Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models

Institutions Week, 2007

Instructors: John Aldrich and Arthur Lupia.

MFR Lecturers: Sona Golder and Michael Thies

Monday 9-10:30. Instructions. Introductions. Goals.

Monday 10:30-12. Arrow’s Theorem and its Implications for Collective Choice

W. Riker, “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions,” American Political Science Review, June, 1980.

Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28198006%2974%3A2%3C432%3AIFTDOM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

A. Lupia and M. McCubbins, “Lost in Translation: Social Choice Theory is Misapplied Against Legislative Intent.” Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, February, 2005.

Recommended:

A. Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, 1970, Chapters 1-3*.

Monday 1:15-2:00 Introducing Institutions: Agenda Control in a Spatial Model

D. Black, “On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making,” Journal of Political

Economy, February, 1948.

Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28194802%2956%3A1%3C23%3AOTROGD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4

T. Romer and H. Rosenthal, “Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo,” Public Choice, Winter, 1978.

http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=3&hid=4&sid=798bc476-09d9-4f61-94fc-1d914276cd1d%40sessionmgr8

Recommended:

E. Gerber, “Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiative,” American Journal of Political Science, February, 1996.

Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0092-5853%28199602%2940%3A1%3C99%3ALRTTTO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R

T. Romer and H. Rosenthal, “Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,” November, 1979.

Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28197911%2993%3A4%3C563%3ABVVOTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T

Monday 2:15-3:00. The New Institutionalism

Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1979. "Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models." American Journal of Political Science 23 (1) (February):27‑59.

Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0092-5853%28197902%2923%3A1%3C27%3AIAAEIM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X

Laver, Michael, and Shepsle, Kenneth. 1990. “Coalitions and Cabinet Government.” American Political Science Review 84(3): 873-890.

Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28199009%2984%3A3%3C873%3ACACG%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q

Recommended:

Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. “The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power. American Political Science Review 81:85-104.

Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28198703%2981%3A1%3C85%3ATIFOCP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G

Weingast, Barry R., and William J, Marshall. 1988. “The Industrial Organization of Congress: or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets.” Journal of Political Economy 96:132-163.

Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28198802%2996%3A1%3C132%3ATIOOCO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S

Monday 3:15-4:00. Initial Group Discussions

Tuesday 9-10:15. Group Presentations of First Assignment.

Tuesday 10:30 –11:45. Spatial Models and their Measurement

J. Aldrich & R.D. McKelvey. "A Method of Scaling with Applications to the 1968 and 1972 U.S. Presidential Elections," American Political Science Review, March, 1977.

Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28197703%2971%3A1%3C111%3AAMOSWA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R

K. Poole and H. Rosenthal, “A spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call analysis,” American Journal of Political Science, May, 1985, 357-384.

Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0092-5853%28198505%2929%3A2%3C357%3AASMFLR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9

Tuesday 1:15-2:45. Strategic Voting

R.D. McKelvey and R. Niemi. 1978. "A Multistage Game Representation of Sophisticated Voting for Binary Procedures." Journal of Economic Theory 18: 1-22.

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6WJ3-4CYG908-34-1&_cdi=6867&_user=38557&_orig=browse&_coverDate=06%2F30%2F1978&_sk=999819998&view=c&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkWA&md5=d5c58ce498ee316b5a3a6af12c6751be&ie=/sdarticle.pdf

McKelvey and Ordeshook 1972. “A General Theory of the Calculus of Voting,” In Mathematical Applications in the Social Sciences, eds. J. Herndon and J. Bernd, Vol 6. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, pp. 32-78.

Abramson, et al., “Preferences and Choices in First-Past-the-Post and Proportional Elections.” Unpublished.

Tuesday 3:00-4:00

Class workshop about student projects with Aldrich, Golder, Lupia, and Thies

Tuesday Evening (TBA) Optional Session

“Introduction to Formal Modeling.” A review of basic concepts and a discussion of game theory and causal inference.

Wednesday 9:00-10:00. Coalition Governance: The Beginning

D. Austen-Smith and J.S. Banks. 1988. “Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes.” American Political Science Review, 82(2): 405-422.

Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28198806%2982%3A2%3C405%3AECALO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

B. Grofman. 1985. “The Neglected Role of the Status Quo in Models of Issue Voting.” Journal of Politics 47 (1): 230-237.

Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3816%28198502%2947%3A1%3C230%3ATNROTS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4

Wednesday 10:15-11:30 Coalition Governance: The End

A. Lupia and K. Strom. 1995. ‘Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections.” American Political Science Review 89: 648-665.

Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28199509%2989%3A3%3C648%3ACTATST%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P

D. Diermeier and R. Stevenson. 2000. “Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events.” American Political Science Review 94: 627-640.

Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28200009%2994%3A3%3C627%3ACTACE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E

Recommended:

S.C. Gordon. 2002. “Stochastic Dependence in Competing Risks” American Journal of Political Science 46: 200-217.

Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0092-5853%28200201%2946%3A1%3C200%3ASDICR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2

Wednesday 1-3:15. Guest Lecturer: Sona Golder

Sona N. Golder. 2006. The Logic of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. Chapter 3.

Sona N. Golder. 2006. ‘Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies’. British Journal of Political Science 36 193-212.

http://find.galegroup.com/itx/retrieve.do?contentSet=IAC-Documents&resultListType=RESULT_LIST&qrySerId=Locale%28en%2CUS%2C%29%3AFQE%3D%28JN%2CNone%2C38%29%22British+Journal+of+Political+Science%22%3AAnd%3ALQE%3D%28DA%2CNone%2C8%2920060401%24&sgHitCountType=None&inPS=true&sort=DateDescend&searchType=PublicationSearchForm&tabID=T002&prodId=ITOF&searchId=R1&currentPosition=1&userGroupName=duke_perkins&docId=A144873489&docType=IAC

Recommended:

Royce Carroll and Gary W. Cox. 2007. ‘The Logic of Gamson’s Law: Pre-election Coalitions and Portfolio Allocations.’ American Journal of Political Science 51(2) 300-313.

http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=5&sid=ffd9462b-9342-4a29-902a-96061bfa9b43%40sessionmgr9

Indridi Indridason and André Blais. 2007. ‘Making Candidates Count: The Logic of Electoral Alliances in Two-Round Elections.’ Journal of Politics 69(1) 193-205.

http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=13&sid=eba98e83-841f-477f-a8c8-ab06216d9432%40SRCSM1

Thomas Gschwend and Marc Hooghe. 2007. ‘Should I Stay or Should I Go? An Experimental Study on Voter Responses to Pre-Electoral Coalitions’. European Journal of Political Research, forthcoming.

Wednesday 3:30-4:30

Class workshop on student projects

Thursday 9:00 -10:30 Group Presentations of Second Assignment

Thursday 10:45-12:00: Michael Thies

Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1991. The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, chapter 2, pp. 22-38.

Thies, Michael. 2001. “Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments.” American Journal of Political Science 45(3): 580-598.

Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0092-5853%28200107%2945%3A3%3C580%3AKTOPTL%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7

Thursday 1:15-3:15. Dynamics of Political Parties

Aldrich, John H. 1983. "A Spatial Model with Party Activists: Implications for Electoral Dynamics." Public Choice 41 (1):63‑100.

http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?index=0&did=608430161&SrchMode=3&sid=4&Fmt=10&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1180383077&clientId=15020&aid=1

Aldrich, John H., David W. Rohde, and Michael Tofias. “Examining Congress with a Two-Dimensional Political Space,” unpublished.

Ken Kollman; John H. Miller; Scott E. Page, “Adaptive Parties in Spatial Elections,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 4. (Dec., 1992), pp. 929-937.

Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0007-1234%28199801%2928%3A1%3C139%3APPAEL%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

Thursday 3:30-4:30

Class workshop on student projects with Aldrich, Golder, Lupia, and Thies

Friday 9-10:30 Institutions and Strategic Information Transmission

A. Lupia and M.D. McCubbins. 1998. The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 and 3.

Recommended:

Lupia. 1994. “Short Cuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections. American Political Science Review 88: 63-76.

Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28199403%2988%3A1%3C63%3ASVEIAV%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5

Friday 10:45-11:45. Modeling the Mind - I

E.S. Dickson, C. Hafer, and D. Landa. 2006. “Cognition and Strategy: A Deliberation Experiment.” Manuscript. New York University.

R. McKelvey and T. Palfrey, “An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game, Econometrica, Vol 60, No 4, July, 1992, 803-63.

Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199207%2960%3A4%3C803%3AAESOTC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J

Recommended:

C. Signorino, “Structure and Uncertainty in Discrete Choice Models,” Political Analysis, Vol. 11: 316-44, 2003.

http://pan.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/11/4/316

R. McKelvey and T. Palfrey, “Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 6-38, 1995.

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6WFW-45NJFPR-10-1&_cdi=6805&_user=38557&_orig=browse&_coverDate=07%2F31%2F1995&_sk=999899998&view=c&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkWW&md5=05717e337b0d270b09fdb9cfcdb20f77&ie=/sdarticle.pdf

Friday 1:15-2:00 Modeling the Mind-II

A. Lupia and N. Zharinova. 2006. “Can Counterfactual Variations Affect Strategic Behavior? Implications of Self-Confirming Equilibria for Political Science.” Manuscript, University of Michigan and Princeton University.

Recommended:

A. Lupia and J.O. Menning. 2006. “When Can Politicians Scare Citizens Into Supporting Bad Policies: Strategy and Emotion in an Equilibrium of Fear.” Manuscript, U Michigan.

A.G. Sanfey, J.K. Rilling, J.A. Aronson, L.E. Nystrom, and J.D. Cohen. 2003. “The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game.” Science 300: 1755-1958.

http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/300/5626/1755

Friday 2:15-3:30 Experiments on Information and Institutions II

A. Lupia and M.D. McCubbins. 1998. The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 6 and 7.