"Behold, my son, this I have known for a long time, that the big fish eat the little."

 

Peace and War

 

Nuclear Weapons and Clear Lines. Draft, 2010

 

National Prestige and Nuclear Weapons. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1560, February 2006.

 

What Does It Mean for Nations to "Negotiate in Good Faith" 2001.

 

Game models of peace and war, some recent developments.  In Diplomacy Games, ed. R. Avenhaus and W. Zartmann, 2007.

 

Mediating National Honour: Lessons from the Era of Dueling. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 2003.

 

Honor, Symbols and War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999; paperback, 2001. 

 

    — APSA's Woodrow Wilson Award for the best book in government, politics, or international affairs, 2000.
  

    — The award citation and previous winners.
  

    — Read the whole book at the University of Michigan press website. (But they've arranged so that you can't

print a copy -- everyone still has to buy it.)

 

Honor and International Violence. Video of the Leon Levy Lecture at the Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton, March 2009.

 

Risk Aversion in International Relations Theory International Studies Quarterly, December 2001.

 

Entries on John von Neumann, Game Theory and Operations Research in Oxford Companion to American Military History. Oxford University Press, 2000.

 

A survey of game theory studies of peace and war. Robert Aumann and Sergiu Hart, editors, Handbook of Game Theory. New York: Elsevier, 1995. 

 

Sources in game theory for international relations specialists. In Michael. Intriligator and Urs Luterbacher, eds. Cooperative Game Models in International Relations. Boston: Kluwer. 1994.

 

Operations research and strategic nuclear warfare. International Military and Defense Encyclopedia. Pergamon-Brassey. 1993.

 

Are game-theoretical models of deterrence biased towards arms-building? Journal of Theoretical Politics. 1992.

 

Rush-Bagot and the upkeep of arms treaties. Arms Control Today. 21, 20-23, 1991.

 

How to Measure the Worths of Weapons. York University working paper, 1991.

 

Ambiguity in Arms Control Verification. York University working paper, 1990. (diagrams missing)

 

Re-experience the Cold War with the Guided Missile Trivia Quiz.

 

The Intermediate Nuclear Forces: an analysis of coupling and reassurance. International Interactions. 15, 329-347, 1990.  ABSTRACT.

 — Reprinted, F. Zagare, ed., Modeling International Conflict. New York: Gordon and Breach.

 

"Inscrutable" badges for verifying a mobile missile quota. (with Nimrod Megiddo). Defense Analysis. 5, 260-262, 1989.     — This piece gave me an Erdös number of 3 -- thanks, Nimrod!

 

Game theory and the study of the deterrence of war. 134-156 in P. Stern, R. Axelrod, R. Jervis, and R. Radner, eds. Perspectives on Deterrence. New York: Oxford University Press. 1989.

 

A measure for crisis instability, with an application to space-based anti-missile systems. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 31, 631-672, 1987.

 

International escalation and the dollar auction. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 30, 33-50, 1986.

 

  — Abridged, 220-227 in U. Luterbacher and M. Ward, eds. Dynamic Models on International Conflict. Boulder: Lynne Reinner. 1985.

 

 —  For a full and understandable exposition of this theorem, see Alan D. Taylor, Mathematics and Politics: Strategy, Voting, Power and Proof. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1995

 

— Developments by Wolfgang Leininger and Gabrielle Demange.

 

 

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