Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models

Summer Institute 2007

Week 2: Bargaining and Coercion Models

Instructors: Ken Schultz (Stanford) and Jeff Lewis (UCLA)

Monday, July 2

Morning Session

Introduction: Bargaining (and Modeling) without a Net

Dan Reiter, “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War,” Perspectives on Politics 1 (2003): 27-43.

Bargaining and Signaling

James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (1997): 68-90.

Bahar Leventoglu and Ahmer Tarar, “War and Incomplete Information,” manuscript.

Recommended:

Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), chap. 3.

Afternoon Session

Empirics without Models

Edward Miguel, Shanker Satyanath and Ernest Sergenti, “Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach,” Journal of Political Economy 122 (2004): 725-753.

Recommended:

Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, “Identification of Causal Effects Using Instrumental Variables,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 91 (1996): 444-455.

Imbens, “Non-Parametric Estimation of Average Treatment Effects under Exogeneity: A Review,” Review of Economics and Statistics 86(2004): 4-29.

Przeworski, Adam, and James Raymond Vreeland, “The Effect of IMF Programs on Economic Growth,” The Journal of Development Economics 62 (2000): 385-421.

Tuesday, July 3

Morning Session

Connecting Game Theory to Empirics: What Can Go Wrong

James Fearon, “Signaling versus Balance of Power and Interests,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38 (1994): 236-69.

Alastair Smith, “To Intervene or Not to Intervene: A Biased Decision,” Journal of

Conflict Resolution 40 (1996): 16-40.

Recommended:

Kenneth A. Schultz, “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War,” International Organization 53 (Spring 1999): 233-266.

Kenneth A. Schultz, “Looking for Audience Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (Feb. 2001): 32-60.

Afternoon Session

Conflict and Commitment

Kenneth A. Schultz, “War as an Enforcement Problem: Interstate Conflict over Rebel Support in Civil Wars,” manuscript. Stanford University.

Recommended:

James Fearon, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” International Organization 52 (1998): 269-306.

Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” International Organization 60 (2006): 169-203.

Robert Powell, “The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information,” American Political Science Review 98 (May 2004): 231-241.

James Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?” Journal of Peace Research 41 (2003): 275-301.

Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, “A Theory of Political Transitions,” American Economic Review 91 (September 2001): 938-63.

Wednesday, July 4

Morning Session

Presentation by Kris Ramsay

Kristopher W. Ramsay and Curtis S. Signorino, "Bargaining and

Society: A Statistical Model of the Ultimatum Game" Typescript,

Princeton University, 2006.

Recommended:

Antonio Merlo, "Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment."

The Journal of Political Economy, 105 (Feb., 1997): 101-131.

McKelvey and Palfrey. 1996. "A Statistical Theory of Equilibrium in
Games" Japanese Economic Review 47(2):186-209.

Models of Repeated Interaction and Reputation

Alexandra Guisinger and Alastair Smith, “Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (2002): 175-200.

Barbara Walter, “Building Reputation: Why Governments Fight Some Separatists but Not Others,” American Journal of Political Science 50 (2006): 313-330.

Recommended:

Anne Sartori, “The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes,” International Organization 56 (Winter 2002): 121-150.

Anne Sartori, Deterrence by Diplomacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), ch. 4.

Afternoon Session

None!

Thursday, July 5

Morning Session

Intro to Fully Structural Modeling: Zero-Likelihood and Random Utility

Curtis S. Signorino, “Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict,” American Political Science Review 93 (June 1999): 279-98.

Recommended:

Curtis S. Signorino, “Structure and Uncertainty in Discrete Choice Models,” Political

Analysis 11 (Fall 2003): 316-344.

McKelvey, Richard D. and Thomas R. Palfrey, “Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games,” Experimental Economics (1998)1: 9-41

Kooreman, Peter, “Estimation of Econometric Models of Some Discrete Games,” Journal of Applied Econometrics 9 (1994): 255-268.

Bresnahan, Timothy F. and Peter C. Reiss, “Empirical Models of Discrete Games,” Journal of Econometrics 48 (1991): 57-81.

Afternoon Session

Fully Structural Models (Continued): Identification and Estimation

Jeffrey B. Lewis and Kenneth A. Schultz, “Estimating State Preferences in International Crises: Promise and Limitations of Fully Structural Models.” Manuscript.

Recommended:

Jeffrey B. Lewis and Kenneth A. Schultz, “Revealing Preferences: Empirical Estimation of a Crisis Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information” Political Analysis 11 (Fall 2003), 345-67.

Jonathan Wand, “Comparing Models of Strategic Choice: The Role of Uncertainty and Signaling,” Political Analysis 13 (Winter 2006): 101-20.

Jeffrey B. Lewis and Kenneth A. Schultz, “Learning about Learning: A Response to Wand,” Political Analysis 13 (Winter 2006): 121-29.

Friday, July 6

Morning Session

Presentation by Becky Morton

Rebecca B. Morton, ``Why the Centipede Game Experiment Is Important for Political Science'' Forthcoming in A Positive Change in Political Science: The Legacy of Richard D. McKelvey’s Most Influential Writings. Edited by James Alt and Arthur Lupia, University of Michigan Press.

Recommended:

Guillaume Fréchette, John H. Kagel, and Massimo Morelli, `` Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers." Econometrica, Vol. 73, No. 6 (November, 2005), 1893-1937

Daniel Diermeier and Rebecca B. Morton, ``Proportionality versus Perfectness:

Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining.'' Typescript, New York University, 2003.

Michael Tomz, “Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach,” International Organization, forthcoming.

Afternoon Session

None!