

Approaches to Modeling in International Relations

Political Science 221

Spring 1996

Professor Arthur Stein (3383 Bunche, 825-1173)

The focus of this course is modelling in international relations theory. The purpose is to focus on discrete theoretical concerns and rigorously and meticulously to assess a few models of the phenomenon.

Course requirements: Regular attendance and participation. I expect you to come to each class session, and to come prepared. Your participation is essential for the course to work. You will also write a paper.

Available for purchase at ASUCLA:

James Morrow, *Game Theory for Political Scientists*

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman. 1992. *War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

1. Introduction

Lake-Powell volume

Morrow, pp.1-11

2. Modelling Discrete Choices: Guns vs. Butter

Jack Hirshleifer. 1988. The Analytics of Continuing Conflict. *Synthese* 76 (August): 201-233.

Jack Hirshleifer. 1991. The Technology of Conflict as an Economic Activity. *American Economic Review* 81 (May): 130-134.

Jack Hirshleifer. 1995. Anarchy and Its Breakdown. *Journal of Political Economy* 103: 26-53.

Robert Powell. 1993. Guns, Butter, and Anarchy. *American Political Science Review* 87 (March): 115-132.

For further study:

Skaperdas, Stergios. 1992. Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights. *American Economic Review* 82 (September): 720-739.

Garfinkel, Michelle R. 1990. Arming as a Strategic Investment in a Cooperative Equilibrium. *American Economic Review* 89 (March): 50-68.

Grossman, Herschel I. 1991. A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections. *American Economic Review* 81 (September): 912-921.

Dixit, Avishai. 1987. Strategic Behavior in Contests. *American Economic Review* 77 (December): 891-898.

3. Deterrence and Coercion

Morrow, pp.38-43, 51-72, 180-186, 199-211, 241-244, 279-291.

Daniel Ellsberg. 1960. The Crude Analysis of Strategic Choice. *American Economic Review* ?? (May 19??): 472-478.

Reinhard Selten. 1978. The Chain Store Paradox. *Theory and Decision* 9: 127-159.

James E. Alt, Randall L. Calvert, and Brian D. Humes. 1988. Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. *American Political Science Review* 82 (June): 445-466.

Barry Nalebuff. 1991. Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World. *World Politics* 43 (April): 313-335.

4. Alliances and Collective Goods

Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser. 1966. An Economic Theory of Alliances. *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 48: 266-279.

Thomas Schelling, "Hockey Helmets, Daylight Savings, and Other Binary Choices," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Chapter 7 in *Micromotives and Macrobehavior*.

Jack Hirshleifer. 1983. From Weakest-Link to Best-Shot: The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods. *Public Choice* 41: 371-386. Correction 46 (1985): 221-223.

Susanne Lohmann, "The Poverty of Green and Shapiro," *Critical Studies* 9 (Winter-Spring 1995): 127-143, 149-153.

5. Endogenous Trade

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1994. Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence. *International Organization* 48 (Autumn): 596-632.

Robert E. Baldwin. 1982. The Political Economy of Protectionism, pp.263-286 in J. Bhagwati, ed. *Import Competition and Response*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gene M. Grossman and E. Helpman. 1994. Protection for Sale. *American Economic Review* 84 (September): 833-850.

Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung. 1988. Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy. *American Economic Review* 78 (September): 729-745.

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Ann Lenway. 1989. Interests or Institutions: An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC Relations. *International Studies Quarterly* 33: 303-327.

6. Two-Level Games

Robert Putnam. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. *International Organization* 42 (Summer): 427-460.

Frederick Mayer. 1992. Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side-payments. *International Organization* 46 (Autumn): 793-818.

George Tsebelis. 199 . *Nested Games:* .

Jongryn Mo. 1995. Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining -- The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games. *American Political Science Review* 89 (December): 914-924.

Mo, Jongryn. 1994. The logic of two-level games with endogenous domestic coalitions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38 (September): 402-422.

Keisuke Iida. 1993. When and How and Do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-Level Games With Uncertainty. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37 (June): 403-426.

Diane Richards *et al.* 1993. Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of Force. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (September) 37: 504-535.

George W. Downs and David M. Rocke. 1994. Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principle-Agent Problem Goes to War. *American Journal of Political Science* 38 (May): 362-380.

Susanne Lohmann. 1995. A Theory of Linkage Politics. UCLA.

7. Institutions and Credible Commitments

Peter Cowhey. 1993. Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments: Japan and the United States. *International Organization* 47 (Spring): 299-325

Oliver Williamson. 1983. Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange. *American Economic Review* 73 (September): 519-540.

Jonathan Bendor and Dilip Mookherjee. 1987. Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action. *American Political Science Review* 81 (March): 129-154. .

Avner Grief, Paul Milgrom, and Barry Weingast. 1994. Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild. *Journal of Political Economy* 102 (December): 745-776.

8. Signalling, Commitment, and Domestic Politics

James Fearon. 1994. Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. *American Political Science Review*. 88 (September): 577-592.

James Fearon. 1994. Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38 (June): 236-269.

9. Evolution and Population Ecology

J. Maynard Smith. 1976. Evolution and the Theory of Games. *American Scientist* 64 (January/February): pp.41-45.

Jack Hirshleifer. 1982. Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation Versus Conflict Strategies. *Research in Law and Economics* 4: 1-60.

Robert Boyd and Jeffery P. Lernerbaum. 1987. No Pure Strategy is Evolutionary Stable in the Prisoners' Dilemma. *Nature* 327: 58-59.

Jack Hirshleifer and Juan Carlos Martinez Coll. 1988. What Strategies Can Support the Evolutionary Emergence of Cooperation? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32 (June): 367-398.

Jonathan Bendor. 1993. Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37 (December): 709-734.

Marc L. Busch and Eric R. Reinhardt. 1993. Nice Strategies in a World of Relative Gains. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37 (September): 427-445.

Lomborg,

W. Brian Arthur. 1990. Positive Feedbacks in the Economy. *Scientific American* (February): 92-99.

Lars-Erik Cederman. 1994. Emergent Polarity: Analyzing State-Formation and Power Politics. *International Studies Quarterly* 38: 501-533.

Lars-Erik Cederman. 1995. Competing Identities: An Ecological Model of Nationality Formation. *European Journal of International Relations* 1: 331-365.