When Parties Meet Voters:
Partisan Networks and Distributive Expectations in Argentina and Chile

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ABSTRACT

How will the goods be delivered? From the viewpoint of voters, that is the critical question that distinguishes clientelistic from programmatic parties. In the former case, partisan networks screen *deserving* from *undeserving* voters and mediate access to goods. In the latter case, the group of beneficiaries is defined by policy and access is independent from partisan distribution networks. In this article we explore how the physical proximity to partisan networks and the ideological proximity to party platforms explain voters' redistributive expectations. We show how programmatic and clientelistic delivery mechanisms shape the voters' distributive views. To this end, we develop an original methodology to measure the size and structure of party networks. We test the proposed methodology using original survey data from Argentina and Chile.

How will the goods be delivered? From the viewpoint of voters, that is the critical question that distinguishes clientelistic from programmatic parties. In the former case, partisan networks screen *deserving* from *undeserving* voters and mediate access to goods. In the latter case, the group of beneficiaries is defined by policy and access is independent from partisan distribution networks. In this article we study how the type of access to goods shapes the distributive expectations of voters. In particular, we explore how the physical proximity to partisan networks and the ideological proximity to party platforms explain voters' redistributive expectations. To these ends, we provide new insights into the nature of party-voter linkages in new democracies and an original methodology to measure its organizational structure.

The widespread democratization of countries since the 1970s has generated a reassessment of the literature on party-voter linkages. In recent times, it has become apparent that the assumptions of organizational encapsulation[1] and programmatic party linkages that characterize the Western European sociological tradition do not adequately reflect the behavior of voters and the dynamics of party competition in most new democracies (Keefer and Vlaicu 2008; Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Magaloni et al. 2007). To provide a theoretical framework that explains the nature of representation in recently democratized countries, a broad literature has emerged contrasting the organizational nature of *programmatic* vs. *clientelistic* parties.[2] This framework, presumes that *programmatic party elites* are

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[1] As described by Lipset and Rokkan, cited by Wellhofer, organizational encapsulation is the strategy by which parties create secondary organizations to "claim allegiance of [the] voters in all social roles and therefore isolate them from disturbing cross-pressures." (Wellhofer 1981; Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

[2] Early in the 1960s and 1970s, a broad literature on clientelism emerged, focusing on the notion of reciprocity (Banfield and Wilson 1963; Schmidt 1977; Scott 1972). By contrast, recent research has a more instrumental view of clientelism as a hard-to-enforce contract between independent patrons and clients (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Dixit and Londregan 1996, 1998; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Schaffer 2007; Stokes 2007).

responsive to voters with whom they share ideological affinity and, consequently, will enact policies that redistribute *public goods* to benefit their constituencies. By contrast, *clientelistic party elites* should specialize in the delivery of *private goods* to a restricted menu of voters. Most of the emerging literature on redistribution, consequently, seeks to distinguish parties based on the type of *public* or *private* good delivered to voters.

However, distinguishing programmatic and clientelistic parties by the types of goods they deliver is problematic. As noted by Kitschelt (2000), it is difficult to classify the clientelistic or programmatic intent of public, club, or private goods. The access to unemployment insurance, for example, could be mediated by party brokers in one country and by bureaucratic agencies in another. Public sector posts could be filled by open searches under civil service rules or by the discretion of senior party figures. The same goods, consequently, may serve diverse political goals in different political environments. In sum, a focus on *types of goods* neglects the importance of party organization in defining access to resources and fails to assess whether the distributive expectations of voters are associated – or not - with specific delivery mechanisms.

In this article, we propose a new theory and a new methodology to understand and classify distributive linkages. First, rather than focusing on the type of goods delivered by party elites, we study whether partisan networks mediate benefit access. Rather than distinguishing public, club, or private goods, we borrow from the literature on network economics and classify distributive benefits as *local* when access depends on a voter's position within a political network, and as *global* when access is independent from the voter's proximity to partisan networks. For example, access to targeted cash transfer programs that provide a private excludable good can be allocated to voters that are proximate to a broker's network — making it a *local* benefit—or based on bureaucratically defined rules that identify a target population — turning it into a *global* benefit. Thus, distinguishing between *local* and *global* benefits provides a classification of programmatic or clientelistic parties that is based on how voters develop distributive expectations about the future delivery of goods.

In the proposed framework, understanding the nature of clientelistic or programmatic linkages requires one to measure partisan networks and to assess the importance that voters attach to the delivery of *local* and *global* benefits. To this end, we provide a novel methodology that estimates the size and structure of partisan networks. Our methodology allows us to measure the distance from individual voters to partisan networks and to estimate how expectations about the future distribution of benefits shape the voter's behavior. In this article, we concentrate on measuring how physical and ideological proximity to parties shapes the distributive expectations of voters.[3]

To measure the size and structure of networks, we take advantage of recent developments in social network analysis that use indirect survey questions of the form "how many X's do you know"[4] to estimate the size of hard-to-count populations and to uncover social structure in individual-level data (McCarty et al. 2000; McCarty et al. 2007; Gelman and Hill 2007; Zheng et al. 2006). This methodology provides a unique strategy for the study of clientelistic linkages, which often precludes honest responses to standard survey instruments.[5]

The remainder of the article has five sections. The following section introduces our theoretical framework to explain the expected effect of networks on voters' distributive expectations. The next section presents our research strategy. Section four applies this methodology to the study of network size and structure in Argentina and Chile. Section five tests the effect of proximity to party networks on

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[3] In a separate article we measure how local and global benefits shape vote choice.

[4] Where the relationship between the respondent *i* and all xЄX is reciprocal and, therefore, the respondent *i* is also known to all X's.

[5] As we will show, the survey strategy does not require the voter to reveal her/his own status as a client or to disclose any information that could be deemed prejudicial. The survey questions place respondents as "observers" rather than subjects, requesting counts of individuals they know across a range of social categories.

voters' distributive expectations. The last section offers some conclusions and proposes avenues for further research.

Political Networks and Party-Voter Linkages

Partisan networks serve multiple functions that benefit both party elites and voters. From the viewpoint of party elites, networks allow brokers to gather critical information about the voters' mood, needs, and wants. Networks allow elites to present a local party face to the dissemination of ideas, policies, and goods across electoral districts. Moreover, in the case of clientelistic parties, networks serve the critical purpose of screening *good* from *bad* clients as well as providing the organizational resources to monitor voters who are likely to default on their exchange agreements.

On the other hand, networks provide equally valuable services to voters. They offer a mechanism to communicate preferences, venues for participation, and access to information, benefits, and goods. More important, in the case of clientelistic parties, they provide a mechanism to reveal the voter's *type* and, consequently, to declare their eligibility to access goods. Forty years ago Rokkan (1968) first highlighted this—arguing that the implementation of secret voting was costly to clients, who were unable to show patrons their willingness to fulfill their part of the *quid pro quo* bargain.

In this article, our theory focuses on how voters evaluate the access to benefits delivered by brokers through partisan networks. We understand voters as individuals who care about receiving goods and understand that networks and party platforms provide two different venues to access these goods. Some voters view their proximity to party networks as a critical venue to access clientelistic goods. Other voters see benefits in voting for parties with whom they share ideological affinity. Finally, a third group of voters understand the benefits of being both physically closer to partisan networks and ideologically closer to their preferred party's policies. Consequently, both the expected benefits of perceiving *local* goods through networks and the expected benefits of perceiving *global* goods through policies shape the distributive expectations of voters. This *local* or *global* access to goods, we argue, is thereby crucial in defining the clientelistic or programmatic nature of party-voter linkages.

Whereas earlier research on mass-parties in advanced democracies highlighted networks as essential in explaining party linkages,[6] prior literature also hypothesized that parties eventually supersede networks as they expand beyond their local constituencies. Consequently, a working hypothesis of most previous research was that party networks would tend to decline and clientelistic attachments would fade (Panebianco 1988; Duverger 1954; Kirchheimer 1966).[7] Over time, the *responsible party* model should come to dominate the political process, with parties bundling issues positions into platforms and voting behavior explained by the dissemination of information through new media technology. Kitschelt and Wilkinson, for instance, declare: "Because programmatic party competition does not necessitate direct individual or indirect social-network-based monitoring of voters' electoral conduct, it is cheaper to construct organizational machines than in the clientelistic case. After all, programmatic parties need fewer personnel to manage exchange relations" (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007: 9).

However, since widespread democratization in the developing world has been accompanied by the rise of non-programmatic parties that rely heavily on the distribution of clientelistic resources to satisfy the demands of often ideologically uncommitted voters, the investment in political networks has become more relevant and its study more pressing. More recent literature, consequently, noticed the political value of networks that monitor voters (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2005), screen likely voters (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Dixit and Londregan 1996, 1998; Cox 2007), mobilize supporters, and coordinate electoral competition (Cox 2007). The increasing theoretical importance attached to partisan networks, however, has been accompanied by scant empirical work measuring their size, structure, and effect on voters.

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[6] Mostly through the encapsulation of social organizations embedded into party organizations.

[7] See Otto Kirchheimer (1966) on the transformations of mass-parties into catch-all parties as the role of party members and networks decline.

In this article, we address this gap by measuring how networks shape the preferences of voters. To accomplish this, we begin with a voter's utility function that has three main components that shape vote choice[8] and the redistributive expectations of voters:

$$U_{ik} = -\lambda_1(x_i - L_k)^2 + \lambda_2(c_i - N_k)^2 + BT_{ik} + \varepsilon_i \qquad (1)$$

The first components of our voter's utility function is the distance between the ideological preference of voters and the policy preferences expressed by each party, $\lambda_1(x_i - L_k)^2$. Borrowing from the literature on networks economics, we define λ_1 as the importance or weight that voter i attaches to the *global* benefit provided by party k. Notice that the ideological distance is independent from the membership of an individual to a partisan network. The second term of equation 1 describes the physical proximity of each voter in location c_i to different party networks N_k, $\lambda_2(c_i - N_k)^2$. In this second term, λ_2 describes the importance or weight that a voter attaches to his or her physical proximity to the different partisan networks.[9] Borrowing from the literature on network economics, we define this λ_2 as the *local* benefit that a voter expects from a party k. The third component, BT_{ik}, describes a vector of parameters B and a matrix of independent socio-economic variables T_{ik} that affect the overall distributive expectations of voters. In the empirical section of this article, we will describe this matrix of independent variables in further detail.

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[8] Equation 1 models the utility of voters using the notation of Adams, Merrill and Grofman (2005). This notation is important also to maintain consistency with spatial models of voting. In a separate article, we analyze the implications of our model for explaining vote choice. In this article, however, we narrowly focus on the distributive effect of networks.

[9] We use a proximity term for networks, rather than distance, to be consistent with the variables used in the empirical section. For this reason, the expected effect is positive instead of negative as is the case with the ideological distance term.

Equation 1 makes clear that voters perceive political parties as providers of *global* and *local* benefits.[10] This perception depends on the role of networks in the delivery of such goods. Voters are said to perceive *global* benefits from the actions of non-neighbors in a network — benefits do not depend on a voter's location within a political network — and *local* benefits from the actions of *neighbors* — benefits depend on voter proximity to specific members within each political network. This distinction between *global* and *local* benefits is based on access and is different from that between private and public goods. The same private goods can be delivered either as *global* benefits following some general criteria or as *local* benefits, which trickle down through personal connections between voters and members of parties embedded in the public sector.

The weight attached to the ideological distance and network proximity terms (λ_1, λ_2) can vary, given that groups of voters have different sensitivities to local and global benefits. For example, wealthy voters that derive significant income from rents will be very sensitive to progressive tax policies. However, this voter would derive very little benefit from accessing clientelistic goods from local brokers and would likely turn down a public sector job distributed through patronage. Consequently, such wealthy voters would attach much weight to λ_1 and very little to λ_2.

If the voters' perceived benefit depends on their proximity to local networks, the strategies of political parties should be affected by their organizational capacity to deliver different types of benefits and by the institutional constraints on their ability to utilize party networks for distribution. Therefore, subject to clearly differentiable budget constraints (which depend on their control of public resources), not all parties will be in the same position to provide voters with equivalent combinations of *global* and *local* benefits. Because political parties have budget constraints on the distribution of *local* benefits, the

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[10] Notice that there is a strong resemblance with the modeling strategy of Dixit and Londregan (1996, 1998), where they distinguish between tactical redistribution and ideology. This classification, however, still requires the identification of parties' intent and the type of good being distributed. Instead, here we are only concerned with how voters distinguish the *local* or *global* origin of the goods being delivered.

supply of clientelistic resources is independent from programmatic decisions to introduce *global* redistributive policies.[11].

When defining distributive expectations as we do in equation 1, we consider that voters' utility will weigh parties differently, subject to institutional and organizational constraints that shape the delivery of both *global* and *local* benefits. In defining these distributive expectations, each voter's compound utility function depends on the additive combination of *local* and *global* benefits by parties who control different levels of government and policy influence. Consequently, voters will have different distributive expectations based on individual endowments (e.g. skill, income) and different sensitivities to the delivery of *local* or *global* benefits depending on their proximity to different partisan networks.[12]

It is important to highlight, however, that the proximity to partisan networks is not just a function of the preferences of voters. In effect, a voter could be very distant from any broker to access clientelistic benefits even if she is willing to receive clientelistic goods from a clientelistic party. Different from ideology, the physical proximity to parties is a function of the size of an individual's personal network and a function of each party's organizational strength.

However, the sensitivity to the local or global benefit measures how proximity affects voters' distributive expectations. An upper class voter from the city of Santiago, Chile will not seek an average paying public sector job but may obtain significant benefits from a decline in income taxes, which is independent of his proximity to a party network. By contrast, a semi-skilled worker in Greater Buenos Aires, Argentina will perceive significant benefits from accessing a public sector job and almost no

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[11] Political parties who lack the organization capacity to deliver *local* goods will have to specialize in the distribution of *global* benefits, but those with dense networks can choose between the two distributive strategies. Additionally, the same party may have a geographically uneven distribution of organizational capacity, which results in different strategies across the same country.

[12] When voters rely on *local* benefits, their costs of defection are higher because membership to a political network requires considerable effort in order to be activated.

benefit from a decline in income taxes. Access to patronage jobs, however, depends critically on the individual's proximity to a political network for its delivery. Consequently, even two voters with similar redistributive preferences, can draw different local benefits from political networks.

In the next section we describe the methodological strategy we use to obtain proper estimates of network size and distance, which are important in determining the global and local benefits of clientelistic and programmatic parties. In particular, we will use this information to test for how the ideological and physical proximity to parties shapes the global and local distributive expectations of voters.

3. A Statistical Model to Measure Political Networks

In this section we describe a research strategy that seeks to identify three key sets of parameters that are critical for measuring the size and structure of partisan networks: (i) parameters measuring the relative size of the voter's personal network, (ii) parameters measuring the relative prevalence of different political groups in the population, and (iii) parameters measuring the relative proximity of voters to each of these political groups. To this end, we take advantage of a recent survey strategy first proposed by Christopher McCarthy that can be used to estimate populations that are sparsely represented in a random sample. The survey uses questions of the type "how many X do you know," to obtain counts of individuals belonging to different group categories. To analyze this data, we use an over-dispersed statistical model proposed by Zheng, Salganik and Gelman (2006) measuring the personal network of respondents and the prevalence of hard-to-count populations as a share of the respondent's personal network.[13]

a) Using Survey Data to Measure the Size of Political Networks: An intuitive description

To measure the size and structure of multiple political networks, we use a survey design that considers every respondent in the sample as an *observer* who discloses information on the relative

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[13] McCarthy et.al. (2001), Zheng et al (2006).

prevalence of different political groups in the population. The survey is designed with questions of the form "how many X do you know," asking each respondent to provide counts of groups whose frequencies in the population are known ("How many individuals do you know whose name is *Silvia*?") and counts of groups whose frequencies in the population we seek to estimate ("How many activists from the Socialist Party do you know?"). In this survey design, we use the information about the known groups as *offsets*, to rescale the parameters that measure the size of the respondents' personal networks. For example, if a respondent knows two *Silvias*, given that the relative prevalence of the name *Silvia* in the population in Argentina is 0.86 per cent, a naïve estimate of the respondent's personal network would be of approximately ≈232 individuals ($N_p = \frac{2}{.0086}$). Using a battery of questions about populations whose frequencies we know, and a slightly more sophisticated statistical model, we estimate the size of each respondent's personal network.

Once we estimate the size of the respondents' personal networks, a different set of questions asks about populations whose frequencies we are interested in retrieving, such as the number of activists, candidates, or volunteers from each relevant political party. We can use this information both to estimate the prevalence of each group in the population and to estimate how closely connected voters are to these groups. For example, if the same respondent who knows two *Silvias* also knows one UCR (Radical Civic Union) activist, we could measure the relative prevalence of UCR activists as a fraction of the respondent's personal network ($Activist_{UCR} = \frac{1}{Personal\ Network}$). Given that we previously estimated the respondent's personal network to be ≈232, we could then estimate the number of UCR activists to be ≈0.43 percent of the Argentine population ($Activist_{UCR} = \frac{1}{232}$), approximately 166,000 activists. The advantage of this survey strategy is the ability to retrieve valid samples from populations that are poorly represented among adult voters. For example, if the percent of UCR activists among adult voters in Argentina is not very different from 0.43 per cent, in a survey of 2800 adult voters we should expect to collect a small and unrepresentative sample of ≈12 UCR activists. By contrast, the proposed methodology retrieves valid samples with voters reporting the number of individuals in each party category. As the

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number of questions and respondents increases, we can estimate more precisely both the size of the respondent's personal network and the prevalence of each group in the population.

b) *The Statistical Strategy: An Over-Dispersed Poisson Model*

Once we collect data reporting counts for each subgroup, we need a statistical model that will estimate all the parameters of interest. Zheng, Salganik and Gelman propose an overdispersed Poisson model that not only estimates the size of the personal network but also allows us to explore social structure in the data. The model estimates the three sets of parameters that are key to the utility function described in the previous section: the relative size of each respondent's personal network, $\propto_i$, the relative prevalence of each group k in the population, β_k, and a parameter that explores individual-level deviations from the personal network and group prevalence. The over-dispersed Poisson model uses the count of individuals known to each respondent as the dependent variable and estimates three sets of latent parameters:

$$y_{ik} \sim Poisson(e^{\propto_i + \beta_k + \delta_{ik}}) \tag{2}$$

where $\propto_i$ describes the size of the personal network of respondent i, β_k describes the expected prevalence of group k in the population, and the overdispersion parameter δ_{ik} estimates a multiplicative factor with individual and group-level deviations from the personal network $\propto_i$ and group prevalence β_k (Gelman and Hill 2007).

To retrieve the proper quantities of interest, however, we need to run two different specifications of the model. While the substantive results from both models are identical, different *offsets* rescale the parameters of interest to theoretically meaningful sets of values. In the first model, we estimate the size of personal networks using as offset the log of the frequencies of the known populations, $O_k \equiv \{o_1, \dots, o_k\}$. Each of the different elements of O_k describes group frequencies that we know e.g. $o_1 = number\ of\ Silvias\ in\ t\ e\ population.$

$$y_{ik} \sim Poisson(O_k\ e^{\propto_i + \beta_k + \delta_{ik}})\ , \text{where } O_k \equiv \{o_1, \dots, o_k\} \tag{3}$$

The posterior median of each individual respondent's parameter provides a vector, $A_i \equiv \{\widehat{\alpha}_1, \dots, \widehat{\alpha}_i\}$, describing the log of the total number of people in each respondent's personal network e.g. if $\widehat{\alpha}_1 = 4.97$, the number of individuals in the personal network of respondent 1 is $N_p = \exp(4.97) = 145$. The vector of personal network parameters $\widehat{\alpha}_1$ is then used as offset for the second model estimated using equation (4):[14]

$$y_{ik} \sim Poisson(A_i \, e^{\alpha_i + \beta_k + \delta_{ik}}) \text{ , where } A_i \equiv \{\widehat{\alpha}_i, \dots, \widehat{\alpha}_i\} \tag{4}$$

Hence, to estimate the prevalence of different political groups in the population, we first estimate a model that measures the size of the respondents' personal networks, $A_i \equiv \{\widehat{\alpha}_1, \dots, \widehat{\alpha}_i\}$. Then, in a second stage, we use these first estimates to rescale the group parameters to meaningful quantities.

The use of an over-dispersed Poisson model is appropriate because the expected mean and variance of the group categories differs. More importantly, the vector of over-dispersed parameters, $H \equiv \{\delta'_{11}, \dots, \delta'_{ik}\}$, provides *critical information about individual-level deviations from the overall group prevalence*. Each parameter δ'_{ik} provides information about the degree to which a respondent knows more individuals than expected from a *k-group* category, given her personal network size and group prevalence. Therefore, we can study the social structure of networks—how different political categories relate to each other— by comparing the over-dispersion parameters for different groups.[15]

To assess the social structure of networks—how different social and political categories relate to each other—we analyze the matrix of over-dispersed parameters in equation (4), $H \equiv \{\delta'_{11}, \dots, \delta'_{ik}\}$.[16]

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[14] The posterior of the and parameters obtained from equation (1.2) can be used for descriptive purposes but at this stage they are not of any substantive theoretical interest.

[15] We estimate both of these models using lme4 in R 2.6 and WinBugs 1.4.3. Both the frequentist and Bayesian models provide similar estimates.

[16] Gelman and Hill measure the absolute difference between the predicted and observed counts, because their specification does not estimate an overdispersion parameter by individual and group. Our estimation strategy provides the full matrix of overdispersed parameters. As a result, we can estimate the inter-group

Each parameter, δ'_{ik}, provides information about the degree to which a respondent knows more individuals from a particular group k than what would be expected given her personal network size and the overall group prevalence in the population. For example, we can compare the deviation in the number of Peronist (PJ) activists known by respondent 1 and respondent 2 e.g. $\delta'_{R1,PJ(activists)}$. Using these parameters, for example, we can compare whether individuals who know more PJ activists also know, on average, more PJ candidates, i.e. $correlation(\delta'_{i,PJ(candidates)}, \delta'_{i,PJ(activists)})$. More importantly, we can generalize the analysis of these inter-group correlations to include all group categories. Analyzing the inter-group correlation between all categories, we can then explore the structure of political networks.

4. Ideology and Partisan Networks in Chile and Argentina

Thus far, we have introduced the concepts of *local* and *global* benefits and a theoretical framework to explain the distributive importance of partisan networks. We also described a methodology to obtain proper measures of partisan networks and their structure. In this section we describe empirical tests of the proposed model, relying on very large surveys—carried in 2007—in Chile and Argentina drawn from a combined total of 5600 respondents.

We selected Chile and Argentina because these countries have party systems that have been characterized as predominantly programmatic and clientelistic, respectively, thereby affording us the opportunity to test the impact of these party linkages on the voters' distributive expectations. In this section, before testing the distributive implications of our model, we provide survey estimates of ideological attachment and partisan networks in each country.

Chile and Argentina are ideal countries to analyze how local and global benefits shape the distributive expectations of voters. The extant literature shows that in Chile parties are structured around distinctive political platforms with low levels of clientelism. By contrast, Argentine parties have been

correlation directly. Both strategies yield substantively similar inter-group correlations, clusters, and dendograms.

generally described as programmatically weak and heavily dependent on the distribution of clientelistic resources (Jones, 2005; Carey, 2002). Argentina and Chile also allow us to control for the effect of variables that have been theorized to affect voter-party linkages. Both countries have democratized recently–1983 and 1990, respectively—and have well-established mass-parties with clearly identifiable party labels.[17] Both countries have a Presidential executive, multiparty environment, and similar levels of economic development, ethnic, religious and cultural legacies, and have experienced market friendly policies in the 1990s.[18]

In order to measure the size of political networks in Argentina and Chile we conducted two nationally representative surveys with 2800 cases each, including in the sample cities with populations over 10,000 in Argentina and 40,000 in Chile. The survey was structured with three modules including questions designed to measure the (i) size of political networks, (ii) political behavior of voters, and (iii) socio-demographic status of respondents, in order to assess conditions that may affect distributive expectations, political behavior and associability.

The first module was subdivided into two parts. The first part asked respondents about populations with known frequencies (i.e. names, professions, life events) that satisfy two criteria: they

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[17] In his analysis of Latin America's party systems, Jones (2007) gives Argentina and Chile similar scores of party institutionalization —62 and 65 respectively— and similar levels of *party roots* in society—46 and 49 respectively on a 0-100 scale.

[18] The literature does not agree, however, on the impact of market-friendly policies on linkages. According to Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), the retrenchment of the state reduces resources used for clientelistic linkages. By contrast, Roberts argues that by reducing universal provision of welfare and introducing targeted social policies in a context of electoral competition, market-oriented reforms furthered clientelism in Latin America (Roberts 1995).

have to be easily and unambiguously identified by voters,[19] and they must have prevalence ranges between 0.1% and 2% in the overall population. Both McCarthy et al. and Zheng et al. note that respondents tend to under-recall categories that are very common in the population and over-recall group categories that are very uncommon (Gelman and Hill 2007; McCarty et al. 2000; McCarty et al. 2007). We used approximately fifteen questions to measure the size of the personal network described by equation (3).[20] The second part of the first module asked for counts of populations whose frequencies we were interested in retrieving, such as the number of political activists from the most important parties, campaign volunteers, candidates, number of individuals receiving handouts from each party, etc.

Ideology and Party-Voter Linkages

As indicated, prior literature suggests that parties in Chile have platforms that are clearly distinguished by voters. By contrast, most scholars consider Argentina's main parties to be poorly defined ideologically. Although the ideologically divided Chilean party system predates the 1990 democratic

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[19] For instance, we had to discard all names in Spanish that are usually combined with Maria (for women) or Jose (for men), such as Maria Laura or Jose Raul, because such individuals could be commonly known by their first or their second name.

[20] The reference categories were not exactly the same in both countries. In Argentina, the names were Silvia, Patricia, Antonio, Francisco, and Angel. The other categories were the number of individuals the respondent knows who work for the *police, as a teacher, medical doctors, receive work programs, had a son within the last year, married within the last year, or have a physical disability*. In Chile, the names were Gladys, Veronica, Marta, Sergio, Jaime, Ricardo, Eduardo, and we ask for individuals who work as a *professor, military, medical doctors, maid, receive Chile Solidario, had a son within the last year, died within the last year, married within the last year, or took their college entrance examination.*

transition, there are two well-defined ideological coalitions that have dominated elections since 1988.[21] The center-left coalition, *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* (Coalition of Parties for Democracy), which has won all four presidential elections since 1990, includes three main parties: the Socialist Party (PS), the Christian Democratic Party (DC), and the Party for Democracy (PPD)—which split from the Socialist Party in 1987. The center-right coalition, *Alianza por Chile* (Alliance for Chile), includes two parties: the National Renovation (RN), heir to the old conservative party, and the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) created in 1987 by close associates of Pinochet's military regime (Huneeus 2007). Although RN and UDI ran separate campaigns in the 2006 election, they presented a joint presidential candidate in all prior elections and coordinated their legislative races.

These two well-defined ideological coalitions gained stability under binomial electoral rules that required both the *left* and the *right* to coordinate the presentation of their district candidacies.[22] The post-transition Chilean party system also displays remarkable ideological stability and low electoral volatility. In the five legislative elections since 1990, the two coalitions gathered between 86 percent and 92 percent of the vote. Similarly, in all four presidential elections, the combined share of votes for these coalitions ranged from 82 percent to 95 percent.

Our survey results show that Chilean voters could readily identify the ideological location of parties in a dominant left-right dimension. As shown in Figure 1, a majority of Chileans identifies the PS

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[21] In 1988, a competitive plebiscite that sought to extend the military rule Pinochet for another term was defeated. This defeat set the stage for competitive elections in 1990.

[22] Chile's two-member electoral districts is among the few counter-majoritarian electoral systems, giving the first seat to the plurality winner and the second seat to the runner-up unless the most-voted list doubles the votes collected by the runner-up. The losing coalition, therefore, is likely to obtain more seats than votes unless there is a landslide in favor of the winner. Moreover, a secure seat for each coalition reinforces polarization, given that under open list rules, the most-voted candidate of each coalition will be selected (Magar et al. 1998; Scully et al. 1993; Navia 2004; Torcal and Mainwaring 2003).

to the left of the political spectrum, with 70 percent of respondents placing the party as outright left (40.3 percent) or center-left (30 percent). Seventy-six percent of respondents identify the DC in the center and locate the PPD as center-left, between the PS and the DC. Respondents also clearly identify the RN and UDI by their ideological placement to the right of the political spectrum. Therefore, in Chile, ideology is a useful cue for voters in defining their distributive expectations.

<<Insert Figure 1>>

In contrast, the two main Argentine political parties are not well-defined ideologically. The Radical Civic Union (UCR), born in the 1890s, and the *Partido Justicialista* (PJ) created by Juan Peron in the 1940s are both catch-all parties with poorly defined ideological niches — even though the latter has more extensive labor-based roots (Calvo and Murillo 2004; Brusco et al. 2004; Levitsky 2003; Cavarozzi 2002). The ideological mode of the PJ at the center of the scale only includes 21 percent of respondents, increasing to 47 percent if we combine the categories of center, center-left, and center-right. Similarly, the UCR mode includes only 18.4 percent of respondents, increasing to 45 percent if we include the categories of center, center-left, and center-right. The survey also reported a high number of non-responses to the ideology questions, with 36 percent of non-responses for the PJ and 40 percent for the UCR.

As in Chile, the Argentine electoral system was a legacy of a military regime that established proportional representation to counteract the electoral dominance of the Peronists since 1946.[23] From 1983 to 1995, the Argentine party system had a relatively low effective number of political parties; until the 1999 presidential election, the joint vote of the two main parties ranged from 88.5 percent in 1983 to 67.6 percent in 1995 (Jones 1997; Cabrera 2001). However, the fall of a UCR-led coalition government in

[23] The system was originally established after a military coup ousted Perón and prohibited the Peronists from running for office. It was first used for the 1960 presidential election, which restricted Peronist candidates and was resuscitated at the time of democratic transition by the two military regimes that followed.

2001 led to a substantive growth in electoral volatility while re-establishing the historical dominance of the Peronists (Calvo and Escolar 2005). As the UCR struggled to produce credible presidential candidates, new parties emerged in an attempt to attract the non-Peronist vote. The UCR, however, remains the most significant alternative to the PJ at the provincial-level, controlling four governorships, eight senators, and more than 30 representatives in addition to a significant contingent of UCR freelancers who supported the new Peronist president on pragmatic grounds. Two of the new parties resulting from the 2001 crisis were the Alliance for a Republic of Equality (ARI) and Republican Proposal (PRO), with better defined ideological profiles and clear programmatic goals catered to voters on the center-left and center-right, respectively (see figure 1). However, their electoral support is limited to metropolitan areas. In sum, ideological cues are more useful for predicting access to resources for Chilean rather than Argentine voters.

Party Systems and Party Organization: Network Size and Structure

As already indicated, the surveys conducted in Chile and Argentina provide us with count data to estimate the size and structure of networks. Using equations (3) and (4), we estimate parameters describing the size of each respondent's personal network, $A_i \equiv \{\hat{\alpha}_1, \dots, \hat{\alpha}_i\}$, the vector of group parameters, $B \equiv \{\beta'_1, \dots, \beta'_k\}$, and the matrix of over-dispersion parameters, $H \equiv \{\delta'_{11}, \dots, \delta'_{ik}\}$. In this section, however, we single-mindedly focus on the size and structure of partisan networks in each country.[24]

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[24] The estimates describing the size of the respondents' personal networks are not included due to space limitations, but can be requested from the authors. The median personal network of our respondents has 146 individuals in Chile and 149 in Argentina. The mean number of individuals, on the other hand, is slightly larger in Chile (204) than in Argentina (195), reflecting a higher dispersion in the network size of Chilean respondents. The estimated size of the respondents' personal networks in our survey is very close to the average size found by prior studies in developed countries (Stiller and Dunbar 2007).

Interesting inferences can be gathered from the group parameter estimates. In both countries, party activists (*militantes*) are the most encompassing party category. As described in Table 1, networks of political activists are larger than that of volunteers or candidates for all parties in both countries. In Argentina, the proportion of political activists from all measured parties adds up to 1.4% of the population whereas in Chile it is 1.2%.[25] Our findings, thus, suggest that the total size of political networks is not so different across the two countries.

<<Insert Table 1>>

However, there are interesting differences in the relative size of party networks within each country, arguably the result of varying patterns of electoral competition. All Chilean political parties have relatively similar contingents of activists. The Socialist Party has the largest political network with a prevalence of 0.356 percent of activists, closely followed by the Christian Democrats (0.299 percent), the PPD (0.2 percent), the UDI (0.2 percent), and the smaller RN (0.147 percent). By contrast, in Argentina, the political network of the PJ is much larger than their competitors' networks. The prevalence of Peronist activists in the population is 0.766 percent; almost double that of the UCR (0.42 percent)—and both the PJ and UCR networks are significantly larger than that of the Chilean Socialist Party. The young PRO (0.029%) and ARI (0.056%) are 10 to 20 times smaller than the Peronists and 5 to 10 times smaller than the UCR. Differences in size reflect the Peronists' post-2001 electoral dominance, the fragility of new entrants in Argentina's political system, as well as the impact of historical legacies in the development of PJ and UCR networks. Moreover, their limited activist base affects the parties' capacity to deliver *local* benefits.

The most interesting findings in the data, however, result from analyzing the matrix of over-dispersion parameters, $H \equiv \{\delta'_{11}, \dots, \delta'_{ik}\}$. To provide a more comprehensive understanding of the

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[25] For Argentina, all references to PPP in tables and figure correspond to the main provincial party in the province of the respondent. However, as we group all these parties together despite wide differences among them, we do not draw inferences from these findings.

parameter results, we use a clustering technique measuring the level of association among all categories, and present the results using *dendograms*.

Clustering is a strategy to minimize the differences among group categories by finding structure in the data through the comparison of inter-group correlations of the over-dispersed parameters.[26] The *dendograms* summarize information about clusters, pairing together the most similar categories and describing stronger association in the lower levels of the graph. We include an agglomerative coefficient summarizing the level of association of all the data, with zero indicating the absence of structure and a maximum of one when groups are perfectly clustered.

The description of the estimated parameters maps as expected to differences in patterns of electoral competition in both countries. Chilean political networks are horizontally integrated across parties reflecting inter-party coordination within each electoral coalition. As shown by the *dendogram* in figure 2, political networks in Chile are clustered by political categories and coalition, with respondents who know more activists from the PS also knowing more activists from the DC, and PPD; while respondents who know more activists from UDI also know more volunteers from RN and vice-versa. Respondents who know more activists for a given party in each coalition, however, are less likely to know candidates from the same party than they are to know activists from other parties in the coalition.

We also find some initial evidence of *global* access to state-provided private goods. The networks of individuals receiving handouts from political parties are not proximate to any of the coalitions' clusters. Instead, handouts networks are associated to municipal and regional employees' networks, the network of recipients of the workfare program Chile Solidario (CS), and social clubs (which have been previously linked to the distribution of clientelistic goods in Chile). This pattern suggests both

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[26] We run the clustering algorithm using "a*gnes*" in R 2.5, library(cluster). Dendograms provide information about the inter-group correlations hierarchically organized by the clustering algorithm (Struyf et al. 1997).

socioeconomic targeting of handout distribution in Chile across all political parties and weak use of networks to distribute goods.

<<Insert Figure 2>>

By contrast, in Argentina, where intra-party coordination is crucial for electoral success, political networks are vertically integrated across categories of political participation and within parties. For instance, individuals who know more Peronist activists are also more likely to know Peronist volunteers, Peronist candidates, and individuals invited to Peronist party activities, as shown in Figure 3. The same holds true for the UCR, the ARI, and PRO. The vertical organization of partisan networks is also observed in the distribution of private goods, suggesting that networks are important mechanisms to access resources. As in Chile, the network of those receiving handouts from political parties all cluster together suggesting socioeconomic targeting. However, the networks of those receiving the *Jefes y Jefas* employment benefits (Plan JyJ) and of those with public employment are more associated to the cluster of PJ networks than they are with those receiving handouts.

<<Insert Figure 3>>

The preliminary analysis of survey data supports the characterization of the party systems as more programmatic in Chile, were voters identify the ideological location of parties, and more clientelistic in Argentina, where ideology fails to provide clear policy cues to voters. Network structure is also different. In Chile, the networks are horizontally integrated across parties within the same category of political participation whereas in Argentina networks are vertically integrated within the each party. The contrast between the networks of the two cash-transfer programs, Chile Solidario (CS) and Jefes y Jefas (JyJ), provides preliminary support for differences in the access to social benefits, which will be further explored in the next section.

5. Political Networks and Distributive Expectations

In this section we conclude with a more general test of the utility function described in equation (1) in the second section. That is, we test whether the ideological affinity to parties and the physical

proximity to partisan networks affect the voter's expectation of receiving *local* and *global* benefits. The differences between the Argentine and Chilean party system have implications for our argument. On the one hand, weak ideological identification for the two major parties in Argentina makes it harder for voters to use ideology as a redistributive cue. By contrast, the larger PJ and UCR networks provide information to voters about the access to *local* benefits. By contrast, voters in Chile clearly identify the policy goals of different parties and coalitions, in a context were partisan networks are smaller and detached from potential beneficiaries. Such differences should increase the weight that Chilean voters attach to *global* distributive benefits.

To test for the effect of political networks on voters' distributive expectations we take advantage of three survey questions asking voters about the likelihood of receiving handouts (clothing, food, other material benefits), being offered a job in the public sector (*patronage*), or witnessing increased public investment in her/his community if a given party wins the election (*pork*). The first question asked respondents to indicate on a ten-point scale, "how likely it would be that, after winning the election, [*Party j*] would provide s/he with food, clothing, money, or other material benefits." A similarly worded question asked "how likely it would be that, after winning the election, [*Party j*] would provide s/he with a job in the public sector" (patronage). Finally, the third question asked how likely it would be that, after winning the election, [*Party j*] would invest in the public works required by the community" (pork). Using the responses to these questions as dependent variables, we run ordered probit regressions for each party and estimate whether the ideological proximity to parties and the physical proximity to political networks explain the perceived propensity to receive goods, jobs, or public works.[27]

Institutional constraints are also important in defining voters' expectations. Chilean parties are more tightly regulated and face additional difficulties in distributing publicly funded goods. These

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[27] For simplicity, we run ordered probit models assuming independent error structures across parties (and models). A GLM model with correlated errors produces very similar results so we opted for a simpler specification.

difficulties are readily observed in our data by the lack of association between party networks and the social program *Chile Solidario,* in contrast with its Argentine counterpart *Jefes y Jefas*. We expect that patterns of access to these social programs should reinforce voters' distributive expectations. Similarly, civil service rules in Chile should make voters perceive that public sector jobs are excludable goods whose access is not mediated by networks. By contrast, public sector jobs in Argentina are heavily politicized and depend on political contacts, thereby shaping voters' perceptions that the likelihood of obtaining a public sector job increases with their proximity to partisan networks.

Expectations about public works are harder to classify since "pork" is non-excludable for most members of the community but only benefits a particular locality. Furthermore, the question asks about "required" public works, which casts a positive bias on the nature of those expenditures to include investment in schools and hospitals that in both countries are considered universal welfare benefits. This combination makes us expect that voters will have a harder time distinguishing type of access and, consequently, the *local* and *global* benefits of public works.

To test for the *global* and *local* benefits perceived by voters, we use two main independent variables: (i) the proximity of voters to each party's network, and (ii) the ideological proximity between voters and parties.:

(i)   The proximity to the network of political activist is measured by each respondent's overdispersion parameter for group *k* in *Party j*: $NetAct = \{\delta'_{i,PJ-activists}, \dots, \delta'_{i,UCR-activists}\}$. Because the overdispersion parameter is measured in log "units" of activists, a value of exp(.69)=2, for example, indicates that the respondent knows twice as many activist as those expected given the group prevalence and his/her personal network size. The relationship between proximity to the network and the propensity to receive private, club, or public goods is expected to be positive and

significant for *local* benefits;[28] As an alternative measure we also use the proximity of

voters to the network of candidates is measured by each respondent *i* overdispersion

parameter for group *k* in *Party j*: NC=$\{\delta'_{i,PJ-candidates}, ..., \delta'_{i,UCR-candidates}\}$.

(ii)   The ideological distance to parties is measured by taking the absolute distance between

the self reported ideological location of each respondent and their reported location of

each party: $Ideology(d) = |x_i - s_j|$. Ideological distance is expected to be negatively

related to the propensity of respondent *i* to receive benefits from Party *j* (e.g. the further

away from *Party j*, the less likely one expects to receive benefits from that party). A

statistically significant effect describes the *global* benefit expected by voters.

Voters also have different perceptions about the adequacy of parties distributing private, club, and

public goods in general. Therefore, as a control we include a variable that ask respondents to express their

positive or negative perception of the distribution of handouts, public sector jobs, and pork by parties.[29]

Other control variables in the model include the size of the respondent's personal network *(ln)*; the

respondent's proximity to the network of beneficiaries of the *Jefes* or *Chile Solidario* work programs, and

proximity to the network of individuals involved in party primaries. We expect that proximity to

primaries will have a positive effect on the delivery of *local* benefits, as they have been associated with

clientelism given the ease of monitoring primary participation (the vote is compulsory in general

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[28] We control for personal network size although the measures of proximity to party networks are relative

to each individuals network size and the prevalence rate of that category in the population.

[29] In each model the independent the variable measuring the positive or negative perception about parties'

redistributive intent matches the type of good described by the dependent variable. There is considerable

variation on this variable—especially regarding public works. For instance, 43% of Chileans consider the

provision of public works by political parties "totally inappropriate" or "not very appropriate," whereas

only 18.5% of Argentines hold that view.

elections) and have the same expectations about the social programs—especially *Jefes y Jefas* as discussed above (Szwarcberg 2008; Kemahlioglu 2006; Weitz-Shapiro 2006).

We also control for the education and socio-economic status of the respondent, age *(ln)*, and gender. We use education and income to assess the skills of respondents, which should affect the marginal value of the benefits they perceive. Lower education and income is expected to increase the marginal utility of the benefits perceived by voters. The effect of education on the utility of a public sector job is increasing at low levels of education and decreasing at high levels of education. We have no clear expectations about the effect of education on the expected benefits from higher investment in public works. Finally, we hold no particular theoretical expectations about the respondent's age, gender or gregariousness.

Empirical Results

Our results provide ample support for the importance that voters attach to *local benefits* in Argentina — given more clientelistic linkages and the broader networks of the PJ and UCR — and the importance of *global benefits* in shaping the distributive expectations of Chilean voters — under more programmatic party-voter linkages. Proximity to party networks, therefore, is a stronger predictor of voters' distributive expectations in Argentina, whereas Chilean voters give more importance to ideology in perceived access to benefits.

The estimates are presented in Tables 2 and 3, with a dependent variable measuring expectations for the distribution of handouts, public jobs, and public works in Chile and Argentina respectively. As the estimates demonstrate, only ideological distance is statistically significant (and in the expected negative direction) in explaining the voter's expectation of being offered handouts by parties from the *Concertación* in Chile—even though these are private goods whose distribution remains institutionally unregulated. The greater the ideological distance to the voter, the less likely s/he expects to receive

targeted benefits. The effect of ideological distance is similar for all parties in the Concertación, leading to an approximately 3% decline in the likelihood of receiving handouts for a unit change in ideology.[30]

In Argentina, on the other hand, ideology has no statistically significant effect on the expectation of receiving handouts from the PJ or the UCR, but proximity to the network of activists has both a significant and positive effect. For example, while a voter that is very close to the PJ network of activists (i.e. knows two or more than the prevalence rate in the population) considers that there is a 42 percent of chance of being offered handouts, a voter that is relatively far from the network (i.e. two below the prevalence rate) perceives only a 30 percent chance of being offered a handout. The effect is even more pronounced for UCR voters, a party with a tighter core constituency after the 2001 crisis. Neither ideology nor proximity to partisan networks explains the distributive expectations of ARI voters, while both ideology and proximity to the party network are significant and in the expected directions for the PRO.

The control variables have the expected effects. In particular, a more positive view of the distribution of handouts, jobs, and public works, is associated with higher expectations to receive these goods. Both the proximity to the network of the *Plan Jefes y Jefas* and to party primaries increases the perceived likelihood of being offered handouts by the PJ. For instance, a voter that is simultaneously *close* to the network of PJ activist (knows two more than the prevalence rate), to the network of the *Jefes*, and to the network of the PJ primaries will be 63 percent more likely to expect an offer of handouts by the PJ. In contrast, a voter that is far removed from all three networks only reports a 23 percent likelihood of being offered handouts. By contrast, neither the proximity to beneficiaries of *Chile Solidario* nor to

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[30] For presentation purposes we report changes in probabilities using *1-Pr(first outcome)*, which we interpret as at least some likelihood of perceiving handouts, jobs, or public works. Given that there are 10 categories, we prefer to use examples with the null expectation outcome, that is a 0 value instead of 1 or more. Our predicted marginal effects, therefore, are very conservative. More dramatic marginal effects could be retrieved using the full 10 point scale.

individuals participating in party primaries increase the perceived likelihood of receiving handouts among

Chilean voters. Consistent with prior research, Chilean voters expect that likely benefits do not depend on

their physical proximity to networks but rather on the overall redistributive intent of parties with whom

they share an ideological affinity (*global* benefits).

Finally, in Argentina more educated voters have a lower expectation, although not statistically

significant, of receiving PJ handouts. However, socioeconomic status is both negative and statistically

significant on expected benefits among voters of all parties.

<center>**<<Insert Table 2>>**</center>

<center>**<<Insert Table 3>>**</center>

Distributive expectations regarding public sector jobs show similar patterns to those of handouts.

The perceived likelihood of being offered a job in the public sector decreases with ideological distance for

all five Chilean parties and increases with education for the PPD, UDI and RN—the effect is positive but

not significant for the DC and PS.[31] As with handouts, in Argentina the perceived likelihood of getting a

public job increases with the proximity to networks (not just of activists, but also of candidates) for the PJ

and UCR, thereby suggesting that jobs are more likely than handouts to go to core supporters. In

Argentina, a voter that is very close to the PJ network of activists—knows two more than the prevalence

rate in the population—perceives a 45 percent chance of being offered a job in the public sector if the

Peronists win the election. A voter that is very distant from the PJ network of activists, by contrast, will

report only a 30 percent chance of being offered public employment if the Peronists win. Again the effect

is more pronounced for the UCR, reflecting the more compact nature of their political networks after the

2001-02 crisis. However, neither proximity to *Jefes* nor to Peronist primaries is statistically significant for

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[31] This finding coincides with the argument of Alfredo Rehren (2000), who noted that contemporary

reforms to the public sector recruitment for under the Concertacion followed a prior partisan rule already

experience under the administrations of Eduardo Frei Montalva and Jorge Alessandri, which combines

skills with partisan loyalty.

<center>27</center>

explaining patronage in Argentina. Education has a significant negative effect on the expectations of getting a public job for the PJ and so does population density for both the PJ and the UCR, in line with the literature that shows the dependence of the population of less urbanized provinces on public employment in Argentina (Gibson and Calvo 2000).

Finally, we analyze expectations about the delivery of public works if a party wins the respondent's district. Interestingly enough, in both countries voters perceive these as both *global* and *local* benefits. In Chile, whereas the effect of ideological distance continues having a significant effect, we also find that proximity to party network has a significant effect for the PS, PPD and UDI. Moreover, proximity to the network of party primaries matters for the three parties in the government coalition (the opposition coalition did not have primaries before the last presidential election). Whereas education has a positive effect for all parties except the PS, socioeconomic status only has a positive effect for the two right-wing parties (UDI and RN). In Argentina, ideological distance has a significant effect on the expectations about public works for all parties but so does proximity to party networks. Proximity to networks of participation in party primaries has a positive effect for the PJ and education has a positive effect for all parties except the PJ. Similarly, socioeconomic status has a negative effect on the PJ, but it is not statistically significant.

In sum, Chilean voters consistently use ideological cues when forming expectations about future redistribution while their Argentine counterparts rely more heavily on their proximity to partisan networks for all three types of goods: handouts, jobs, and public work. These results suggest that *local* benefits are more influential in defining the distributive expectations of Argentine voters than of Chilean voters. Indeed, the latter are probably more likely to rely on *global* benefits when defining their distributive expectations based on the role of ideology in cueing their answers. Although these patterns confirm our predictions regarding the different types of party-voter linkages (either programmatic or clientelistic), the distinction turns weaker regarding public works, which are the least excludable of all three goods analyzed, and seem to combine *local* and *global* access in the expectation of voters in both countries.

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V. Conclusion

We began this article by presenting a simple question that, from the viewpoint of voters, clearly distinguishes clientelistic from programmatic parties: How will the goods be delivered? We then outlined our goals in providing a theory that distinguishes benefits perceived through neighbors in a network – *local benefits*- from benefits that do not depend on the voter's membership in a partisan network –*global benefits—*. We then provide a methodology to measure the size and structure of partisan networks, as well as to measure how much voters care about the access to *local* and *global benefits*. That is, we explain how physical proximity to partisan networks and ideological proximity to party platforms explain the redistributive expectations of voters.

Comparing Chile and Argentina, we find variation in voters' ability to identify the ideological location of parties and differences in the expected local and global benefits delivered by parties. Poor ideological identification by voters, we argue, reduces the value of ideology as a distributive cue in Argentina and thus the importance of programmatic linkages. Whereas all five Chilean parties provide voters with clear ideological cues about their future policy intent, the two major Argentine parties fail to communicate ideologically consistent policy preferences. Instead, Peronists and the UCR rely on large partisan networks to deliver *local* benefits to their voters. The voters' proximity to the networks of activists, therefore, shapes the distributive expectations of most Argentine voters. By contrast, Chilean voters expect parties to deliver *global* benefits to voters with whom they share ideological traits.

Our research also provides some new empirical findings that deserve attention. First, we show that electoral coordination affects the size and structure of political networks. Networks in Chile are more horizontal, displaying high levels of within-coalition coordination. By contrast, different partisan networks in Argentina are connected at the party level. Networks of handout distribution also reinforce these patterns. While Chilean political parties distribute handouts beyond their own electoral coalition, Argentine parties distribute handouts to voters that are physically proximate to the party's network.

We conclude by proposing two avenues for future research. First, the comparative methodology presented here can be used to identify networks sustaining other non-programmatic coalitions, based on ethnic, religious, or geographic affinity. Our findings on the distributive importance of networks provide a more general strategy to understand non-programmatic linkages and their importance for voters. We are confident that future research can extend this methodology to test for the effect of ethno-cultural and geographic networks on the behavior of voters. Second, we have shown that parties generate different distributive expectations for voters that have different sensitivities to *local* and *global* benefits. It is our believe that future work on distributive politics needs to devote effort to exploring not only differences in the demand for redistribution but also in understanding preferences for the type of access to such benefits. In sum, a significant future agenda needs to measure the effect that local and global benefits have on the determinants of vote choice.

Table 1: Prevalence of political group k as share of the respondents' personal networks in Chile and Argentina

Estimates $B \equiv \{\beta_1', \ldots, \beta_k'\}$ from Equation (1.3)

POLITICAL NETWORK				POLITICAL NETWORK			
Share of the Respondent's Network				Total Number of Members			
CHILE		ARGENTINA		CHILE		ARGENTINA	
Approached PS	0.155	Approached PJ	0.314	Approached PS	23,495	Approached PJ	119,363
Candidate PS	0.177	Candidate PJ	0.330	Candidate PS	26,711	Candidate PJ	125,376
Volunteer PS	0.195	Volunteer PJ	0.640	Volunteer PS	29,417	Volunteer PJ	243,262
Activist PS	0.356	Activist PJ	0.766	Activist PS	53,880	Activist PJ	290,930
Approached DC	0.115	Approached UCR	0.146	Approached DC	17,396	Approached UCR	55,299
Candidate DC	0.139	Candidate UCR	0.183	Candidate DC	21,074	Candidate UCR	69,532
Volunteer DC	0.167	Volunteer UCR	0.311	Volunteer DC	25,250	Volunteer UCR	118,016
Activist DC	0.299	Activist UCR	0.420	Activist DC	45,221	Activist UCR	159,684
Approached PPD	0.080	Approached ARI	0.022	Approached PPD	12,117	Approached ARI	8,416
Candidate PPD	0.100	Candidate ARI	0.026	Candidate PPD	15,077	Candidate ARI	9,908
Volunteer PPD	0.126	Volunteer ARI	0.037	Volunteer PPD	18,987	Volunteer ARI	13,986
Activist PPD	0.200	Activist ARI	0.056	Activist PPD	30,257	Activist ARI	21,463
Approached UDI	0.074	Approached PRO	0.014	Approached UDI	11,127	Approached PRO	5,484
Candidate UDI	0.106	Candidate PRO	0.011	Candidate UDI	16,022	Candidate PRO	4,257
Volunteer UDI	0.117	Volunteer PRO	0.019	Volunteer UDI	17,621	Volunteer PRO	7,262
Activist UDI	0.199	Activist PRO	0.029	Activist UDI	30,031	Activist PRO	10,853
Approached RN	0.071	Approached PPP	0.035	Approached RN	10,660	Approached PPP	13,277
Candidate RN	0.087	Candidate PPP	0.048	Candidate RN	13,130	Candidate PPP	18,060
Volunteer RN	0.124	Volunteer PPP	0.098	Volunteer RN	18,748	Volunteer PPP	37,232
Activist RN	0.147	Activist PPP	0.108	Activist RN	22,283	Activist PPP	41,079
Primaries	0.370	Primaries	0.569	Primaries	55,862	Primaries	216,177

Table 2: Distributive Expectations, Ideological Proximity to Parties, and Proximity to Political Networks in Chile

	"Expects to Receive Goods, Money or other material incentives"					"Expects to Receive a Public Sector Job"					"Expects public works in the Community"				
	PS	DC	PPD	UDI	RN	PS	DC	PPD	UDI	RN	PS	DC	PPD	UDI	RN
Ideology	**-0.061***	**-0.058***	**-0.04***	**-0.01**	**-0.014**	-0.074***	-0.065***	-0.048***	-0.031***	-0.03***	-0.071***	-0.061***	-0.052***	-0.035***	-0.035***
	(0.01)	(0.011)	(0.01)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.01)	(0.011)	(0.01)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.01)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Network of Candidates	-0.001	0.002	0.07	0.011	-0.05	0.037	0.011	-0.009	-0.042	**-0.075**	0.039	0.014	**0.101***	**0.09***	0.053
	(0.047)	(0.05)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.063)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.064)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.056)
Network of Activists	0.035	0.023	0.039	0.062	0.041	0.046	0.035	**0.108***	0.02	0.053	**0.066**	-0.012	**0.079**	**0.087**	0.055
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.048)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.044)
Personal Network	**0.078**	**0.068**	**0.065**	0.031	0.03	**0.091***	**0.111***	**0.065**	**0.076**	**0.093***	**0.069**	**0.092***	**0.087***	**0.083***	**0.073**
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Chile Solidario	-0.031	-0.03	-0.029	-0.021	-0.027	-0.031	-0.017	-0.017	0.014	0.009	**-0.098***	**-0.063**	**-0.107***	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Primaries	0.008	0.03	0.0023	0.024	0.04	0.046	0.047	**0.053***	-0.004	-0.003	**0.094***	**0.122***	**0.066**	0.021	0.03
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Age	-1.749	-0.69	-0.436	-0.902	-1.163	-0.267	-0.121	-0.467	0.767	0.614	-0.374	0.265	0.503	1.094	0.846
	(1.229)	(1.226)	(1.238)	(1.239)	(1.244)	(1.249)	(1.249)	(1.253)	(1.275)	(1.275)	(1.154)	(1.154)	(1.159)	(1.177)	(1.178)
Age Sq	0.191	0.053	0.013	0.086	0.123	-0.021	-0.028	0.013	-0.143	-0.122	0.016	-0.06	-0.105	-0.168	-0.131
	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.166)	(0.167)	(0.167)	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.169)	(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.155)	(0.155)	(0.156)	(0.158)	(0.158)
Women	0.018	0.041	0.035	0.056	0.047	0.043	**0.067**	0.048	-0.011	0.017	0.026	0.045	0.024	0.036	0.027
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Education	-0.011	0.009	0.013	**0.027***	0.022	0.008	**0.022**	**0.025***	**0.026***	**0.025***	0.019	**0.022***	**0.031**	**0.038***	**0.037***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Socio-Economic	0.027	0.003	0.007	-0.008	0.005	0.019	0.008	0.03	0.023	0.019	0.017	0.019	0.028	**0.074***	**0.065**
	(0.03)	(0.029)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Perception of Redistribution	**0.172***	**0.163***	**0.175***	**0.125***	**0.121***	**0.139***	**0.131***	**0.139***	**0.125***	**0.131***	**0.168***	**0.164***	**0.17***	**0.139***	**0.144***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Population (LN)	**0.053***	**0.046***	**0.037***	**0.041***	**0.027**	**0.032**	**0.028**	0.02	0.014	**0.024***	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.006	-0.009
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
LogLik	-3674	-3762	-3688	-3773	-3730	-3648	-3675	-3587	-3488	-3481	-4778	-4747	-4724	-4601	-4590
AIC	7392	7568	7420	7590	7504	7341	7394	7218	7020	7005	9599	9538	9492	9245	9225
N	2718	2718	2718	2718	2718	2727	2727	2727	2727	2727	2716	2716	2716	2716	2716

Note: Dependent variables with 10 categories ranging from 0 (not likely) to 10 (extremely likely). For presentation purposes we omit the ordered probit cutpoints from the table.

Table 3: Distributive Expectations, Ideological Proximity to Parties, and Proximity to Political Networks in Argentina

	"Expects to Receive Goods, Money or other material incentives"					"Expects to Receive a Public Sector Job"					"Expects public works in the Community"				
	PJ	UCR	ARI	PRO	PPP	PJ	UCR	ARI	PRO	PPP	PJ	UCR	ARI	PRO	PPP
Ideology	-0.007	0.003	0.012	-0.042***	-0.043***	-0.007	-0.009	0.016	-0.035***	-0.009	-0.036***	-0.059***	-0.061***	-0.065***	-0.053***
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Network of Candidates	0.009	0.117***	-0.005	-0.029	0.026	0.072**	0.175***	0.012	-0.005	-0.047	0.055*	0.136***	0.004	0.216***	-0.01
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.054)	(0.059)	(0.049)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.054)	(0.06)	(0.053)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.041)
Network of Activists	0.103***	0.099***	-0.045	0.081*	-0.086**	0.151***	0.132***	0.05	0.116**	-0.045	0.125***	0.158***	0.098***	0.098**	-0.103***
	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.036)
Personal Network	0.065**	0.004	-0.053	-0.046	-0.043	0.091***	0.038	-0.007	-0.026	-0.024	0.112***	0.018	0.021	-0.005	0.0001
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Network of Jefes	0.075***	0.05**	0.016	0.022	0.013	0.012	0.005	-0.027	-0.017	-0.026	0.009	-0.03	-0.016	-0.014	-0.033
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.02)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Network of Primaries	0.049*	-0.033	-0.023	-0.046	-0.046	0.029	-0.038	-0.062**	-0.057*	-0.062**	0.082***	-0.006	-0.032	-0.045*	-0.05**
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Age	0.777	0.687	0.609	0.824	0.861	0.632	0.403	0.776	1.133	1.129	0.02	0.784	0.481	0.283	0.346
	(0.86)	(0.83)	(0.902)	(0.941)	(0.937)	(0.673)	(0.69)	(0.889)	(0.967)	(0.954)	(0.631)	(0.707)	(0.724)	(0.724)	(0.726)
Age Sq	-0.164	-0.161	-0.141	-0.176	-0.183	-0.171*	-0.132	-0.173	-0.223*	-0.223*	-0.036	-0.146	-0.097	-0.066	-0.074
	(0.119)	(0.115)	(0.125)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.094)	(0.096)	(0.123)	(0.134)	(0.132)	(0.087)	(0.098)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Women	0.074	0.056	0.067	0.08	0.071	0.026	0.073	0.041	0.018	0.012	0.022	0.063	0.001	-0.012	-0.026
	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Education	-0.013***	-0.006	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.012***	-0.004	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	0.002	0.007**	0.011***	0.01***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Status	0.0003	0.0004	-0.0001	-0.0002	-0.0002	0.0006	0.0013	0.0007	0.0012	0.0014	0.0005	-0.0004	-0.0004	-0.0021	-0.0018
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Perception of Redistribution	0.047***	0.031***	0.02**	0.011	0.01	0.024***	0.005	0.009	0.007	0.009	0.045***	0.021***	0.009	0.006	0.007
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Population (LN)	0.057	-0.032	0.045	0.049	0.048	-0.127***	-0.151***	-0.058	-0.064	-0.064	-0.06*	-0.122***	-0.009	-0.058	-0.062*
	(0.04)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.04)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)
LogLik	-3733	-3118	-2641	-2611	-2611	-3563	-2916	-2379	-2329	-2336	-5398	-4782	-4317	-4229	-4252
AIC	7517	6289	5333	5273	5274	7177	5885	4809	4710	4725	10848	9616	8685	8510	8557
N	2748	2748	2748	2748	2748	2754	2754	2754	2754	2754	2736	2736	2736	2736	2736

Note: Dependent variables with 10 categories ranging from 0 (not likely) to 10 (extremely likely). For presentation purposes we omit the ordered probit cutpoints from the table.

Figure 1: Reported Ideological Location of Largest Political Parties in Chile and Argentina


Ideological Placement of Argentine Parties

Ideological Placement of Chilean Parties

Figure 2: Dendogram describing the Structure of Networks in Chile, Clustering Algorithm on $H \equiv \left\{ \delta_{11}^{'}, \ldots, \delta_{ik}^{'} \right\}$

Dendrogram of agnes(x = distance)

Height

Approached PS
Approached DC
Approached PPD
Candidate PS
Candidate DC
Candidate PPD
Volunteer PS
Activist PS
Primaries
Activist DC
Activist PPD
Volunteer DC
Volunteer PPD
Approached UDI
Approached RN
Candidate UDI
Candidate RN
Volunteer UDI
Activist UDI
Volunteer RN
Activist RN
Municipal Employee
Sports Club
CS WorkPlan
Public Employee Family
Family Municipal Employment Plan
Regional Employee
Goods PS
Goods DC
Goods PPD
Goods UDI
Goods RN

distance
Agglomerative Coefficient = 0.38

Figure 3: Dendogram describing the Structure of Networks in Argentina, Clustering Algorithm on $H \equiv \left\{ \delta_{11}^{'}, \ldots, \delta_{ik}^{'} \right\}$

Dendrogram of agnes(x = distance)

distance
Agglomerative Coefficient = 0.52

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