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# Contents

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PREFACE	page xi
1 The paradox of addiction	1
1.1 Addictions provide a model for participatory disease	3
1.2 Behavioral science has not dealt with our most significant decisions	7
1.2.1 Utilitarian concepts of higher motives are primitive	8
1.2.2 Anomalies contradict current utility theory	12
1.3 Utility theory fails to account for several major areas of behavior	14
1.3.1 Ambivalence	14
1.3.2 Participation in aversion	17
1.3.3 Dependence of rewards on taste	19
1.3.4 Need for emotional objects	21
2 In search of the two minds	24
2.1 Conflict with other people does not imply ambivalence	25
2.2 Multiple centers of choice must compete on a common basis	28
2.3 Separate principles of decision making must also compete	32
2.3.1 Motivated lower principles	33
2.3.2 Unmotivated lower principles	39
2.4 Misinformation cannot cause ambivalence	48
2.4.1 Superstition	48
2.4.2 Hidden costs	49
2.4.3 Misinterpretation	50
2.4.4 Nonspecific errors of learning	51