

**Could Humphrey Have Gone to China?
Measuring the Electoral Costs and Benefits of Making Peace**

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ABSTRACT

Theoretical arguments for why “it takes a Nixon to go to China” emphasize either the superior credibility that hawks have in advocating peace or the superior political benefits they enjoy in doing so. This paper looks for evidence of these effects in the canonical case: that of U.S. rapprochement with China in the early 1970s. I use counterfactual simulations on data from the 1968 National Election Study to explore the political effects of a proposal to open relations with China, focusing on whether and how those effects would depend on who made the proposal: Richard Nixon or Hubert Humphrey. I find evidence of both the credibility and electoral security effects hypothesized in the theoretical literature. In particular, there is a very dramatic asymmetry in the political costs and benefits of proposing peace: while such a proposal would have been electorally costly for Humphrey, it could have been an electoral boon for Nixon.

Conventional wisdom holds that “it takes a Nixon to go to China”: that is, only a leader with a hawkish reputation can make peace with a long-time adversary. This conventional wisdom rests on some theory and a good deal of anecdote but has rarely been the subject of rigorous empirical testing. On the theoretical side, at least two sets of arguments have been advanced to support this claim. One emphasizes the superior credibility that hawks have in advocating peace (Cukierman and Tommasi 1998; Cowen and Sutter 1998), while the other emphasizes the superior political security that hawks have in going out on a limb for peace (Schultz 2003; Nincic 1988). Though there is some evidence of this effect in studies of economic reform—i.e., orthodox measures implemented by populist parties (Rodrik 1993; Stokes 1999)—there is scant systematic evidence from the realm of international relations that either (1) hawks are more likely than doves to make or attempt peace with rivals or (2) hawks enjoy greater credibility and/or political security in doing so.¹

This paper represents an initial effort to fill this gap by looking for evidence of the causal mechanisms suggested in the theoretical literature: do hawks have greater credibility in advocating peace and/or do they face lower political risks in making such a proposal? I explore these questions in the context of the canonical case: U.S. rapprochement with China in the early 1970s. I use data from the 1968 National Election Study (NES 1999) to probe the political effects of a proposal to open relations with China, focusing on whether and how those effects would depend on who made the proposal: Richard Nixon or the Democratic candidate, Hubert Humphrey. I find evidence of both the credibility and electoral security effects hypothesized in the theoretical literature. In

¹ The lone empirical test that I am aware of is Chiozza and Choi (2003), who find some support for the claim that leaders who have been victorious in wars have a higher probability of making concessions in territorial disputes.

particular, there is a very dramatic asymmetry in the political costs and benefits of proposing peace: while such a proposal would have been electorally costly for Humphrey, it could have been an electoral boon for Nixon.

Asking the question “Could Humphrey have gone to China?” underscores one of the methodological challenges inherent in doing this research: that of making counterfactual inferences. The challenge of assessing the counterfactual claims is inherent in much of political science, but particularly when testing theories involving strategic choice (Tetlock and Belkin 1996, esp. chapters by Bueno de Mesquita and Weingast therein). The claim that Humphrey would have suffered high political costs for seeking rapprochement with China is a counterfactual claim in at least two ways. First, Humphrey was not elected president in 1968, meaning that he did not have an opportunity to make the trip that Nixon made three years later. How then can we assess what Humphrey would have done, and how voters would have reacted, if he had been in Nixon’s position? More importantly, the logic of the argument suggests that, even if Humphrey had been elected, he would not have made the trip, anticipating the electoral firestorm that would have followed. As I have argued elsewhere (Schultz 2001), strategic behavior by politicians can make it difficult to measure the costs associated with actions that are presumptively costly. Rational foresight will lead politicians to avoid policies which they expect will lead to unfavorable outcomes.² In doing so, they deprive analysts of the ability to observe the costs that are “lurking out there” but are never incurred. How, then, can we measure—or even confirm the existence of—these costs, without engaging

² Zaller (2003) raises a similar issue in the context of a discussion of “latent opinion.” He notes that, because politicians generally try to avoid activating latent opposition, we often cannot observe that opposition directly.

in speculation or, worse, circular reasoning (e.g., “He did not do it because it was costly. We know it was costly because he did not do it.”)?

I circumvent the first counterfactual problem—that fact that Humphrey was not elected in 1968—by asking a more modest question: what would have been the political ramifications if either Humphrey or Nixon had made a dramatic peace overture prior to the 1968 election? Focusing on an election campaign is useful because it allows us to observe the behavior of both candidates, and the possible reaction of voters, simultaneously. The 1968 election was the last national election prior to the opening with China. This is important because, once the process of rapprochement was underway, any subsequent soundings of the electorate would be tainted by the knowledge of what had happened. For example, had George McGovern won in 1972, he would probably have had greater leeway to engage in further negotiations with China because the key opening had already taken place. He would have been walking in Nixon’s footsteps rather than paving a new and risky path. Hence, to assess the political ramifications of making the opening, we have to look earlier in time.

Nevertheless, shifting the focus to 1968 does not do away with the more interesting counterfactual problem: the fact that neither Humphrey nor Nixon made a dramatic proposal to seek peace with China. As we will see, while both candidates spoke of their desire to see better relations with China, both hedged this discussion with guarded language, suggesting that any opening would be years away. Early in the campaign, Humphrey did suggest relaxing the trade embargo to allow sales of food and other non-strategic goods, but this proposal was not made very prominently, nor was it repeated after he had sealed up the Democratic nomination. The key challenge thus

remains: assessing the political costs and benefits of a hypothetical proposal that neither candidate actually made.

The method employed here involves using counterfactual simulations on the NES survey data. In doing so, I take advantage of the preexisting variation in respondents' perceptions of the candidates' positions on this issue. As we will see, the NES did not ask directly about where respondents thought the candidates stood on China, but it did ask them which party was more likely to allow trade with communist nations. While most respondents understandably saw little difference between the parties on this dimension, about 25 percent thought that the Democrats were more likely to allow trade with communists and about 13 percent thought that the Republicans were softer on this issue. I show how responses to this question can be used to impute voters' perceptions of each candidate's likely stance on this issue. I then estimate, using standard models, how these perceptions influenced (1) respondents' position on the prospect of admitting Communist China to the United Nations and (2) their preference among candidates. Finally, I ask: what if one candidate or the other had taken a dramatic stand on China that would have led voters' perceptions to change? In particular, what if Humphrey had taken a position that led voters to conclude that he was likely to seek an opening with China? What if Nixon had taken such a stand? To answer these questions, I assume that a peace proposal would have caused voters' perceptions to shift away from the original baseline and to converge on the belief that the candidate making the proposal was very likely to allow trade with communist countries. I can then estimate the political effects of such a proposal using the estimates of the baseline model but altering the respondents'

perceptions of the parties' positions, as warranted.³ This method gives me leverage on the key counterfactual question: holding everything else about each voter constant, how would voters' views on China and their candidate choices have changed in response to a dramatic proposal that would have altered their perceptions of the candidates' positions?

The exercise is rough because we cannot of course know exactly what would have happened in the event that one candidate or the other had made such a proposal. Much would have depended on how the candidates and media played the issue, how China and other countries responded to the proposal, how prominent this proposal would have been relative to everything else competing for voters attention, and the like. The purpose of the exercise, then, is not to precisely estimate the effect of such a proposal on the electoral outcome and vote shares. Rather, it is to uncover the tendencies that are suggested by the data.⁴

That caveat aside, the results are strongly consistent with both the credibility and electoral security arguments put forward in the theoretical literature. In particular, I present two main findings. First, a proposal by Nixon to seek normal relations with China would have had a profound effect on voters' attitudes toward the communist nation, as measured by their position on whether China should be admitted to the United Nations. Indeed, such a proposal, coming from the Republican candidate, had the potential to shift the modal respondent from an opponent to a supporter of that policy. By contrast, the same proposal coming from Humphrey would have had a negligible effect on voters' positions on this question. The second result is that there was a marked asymmetry in the electoral costs and benefits of proposing peace. By making such a proposal, Humphrey

³ Bartels (1996) uses an analogous method to explore the political effects of poorly informed voters. He uses a model of vote choice to simulate election results in a hypothetical world of fully informed voters.

⁴ I am grateful to John Zaller for discussions on this point.

would have incurred substantial defections by moderate and hard-line voters. Nixon, by contrast, would have attracted more dovish voters while facing few defections from his hard-line base. For Humphrey, then, the prospect of “going to China” was quite unattractive, whereas, for Nixon, such a move held out the potential for sizable domestic political benefits.

Why Hawks Make Good Peacemakers: Two Theories

The conventional story for why hawks make better peacemakers than doves hinges on a leader’s credibility in advocating peace. This idea, formalized in Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) and Cowen and Sutter (1998), starts with the assumption that the government has more and better information than the electorate about the desirability of making peace. As a result, when deciding whether or not to ratify a peace agreement or to reelect a government that has sought peace, voters must try to infer whether or not the proposed action is really in their interests. If a leader chooses to make peace, it might be because the government’s private information suggests that cooperation is in the national interest, but it might also be because the leader is excessively dovish and willing to make peace when the electorate would not. Thus, when Nixon says that peace with China is in U.S. interests, this is more credible than if the message had come from a leader with less obvious anti-communist credentials. After all, Nixon would only make this proposal if he truly believed that peace with China was beneficial. A dove, on the other hand, might seek peace regardless of whether or not it was in the national interest; hence, little can be learned from a dove’s advocacy of this position. This logic is a natural extension of Calvert’s (1987) argument about the value of biased information sources. The point here

is that the reputation of the leader influences the prospects for peace by influencing voters' beliefs about the desirability of concluding a deal. Because the argument hinges on leader's credibility in advocating peace, I call the "credibility argument." It gives rise to two hypotheses:

Credibility Hypothesis 1: If a leader with a hawkish reputation proposes peace, voters will become more supportive of cooperative policies.

Credibility Hypothesis 2: If a leader with a dovish reputation proposes peace, voters will not change their policy preferences.

A second argument, which I develop in Schultz (2003), is that the reputation of the leader influences the inferences voters make about a leader that proposes peace. In that model, I differentiate between three major types of preferences that a candidate could have: pacifist, moderate, and hard-line. I then assume that, if foreign policy preferences correlate with the dominant party cleavage, then one might identify relatively hawkish and dovish parties on the basis of the distribution of these preferences within each party. In the stylized model, I assume that, all three types can be found in both parties, there is a Dove party dominated by moderate and pacifist wings and a Hawk party dominated by moderate and hard-line wings. In this sense, the parties reflect partially overlapping preference distributions. Uncertainty about a given candidate's preferences then arises from uncertainty not only about the personal views of the candidate, but also the relative strength of the factions within the party, the candidate's need to cater to those factions, etc. A party's or candidate's reputation can then be thought of as the probability that it takes each of the possible types. A candidate from the Hawk party is likely to be a moderate or a hard-liner, and the voters would have some prior beliefs about the

relatively probability of those types. Similarly, a candidate from the Dove party is likely to be a moderate or a pacifist, and again voters would have some prior beliefs about the relative probability of those types.

One key result in that paper is that, when parties have different reputations like this, the same policy—e.g., proposing peace—leads voters to make different inferences about the preferences of the leader. For a hawk, advocating cooperation is a sign that the candidate is moderate; for a dove, advocating cooperation is a sign that the candidate is a pacifist. Hence, the same proposal is moderate when coming from a leader with a hawkish reputation but extreme when coming from a leader with a dovish reputation. This difference arises from the fact that moderates of each party must reveal themselves to voters in different ways. A moderate hawk wants to convince voters that he is not hard-line. He can do so by taking a softer foreign policy position that a hard-liner is willing to take. A moderate dove, on the other hand, needs to convince voters that he is not a pacifist. He can do so by taking a harder line than a pacifist would be willing to take. The result is what Nincic (1988) refers to as the “politics of opposites”: to increase support among moderate voters, the hawk must be soft while the dove must be tough.

The different incentives created by the parties’ preexisting reputations thus influence the way voters react to a politician who proposes peace. In particular, there is an asymmetry in the political costs and benefits of proposing peace. For a hawk, such a proposal is electorally beneficial, because it reassures the median voter of the candidate’s moderation. For a dove, the same proposal can be electoral suicide, since it causes voters to fear that the candidate may be too soft. I will call this view the “electability argument.” It gives rise to two hypotheses:

Electability Hypothesis 1: If a candidate from a hawkish party proposes peace, his/her electoral support will increase.

Electability Hypothesis 2: If a candidate from a dovish party proposes peace, his/her electoral support will decrease.

These two views of why reputation matters are not necessarily contradictory, and indeed the evidence will suggest that both are going on at the same time. The key difference hinges on what voters are trying to learn. In the credibility argument, voters are trying to learn whether or not a given policy proposal is in their interests. In the electability argument, voters are trying to figure out the preferences of the leader. What the electability argument adds to the standard credibility story is a positive incentive for hawks—and particularly moderate hawks—to make peace. The credibility argument suggests that hawks are better at selling peace, but it does not explain why they would want to do so in the first place.⁵ The electability argument fills this gap by suggesting that hawks have an incentive to make peace because they reap political benefits from doing so. At the same time, the electability argument suggests that doves face substantial political risks in advocating peace, because doing so can raise doubts in the minds of voters.

China and the 1968 Campaign

I now turn to the matter of assessing these hypotheses using 1968 presidential campaign as a laboratory. The background assumption here is that the Republicans were

⁵ Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) conflate the preference for the policy and the preference for the candidate by assuming that candidates are bound by their electoral platforms. Hence, a hawk who has proposed peace is electable not because the hawk has revealed itself to be moderate, but because the hawk has committed itself to making peace, and the electorate has inferred that peace must be good.

generally seen as the more hawkish party on relations with communist countries.

Certainly Nixon, who had built his early political career on fighting communism at home and abroad, had a strong reputation as hawk on this issue. Perhaps harder to establish is that the Democratic Party could be seen as somehow dovish, especially given that it was Democrats who had gotten the country into the Vietnam War. The point to make here is that the Democratic Party contained factions of various stripes, including a very vocal peace wing. While Humphrey, as vice president, was closely associated with the war, the events of 1968 showed quite clearly the strength of the anti-war faction, manifest most clearly in the primary campaigns of Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy. And even though Humphrey ultimately prevailed, he did so in part by differentiating himself from Johnson and moving in the doves' direction. Hence, the situation at the time resembles the stylized set-up I discussed above: a more hawkish party composed primarily of moderate and hard-line factions, and a dovish party composed of primarily of moderate and pacifist factions. These observations describe the initial reputations of the parties, and we would expect them to influence the prior beliefs that voters would have about the kinds of foreign policy each candidate would pursue if elected.

An analysis of the 1968 presidential campaign itself suggests that voters received few clear signals that would have led them to update these priors. First, the issue of relations with China was a relatively minor one in the campaign. Predictably, the 1968 race focused more on domestic matters, particularly "law and order" and civil rights (Vavreck 2003). Even among foreign policy issues, China ranked at best third behind the Vietnam War and the Soviet Union. An analysis of post-convention campaign ads and speeches reveals that Humphrey mentioned relations with China in only one speech,

while Nixon did so in three.⁶ Second, the differences between the candidates were not particularly striking. Indeed, in an article summing up the candidates' position on foreign affairs, the *New York Times* included the sub-headline "Little Choice for Voter Seems Evident" (*New York Times*, Oct. 24, 1968).

Astute voters could, however, find evidence of softening attitudes in both major party candidates, a development that was particularly noteworthy in the case of Nixon. The politician who had built his early political career on fighting communism had quite explicitly moderated his views by 1968. In a news conference on Aug. 6, Nixon told reporters that the "era of confrontation" with the communist world had ended, and he presaged his willingness to negotiate with communist adversaries: "Whoever is President...in the next four years and these eight years must proceed on the assumption that negotiations with the leaders of the Soviet world, [and] negotiations eventually with the leaders of the next superpower, Communist China, must take place" (*New York Times*, Aug. 7, 1968). Similarly, in a speech on Oct. 2, Nixon struck both hard and soft chords in his discussion of China:

Now, we cannot forever just sit here and say, well, there is China out there, and at the present time we shouldn't recognize China, we shouldn't admit it to the U.N., we shouldn't trade with it, because Communist China has an aggressive policy toward several U.N. members, including India and others, and at this time if you recognize it in the U.N. you in a sense put a seal of approval on that policy and encourage her to do more. But looking to the future, the next president of the United States must make plans in terms of how the strength of free Asia...can be built up so that we eventually can open a dialogue with China and bring China within at least the realm where we can communicate again.⁷

And again, on Oct. 19, he stated:

⁶ This analysis is based on a material in the Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse (CD-ROM).

⁷ This and all quotations from campaign speeches are from the Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse (CD-ROM).

Looking further into the future, we must also anticipate eventual conversations with the leaders of Communist China. In the short run, we should not reward China's present tactics with offers of trade or recognition; but taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation.

In this, Nixon was amplifying a position that he had taken in an earlier *Foreign Affairs* article, in which he argued that Communist China could not be isolated indefinitely (Nixon 1967). Hence, Nixon's reputation as a hard-line anti-communist mixed with public statements suggesting a more moderate, pragmatic approach that included a willingness to open a dialogue.

As for the Democratic candidate, Humphrey too signaled a desire to build "peaceful bridges" to China, resurrecting from several years earlier the phrase "containment without isolation" (New York Times, April 23, 1968). Humphrey even went so far as to suggest ending the embargo on food and other non-military goods, a step that Nixon was not yet willing to propose (New York Times, June 23, 1968; July 13, 1968). Like Nixon, though, Humphrey was cautiously vague about how soon such reconciliation could take place. For example, in a major foreign policy address on July 12, he said, "Although the prospects for cooperative programs with China in the next decade are not good, we should make it clear that we are prepared to replace conflict with cooperation whenever the Chinese are" (New York Times, July 13, 1968). Similarly, in a post-convention stump speech on Oct. 8, Humphrey mixed his call for a "flexible and open attitude toward" China with cautionary tones:

An isolated China is a dangerous and militant China. We must keep probing patiently to see if there is a change of heart and will on the part of Peking's leaders. Widening the contacts between our two peoples is to everyone's interest.

But here... as in our relations with the Soviets, we must be vigilant as well as open-

minded.

As with Nixon, then, there were reasons to think that Humphrey would be likely to expand ties with China, although his advocacy of this policy was guarded.

Interestingly, Humphrey seems to have put greater emphasis on reconciliation with China prior to the Democratic convention, while he was battling Eugene McCarthy for the party's nomination. McCarthy and other anti-war Democrats were critical of the vice president for his support of the Vietnam War, and Humphrey wanted to shed this image in order to shore up support from the dovish wing of the party. On one occasion, he trumpeted his dovish credentials with a barb clearly directed at McCarthy: "Peace talkers are 10 cents a dozen today. Peace workers, peace makers, are priceless" (New York Times, July 24). The emphasis on "bridge building" with China and the Soviet Union was an effort to appeal to the doves, differentiate his foreign policy from that of the Johnson administration, and thereby lock up the nomination (Navasky 1968; New York Times Sept. 1, 1968). It is not surprising, then, that this rhetoric was toned down after the convention. The proposal to relax the trade embargo, for example, was not mentioned in post-convention speeches. This behavior is consistent with the view of candidate navigating between the need to satisfy a dovish faction within the party while not appearing too soft to the general electorate.

Data on Voter Perceptions

Data from the 1968 National Election Study show the impact the candidates' strategies had on voter perception of the parties' positions with respect to China. The best indicator of these perceptions comes from responses to a question about which party

was more likely to open trade with communist countries. This question is not specifically about China, as trade with the Soviet Union and Cuba were both important issues at the time as well. Nevertheless, the issue of trade was particularly important in the relationship with China and was one of the areas profoundly affected by Sino-US rapprochement in the early 1970s. Respondents were first asked a screening question assessing their interest in and position on this issue. Respondents who were interested enough to express a position were then asked which party they thought was “more likely to allow farmers and businessmen to trade with communist countries.” Possible answers included “Democrats,” “Republicans,” and “No Difference.” Because of the screening question, there are 1121 non-missing observations on this variable, which corresponds to about 72 percent of respondents. Of those, 26.0 percent thought the Democrats were more likely to open trade with communists, 12.4 percent thought the Republicans more likely, and 61.6 percent perceived no difference between the parties on this issue.⁸

This pattern of responses makes sense given the prior reputations of the two parties and what was said during the campaign. Overall, there was no great distinction between the candidate’s public statements, particularly during the general election campaign. Both spoke of a desire to lessen China’s isolation and to expand ties with the communist nation; at the same time, both tempered these positions with cautionary words and did not promise a major breakthrough any time soon. Among those respondents that did perceive a difference, more saw the Democrats as the softer party, which is not surprising given that party’s vocal dovish wing and Humphrey’s own proposal to relax the trade embargo on China, all weighed against Nixon’s hard-line reputation. At the

⁸ Respondents answering “Don’t Know” to this question were coded as perceiving no difference, but none of the results change if these observations were coded as missing.

same time, a perception among some voters that Nixon was likely to open ties with China was not inconsistent with a careful reading of his views. The variety in voter perceptions might reflect variation in respondents' prior beliefs about the parties and in their attention to campaign statements.

An unfortunate consequence about the way this question was worded is that some important information about voters' perceptions was lost. In particular, the "No Difference" category potentially includes two very different sets of perceptions: either the respondent thought that both parties were likely to trade with communist countries or the respondent thought that neither party was likely to do so. Both beliefs would be consistent with a "No Difference" response. With standard spatial models of voting, the difference between the candidates' positions matters more than their absolute positions in the policy space. However, the hypotheses here depart from the standard spatial model by assuming that voters make important inferences—about the preferences of the candidate and/or the desirability of making peace—from the policy proposals and who made them. Hence, it matters very much whether voters who perceived no difference between the parties thought that both candidates supported opening trade with China or that both candidates opposed such a measure. The theories considered here, as well as general theories of elite leadership of mass opinion (e.g., Zaller 1992), see very different consequences associated with these scenarios.

It is desirable, then, to try to extract from the actual survey responses additional information about the respondents' perceptions of each party's likely strategy. In the appendix, I describe such a method. The basic idea is to treat the problem as one of censoring or partial observability. I assume that each respondent has perceptions about

the positions of the two parties on this issue: whether the Democrats are likely or unlikely to allow trade with communists and whether the Republicans are likely or unlikely to do so. Using these broad categories, each respondent's beliefs fall in one of the four boxes of the two-by-two table shown in figure 1. This figure also shows how different belief patterns should map into answers to the NES question. Two of the belief pairs, those on the main diagonal, are indistinguishable because both are consistent with a "No Difference" response. Only if the respondent believes that one party is likely to allow trade and the other is not do we observe that belief pair directly.

The methodological challenge is to impute the respondents' perceptions about each party given the incomplete information in the actual survey responses. This is done using a bivariate probit model with partial observability of the kind described in the figure. The method generates, for each respondent, an estimate of her perception of each party's position on the issue of trade with communist nations. In particular, the variables $DEMTRADE_i$ and $REPTRADE_i$ capture respondent i 's belief that the Democrats and Republicans, respectively, are likely to allow trade with such countries. Both variables are measured on a zero to one scale, with higher numbers corresponding to a higher probability that the respondent thought the party in question was likely to open trade. The average imputed value for $DEMTRADE$ is 0.41 with a standard deviation of 0.32. The average imputed value for $REPTRADE$ is 0.29 with a standard deviation of 0.27. Hence, consistent with what we know of the campaign, respondents were more likely to see the Democrats as willing to allow trade with communist nations, but neither party was strongly regarded as likely to make this move.

Imputing the underlying perceptions from censored data is necessarily imperfect

and relies on (often untestable) auxiliary hypotheses that may or may not be correct (see, e.g., Meng and Schmidt 1985). In addition, the estimates of partial observability models are known to be sensitive to changes in model specification. To avoid placing too much stock in the imputations, all tests performed here operationalize respondent perceptions in two ways: first, using the imputed preferences, and, second, using the actual survey responses, but keeping in mind the ambiguity of the “No Difference” response. When using the imputed perceptions, I use multiple imputation to capture the uncertainty inherent in the imputation process (see King et al. 2001). In particular, twenty data sets were created, in which the estimates of $DEMTRADE_i$ and $REPTRADE_i$ vary in a way that reflects our uncertainty about their true value. Every model reported below was estimated on all 20 data sets, and the results were combined using the method described in King et al. (2001, 53).⁹ When using actual survey responses, I define $DEMSOFTER_i$ and $REPSOFTER_i$ as dummy variables indicating whether or not respondent i thought the Democrats and Republicans, respectively, were more likely to allow trade with communists. Note that, for each respondent, at most one of these variables can be coded as a one; both are coded as zero if the respondent saw no difference between the parties on this issue.

Did the Parties’ Positions Affect Voters’ Positions on China?

In this section, I test the credibility hypothesis that hawkish leaders can influence the prospects for peace through the effects their statements and actions have on voters’ beliefs about the desirability of peace. If this view is correct, then a hawk’s advocacy of peace should lead voters to be more accommodating toward the adversary than should a

⁹ Combining the results was performed using CLARIFY, particularly the mi option.

dove's advocacy of peace. This effect is driven by the hawk's greater credibility in arguing for rapprochement. Precisely because such a position is unexpected coming from a hawkish leader, it leads voters to update their beliefs about the proper policy. If a more dovish leader argues for peace, on the other hand, this is not particularly informative, and voters should not update their beliefs in response.

Dependent Variable: Position on China

Voters' positions on China were classified according to how they responded to a question concerning the possibility of Chinese membership in the United Nations. As with the question about party positions, respondents were first asked a screening question to assess whether or not they knew that China was (a) communist and (b) not yet a member of the United Nations. The 952 respondents (or just over 60 percent) who demonstrated knowledge of these facts were then asked a two-part question. Respondents were first asked whether or not they would support China's admission to the United Nations. Those that answered no were then asked, in the event that China was admitted to the UN, whether the United States should stay in or get out of the world body. This series of questions generates a straightforward classification of voters into soft-, medium-, and hard-line positions: soft voters supported Chinese admission into the UN; medium voters opposed admission, but did not think the US should get out of the UN if China was allowed to join; hard voters opposed Chinese admission and wanted the US to leave the UN in the event China was allowed to join. Of those answering the question, 353 (41.2 percent) were soft-line, 429 (50.1 percent) were medium, and 75 (8.8 percent) were hard-line. Hence, the median voter on this dimension was medium. In the analysis that

follows, these positions were placed on a simple three-point scale, CHINAPREF, which ranges from 0 (soft) to 2 (hard).

Independent Variables

The main independent variable in this analysis is the respondent's perception of the parties' positions on trade to communist countries, as just described. The model was estimated using the imputed perceptions, REPTRADE and DEMTRADE, and using the actual survey responses, captured by REPSOFTER and DEMSOFTER. Assuming that Nixon and the Republicans had a more hawkish reputation, Credibility Hypothesis 1 predicts that respondents should have a softer attitude towards China as they become increasingly convinced that Republicans will allow trade with communists. By contrast, Credibility Hypothesis 2 predicts that voters' positions of China should not be affected by their perception of the Democrats' position on this issue. In other words, Credibility Hypothesis 1 predicts a negative coefficient on REPTRADE, while Credibility Hypothesis 2 predicts a zero coefficient on DEMTRADE.

When using the actual survey responses, the predictions are complicated by the fact that the base category of No Difference conflates cases in which both parties were seen as likely to trade and cases in which neither party was seen as likely to trade. As a result, we cannot say how respondents for whom, say, REPSOFTER=1 should compare with those who saw no difference. We would only predict a negative coefficient on REPSOFTER, relative to the base category, if most of those who saw No Difference thought neither party would open trade. As it turns out, this is what the imputations suggest. Nevertheless, the best prediction we can make given these data are that those

who saw the Republicans as more likely to trade with communists should have softer positions on China, *ceteris paribus*, than those who saw the Democrats as more likely to do so. Hence, the coefficient on REPSOFTER should be significantly less than the coefficient on DEMSOFTER.

In addition to the dummy variables for the parties' positions, the empirical model includes several control variables for other factors that influence voters' positions on this dimension:

- Political Ideology: More conservative voters are expected to take a harder line toward China. A measure of political ideology was constructed by subtracting the feeling thermometer score for "Liberals" from the feeling thermometer score for "Conservatives" and dividing by 100. This creates a continuous measure from -1 to 1 with higher values indicating more pro-conservative feeling.¹⁰
- Position on Vietnam: To gauge overall hawkishness in foreign policy, a variable is included which measures the respondent's position on the Vietnam War. Respondents were asked to place their most preferred policy on a seven-point scale, with 1 corresponding to "immediate withdrawal" and 7 corresponding to "do everything necessary to ensure a complete military victory."

¹⁰ This measure is suggested by Zaller (1991, 1221). Zaller notes that there is some danger that these feeling thermometer scores are partly endogenous to policy opinions. This concern seems more likely to be an issue in the context of his study of Vietnam attitudes, because of the salience of that issue. Hawks on Vietnam, for example, might have had a particularly bad view of liberals because they were associated with the anti-war movement. It is less likely that this is going on over the issue of China and the UN. In any event, I am using this variable solely as a control, so if endogeneity leads it to explain more of the variance in CHINAPREF than is warranted, then that should only make it harder to find significant effects from other independent variables.

- Age: Older respondents are likely to remember the Korean War and the period of intense hostility with China in the 1950s. Hence, a variable was included indicating the log of the respondent's age.
- Party Identification: Two dummy variables were created to indicate whether or not the respondent identified as a Democrat or Republican, respectively (leaving Independent and no affiliation as the omitted category).

Results

Since the dependent variable is a three-point scale, I use an ordered probit regression model. The results are given in Table 1. Column (1) reports the estimates obtained using the imputed perceptions, REPTRADE and DEMTRADE, while column (2) reports the estimates obtained using the actual survey responses, REPSOFTER and DEMSOFTER.

Turning first to column (1), the estimated coefficients on REPTRADE and DEMTRADE are exactly as expected by the credibility hypotheses. In particular, the coefficient on REPTRADE is negative and statistically significant below the 5 percent level; the coefficient on DEMTRADE is smaller in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable from zero. A Wald test shows that these coefficients are statistically different from one another. To determine the substantive effects of these results, consider the counterfactual scenario that is of interest here: what if Nixon or Humphrey had made a clear proposal to open ties with China? For the sake of illustration, I assume that, in such an event, average respondent's perception of the relevant candidate's position would

increase from the baseline mean to 0.75. Increasing REPTRADE in this manner, while holding all other values at their means or modes:

- increases the predicted probability that a voter is soft-line from 0.44 to 0.62,
- decreases the predicted probability that a voter is medium-line from 0.49 to 0.35, and
- decreases the predicted probability that a voter is hard-line from 0.067 to 0.029.

Hence, if an “average” voter comes to see the Republicans as taking a softer line on trade with communists, her predicted position on China will change from medium to soft line. All of these changes are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.¹¹ By contrast, a similar change in the value of DEMTRADE generates substantively small and statistically insignificant changes in voters’ position toward China. Put another way: voters change their positions in response to a soft line from the hawks but not in response to a soft line from the doves.¹²

Turning now to column (2), we find that the results based on the actual survey responses are very similar. The coefficient on REPSOFTER is negative and statistically significant, while the coefficient on DEMSOFTER is tiny and statistically indistinguishable from zero. If we interpret the No Difference category as mostly indicating respondents that thought neither party would allow trade with communists, then these results match closely with those above. Indeed, the predicted effects of

¹¹ Predicted probabilities and their confidence intervals were obtained using CLARIFY (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).

¹²Zaller’s (1992) “mainstream effect” predicts that voters would be particularly likely to shift their views in the response to elite consensus, suggesting that a bigger effect would arise if both parties were seen as willing to trade with communists. To look for evidence of such an effect in this case, I estimated a model with an interaction term DEMTRADE*REPTRADE. The coefficient on the interaction term was insignificant, and its inclusion did not affect the results just reported.

moving from No Difference to seeing the Republicans as the softer party are virtually identical to those obtained in the simulations just reported. As noted earlier, though, the ambiguous nature of the base category means the best test using these data involves a comparison of the coefficients on DEMSOFTER and REPSOFTER. A Wald test for the equality of the two coefficients rejects the null hypothesis with p-value of 0.058. Collectively, then, these results are consistent with the expectations of the credibility hypotheses.

Before moving on, it is worth noting that the other control variables generally perform as expected. Respondents take a harder line on China if they are politically conservative, older, and have a hawkish position on the Vietnam War. After controlling for these factors, party identification does not systematically affect voters' positions.

Did the Parties' Positions Affect Voters' Candidate Preference?

The evidence just presented is consistent with the credibility argument: the view that hawks make good peacemakers because they can convince voters that accommodation is a desirable policy. I now turn to the electability hypothesis that hawks have greater electoral incentive to make peace in order to convince the voters that they are desirable leaders. In everything that follows, I am going to assume that attitudes about China are not influenced by perception of party position. Hence, I am going to put aside the effects just identified in order to focus on how perception of party position affects vote choice, holding attitudes toward China policy constant. This strategy permits me to analyze these effects separately before considering what they mean jointly.

Dependent Variable: Candidate Preference

The dependent variable in this analysis is the respondent's preference among presidential candidates. In the post-election wave of the survey, respondents were asked for whom they voted and, in the event that they did not vote, which candidate they preferred. This variable was coded with three outcomes: Humphrey, Nixon, and Wallace. Of the 702 respondents that (a) cared enough about trade with communists to express an opinion and (b) knew that China was communist and not in the UN, 48.9 percent favored Nixon, 39.2 percent favored Humphrey, and 11.9 percent favored Wallace.¹³ While the existence of a strong third-party candidate in this race complicates things slightly, the discussion of the results in this section will focus primarily on the two-party race between Nixon and Humphrey.

Independent Variables

The main independent variables are the voter's position on China, CHINAPREF, and her perception of where the parties stand, DEMTRADE and REPTRADE or DEMSOFT and REPSOFT. I also include several interaction terms. First, in the model with imputed positions, I include DEMTRADE*REPTRADE, in order to determine whether parties' positions matter jointly. Second, I interact the voter's position on China with her perception of the parties' position. The interaction term CHINAPREF*DEMTRADE, for example, allows us to estimate how the perception that the Democrats were soft affects the candidate choice of soft-, medium-, and hard-line voters. The expectation of Electability Hypothesis 2 is that Humphrey is likely to lose

¹³ Notice that these figures overstate Nixon's actual margin in the popular vote, which was 43.4 percent to Humphrey's 42.7 percent. This is not surprising, given that respondents showing sufficient interest and knowledge to appear in the sample are probably wealthier and better educated than those who did not.

voters that perceive the Democrats as likely to allow trade with communists and that this vote loss will be more pronounced among moderate and hard-line voters. Similarly, the interaction term CHINAPREF*REPTRADE allows us to estimate how the perception that the Republicans are likely to trade with communists affects the choice of different kinds of voters. The expectation of Electability Hypothesis 1 is that Nixon is likely to gain the votes of those that perceive his party as being soft and that his vote loss among harder-line voters in this event will be lower than Humphrey's.

The model includes several control variables that should also influence voters' preferences over candidates. In addition to the political ideology and party identification variables discussed above, the candidate choice model includes three further controls:

- **Financial Situation:** Theories of economic voting suggest that voters are more likely to reject the incumbent party if they perceive the economy as doing poorly under its watch. Hence, a variable is included indicating respondents' perception of how their current financial situation compares with that of a year ago. Responses were coded on a three-point scale with 1 indicating an improvement in finances, 0 indicating no change, and -1 indicating worsening finances.
- **Race:** Race and civil rights were important issues in the 1968 election, especially given the candidacy of the pro-segregation Wallace. A dummy variable indicates whether or not the voter identified herself as white.
- **Region:** To capture the effects of Nixon's "Southern Strategy" and the likely regional appeal of Wallace, a dummy variable indicates whether or not the interview took place in the South, as defined by the NES.

Controls for gender, education level, and union status were also included in alternative model specifications, but none had statistically significant effects. Several variables were also included to capture the respondents' views on the Vietnam War. These did not have consistently significant effects, and none of the results reported here changed materially when such variables were included.

Results

Given that the dependent variable has three unordered outcomes, multinomial logit is the appropriate regression tool. Table 2 presents the estimates obtained using the imputed candidate positions, while table 3 presents the estimates obtained using the actual survey responses. In each table, column (a) shows the estimated effects of the variables on the relative probability of voting for Nixon over Humphrey, while column (b) shows the estimated effects on the relative probability of voting for Wallace over Humphrey. Since multinomial logit estimates are hard to interpret, it is not worth dwelling at lengths on these tables except to note that the sign and significance of most of the variables make sense. First, most of the control variables are significant and in the expected direction. Being conservative, white, and from the South increased the probability of voting for either Nixon or Wallace over the probability of voting for Humphrey. Identifying as Republican increased the probability of voting for Nixon over Humphrey, while identifying as a Democrat increased the probability of voting for Humphrey over either of the other two. Respondents whose finances had deteriorated in the year before the election were more likely to vote for Nixon over Humphrey.

Turning now to the variables of substantive interest—and focusing primarily on the major-party choice in Table 2, column (a)—two key results stand out. The first is that the coefficient on the interaction term DEMTRADE*CHINAPREF is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that the perception of being willing to trade with communists cost Humphrey support, especially among medium and hard-line voters. Notice that the coefficient on DEMTRADE is not statistically different from zero. This means that, even among soft-line voters (for whom CHINAPREF=0), increasing the perception that Humphrey was willing to trade with communists did not appreciably help Humphrey against Nixon. The coefficient on REPTRADE, by contrast, is positive and significant at the 5 percent level, while the interaction term REPTRADE*CHINAPREF is negative, smaller in magnitude, and not significant at conventional levels. This suggests that soft-line voters who perceived the Republicans as willing to trade with communists were drawn to Nixon, as perhaps were some medium voters, while Nixon’s loss among hard-line voters in that event appears to have been negligible. Virtually identical results are implied by the estimates obtained using DEMSOFTER and REPSOFTER in Table 3. All further discussion, consequently, will build on the estimates from Table 2.

The interpretation of these results becomes clearer when we consider the predicted probabilities implied by the model. As before, for the purposes of illustration, let us assume that, if one candidate or the other had made a proposal to open ties with China, then the average respondent’s perception of that party’s position would move from its baseline average to 0.75. To focus on the race between the major party candidates, the quantity of interest here is the probability of voting for Nixon given that the voter preferred either Nixon or Humphrey, or $\frac{\text{Pr(Nixon)}}{\text{Pr(Nixon)+Pr(Humphrey)}}$. This

quantity corresponds most closely to Nixon's predicted share of the two-party vote. Figure 2 graphs this predicted probability for each of the three kinds of voters: soft-, medium-, and hard-line. For each type of voter, the predicted probabilities vary with beliefs about which candidate was assumed to propose an opening with China: Humphrey, Nixon, or neither. A solid line between points represents a change that is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, while a dashed line represents a change that is not significantly different from zero. In each case, other independent variables were set at their means and modes; however, because political ideology and party identification vary strongly with voter type, these means and modes were recalculated for each voter. While the modal soft- and medium-line voters are both Democrats, the modal hard-line voter is an independent. As attitude toward China hardens, the average voter becomes more conservative ideologically. Changing the independent variables in this way primarily influences the vertical location of the lines, and has less influence on the changes within voter types, which are of primary interest here.

Several patterns stand out from this figure. First, while soft-line voters have a tendency to vote for Humphrey—largely because they are Democrats and politically liberal—a proposal by Nixon to open ties with China would have drawn them in the Republican's direction to a substantial degree. The same proposal by Humphrey, by contrast, would not have helped him among these voters by any appreciable amount. The second key observation is that hard-line voters turn sharply and significantly away from Humphrey when he appears willing to trade with communists, but their flight from Nixon in the event that they perceive the same willingness in him is not as dramatic, nor even statistically significant. Hence, the perception of being willing to trade with communists

hurts Humphrey much more with hard-line voters than it hurts Nixon. Finally, medium voters, much like their hard-line counterparts, are predicted to flee from Humphrey to Nixon if they perceive the former as being soft on communism. On the other hand, there is some evidence of a swing toward Nixon among these voters in the event of a proposal by the Republican, though this change is not statistically significant. We can thus summarize how each of these voting types responds to a shift from the baseline scenario to a scenario in which one candidate or the other proposes an opening with China:

- If Humphrey makes the proposal, he loses votes to Nixon from medium and hard-line voters while making no gains among soft-line voters.
- If Nixon makes the proposal, he gains votes from soft-line voters, may gain some from medium-line voters, and his loss among hard-line voters is small.

While this analysis tells us something about how different voter types respond to changes in their perceptions about the parties' positions, it gives us only a partial sense of how these changes would affect the main quantity of interest to the candidates: their overall vote share. This quantity depends not on how average voters of each type behave but on the distribution of voter types and other characteristics in the electorate. To determine the effects of perceived party positions on the electoral outcome, I simulate 1000 elections under four different conditions:

1. Neither candidate makes a proposal. In this case, each voter's perceptions of the candidates' positions are set at their actual (imputed) values.
2. Humphrey makes a proposal. In this case, DEMTRADE is set to 0.75 for all voters, unless DEMTRADE was originally greater than 0.75, in which case it

remains unchanged. Voters' perceptions of Nixon's position, REPTRADE, are unchanged.

3. Nixon makes a proposal. In this case, REPTRADE is set to 0.75 or the original value, whichever is higher. Voters' perceptions of Humphrey's position, DEMTRADE, are unchanged.
4. Both candidates make a proposal. In this case, both REPTRADE and DEMTRADE are set to 0.75 for all voters, unless one or both scores were already greater than 0.75.

In a very rough way, these simulations probe the counterfactual that is at the heart of this paper: what would have been the electoral effects if Humphrey or Nixon had made a dramatic proposal during the campaign to open ties with China? It is unlikely, of course, that, if a candidate had made a dramatic and visible proposal along those lines, all voters' perceptions would have converged, as I am assuming in these simulations. Forcing the convergence to occur at 0.75, rather than at 1.0, makes some allowance for the lingering uncertainty, though not for potential heterogeneity in the way voters would have responded. As we will see, the best conclusions from this exercise deal with the relative ordering of candidates' vote shares across the different scenarios, rather than a precise estimate of the magnitudes involved.

With that in mind, it is also worth recalling that these estimates are based on the 504 respondents (roughly two-fifths of the NES sample) who both cared enough about the issue of trade with communists to answer the question about parties' position and knew enough about China to be asked about their attitudes towards its admission to the UN. As a first cut, these are the voters who are most likely to change their vote in the

counterfactual scenarios we are considering. Nevertheless, this restriction of the sample means that the simulations overestimate the effects on overall vote shares among all NES respondents. If we assume, however, that the remainder of respondents would not systematically change their votes across these different scenarios, then again the ordering of outcomes reflected in the simulations would be preserved.

The simulations were carried out using CLARIFY (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000; see also Scheve and Tomz 1999). The basic strategy is to take the estimates reported in Table 2 and then draw 1000 parameter vectors from their posterior distribution. For each voter and each simulated parameter vector, the predicted vote is determined, based on that voter's scores on the independent variables and randomly generated disturbance terms. Repeating this exercise for each of the 504 voters in the sample tells us how each voter is predicted to vote in each of 1000 elections, with the variation reflecting both the estimation uncertainty in the parameters and the fundamental uncertainty captured in the disturbance terms. This was then repeated four times, each time changing the voters' values of DEMTRADE, REPTRADE, and the associated interaction terms, as necessary to cover the four scenarios.

Once again, since the main focus of interest is the major party race, I calculate for each scenario Nixon's expected share of the two-party vote. The results are depicted in Table 4. The asymmetric effects of proposing peace are obvious here. Nixon's expected vote share is highest if he makes a proposal, regardless of what Humphrey does. Moreover, Nixon's vote share increases considerably if Humphrey makes a proposal and he does not. Nixon's vote share is lowest when neither candidate makes a proposal. What this means is that Nixon does very well if either Humphrey appears willing to trade

with communists or if he does. Hence, the appearance of being soft hurts Humphrey but helps Nixon. The aggregate outcomes confirm the pattern suggested by individual voting behavior above.¹⁴

What if we allowed voters' attitudes towards China shift as their perceptions of the parties' positions changed? As we saw in the previous section, the perception that the Republicans were open to trading with communists tended to soften respondents' attitudes towards China, which the same perception about the Democrats had no such effect. What this means is that, in the counterfactual scenario in which the Republicans propose to open ties with China, there would be a tendency for voters to soften their attitudes as well. As should be clear from the analysis of individual behavior, this effect would generally serve to magnify Nixon's electoral advantage in this event. By appearing willing to trade with communists, Nixon would create more soft voters while at the same time drawing them to his side.

Conclusion

This paper sought to estimate the domestic political effects of proposing peace in the context of an important great power rivalry. The analysis was strongly consistent existing theoretical arguments for why leaders with hawkish reputations have advantages in making peace. The results suggests that, had Nixon proposed to open ties with communist China, he would have both softened voter attitudes regarding China and

¹⁴ The statistical significance of these results depends on whether we treat the figures as predicted or expected vote share (see King, Tomz, Wittenberg 2000). While these quantities are in general the same, they are estimated with different degrees of precision. The predicted vote share takes into account not only the uncertainty inherent in the estimated coefficients, but also the uncertainty captured in the disturbance term for each voter. The expected vote share integrates over the latter. Hence, the expected vote share is estimated with less noise than is the predicted vote share. This matters because, while the predicted vote shares are not significantly different across the four scenarios, the expected vote shares are.

broadened his electoral appeal, attracting soft-line voters and some moderates, without overly jeopardizing support among his hard-line base. By contrast, a similar proposal from Humphrey would not have changed voters' views much, and it would have caused moderate and hard-line voters to flee the Democratic candidate. This stark asymmetry shows how prior reputation can significantly shape the way voters respond to policy proposals from different candidates. The same proposal would have been seen as reasonable and moderate coming from Nixon, but as unreasonable and extreme coming from Humphrey.

One question this analysis begs is: so why did Nixon not make a dramatic gesture during the campaign and more clearly telegraph what he was going to do? The ordering of outcome implied by Table 4 suggests that, on the basis of electoral considerations at least, Nixon had a dominant strategy to be bolder on this dimension. There are a number of plausible reasons that might explain why he nevertheless failed to make the proposal. From a strictly electoral standpoint, Nixon may have decided that did not want to distract from other issues, particularly race and crime, which were central to his campaign and are the kind of domestic issues that voters generally care about. The counterfactual simulations here are very clean, in the sense that I estimate the effects of a proposal to make peace while holding everything else constant. The real world is rarely so clean, however. For example, would campaigning on a "peace with China" platform have muddied his ability to appeal to Southern voters on other, more salient, issues?

There were also international factors that might have caused Nixon to approach this issue gingerly. A substantial uncertainty complicating any decision to make a

peaceful gesture toward China was how that country's leaders would respond.¹⁵ Given the fact that the Vietnam War was still ongoing, it would have been difficult to call for rapprochement with China without a strong expectation of Chinese pressure on North Vietnam in return. This was a concession that Nixon would not be able to obtain even three years later during his dramatic visit (Ross 1995, 40). In general, a candidate in the thick of an electoral campaign should be particularly reluctant to go out on a limb if there was some danger that the foreign adversary would cut the limb out from under him. We see this in some small measure by the discomfort Nixon experienced when, just two weeks after declaring that the "era of confrontation" with communists was over, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia, quashing the "Prague Spring" (New York Times Aug. 25, 1968, p. 78). A similar risk with respect to China would have dampened either candidate's enthusiasm to make too dramatic an initiative. Nixon's caution in this regard is evident in the great lengths that he went, after becoming president, to sound out the Chinese before going public with his peace initiative.

¹⁵ Elsewhere, I explicitly model how foreign states react to peace initiatives from hawkish and dovish leaders (Schultz 2003).

Appendix. Imputing Perceptions of Party Positions

This appendix describes the method that was used to impute respondents' perceptions of the parties' positions on trade with communist countries given the partial observability problem described in the text. Let $y_{p,i}^*$ be a continuous latent variable measuring respondent i 's perception of party p 's propensity to allow trade with communists, with $p \in \{D, R\}$. As a latent variable, $y_{p,i}^*$ cannot be observed directly; however, we assume that is a function of observed covariates and a disturbance term, so

$$y_{D,i}^* = X_{D,i} \mathbf{b}_D + \mathbf{e}_{D,i}, \text{ and}$$

$$y_{R,i}^* = X_{R,i} \mathbf{b}_R + \mathbf{e}_{R,i}.$$

Let $w_{p,i}^*$ be a dichotomous variable derived from $y_{p,i}^*$ indicating whether or not respondent i thinks party p is likely to trade with communists; hence,

$$w_{p,i}^* = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } y_{p,i}^* \leq 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } y_{p,i}^* > 0 \end{cases}.$$

These variables are only partially observed. Let $y_i \in \{D, R, N\}$ denote respondent i 's observed response to the NES question asking which party is more likely to allow trade with communists. We assume that these responses are generated as follows (see figure 1):

$$y_i = \begin{cases} D & \text{if } w_{D,i}^* = 1 \text{ and } w_{R,i}^* = 0 \\ N & \text{if } w_{D,i}^* = w_{R,i}^* \\ R & \text{if } w_{D,i}^* = 0 \text{ and } w_{R,i}^* = 1 \end{cases}$$

The final assumption we need to make is that the disturbance terms, $\mathbf{e}_{D,i}$ and $\mathbf{e}_{R,i}$, are drawn from standard normal distributions, with $\text{corr}(\mathbf{e}_{D,i}, \mathbf{e}_{D,i}) = 0$. The assumption

of independent error terms is made to ensure identification of the model.¹⁶ Given these assumptions, it is straightforward to write the log-likelihood function:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln L(\mathbf{b}_D, \mathbf{b}_R) = & \sum_{i:y_i=D} \ln \Phi(X_{D,i} \mathbf{b}_D) \Phi(-X_{R,i} \mathbf{b}_R) \\ & + \sum_{i:y_i=N} \ln \left[\Phi(X_{D,i} \mathbf{b}_D) \Phi(X_{R,i} \mathbf{b}_R) + \Phi(-X_{D,i} \mathbf{b}_D) \Phi(-X_{R,i} \mathbf{b}_R) \right], \\ & + \sum_{i:y_i=R} \ln \Phi(-X_{D,i} \mathbf{b}_D) \Phi(X_{R,i} \mathbf{b}_R) \end{aligned}$$

where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal.

The rest of the procedure is straightforward:

1. Identify independent variables that are thought to predict the voter's perceptions of the parties' positions.
2. Estimate the posterior distribution of the parameter vectors \mathbf{b}_D and \mathbf{b}_R using maximum likelihood techniques.
3. For each parameter vector, draw 20 values from its posterior distribution, taking advantage of the fact that the elements are distributed multivariate normal with the means, variances, and covariances determined by the estimator (see King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).

¹⁶ While this assumption may not be justified, it solves the problem that arises when using a more general model in which $\mathbf{e}_{D,i}$ and $\mathbf{e}_{R,i}$ are assumed to be distributed bivariate normal with correlation \mathbf{r} . It is known that there are conditions under which the censored bivariate probit model used in standard selection model generates estimates of \mathbf{r} that approach the boundary values of 1 or -1 (Butler 1996). Such estimates can cause problems not only for estimating the variance-covariance matrix, but also because, when \mathbf{r} is on the boundary, certain observations become logically impossible. Given the nature of the censoring in the present application, it is not surprising that estimates of \mathbf{r} obtained with the more general estimator always approached -1. At this extreme, for any given observation, either $w_{D,i}^* = 1$ and $w_{R,i}^* = 1$ or $w_{D,i}^* = 0$ and $w_{R,i}^* = 0$ is logically impossible. However, this impossibility does not cause a problem for the likelihood function because neither of these outcomes is ever observed uncensored. Hence, the observable data do not constrain the estimator from converging on this boundary.

4. Multiply each vector of parameters with the matrix of independent variables to impute 20 sets of the unobserved latent variables, $y_{D,i}^*$ and $y_{R,i}^*$.
5. Convert the predicted values of $y_{D,i}^*$ and $y_{R,i}^*$ into probabilities by transforming each as follows: $DEMTRADE_i = \Phi(y_{D,i}^*)$ and $REPTRADE_i = \Phi(y_{R,i}^*)$.

Because this is an exercise in imputation, rather than more standard causal modeling, several issues need to be taken into account. First, the imputation model must include all variables that will subsequently appear in the analysis models, including the dependent variables (see King et al. 2001, 56; Meng 1994). Hence, the imputation models used here included the dependent variables for the two analysis models (CHINAPREF and dummies for Nixon and Wallace voters), all independent variables used in the analysis models (Log of Age, Position on Vietnam, Political Ideology, Party Identification dummies, Southern dummy, Financial Status, and Race), as well as several addition variables that were thought to predict the respondents' perceptions of the parties. These included a variable indicating the respondent's position on trade with communist countries, measured on a three-point scale, and dummy variables indicating the response to a question about which party was more likely to give foreign aid to other countries. For each party, I included an interaction between the respondent's position on trade with communists and a dummy variable for whether or not the respondent preferred that party's candidate. The hypothesis here was that supporters of, say, Humphrey would be more likely to see the Democrats as willing to trade with communists if they favored such trade, while opponents of Humphrey would be more likely to see the Democrats as

willing to trade with communists if they opposed such trade. This correlation was indeed evident in the estimates for both the Democrats and the Republicans. For each party, I also included a variable measuring the difference between the respondent's position on Vietnam and her perception of the candidate's position on Vietnam. The hypothesis, again confirmed in the estimates, is that respondents would be more (less) likely to see a party as willing to trade with communists if they saw the party as more dovish (more hawkish) than them on Vietnam. Finally, a variable indicating union membership was included in X_R on the grounds that union members might have been cued by the question's mention of "businessmen" to see the issue as one of free trade. In that case, union members might have given particular consideration to the Republican party's pro-business and pro-free trade orientation. This too was evident in the estimates.¹⁷

The second issue in handling the imputation deals with creation of predicted values. In typical analysis, we would form, say, the expected value of $y_{D,i}^*$ simply from the estimated coefficients, $\hat{\mathbf{b}}_D$, and the observed covariates, or

$$E(\hat{y}_{D,i}^*) = X_{D,i} \hat{\mathbf{b}}_D.$$

When done this way, $E(\hat{y}_{D,i}^*)$ is the expected perception of a respondent with covariates $X_{D,i}$. The disturbance term falls out because its expectation is zero for any generic respondent. However, we are not interested in the expected perception of the *average* respondent given a set of covariates; rather, we want to say more about the perceptions of the *actual* respondent in our sample. Thus, we need to take advantage of what we know about that respondent's actual response and what that tells us about the disturbance term for that individual.

¹⁷ Results from the imputation model are available from the author.

For example, say respondent i said that the Democrats were more likely to trade with communists. From this, we know that $y_{D,i}^* = X_{D,i} \mathbf{b}_D + \mathbf{e}_{D,i} > 0$ and

$y_{R,i}^* = X_{R,i} \mathbf{b}_R + \mathbf{e}_{R,i} < 0$. Hence, the expected value of $y_{D,i}^*$ for this respondent is

$$E(y_{D,i}^* | y_i = D) = X_{D,i} \hat{\mathbf{b}}_D + E(\mathbf{e}_{D,i} | \mathbf{e}_{D,i} > -X_{D,i} \hat{\mathbf{b}}_D).$$

Using the formula for the expectation of a truncated normal distribution, this means

$$E(y_{D,i}^* | y_i = D) = X_{D,i} \hat{\mathbf{b}}_D + \mathbf{f}(-X_{D,i} \hat{\mathbf{b}}_D) / [1 - \Phi(-X_{D,i} \hat{\mathbf{b}}_D)],$$

where \mathbf{f} is the probability density function of the standard normal. Similarly, the

expected value of $y_{R,i}^*$ for this respondent is

$$E(y_{R,i}^* | y_i = D) = X_{R,i} \hat{\mathbf{b}}_R - \mathbf{f}(-X_{R,i} \hat{\mathbf{b}}_R) / \Phi(-X_{R,i} \hat{\mathbf{b}}_R).$$

The expected values for a respondent for whom $y_i = R$ can be determined similarly. The main complication arises in the case of respondents for whom $y_i = N$. In such cases, we cannot know for sure whether the latent variables were both greater than or both less than zero. Consequently, we cannot know whether the posterior distribution of the disturbances terms should be truncated from below or from above. Nevertheless, we can still form the expected values in this case by recognizing that the expected value of the disturbance term is the weighted average of its expectation under the two possible scenarios. For example,

$$E(y_{D,i}^* | y_i = N) = X_{D,i} \hat{\mathbf{b}}_D + \Pr(y_{R,i}^* > 0) \cdot E(\mathbf{e}_{D,i} | \mathbf{e}_{D,i} > -X_{D,i} \hat{\mathbf{b}}_D) \\ + \Pr(y_{R,i}^* \leq 0) \cdot E(\mathbf{e}_{D,i} | \mathbf{e}_{D,i} \leq -X_{D,i} \hat{\mathbf{b}}_D), \text{ or}$$

$$E(y_{D,i}^* | y_i = N) = X_{D,i} \hat{\mathbf{b}}_D + \Phi(X_{R,i} \hat{\mathbf{b}}_R) \cdot \frac{\mathbf{f}(-X_{D,i} \hat{\mathbf{b}}_D)}{1 - \Phi(-X_{D,i} \hat{\mathbf{b}}_D)} - \Phi(-X_{R,i} \hat{\mathbf{b}}_R) \cdot \frac{\mathbf{f}(-X_{D,i} \hat{\mathbf{b}}_D)}{\Phi(-X_{D,i} \hat{\mathbf{b}}_D)}.$$

The expectation of $y_{R,i}^*$ in this event is calculated analogously. When created this way, $DEMTRADE_i$ and $REPTRADE_i$ represent the posterior probabilities that respondent i believed the Democrats and Republicans, respectively, were likely to trade with communists, where the probabilities are conditioned on the known survey response.

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Table 1. The Effect of Party Position on China Policy Preferences

Dependent Variable: Position on China and UN (CHINAPREF)

Model: Ordered Probit

Variable	(1) Imputed Perceptions	(2) Actual Survey Responses
DEMTRADE	-0.40 (0.26)	--
REPTRADE	-0.99* (0.39)	--
DEMSOFTER	--	-0.076 (0.11)
REPSOFTER	--	-0.38** (0.15)
Political Ideology	0.88** (0.21)	0.86** (0.17)
Position on Vietnam	0.15** (0.034)	0.13** (0.027)
Log(Age)	0.44** (0.17)	0.40** (0.14)
Democratic Identifier	-0.047 (0.15)	0.10 (0.13)
Republican Identifier	-0.0054 (0.16)	0.11 (0.13)
Threshold 1	1.75** (0.64)	1.98** (0.56)
Threshold 2	3.40** (0.66)	3.59** (0.57)
Number of observations	504	609

Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.

* $0.05 > p > 0.01$ ** $p < 0.01$

Table 2. The Effects of Party Positions on Candidate Choice (Imputed Perceptions)

Dependent Variable: Candidate Preference

Model: Multinomial Logit

Variable	(a) Nixon/Humphrey	(b) Wallace/Humphrey
Constant	-2.77** (0.97)	-2.89† (1.60)
Political Ideology	2.20** (0.59)	2.06** (0.71)
Republican Identifier	1.57** (0.39)	0.48 (0.57)
Democratic Identifier	-1.99** (0.33)	-1.14** (0.40)
White	2.83** (0.76)	2.58* (1.10)
South	0.59† (0.34)	1.07* (0.42)
Financial Situation	-0.48* (0.19)	-0.26 (0.26)
CHINAPREF	-0.22 (0.52)	-0.91 (0.64)
DEMTRADE	-0.94 (0.91)	-2.92 † (1.53)
DEMTRADE* CHINAPREF	2.74* (1.08)	3.93** (1.41)
REPTRADE	2.47* (1.11)	-0.73 (1.80)
RETRADE* CHINAPREF	-1.91 (1.20)	-0.27 (1.80)
DEMTRADE*REPTRADE	1.55 (3.37)	6.35 (4.01)
DEMTRADE*REPTRADE* CHINAPREF	-0.66 (3.62)	-2.41 (4.29)
Number of observations	504	

Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Estimates were obtained by combining the results from 20 imputed data sets. All significance tests are two-tailed.

† $0.10 > p > 0.05$ * $0.05 > p > 0.01$ ** $p < 0.01$

Table 3. The Effects of Party Positions on Candidate Choice (Actual Responses)

Dependent Variable: Candidate Preference (Nixon, Humphrey, Wallace)

Model: Multinomial Logit

Variable	(a)	(b)
	Nixon/Humphrey	Wallace/Humphrey
Constant	-2.37** (0.69)	-3.69** (1.22)
Political Ideology	2.25** (0.51)	2.37** (0.63)
Republican Identifier	1.53** (0.32)	0.37 (0.48)
Democratic Identifier	-2.04** (0.27)	-1.25** (0.34)
White	2.93** (0.67)	2.88** (1.09)
South	0.76** (0.28)	1.15** (0.33)
Financial Situation	-0.54** (0.16)	-0.24 (0.22)
CHINAPREF	-0.21 (0.23)	-0.17 (0.30)
DEMISOFTER	-0.64 (0.42)	-0.84 (0.63)
DEMISOFTER* CHINAPREF	1.76** (0.49)	1.73* (0.63)
REPSOFTER	1.07* (0.49)	0.023 (0.80)
REPSOFTER * CHINAPREF	-0.80 (0.49)	-0.51 (0.92)
Number of observations	599	

Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed.

† 0.10 > p > 0.05 * 0.05 > p > 0.01 ** p < 0.01

Table 4. Nixon’s Expected Share of the Two-Party Vote under Four Scenarios

		Humphrey	
		No Proposal	Proposal
Nixon	No Proposal	57%	61%
	Proposal	65%	72%

Figure 1. The Assumed Relationship Between Voter Perceptions and Survey Responses

		Democrats	
		Unlikely to Trade with Communists	Likely to Trade with Communists
Republicans	Unlikely to Trade with Communists	No Difference	Democrats
	Likely to Trade with Communists	Republicans	No Difference

Note: Each cell contains the survey response that is assumed to coincide with the belief pair indicated. The survey question is: "Which party do you think is more likely to allow farmers and businessmen to trade with communist countries."

Figure 2. Predicted Probability of Voting for Nixon in Two-Party Race

