atolik nodong ch’ôngnyŏnhoe), persistently raised issues of labor—low wages, harsh working conditions, violation of the basic labor laws—through statements, manifestos, hunger strikes, prayer services, and street demonstrations (KSCF 1984a). The utterance of the words “labor” and “working class” by students, intellectuals, newspapers, journals, and popular magazines helped make the discourse of labor legitimate and public (for further discussion, see Lee 2001, chap. 8.) These activities were rather remarkable, given the absence of organizational links between the student movement and labor.
organizations and the absence of leftist political organizations since the 1960s, in contrast to postwar Japan and Europe, for example (see Brown 1974; Shimbori 1971; Webler 1980).

The university students said it best when they characterized their alliance with labor in the 1970s as “lateral support” (KSCF 1984a, 180). Students and intellectuals held demonstrations and hunger strikes whenever called for. They set up night schools and hoped to enlighten workers and stir their consciences. They staffed the UIM, JOC, Christian Academy, and labor research centers. They were vilified as communists and imprisoned along with workers. But, they did not necessarily think of their own activities as part of the labor movement, nor did they believe the issue of labor called for a fundamental rethinking of their own lives. When the time arrived to return to their schools or jobs, they gladly and “without much apparent agony” went back, as did many members of National Democratic Federation of Youth and Students (Minch’önghangnyöön), an organization accused of planning to overthrow the South Korean government in the 1970s (l. Kim 1985, 18–19).

In the 1980s, however, sociopolitical factors as well as the undongkwön’s own internal dynamics propelled labor to the center of social movements. Within the democratization movement, involvement in labor (nodong hyönjang) became the most privileged form of praxis. Not only was the worker hailed as the true revolutionary subject, but labor also acquired the aura of the inevitability of a revolution. The most critical event in catapulting labor to the center of the democratization movement was the Kwangju People’s Uprising in 1980.

The Kwangju Uprising

The Kwangju Uprising, initially an ordinary university students’ demonstration demanding the lifting of martial law and general political reform, became a watershed event for South Korean society when it developed into a citywide rebellion that was brutally crushed by government troops. The Kwangju Uprising informed the post-Kwangju social movement as a heroic narrative—forcefully articulating “who the real heroes were” and “who really fought” for the democratization. With the Kwangju Uprising, the intellectuals, who had long denigrated themselves as being egotistical, petty bourgeois, or “fanciful ideologists,” proved their own fragility and cowardliness in times of revolution. The workers, by contrast, confirmed their ontological status as revolutionary “fighting material.”

Even before the Kwangju Uprising, the democratization movement as a whole had been obsessed with defining the true nature and concept of minjung. (The democratization movement is also known as the minjung movement.) Minjung, meaning “common people” in the everyday sense of the term, also came to have a specific historical import within the democratization movement as constituting true historical subjectivity—that is, people capable of rising up against the oppressive system. The

“Although the literal meaning of hyönjang is “site” or “field,” its import depends on the context and the word with which it is paired: it can be a place of happening, such as a construction site or an accident scene, or a place of historical importance. Hyönjang was used within the social movement to denote a place of work that one pursued with the democratization movement’s goals in mind, and it had a strong connotation of “praxis” as opposed to “theory.” As the unsavory term wijang ch’wipja (disguised worker) was coined by the government and mass media to impute criminality to working in a factory with a forged identity card, the undongkwön’s preferred term was “going to hyönjang,” or hyönjang ch’wip (factory employment).
Kwangju Uprising rendered the essential ambiguity of this term moot on the one hand and even more contentious on the other. The ordinary citizens of Kwangju rose up in arms to defend democracy, thereby affirming minjung as a historical subject. However, those who gathered in the provincial government building and were killed by government troops on the final day of the uprising were the very bottom stratum of this minjung, factory workers and lumpen proletariat. Very few intellectuals and students remained in the provincial building; furthermore, they had advocated the return of arms to the authorities, an act that the workers vehemently opposed at the time as giving in to the state.

Thus, while the Kwangju citizens were projected within the minjung movement as true examples of minjung as historical subjects, the working class and lumpen proletariat’s disproportional share in the sacrifice made the discourse of minjung more contentious. In the post-Kwangju period, “those who participated in Kwangju” became a trope for the intellectuals’ inherent weakness and the workers’ inherent revolutionary qualities—a trope that was hammered into the social science literature and the literary representation of the event. Those who fought and died in the provincial building became the ultimate heroes of the Kwangju Uprising. Defining those who died as the real makers of history is the central theme, for example, of a short story that appeared in 1988: “Remember those who remained in the provincial building. You have to remember who participated, who fought, and who died. . . . Then you will know what kind of people make history, . . . that knowledge will become your strength” (Hong 1988, 203).

This “truth” of the Kwangju Uprising, however, was a source of immense shame for students and intellectuals. Among the post-Kwangju undongkwon, the educated and knowledgeable were equated with cowardice and impurity. University students and graduates frequently used self-deprecating terms such as “weakling intellectual” (bakppiri) and “watered-down ink” (mongmul) to refer to their reputed weakness. Those who survived the Kwangju massacre were burdened with the guilt of not having died. One university student from the city of Kwangju who was not even an undongkwon killed himself after a year of agonizing over his inability to stop the massacre (Sin 1990a, 140). It was also widely assumed that the shame of fleeing Kwangju drove the former president of the Student Association of Chŏnnam University to his eventual death after a prolonged hunger strike in prison (see Lee 2001, 194). The leaders of the famous 1985 Daewoo Auto Strike confessed that their commitment to the labor movement was a way to overcome the “guilt that we did not participate in Kwangju and thought only about our own livelihood” (Sin 1990b, 167).

Between Obligations and Privileges

The overriding sense of guilt and despair in the aftermath of the Kwangju Uprising converged with post-1980 sociopolitical developments to produce a narrative of revolution. That is, the post-Kwangju social movement had to be completely and irrevocably transformed from that of the 1970s—it had to be “revolutionary.” The

7The most frequently quoted statistic indicates that workers, peasants, and “lumpen proletariat” (this term was used in the cited source and indicated the unemployed and occasional manual laborers) accounted for 59.9 percent of the injured, 59.2 percent of the dead, 58 percent of the arrested, and 80 percent of the Mobile Strike Task Force during the Kwangju Uprising (Chung 1991, 207–8). As the state troops’ indiscriminate killings continued, the citizens of Kwangju began to arm themselves and organized the Mobile Strike Task Force, a patrol unit, one day before the regular state army seized the city on May 26.
post-Kwangju revolutionary fervor generated its own culture and internal dynamics through which revolutionary ideals and sentiments were created and sustained. In the construction of an undongk\wôn identity and culture of the 1980s, two notions are symptomatic of the unremitting tension faced by undongk\wôn, both individually and collectively. One is that a truly committed undongk\wôn had to give up kid\ukk\wôn, privileges and rights that come with education and social background. The other is that the force of tangwis\óng, obligations which are obvious and evident, dictated that one give up such privileges and rights. For many undongk\wôn university students, the ultimate form of giving up privileges was to forgo a university diploma. But for many others, it also meant forgoing the chance to go abroad; to pursue a graduate program; to get married; or to become a doctor, a lawyer, or an artist. The force of obligation, however, was not always directed only to the undongk\wôn. In 1986, the year when Kwôn In-suk forged her identification card to work in a factory, another Seoul National University student, unable to resolve the tension between her wavering self and the "oppressive clarity" of the historical responsibility to engage in the social movement, threw herself into the Han River (Lee 2001, 31).

Decimation of the Labor Movement

The undongk\wôn’s self-generated political culture (to borrow the term used by Lynn Hunt [1984] in a different historical context) was sustained as well by the sociopolitical landscape of the period. The overwhelming sense of guilt and despair in the post-Kwangju period was heightened by the decimation of the labor movement. Chun Doo Hwan’s ascendency to the presidency in August of 1980 was preceded by a severe crackdown on labor, which continued after he became president. The Chun regime’s labor policies, “the most restrictive and oppressive in South Korean history” (Hart-Landsberg 1993, 219), need not be detailed here. Union leaders were not only forcibly removed from their offices and sent to prison on various pretexts; they were also sent to the infamous “purification camps” run by the military and were subjected to harsh labor and physical abuse (see, among others, Ogle 1990; Asia Watch 1985).

The widespread sense of failure following the Kwangju Uprising led to intense debates within the labor movement and social movements at large. Even prior to the Kwangju Uprising, there had been a long-standing debate on the merit of continuing with “political struggle”—that is, engaging the public with issues chiefly concerned with political reform. Some had argued that the democratization movement’s failure to oppose the Normalization Treaty of 1965 between Japan and South Korea and Park Chung Hee’s Yushin system revealed the limitations of political struggles. Also before the Kwangju Uprising, another group had begun to articulate that the principal agent of social change was the working class and that thus their most urgent task was to strengthen the labor movement. The group’s members had concluded that they must avoid direct political confrontation with the regime and prepare themselves for involvement with labor. This group, which became known as the proponents of “fieldwork” (by\ónjang-non), advocated going into factories as factory workers (C. Yi 1988, 25).

The common criticism directed against these proponents of fieldwork is that they failed to produce any labor organizations, let alone any social changes, because they were preoccupied with their long-term strategy of preparation and were obsessed with the fear of exposure. Even though they lived as workers under the conviction that workers were the main agent of social change, for most of them the idea of a labor movement remained abstract and utopian. Their presence in factories only added more
numbers to the swelling tide of workers but did little to change their thoughts, their vision, or their welfare (C. Yi 1988, 226).

The fieldwork proponents were primarily reacting against their own experience with the 1970s' student movement. The well-known labor activist Kim Mun-su is a case in point. At Seoul National University, where Kim was a freshman in 1970, the student leaders who insisted on the primacy of the labor movement vis-à-vis the social movement at large did not have a clue about life in a factory: “There was an abundance of theory but no praxis.” Kim believed that political issues were a luxury with which only (idle) university students or the well-to-do concerned themselves: “When workers were busy just getting by with three meals a day and saving their own asses, why bother with politics?” (1986, 188).

Yi Tae-bok, another well-known labor organizer, had a similar experience with the student movement. Dismissed from a university in 1971, he was forcibly conscripted into the army. After witnessing the flagrant surrender of the student movement in the aftermath of the Garrison Decree in 1971 and the disappointing behavior of the movement’s erstwhile leaders (who were mobilized as speakers for a pro-Yushin lecture series), he concluded that the student movement was incapable of making real changes in society. Discipline and determination were lacking in the student movement, Yi felt, and he vowed to cut all ties with it until he himself was firmly established as a worker (1994, 265–66).

The disappointing personal experience with the political thrust of the social movements of the 1970s—largely represented by the university student movement—reinforced the importance of “preparation” in the post-Kwangju period. As any open, nationwide labor organization was an easy target for state crackdown, intellectuals were reluctant to create yet another labor organization that would be exposed to the regime’s security agencies. Given the severe suppression, the proponents of fieldwork believed that organizing small groups of workers was the most appropriate strategy and that it be carried out by people who were grounded in factories (Ch’ong 1988, 186).

South Korea’s draconian labor law contributed inadvertently to the rise of fieldwork proponents as well. The labor law of 1980 contained an infamous clause prohibiting “third-party intervention.” This law made it illegal for a local union to receive assistance from its industrial union or the FKTU with regard to bargaining. Although local unions were still required to belong to an industrial federation and the FKTU, each local was on its own, and bargaining was possible only between the company and the plant union. This measure made collective bargaining “even more of a sham than it had been under Park” and led to complete control over the union by the company and police (Ogle 1990, 113). For anyone wishing to participate in labor negotiations, the only way was to become one of the workers.

The early 1980s were also a time when South Korean intellectuals were hit by a wave of socialism, the “great ideology that has swept the twentieth century” (An 1989, 11). Socialism was certainly not new in Korea—its history goes back to the colonial period—but the division of Korea into two halves and the internecine war

---

9In an autobiographical novel by a former student/labor activist, the tendency that I just described reaches an absurd point: The student/labor activist protagonist is waging a one-man campaign to get his job back after he was unjustly fired. After months of protesting in front of the factory gate, he is approached cautiously by two female fellow workers, who turn out to be student/labor activists from a different university. He also learns that there are two more student/labor activists in the same factory; none had dared to support him for fear of exposure (An 1989, 98–99).
had made socialism, along with communism, South Korea's nemesis (see Lee 2002a). The intellectuals' enchantment with socialism in the 1980s also coincided with their disenchantment with Western liberal democracy. The democratization movement attributed its failure to stop the Yushin regime in the 1970s and the reemergence of the military dictatorship in 1980 partly to the uncritical application of western liberal democratic ideas to South Korea.

None of the above-mentioned factors would have mattered much, however, if the lives of the working class had improved significantly over the years. Even well into the mid-1980s, the lives of the majority of the South Korean working class evoked the Dickensian image of a "blighted patch of humanity": "murderous" low wages; harsh working conditions; crammed "chicken coop" housing; and the ever-present threat of being fired, maimed, or imprisoned. According to an FKTU report in May 1985, the workers' fixed wages, averaged across all areas, reached only 44 percent of the minimum cost of living; even with overtime pay and bonuses, wages reached only 54 percent of the minimum cost of living (Ch'oe 1986, 52).9

During South Korea's rapid industrialization, the Korean workers' average work week was not only longer than that of the workers in industrialized countries such as the United States and Japan but was also longer than that of workers in other developing countries in Asia such as the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan (P. Kim 1984, 176). The workers also faced extremely harsh and unsafe working conditions; each day workers were killed, maimed, and permanently disabled, largely due to the negligence of factory owners and managers (see, among others, Sö 1988).10 Those who were involved in union activities were branded as procommunists and subjected to various threats, employment termination, and imprisonment (see, among others, Ogle 1990, 75–91).

The bodily intervention of intellectuals into the discourse of labor by repositioning themselves as workers was therefore an outcome of various sociohistorical forces as well as the undongkwon's own political culture: the post-Kwangju minjung movement's revolutionary push with its internal dynamics between obligation and privilege, the preexisting theoretical debate that privileged working in factories over engaging political issues, the labor laws that allowed intellectuals' participation in labor issues only as factory workers, and the intellectuals' predilection for socialist ideas. All these factors converged with the prevailing belief among intellectuals that the workers most deserved rectification of the unjust and unequal society.

9South Korea's economic development was noted for its equality, meaning that economic growth improved income distribution among different social groups. According to Ho-Keun Song (1991c), an assessment based on the official statistics hides more than it reveals, as income data are not reliable. South Korea's statistics on income are comparatively abundant and useful, but they only contain regular incomes after tax, ignoring unearned income, which is a practical source of the luxurious life for the upper class. The importance of unearned income multiplies particularly when rapid economic growth offers enormous opportunities for capital gains through speculation in housing and land. When land ownership and financial assets are considered in the measure of inequality, the story is radically different than official statistics suggest.

10In 1986 alone, 142,088 workers were injured during work; of these, 1,660 died, 21,923 became disabled, and 1,637 suffered from work-related chronic illnesses. The total amount of industrial damage reached one trillion won in 1986, a 10 percent increase from the previous year. The actual number of injured workers and the amount of monetary damage are probably much higher, since the government statistics do not include small factories with fewer than four employees or factories that do not carry industrial accident insurance. In addition, seamen, Korean employees of the U.S. Eighth Army, and construction workers employed in foreign countries were not included in the statistics (Sö 1988, 257).
The Sociology of “Disguised Employment”

In the 1970s and until the early 1980s, an undongkwon’s decision to go to a factory was made individually, without organizational support or any practical guidance. The number of undongkwon in factories was small, perhaps less than one hundred altogether, and individuals were scattered throughout the country, unlike in the 1980s. While students and the graduates of elite universities might have had some personal networks in factories, as some of their seniors and classmates were already in factories, those from less well-known schools with little or no activist background could rely only on their own sense of historical responsibility. It was not until around 1984 that a would-be student/worker would have some written guidelines for activism in factories.

In the immediate post-Kwangju era, activism in factories was the only logical path to follow for the most committed undongkwon. As one former student/worker activist recollects in his autobiographical novel, “every activist prioritized the labor movement [and] factory work became the barometer of one’s commitment to the movement” (An 1989, 1–2). Starting in the mid-1980s, due partly to the government’s liberalization policy and partly to the concomitant growth of the minjung movement, the number of undongkwon increased, and many more paths besides the factory opened up for them. By becoming a professional such as a teacher, journalist, or staff member for a legal organization, one could still retain privileges and contribute to a white-collar labor movement. These “choices” notwithstanding, the immense force of obligation, that the prerequisite for being a truly committed undongkwon was to give up all privileges, was still very prevalent throughout the 1980s.

Although by the mid-1980s working in factories had become ritualized and even privileged among the undongkwon, the actual process of transplanting oneself into a factory involved more than a sense of historical responsibility and individual determination. In order to crack down on disguised workers, the Ministry of Labor in 1984 directed management to screen the educational, social, and family background, as well as the employment history of prospective employees. This measure forced the university graduate or student to acquire an assumed identity, forging official documents and reconstructing life stories to fit those of a worker. Many were immediately suspected and weeded out before they set foot in a factory. Once arrested, they were charged with criminal offenses, as was the case with Kwón In-suk.

Perhaps a more daunting task than the logistical difficulties of obtaining a counterfeit identification card was the confrontation with parents, either during the decision or after having been found working in a factory. The undongkwon’s parents’ generation had collectively shared the historical experience of the Japanese colonial occupation, three years of bloody civil war, and rapid industrialization; their high hopes and determination for their children’s material success and well-being thus took on a particular vengeance. Given the unwavering and collective push in South Korea for material success and status elevation, a son or daughter as a factory worker could only be a slap in the face, a disgrace to the family name, and possibly a sign of the parents’ own moral failure. Students’ personal letters and essays as well as court doc-

11Prior to the mid-1980s, ideological influences within the student movement were generated mostly through underground circles, which had existed more in elite universities and those with a strong tradition of student movements than in others. One former student activist claimed that one can trace the labor movement’s differing ideological leanings to various underground circles in universities (An Chae-hwan, interview, March 17, 1993).
uments attest to the unrelenting dilemma between their desire to fulfill their parents’ wishes and their sense of responsibility to continue their activism. One male student agonized over his parents’ objection to his working in a factory. His father threatened to break his leg if he dared, and his mother did not intervene but was always watchful and worried: “My mother would worry about whether I was safe, whether I got injured, whether I ate regularly, or whether I was healthy. My heart feels so heavy. I have to overcome this loneliness, overcome the web of affection and sentimental feelings” (KSCF 1984c, 97).

Throughout the 1970s and until the early 1980s, the social categories of worker and intellectual were more in flux and not as clear cut as they would become later. South Korea’s rapid industrialization and its concomitant massive urban migration resulted in a large number of university students hailing from socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds. As education became the sole source for upward mobility for most South Koreans, one’s university education was attained at the great sacrifice of family members. Many university students had parents and younger (mostly female) siblings working in factories to finance their education. So while the previously mentioned Kim Mun-su’s decision to become a factory worker in the early 1970s was a circuitous one, he was not unfamiliar with factory work, as his sister was a factory worker. His poor family did not own a radio until he was in high school. Pak Tong, a Korea University student in the early 1980s, did not have a decent pair of shoes throughout his high-school years, and his father was a day laborer (interview, February 12–13, 1993).

Starting in the mid-1980s, however, with South Korea’s rapid industrialization, more and more university students came from the homes of South Korea’s first post-colonial middle-class generation. Their childhoods were spent in relative wealth and comfort. Kwôn In-suk, class of 1987, came from a solid middle-class background; her father was a government official, and her goal had been to pursue doctoral studies in France. Neither Kim Mun-su in the 1970s nor Pak Tong in the early 1980s would have dreamed of studying abroad, as it was reserved only for the truly privileged.

In the 1970s, “disguised employment” (wijang ch’uwîdp) required a tremendous sense of determination, will, and resourcefulness. The previously mentioned labor activist Yi T’aebok began as a day laborer in Yongsan, Seoul, and spent the first few years exploring labor conditions in industrial complexes throughout the country. He attempted to “infiltrate” the FKTU with the hope of reforming it from within, only to be thwarted by someone who recognized him as a former student activist (T. Yi 1994, 266–67).

Kim Mun-su’s decision to dedicate his life to labor was tortuous and laborious. He had spent his first summer vacation in college making dresses in a sweatshop which stood in the middle of a vegetable field on the outskirts of Seoul. No application or resume was required to get a factory job then. As Kim pedaled the sewing machine, however, he began to doubt his decision: “I began to question whether or not I could last like this for the rest of my life. I was used to being poor, but I didn’t think I had to live like this. My friends and I talked about the need for organizing workers, but I didn’t think I had to be the one to do it” (1986, 134). His final resolve to commit himself to the labor movement a few years later took him to another sweatshop where he made buttonholes for men’s shirts. He was twenty-two years old—and a former student at a prestigious university—and slow, for which a much younger co-worker constantly rebuked him. After stints at three different sweatshops, he obtained a license as a boiler mechanic in 1975 (138–40).
From the mid-1980s on, however, entering into work at factories was no longer an act of individual determination. The process became more collective, with a ritualized and routinized element that suggested that it was not always an invitation to a life-changing experience. Most disguised workers were concentrated in the Kyŏnggido-Inch'ŏn area, which had the highest concentration of small-sized factories and a high concentration of workers; about half of all manufacturing workers in South Korea resided in this area. The area was also known for high job turnover. Little skill was required for jobs, and the security screening of applicants was less thorough than in areas with large factories. Kyŏnggido-Inch'ŏn was also close to Seoul, which was the center of the democratization movement. Would-be workers found it easy to blend in and to find like-minded fellow undongkwŏn. In the mid-1980s, when a female university student went to work in a small electronics factory with 140 employees in Inch'ŏn, for example, she discovered that there were at least ten student/worker activists in that factory alone (S. Kim 1997, 135).

The Discourse of Moral Privilege

The intellectuals' migration into factories was grounded in a fundamental shift in the visions and goals of the minjung movement, and the story of this migration was accompanied by fundamental shifts in their understanding of capitalism and modernization. Sociologist Jeffrey Alexander argues that intellectuals in the West developed a new explanatory theory to represent the shifting sociopolitical world order in the 1960s; their new narrative of modernity, modernization, and capitalist development inverted the signs and symbols previously associated with these notions (1995, 66–78).

As South Korea's overall state policy and practice implicitly conferred the status of luxury to the notions of democracy and equitable justice, the intellectuals' shift of the social narrative involved inverting the state's goals and ideals. Capitalist development, in its production of great wealth and great poverty, was viewed as the source of dehumanization, individualization, fragmentation, and alienation, instead of liberation. This inversion of economic ideals carried into the overall vision of the democratization movement. Socialism, or some sort of socialism, became the ultimate symbol of the good that would provide wealth, equality, and a restored community.

Intellectuals also inverted the received societal representation of workers. Workers, who had previously been disdained by society as kongsuni and kongdori (derogatory terms denoting "factory girls" and "factory boys") without their own class consciousness or subjectivity, were seen as having acquired class consciousness and subjectivity through their resistance to exploitation and oppression in the workplace and in society at large. Their resistance also became a legitimate basis for their place in society as a significant economic and political actor.

At the same time, however, the narrative of the intellectuals' commitment to labor took on what I characterize as the "discourse of moral privilege," which relied on the traditional role of intellectuals as educated and therefore morally upright and socially responsible (for a fuller treatment of this topic, see Lee 2002b). Students and intellectuals were bequeathed a rich tradition of social criticism; during the Chosŏn period (1392–1910), the students at the National Academy and also local public schools "routinely engaged in protest acts or voiced their opinions through joint memorials" (Haboush 1994, 387). Of particular relevance is the Confucian concept
of knowledge, central to political power and prestige in traditional society, which dictated that knowledge be employed not only to enhance one's social position but also to maintain the proper and stable order of society, "rectifying it if gone astray and restoring it if in disarray" (Kwok 1994, 19). Even as intellectuals sought to envision a fundamental shift from the existing epistemic and sociopolitical order, their claim to be the voice and the true representative of the people rested in this largely Confucian concept of knowledge.

The discourse of moral privilege was of course not unique to the South Korean social movement; from the 1960s' New Left in the West to Tiananmen in China, social protest represented a moral critique of society and was framed in terms of moral righteousness (see, for example, Levitt 1979; Perry 1992, 152). But in South Korea, the discourse was injected with urgency and potency by what was perceived to be the distinctive historical experience of modern Korea: its colonial past and the divided state. As contemporary social problems were understood to have been derived from uncorrected historical wrongs, such as the colonial legacy and the continuing confrontation between North and South Korea, the suggested resolution was to rectify the wronged history. Also, because of state repression, intellectuals could not openly support socialism. The intellectuals' discourse of moral privilege had deep historical roots and was also an effective strategy for the "public transcript," given the state's repression and its own emphasis on nationalism (for details, see Lee 2002a).

The students and intellectuals' court testimonies, statements of appeals, and letters throughout the 1980s testify to the prevalent discourse of moral privilege. For example, the following is a court testimony of No Suk-yŏng, a female student on trial for working illegally in a factory and "possessing socialist thoughts": "No one can avoid the responsibility for our society's problems. Especially those with higher education and social conscience need to volunteer to create a new ethical and moral social order. For this simple reason, I went to work in a factory. I had no self-conceit or arrogance. My only desire was to contribute to the society that I have benefited from by living a productive life [dictated by] my conscience and reason" (1982, 3).

Revolution and the Discourse of Moral Privilege

The narrative of moral privilege became even more prevalent in the mid-1980s, at a time when the democratization movement as a whole was working out a "scientific" path to its "revolutionary" goals and when socialist ideas began to dominate the movement. Even for those involved in Sŏnoryŏn (Alliance of Labor Movements in the Seoul Area), which was inspired by Marxist-Leninist ideas and principles, rhetorical constructions and language operated in terms of morality. Sŏnoryŏn members were accused of engaging in antistate activities and were tried for violating the National Security Law. During the court testimony, the majority of Sŏnoryŏn members narrated their involvement in labor as expressing their sense of responsibility as the privileged and their desire to share the life of workers, which they considered more authentic than their own.

Yun Hyŏn-suk had been teaching at a performing-arts school since 1980. Her students were from largely upper-middle-class backgrounds and were brought to school in chauffeured cars. Disillusioned with teaching, she went to work in a factory. Her first job was at a small factory with ten employees. She worked from 8:00 a.m. until 9:00 p.m., often sustaining herself on diluted yogurt and pieces of 100 wŏn pastry. She saw some fellow workers saving the pastries to give to their siblings at home. She had to quit her first job due to an injury but found another garment factory
job soon thereafter. The starting daily wage at the new factory was 2,280 won, which would have been about $2.56; without overtime, a monthly wage would have been between 70,000 and 80,000 won, which was hardly enough to make a living. When charged with instigating a rally for increased wages at the factory, Yun declared: "I accept the charge. Who would not instigate the struggle, given this reality?" (Sŏnoryŏn n.d., 109).

Yu Si-chu had also been a teacher prior to joining Sŏnoryŏn. Her first teacher's paycheck of three hundred thousand won felt like the "workers' sweat and blood." Working in a factory was a way of doing away with her own "life of complicity and cowardice" (Sŏnoryŏn n.d., 110). Another Sŏnoryŏn member, Yu In-he, believed that factory experience was necessary in order to live "a rightful life." When a wrist injury forced her to quit her factory job, she established a night school with the workers whom she had befriended at the factory (Sŏnoryŏn n.d., 108).

Ch'oe Han-bae's case was unusual among Sŏnoryŏn members in that he became involved in labor after having had a white-collar job. With a bachelor's degree in business management, Ch'oe had worked in the marketing department of a large corporation and had been conducting marketing research in the sweatshop district of the Ch'önggye area. He was very impressed with the workers who remained dignified in spite of "hell-like working conditions." Especially impressive for him was the fierce spirit of the Ch'önggye Textile Union (Ch'önggye pibok nojo) workers, which changed his life course. Not knowing how to go about getting involved in labor, he started as a handyman on a construction site and later acquired a license as a boiler technician. After stints at a paper mill and an electronics manufacturer, he found a job at Daewoo Apparel (Sŏnoryŏn n.d., 113–14).

The discourse of moral privilege also provided eloquent witness to the workers' low wages and harsh working conditions. Kwŏn In-suk's moving testimony of her own brief experience as a factory worker is emblematic of this genre:

The daily wage was twenty-nine hundred won. . . . If there was no overtime, the entire monthly wage of sixty thousand to seventy thousand won would easily be spent on the younger brother's tuition, the father's medicine. . . . This forces workers to work until ten at night. With the conveyor that never stops, there is already work piled up if one gets up even once to straighten one's back [and] the never-ending verbal abuse of the foreman. . . . [W]here there is no meaningful conversation between [the workers], when one nineteen-year-old fellow worker said to me, "Ônni [big sister], it is hard work, isn't it," I cried in gratitude.

(1987, 177–78)

The Insidious Logic of Representation

Bifurcation of the Intellectual and the Worker

Although the intellectuals' desire to fuse with workers was sincere, genuine, and even heroic, plunging oneself into the life of a worker had also become a sort of deus ex machina by which all tensions and problems of the undongkwŏn were resolved. More important, intellectuals' relations with workers remained tenuous and even problematic; that is, their discourse of moral and ethical privilege was embedded in an a priori conceptual bifurcation of intellectual and worker. The epistemological logic of the intellectuals' representation of themselves as socially conscious and responsible hinged on the workers as the object and beneficiary of their act of conscience.
This problematic, embedded to some extent in any representation—and with abundant precedent in other countries (see, among others, Brown 1974)—manifested itself at two levels in the mid-1980s in South Korea. At one level, students and intellectuals unwittingly objectified and in some cases apotheosized workers, subsuming workers’ individual identities under the identity of the working class and putting them into an easily transparent category. The tendency to put workers in a category disempowered workers, as they became the object of the intellectuals’ competing debates and mobilizations.

The following case encapsulates the discursive working of the intellectuals’ objectification of workers. In 1984 the Korea Student Christian Federation (KSCF) (Han’guk kidok haksang ch’ŏng yŏnmaeng) published an extensive manual for would-be-workers entitled “Guidelines for Factory Activism” (“Kongjang hwaldong annaesŏ”). The purpose of this manual was to approach the reality of minjung objectively, to “overcome the prevalent tendency to objectify minjung as an abstract form.” The publication is comprehensive and admirably detailed: it discusses the “correct attitude” for a prospective student/labor activist, offers a long list of prerequisite readings before finding a job, suggests topics for conversation with workers, offers a list of skills helpful in getting jobs (including instructions on how to fabricate one’s background), and explains how to calculate wages and how to quit. The following is on how to befriend co-workers:

Hobbies that take money and time are not appropriate for workers. Find out what you can do together with co-workers [that does not cost money] such as hiking, ko [Korean chess], and chess. If you can sing pop songs soulfully, play guitar, repair a tape recorder, or give acupressure, you can gain popularity. Good handwriting can be particularly useful in various ways.

1. In order to befriend co-workers, one has to invest lots of time and have a reservoir of conversation topics ready. When getting to know someone for the first time, accompany him or her wherever he or she goes (such as on walks; shopping; and going to stores, taverns, and pool halls).
2. Do not slacken while working; don’t complain about hard work (lest you be seen as making a fuss). However, it is not good to be seen as a workaholic either. One can always learn how workers talk and what they do for leisure by observing. Let’s learn by imitating.
3. Keep up your spirits in the factory (it is all right for women to be talkative); a man should be seen as considerate but of few words. Pay attention to your expressions and choice of language. At first, ask simple questions to learn their language and their way of speaking, then gradually lead the conversation to a more sophisticated level.
4. Be attentive to your clothes, choice of food, hobbies, and so on, so that you are not noticeably different but also do not give the sense that you are hiding something.

(KSCF 1984c, 1–3)

While the manual shows the extent to which the intellectuals labored to acquire intimate knowledge of workers, it also captures the moment when what J. Rancière calls the “insidious logic of representation” plays out most innocently and disturbingly: the worker becomes all-knowable, categorizable, and most of all transparent.

12Despite its name, the KSCF is actually an organization composed of youth, university students, and university graduates, and its leadership is usually in their late twenties or thirties.
There is a presumed worker's identity, culture, attitude, and value system that orders the worker's daily life differently than that of the intellectual. More to the point, this objectifying conferred upon the intellectuals the authority to represent workers and to articulate the ideology of workers as their own, much as the French intellectuals in nineteenth-century France described by Rancière (1989, xviii).

If the KSCF manual presumed a difference between the intellectual and the worker at the conceptual level, this difference is inscribed on their bodies as well. A female activist on trial for instigating a wage-increase dispute urged the presiding judges and prosecutors to "go out on a sunny day around five or six in the evening near Ewha Women's College and the Kuro Industrial Complex and compare college students and workers. The students are shiny, vivacious, and pretty, whereas the workers are pale and short, with big feet—since they work sitting down all day long" (Sŏnoryŏn n.d., 111).

This bodily bifurcation was not merely rhetorical; it was also immediately recognized as a given and accepted by society at large. Undongkwŏn students and intellectuals often invoked this familiar representation of workers to highlight both the plight of workers and their own dedication to erasing the division between the workers and themselves. In the mid-1980s, collections of writings on the students' experiences of working in factories would often bear titles such as "Rough Hands Are Beautiful" ("Koch'in soni ärūmdapda") (see, for example, KSCF 1984b).

The problem was that the intellectuals' efforts to shift their social category from intellectual to worker was meaningful and effective only when the bifurcation—conceptual as well as actual—of the intellectual and the worker was recognized and validated by society at large. The intellectuals' moral discourse relied on and sustained this bifurcation, however unwittingly. The undongkwŏn's true dilemma was that without the binary set up between the intellectuals and the workers, their discourse of privilege had little social and political efficacy.

The problem of objectifying and "otherizing" workers was noticed and acknowledged by the undongkwŏn themselves. In fact, activists raised these issues more straightforwardly than the above instructions on how to befriend workers would suggest. In another manual prepared by the same group, for example, soon-to-be workers are warned of the potential problems that they would create in their relations with co-workers. These included the tendency to put forth theoretical positions over practical considerations, to view workers as objects of pity, to think of labor activism as the sole barometer of one's commitment to the movement ("if she cannot survive in the labor movement, she lacks basic qualifications as an activist"), and of what was called "pietism," showing off to fellow activists how well one is adapting to the ascetic life of a worker (KSCF 1987, 18–20). The would-be-workers are also told: "Many of you think of workers as simple and lofty individuals, without greed and egotistical individualism, but the reality is different; workers are realistic, giving in to the rules of capitalistic society" (KSCF 1987, 12).

Indeed, the workers whom the undongkwŏn met on factory floors refused to live up to the stock image of the working class carrying on a class mission. A former student/worker activist tells of her encounter with a female worker who, unaware of her university background, teased her for her "carelessness about appearance": "Things started getting interesting; one fellow worker chided me for an hour to put on makeup and wear skirts and told me that [my negligence about my appearance] was because I was lazy... It is difficult being a worker" (KSCF 1984c, 120).

If the "insidious logic of representation" operated at the level where intellectuals objectified workers, then in everyday practice it operated as workers became the object...
of intellectuals' conflicting aspirations: the Gramscian aspiration for an organic fusion with the workers versus the Leninist one to lead them. The 1980s' democratization movement's lexicon produced various terms that pointed to the complex ways in which these desires were expressed. Intellectuals' "infatuation with struggles," their emphasis on "political struggle," and their "ideological struggles" were often-used phrases. Intellectuals were anxious to engage in whatever form of struggle that they saw fit as soon as they set foot in a factory, to lead a protest into "political" struggle, and to justify such an act on ideological grounds. Once, a student/worker activist organized a strike only six months into his job at a factory, without organizing a union first (Yi Tong-su, interview, February 14, 1993).

Bifurcation, "Political Struggle," and Sŏnoryŏn

The intellectuals' emphasis on political struggle often led workers to more radical forms of protest regardless of the issue at hand: street demonstrations, sit-ins, and the occupation of factories. The workers who associated with intellectual/labor activists were dismissed, often even before they engaged in any activities, such as union organizing, study groups, or street demonstrations. Unable to find other jobs due to the circulation of blacklists and unable to sustain their movement activities due to their exposure to management and state surveillance, the workers found that their proletarian consciousness and revolutionary vision, acquired initially (in many cases) through the urging of the intellectuals, often led them to the path of the lumpen proletariat (see Chŏng 1988; Pak 1991).

This tendency was most pronounced in the 1986 "wage-increase struggle." Wage-increase negotiations take place in May of every year, and until 1985 or so collective bargaining and signing contracts were perfunctorily performed between union and management. In early 1986, a consensus was reached within the labor movement that its annual negotiations would be conducted in a unified manner, with its demands not limited only to bread-and-butter issues but also addressing political reforms (Ch'oe 1986, 60–69). An attempt to organize a regionwide committee to lead and guide unified regional activities to obtain wage increases across enterprises failed, however. Eventually two separate groups were formed, with no significant differences between them (Chŏng 1988, 198–99).

Both groups saw the upcoming negotiation as providing the labor movement with momentum for a higher level of struggle, owing to the workers' heightened political consciousness. They also agreed that their wage-increase campaign should aspire to be like the Kuro Industrial Complex Solidarity Strike of 1985 (for a detailed analysis of this strike, see Koo 2001, 111–25). The Kuro strike was a model of solidarity not only among workers crossing the barriers of individual plants and regions but also among dissident and student groups. It was also considered a "political struggle" par excellence, as political repression of the democratic union movement, rather than economic grievances, triggered the strike in the first place. The 1986 campaign was a woeful failure, however, accomplishing even less than what had been achieved in 1985. Suppression by the state and management was only one reason for the dismal performance. Much blame went to organizations such as Sŏnoryŏn, which had pushed for "political struggle" (Chŏng 1988, 198–99).

Sŏnoryŏn, which was organized in August 1985, represented a new breed of labor activism in South Korea. Sŏnoryŏn openly defined itself as a revolutionary organization—a revolutionary act in itself in the sociopolitical context of South Korea at the time. Sŏnoryŏn was critical of the prevailing perspective among activists that workers
acquire their political consciousness gradually and attributed the failure of the 1970s' labor movement to "trade unionism."

"Trade unionism" here refers to achieving the improvement of working conditions and higher wages as the final and ultimate goal of the labor movement as a whole. Lenin was perhaps the most vocal critic of trade unionism, arguing that a "spontaneous" working-class movement could not on its own develop more than a trade union consciousness: "[T]he "spontaneous element" represents nothing more nor less than consciousness in an embryonic form and . . . a revolutionary consciousness would have to be brought to the workers from without for them to overcome their ideological enslavement by the bourgeoisie" (1902, 30–31; quoted in Fantasia 1988, 237). As an aspiring Leninist organization, Σόνορŷn guided and supported various workers' "political struggles" to develop revolutionary consciousness, openly carrying out political agitation among workers through its publication Σόνορŷn Gazette and through organizing workers in underground small groups.

"Political struggle" refers to tackling all sociopolitical issues that affect the workers' lives directly or indirectly rather than concentrating on issues traditionally defined as belonging to the working class such as wages, working conditions, and the right to unionize. In South Korea's sociopolitical context at the time, political struggle would have meant engaging virtually all issues of society: from import liberalization to reunification and nuclear proliferation. Σόνορŷn was the first labor organization to announce its official position on the presidential direct election debate in 1985 and on the campaign to abolish the National Security Law, issues that were not traditionally in the domain of the labor movement (see Chŏng 1988, 197; Pak 1991, 88–92).

Σόνορŷn's place within the democratization movement was a highly contested and contentious one, but the organization inspired much awe among the undongkwŏn (and society at large, as its leaders later became well-publicized fugitives) for its members' reputed Leninist discipline, dedication, and revolutionary lifestyle. (Σόνορŷn also inspired the literary imagination of former student/labor activists who produced much of the "labor literature" of the late 1980s and early 1990s.) The main force behind the rise of Σόνορŷn was intellectuals, such as the previously mentioned Kim Mun-su.

In summary, the following reasons were offered within the labor movement to explain the failure of the 1986 wage-increase negotiations (see Chŏng 1988; Pak 1991). First, the leaders of the negotiations, many of whom were intellectual/worker activists, were "obsessed" with their role as leaders, often resorting to taking action without first analyzing the demands or the general situation of the workers. Second, most activists were concerned more with immediate results than with the process of workers coming to their own empowerment through their gradual and self-motivated participation. Finally, most activists tried to veer wage-increase negotiations toward political struggles.

In other words, intellectual/worker activists were too busy starting fights with management without first making it possible for the workers to engage in the fight themselves. Often the activists' demands to management were incongruous, given the workers' immediate and pressing needs. They also carried out more militant tactics such as the occupation of factories and sit-ins, accompanying their demands for wage increases with slogans such as "down with the military regime" (Pak 1991, 86–87). Some workers, who were initially very active in the wage-increase struggle rejected the more militant political demands put forth by the activists (Chŏng 1988, 200). The lack of support by the rank and file for such measures left leaders without protection. Many of the labor disputes of 1986 failed in spite of numerous strikes and
sit-ins, resulting in the dismissal and the imprisonment of numerous workers. All these pointed to the impatience of activists, their interest in seeking the immediate fruits of their organizing efforts at the expense of long-term gains for the workers, and their inattentiveness to the workers' everyday issues. The main cause of all these was believed to have been rooted in the intellectuals' general tendency to think of workers as objects of their agitation and mobilization rather than to see them as agents of their own movement.13

“Ideological Struggles”

The “political struggle” that was at the center of the 1986 wage-increase campaign was part and parcel of the “ideological struggle” (inyŏm t’u’janeg) that became one of the hallmarks of the 1980s’ movement. Inspired by and modeled after Lenin’s What Is To Be Done?: Burning Questions of Our Movement, “ideological struggles” were ostensibly debates on the comprehensive issues of political theories, organizational theories, strategies, and tactics of the democratization movement. In reality, however, the debates were largely between two main groups who disagreed over how closely to follow orthodox Marxism-Leninism. These mostly sectarian, divisive, and debilitating debates consumed much intellectual energy of the 1980s and caused a great deal of anguish and pain for those involved. Whatever merits that the long and exhaustive debates might have had for the labor movement were often outweighed by their extreme pedantry and enmity. Numerous groups and underground circles gathered and scattered along ideological divisions. Workers often felt squeezed between the warring groups. The experience of one former Sŏnoryŏn member and seamstress, Kim Mi-yŏng, is emblematic.

In her memoir, Kim recalls the evening when she presided over a public rally to launch a nationwide workers’ organization. The idea of a national organization was conceived by the upper echelon of Sŏnoryŏn leadership and had generated heated debates among various groups in the labor movement. Many of these groups saw the plan as Sŏnoryŏn’s attempt to gain hegemony within the labor movement. Unaware of this prevalent sentiment, Kim had worked hard to prepare for the rally, even rehearsing answers for questions that might be raised from the floor. Her speech (“Let’s build a nationwide workers’ organization and build a world where the workers become owners of society!”) was greeted with cynical remarks and a barrage of questions from activists representing various ideological orientations. As Kim stood on the podium with hundreds of people staring at her, it occurred to her for the first time that she had not the slightest idea how to build such a world, much less what it meant to her. She confidently shouted the slogan but had not probed into its meaning—that she had been yearning for such a world and the fact that the other people who shared the same vision had proposed it was sufficient ground for her to proclaim it publicly (1991, 144–46).

Meanwhile, members from other organizations leaped to the podium and led the audience to the streets with their own slogans. What troubled Kim was not only the organized disruption from other organizations at the rally, however, but also the

13Another scholar, Seung-kyung Kim, notes that the student activists also considered the workers’ acceptance of a meager improvement in their tangible rewards as “false consciousness”: “Student activists aimed at leading workers to a higher level of understanding of their social location and sometimes regarded the improvements in workers’ lives as hindering their progress towards achieving class consciousness” (1997, 142).
increasing gap within Sŏnoryŏn between the intellectuals who composed the leadership and the ordinary workers such as herself. For example, Kim was asked by Sŏnoryŏn leaders to draft the workers' position on the abolition of the National Security Law and the 1986 Asian Games. She had spent many nights working on the draft, only to have it returned with instructions for revisions that she believed were beyond her capacity. She was discouraged and confused and felt ignorant (1991, 147).

Soon after the rally, an underground pamphlet circulated within Sŏnoryŏn criticizing its activities as “bowing to spontaneity,” a phrase from Lenin’s What Is To Be Done? (1969, 41). Its meaning remained elusive to Kim Mi-yŏng, which also made her feel that all her activities so far could have been characterized as “bowing to spontaneity.” Kim soon found that those who agreed with this type of criticism were leaving Sŏnoryŏn, and it eventually dissolved soon after (152).

The “political struggle” and “ideological struggle” of Sŏnoryŏn point to the widespread tendency of the intellectuals to inculcate in the workers a “correct” vision for the future, which, as sociologist Song Ho-kŭn suggests, might have caused intellectuals to settle too readily into the role of the worker. Consequently the intellectuals eschewed the need for a critical tension mediating their relationship with the workers. Being a worker provided a sense of security and comfort at the expense of interrogating and reflecting on one’s own motives and position (1991b, 1267). Moreover, the political efficacy of the alliance relied on the intellectuals’ preserving their position as authoritative and knowledgeable. There is no denying that the alliance was predicated on and in some ways reified the division between intellectual and worker.

**Representation and Historical Accountability**

Although my account of the intellectuals in the alliance may be rather critical, it is not to undermine or discount their crucial contribution to the labor movement and the social movement at large. In fact, a brief discussion of the 1987 labor movement points to the dispersed and multiple ways that the undongkwŏn played their roles in historical moments. Soon after the ruling party leader promised in June 1987 to bring political reform, the South Korean workers rushed into the streets in protest—the largest such labor protest since 1945. In the aftermath of the 1987 “Great Labor Offensive,” South Korean labor had experienced the most militant and successful labor activism of the four “Asian tigers” (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong)—pushing pay increases to double digits since 1987 and organizing two thousand new unions in 1988 (see Koo 2001, 153–217).

Most of the literature and social commentary on the Great Offensive suggests that the undongkwŏn had no place in the dramatic events of the summer of 1987. Intellectual/worker activists by then either had left the factories or were concentrated in the Kyŏnggido-Inch’ŏn area, far from the southeast region where the most militant protest took place. The volcanic eruption of the workers was indeed unanticipated by many undongkwŏn, who watched the unfolding scene with a sense of bewilderment—and in some cases skepticism—along with the rest of society.

A recent study suggests, however, that the offensive cannot be adequately considered outside the context of the continuous and vociferous rise of discourse of labor in the 1980s in which intellectuals were a constitutive part. The intellectuals’ participation in the labor movement facilitated bringing the issue of labor into the public domain, “shifting social resources” at a time when the democratization movement as
a whole privileged the issue of political reform over the issue of labor. More specifically, many of the workers who emerged as leaders during and after the offensive had connections to the undongkwŏn through either underground study groups or personal networks that were in place before the massive mobilization in 1987 (see Koo 2001, 153–87). Also, many of the intellectual/worker activists returned to the site of labor after 1987 as leaders and staff members of labor organizations that were created in the aftermath of 1987, such as the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (Minju noch’ong), or as researchers in labor institutes.14

The changed landscape of the South Korean social movement in the 1990s, however, tempers a hasty celebration of the intellectuals’ historical role in the labor movement of the 1980s. Since the early 1990s, labor no longer occupies the privileged ontological place within social movements at large as it once did in the 1980s. Furthermore, as I have argued elsewhere, the general paradigm shift from the “people” (minjung) to the “citizen” (simin) in the social movement shifted the terms of emancipatory narrative from the “moral and ethical” to “that of articulating the issues largely on the basis of interest, as a right-bearing and right-claiming citizen” (2002b, 156). Labor particularly has had difficulties maintaining its hard-won rights and concessions due to sociopolitical changes beginning in 1990 as well as the financial crisis of 1997. In the 1990s, one would have been hard pressed to find a Kwŏn In-suk forging her identification card hoping to lead the workers into a revolution. Most undongkwŏn in the alliance reverted back to their nonworker status, an option which few workers had. At the same time, the erstwhile experiences of undongkwŏn are rapidly becoming commodity items in the domain of popular culture, ubiquitous in literary and dramatic representations of the 1980s as a bygone era imbued with the spirit of self-negation and collective goodwill, feeding the current sentiment of nostalgia and enervation.

In the context of the democratization movement’s demise and the consequent shifting intellectual paradigm, how does one engage responsibly with the 1980s’ social movement so that one is able to explain both its potency and problematics, neither privileging essentialized notions of “history” and “people” nor dismissing pronouncements that are not “theoretically sophisticated”? How might such a historical narrative facilitate the intellectuals of the alliance to reflect on their role in hailing the worker as a hero of the revolution—which eventually came only in the form of piecemeal reform measures—and rearticulate their locations and positionalities? With the projected visions and ideals of the 1980s unattained, how does one prevent the undongkwŏn experience from becoming reduced to an object of nostalgia or commodification and instead enable us to reconceptualize social relations in an empowering and participatory way?

Compared to the largely deflated Western intellectual scene after 1968, the South Korean undongkwŏn intellectuals’ attempt to shift their social identity and mold the workers into revolutionaries is a countercurrent against the tide of postmodern doubts and uncertainties about progress, human emancipation, and class struggle (see, for example, Lyotard 1984). In the words of Michel Foucault in particular, any progressive political potential in the ideal of the autonomous subject was questioned, and the links between “consciousness, self-reflection and freedom” dissolved (Dews 1984, 87).

14I do not just celebrate this phenomenon; in fact, a number of serious problems are related to the fact that the former intellectual/worker activists occupy positions of leadership in the current labor movement, one of which is that they bring forth their previous sectarian tendencies to the issues at hand.
Furthermore, the intellectuals' efforts can be challenged as yet another type of political construction producing "particular historical forms of power, self-identity, exclusion, and subjection" (Mitchell and Abu-Lughod 1993, 79). In this context, intellectuals in the postcolonial nationalist movements and nation building in the third world have largely been viewed with suspicion for their less-than-emancipatory ways, as noted by Neil Lazarus (1994). In the case of the South Korean democratization movement, while the sacrifice and dedication of the undongkwon are recognized as catalyzing the democratic reforms of the late 1980s, nowadays their previous behavior in the movement is being scrutinized more and more as undemocratic, hierarchical, and sexist, among other things (see, among others, Kwon 2000).

To the implied proposition of abstinence from any sort of representation—since it is implicated with power—the scholars of the Subaltern Studies school have responded that it is yet again the voice of the privileged within the domain of the first world that is speaking, arguing that even after all the privileged positions are challenged with the spread of anticolonial movements, the Western industrial societies still enjoy "the epistemic privilege" (Chatterjee 1986, 17). Gayatri Spivak, developing this line of thinking, charged that the first-world intellectuals' concern for the politics of the oppressed can hide a privileged position of the intellectual (1988, 284–85). Feminist philosopher Linda Alcoff has elaborated on Spivak's points: "[Spivak] criticizes the 'self-abnegating intellectual' pose that Foucault and Deleuze adopt when they reject speaking for others on the grounds that it assumes the oppressed can transparently represent their own true interests. According to Spivak, Foucault and Deleuze's position serves only to conceal the actual authorizing power of the retreating intellectuals, who in their very retreat help to consolidate a particular conception of experience (as transparent and self-knowing)" (1991–92, 22–23).

Alcoff finds a viable option in Spivak's suggestion of "speaking to" in which "the intellectual neither abnegates his or her discursive role nor presumes an authenticity of the oppressed but still allows for the possibility that the oppressed will produce a 'countersentence' that can then suggest a new historical narrative" (1991–92, 23). Alcoff's position is based on the premise that speaking for the other and speaking about the other are not so clearly demarcated. Speaking for others entails speaking about others; in addition, every form of representation, whether it is speaking for the other or speaking about the other, is a form of mediation and interpretation that has impacts on the other.

Alcoff argues further that speaking for others, despite the epistemological problems, remains valid for certain situations: "An absolute retreat [from speaking] weakens political effectiveness, is based on a metaphysical illusion, and often effects only an obscuring of the intellectual’s power" (1991–92, 24). She raises, along with the necessity of speaking, the important issue of accountability: "Speaking should always carry with it an accountability and responsibility for what one says" (25). This accountability is closely connected to analyzing the impact of the speaking, "the probable or actual effects of the words on the discursive and material context. . . . [O]ne must also look at where the speech goes and what it does there" (26).

This notion of accountability is what leads me to reconsider the post-Foucauldian disavowal of representation. While the disavowal calls attention to the need for critically scrutinizing representation in general, a much-needed practice, it also dislodges the act of speaking for others from the Alcoffian notion of accountability by implying that all acts of speaking for others are "a discredited aspiration, and secretly authoritarian" (Lazarus 1994, 204). If the undongkwon's efforts in the alliance are dismissed as yet another politically suspicious act of third-world intellectuals' representation of
the people, predicated upon "a will to power" that is similar to the dominant state power, for example, this amounts not only to dismissing their historical role in the social movement but also to eschewing the need for continued engagement in the current era.

The alliance between workers and intellectuals was a part of the evolving political debate over diverse visions for the future society and the articulation of principles and identification of appropriate historical actors to realize such visions. From this discursive process, the workers, previously disdained as lacking class consciousness and subjectivity, were endowed with a new collective social identity and subjectivity and with a potential for revolutionary vision and action. The practice of the alliance was beset by the unrelenting tension between the intellectuals’ desire for organic fusion with the workers and the practical demands of leading the workers. Amid these conflicting desires and demands, labor was catapulted into the central position in the 1980s’ democratization movement. At the same time, however, for many undongkwŏn, privileging labor was more a symbol of their commitment and devotion than an actual program for revolution.

The problems related to the intellectuals’ representation of workers in this process, while arising from a particular set of historical and sociopolitical arrangements and inner dynamics of the undongkwŏn, also point to the inherent difficulties of representation in general. As Lazarus points out, it would be irresponsible to suggest that the division between the intellectual and the worker can be resolved theoretically without first being dissolved by the transformation of society (1994, 211). One cannot deny that the very decision of the intellectuals to “move over,” to revert back to their nonworker social category, for whatever reason, was possible because of their privileged social position. As Alcoff reminds us, the decision to retreat from social engagement is not an abdication of privilege, but an “extension or application” of it (1991–92, 24–25). Although few intellectuals still call themselves undongkwŏn, social movements today still have to deal with their material and discursive impact. As sociopolitical structures and intellectual paradigms shift, their words will be reinterpreted to remain historically meaningful and relevant. The undongkwŏn may have retreated, but the responsibility and impact of their words remain.

List of References


HABOUSH, Han'guk Dews, Hart-Landsberg, Hunt, Hong Ch'ong Kim, Fantasia, Movement Dialectic Tolbegae. Korean Task Contemporary Traditions], Typescript. 


KSCF. See Han'guk kidok haksaeng ch'ong yŏnmaeng 1984, 1987.


Korean Labor Movement], ed. Han’guk kidokkyo sanop kaebalwôn. Seoul: Chông’amsa.