Quaestio

The UCLA Undergraduate History Research Journal



Volume I, Issue I 2002

Quaestio

Quaestio history undergraduate research journal is the official publication of the Theta Upsilon chapter of Phi Alpha Theta international history honors society. In accordance with chapter bylaws, all editors of the journal are members in good standing of Phi Alpha Theta. *Quaestio* accepts unpublished, original manuscripts from all current UCLA undergraduate students that meet the criteria as established by the Editorial Board and posted on the chapter's official web site at http://www.studentgroups.ucla.edu/pat. Calls for papers are issued at intervals to be determined by the Editorial Board. Manuscripts submitted to the journal that are introduced into the editorial process are not returned.

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Cover: The speaker's rostra in the Roman Forum.

Publication funded with a generous grant from the Elizabeth Pinela family.

Acknowledgements

It is with extreme satisfaction that I present to the student community the inaugural issue of *Quaestio* (Latin: "inquiry")- the first undergraduate research journal at UCLA devoted exclusively to the topic of history. This ambitious project, embarked upon by the Theta Upsilon chapter's Executive Board back in January, took a long and bumpy road toward completion. Along the way, the new journal's hard-charging staff worked tirelessly while they hammered out the details of the editorial procedure to insure its accuracy, efficiency and anonymity, and then dealt superbly with the overwhelming response to the February Call for Papers. Every facet of this aptly named journal's creation was imbued with a process of inquiry and discovery. The finished product represents just a small sampling of some of the best undergraduate writing by UCLA students. However, we could not have come so far without the help of several very important people- and it is to them that I would like to turn in gratitude and recognize here.

First and foremost, our readers- all graduate students in the History Department- who enthusiastically supported this project: Fiona Galvin, the President of the Graduate Students History Association; Corey Hollis and Laura Talamante, the co-Editors-in-Chief for the 1999 issue of the graduate student's *UCLA Historical Journal*; Scott McDonough; Magdy El-Shamma; Lorraine Pratt; Dan Ryan; Britta McEwen; and Petula Iu. I would also like to thank Mike Kockler, the student groups Advisor at the Center for Student Programming, and Dr. Reed Wilson, Director of the UCLA Undergraduate Research Center (which publishes the *Westwind* undergraduate research journal) for their advice and encouragement.

Last, but certainly not least, I wish to express my thanks and admiration for the hard-working staff of this journal. Most especially, I want to recognize my Assistant Editor-in-Chief, Nefertiti Takla, who embraced this effort from the very beginning with an enthusiasm and dedication equal to my own.

With that, I hope you will read on and enjoy.

Frank Miranda
Editor-in-Chief

Contents

Ukraine in the 1990's: Achievements, Disappointments and Lessons Learned

by Olesya Baker

This study examines the macroeconomic trends in the Ukraine following the country's independence. With the major economic reforms already completed or still in progress, the Ukraine is still far away from calling itself a market economy. One of the major obstacles to Ukraine's economic recovery is the lack of market principles and institutions. This paper assesses the progress of these market reforms and examines various sectors of the economy to evaluate the extent to which these reforms have been implemented. In its conclusion, this work provides some suggestions that may facilitate the transition to market and improve future economic performance.

INTRODUCTION

The Ukraine's path to independence has proven to be very long and challenging. Richly endowed with fertile black soil, a plethora of natural resources, favorable geographical location and numerous seaports, it persistently became a victim of foreign domination. A surge of nationalist uprisings in the beginning of the 20th century was crushed by the brutal Soviet rule that lasted for over 70 years, radically transforming the Ukrainian economy and its people. As the events of 1991 unfolded, the Ukrainians proudly raised their new flag and happily cheered for the newly elected President Kravchuk as he faithfully promised to fill the stores with a multitude of consumer goods and raise the living standards of the population. However, restructuring the economy proved to be a daunting task for the policy-makers, as they understood that the entire foundation for the market economy was missing. To exacerbate things further, the Ukraine's political system was still infested with old-regime bureaucrats who continued to exercise Soviet principles of *nomenclature* and opposed any radical changes in order to promote their own self-interests.

The formation of independent states and the task of restructuring the old system generated an abundance of responses from academia and other scholarly circles from around the globe. While the topics of discussions varied, there seemed to be a consensus about the nature of economic reforms. Since the classical Soviet system left behind a highly centralized hierarchy, artificially set prices and no financial sector, the first step in the transition process had to start with price liberalization, private sector development, and financial stabilization as well as the redefinition of the role of the state.[1] However, as the economic conditions in many CIS countries continued to worsen, many turned their attention to the overall economic environment, as corruption, poor property rights and regulatory hurdles seemed to undermine the reform efforts.[2]

This paper examines the economic performance of the Ukraine relative to its neighboring states, as well as the causes of the economic trends of the past decade. By examining the origins of the economic problems and analyzing the progress of certain sectors of the economy, it will try to suggest some remedial measures that may help the Ukraine return to the path of healthy economic growth and prosperity.

II. INITIAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SITUATION

As it faced independence, the Ukraine had found itself endowed with many assets. A nation bordered by 8 Eastern European countries, it contained 2782 km of accessible coastline, fertile terrain (58% of its territory was comprised of arable land), and was second most important economic component of the former Soviet Union (with Russia placing first). It had a highly educated population with a literacy rate of over 98% and was well developed in various heavy industries.[3] A study conducted by the Deutsche Bank soon after 1991 gave Ukraine the best economic development forecast of all post-Soviet republics.[4] However, as the Ukraine began its transition, the links that made the above-mentioned assets work together for the benefit of the country were no longer present. The economies of the Soviet Union were highly specialized - instead of serving the needs of their people, they served the needs of the greater Soviet Union. The collapse of the USSR eliminated some of the Ukraine's vital markets in other Soviet

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[1] Hans Van Zon, *The Political Economy of Independent Ukraine* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).
[2] S. Johnson, J. McMillan, and C. Woodruff, *Property Rights, Finance and Entrepreneurship* (EBRD Working Paper No. 43, 1999) and *Entrepreneurs and the Ordering of Institutional Reform: Poland, Romania, Russia, the Slovak Republic and Ukraine Compared* (EBRD Working Paper No. 44, 1999).
[3] *The CIA Handbook* (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1999).
[4] Von Zon (2000).

Republics, proving fatal for selected Ukrainian enterprises.[5] The Soviet Union was also widely known for the poor quality of its products. Since these goods were not intended for consumption outside of the USSR, they were not competitive in the global market, and were soon defeated by their foreign counterparts.[6]

Rising energy prices were one of the major concerns for the post-1991 Ukrainian economy. The Ukraine is considered to be on of the most energy-intensive countries in the world, and it imported most of its fuel from Russia and Turkmenistan. This dependency did not trouble the Ukraine much during the Soviet era, since energy was available at negligible costs (5-10 percent of the world prices). However, in 1991 Russia had increased its energy prices by more than 10 times, leaving the Ukraine struggling to pay for its 60% of natural gas imports. The government ran up huge debts, forcing Russia and Turkmenistan to cut off supplies to force debt repayment.[7]

The energy crisis in the Ukraine was in part a child of negligence and inefficiency conceived during the Soviet era. Much of the equipment produced prior to break up was very energy-intensive, and many facilities were being wasteful. This practice remained there after independence, further exacerbated by the fact that certain unprofitable enterprises continued their operations for purely social reasons (fear of social unrest).Inefficient energy use by the population also added to the problem.[8]

With these difficulties in mind, the Ukraine embarked on a road to the market economy. However, apart from the economic legacies of the past, Ukraine also inherited a powerful social system that could prove to be as detrimental to the development of the market system as the economic drawbacks.

The creation of an independent state was accompanied by a formation of a new political system; however, this new system was no *tabula rasa*. The political structure in the Ukraine certainly changed, but when examined closer, one will find that it consisted of the same elites and "clans" as before. Ex-communist functionaries still predominated, and the new party elite, "The Party of Power" consisted of members of the old *nomenklatura*, characterized by "economic and political conservatism … and clan connections."[9] President Kravchuk himself (1991-1994) was the former head of the Ideology Department of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

Making any kind of progressive reform in this environment had proven to be impossible, and a few notable government figures resigned in desperation. In the words of Kravchuk's advisor, Taras Stets'kiv, who resigned with many others, "corrupt banking bureaucrats and the influential directorate had strangled the economy … government represented only the industrial oligarchy and the state sector of the economy."[10]

III. MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS

Available macroeconomic indicators for any former Soviet country should be interpreted with extreme caution, for they may suffer from serious biases. Since Soviet statistical services either did not exist or were designed only to measure the output of the state sector, the rise of the output in the private sector tends not to be recorded.[11] Another important consideration should be the size of the underground economy, which accounts for almost 50% of all economic activity.[12]

Ukraine's GDP experienced a serious decline in the years immediately following independence. Despite the reforms undertaken by the government, the GDP plunged to around 60% of its initial pre-independence levels. Research suggests that there seems to be a negative correlation between inflation rate and GDP growth,[13] which appears to justify a simultaneous occurrence of an acute drop in GDP and hyperinflation.

However, the Ukraine's misfortunes were not the only ones observed in the region. Its neighboring states, Russia, Romania, and many others were struggling to achieve economic growth and stability as well. Russian GDP also took a dive, although not quite reaching the same levels, and Russia's inflation was not as severe, climaxing to roughly 2,500% in 1992. Romanian GDP declined as well, hitting it's lowest in 1992, with inflation rates that peaked at about 300%. Poland, which started the transition process earlier, seemed to exhibit the same pattern,

[5] *CIA* (1999).
[6] *Ibid.*
[7] Woehrel, S. (1997), "Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy" *Post-Soviet Policy Perspectives*, 99-118.
[8] "Ukraine. Restoring Growth With Equity: A Participatory Country Economic Memorandum," *A World Bank Country Study* (Washington: The World Bank, 1999).
[9] *CIA* (1999), 72.
[10] *Ibid., 70.*
[11] S. Fischer, R. Sahay, and C. Vegh, *From Transition to Market: Evidence and Growth Prospects* (IMF Working Paper No. WP/98/52, 1998).
[12] Johnson, *Entrepreneurs* (1999).
[13] S. Fischer, R. Sahay, and C. Vegh,(1996), "Stabilization and Growth in Transition Economies: The Early Experience" *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 10 (1996), 45-66.

preceding Russia and the Ukraine by a few years. Its inflation culminated in 1989, and the lowest output was recorded in 1991.[14]

The reversal occurred in 1994, when Ukraine's GDP revived, and inflation fell sharply from thousands to only hundreds, and was soon contained at low levels such as 15% by 1997. Research indicates that government's stabilization program, initiated in November of 1994, was crucial in resuming the country's economic growth,[15] because it served as an anchor in an otherwise turbulent macro and microeconomic environment.

The initial drop in output was caused by several key factors. As discussed earlier, Soviet economic structures performed very poorly in the new setting, exacerbated by high energy prices and a corrupt political environment. However, the decline in output was rooted not only in the inefficiencies of the old system, but, ironically, was also caused by those factors that allowed Ukrainian economy to develop in the first place.

Ukraine is blessed with many natural resources - coal mining and ferrous metallurgy accounted for 20% of its output in 1990, and its agricultural potential was well-known around the world. Unlike other countries of the former Soviet Union, the Ukraine avoided a sharp economic crisis, the kind that leaves people demanding change at any cost. For example, as Estonia found itself cutoff from Russian energy supplies during a harsh winter following independence, the government began to plan the evacuation of urban population to the countryside in order to avoid cold and hunger. Finland eventually supplied the country in crisis with the necessary aid, however, this dramatic episode helped convince Estonian government that it had to adopt dramatic reforms in order to divert a similar crisis situation in the future. As a result, Estonian economy was dramatically reformed, and links with Western markets were established very rapidly.[16]

Graph 1: GDP Growth in 4 Transition Economies

(percent change from previous year)



Source: Ukraine at the crossroads, pg. 24.

Ukraine's endowments allowed it to avoid a similar crisis; in addition, major powers from both the East and the West were focusing on making the Ukraine their ally, thus providing substantial resource inflows in the form of energy and financial support. These developments delayed the implementation of profound economic reforms in the Ukraine, negatively reflecting on country's growth.

The underground economy also accounts for a major decline in GDP, since much of the country's economic activity eludes the government. Burdensome tax system and regulatory government intervention lead to tax evasion and create incentives to move into the shadow economy. In the Ukraine, taxes (as percentage of GDP) have been at least 25% higher than in countries with similar per capita incomes.[17] Frequent tax inspections generate an environment in which bribery flourishes and illegal transactions regularly take place. Since conventional

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[14] Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1998).
[15] Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1996)
[16] "Ukraine" (1999).
[17] "Ukraine" (1999).

information systems cannot capture underground economic activity, efforts to monitor consequences of economic policy reforms generate a distorted picture, making it more difficult to assess the true economic situation (underground economic activity will be discussed in later sections).

While many countries in the region experienced acute drops in their growth rates, Ukraine's inflation experience sets it apart from the rest. Inflation rates in the Ukraine reached over 5000% a year by 1994, making inflations in the neighboring countries seem fairly "moderate" (see Graph 2).

Graph 2: Inflation in 4 Transition Economies



Source: National Bank of Poland, Political Risk Services Database.

The Ukraine continued using the ruble as its official currency up to February of 1992, and the initial rise of inflation was caused by Russian monetary policies. The main causes of inflation, however, were the giant subsidies and loans to insolvent state enterprises, as well as unrestricted money printing. As the government bureaucrats attempted to maintain state ownership of industry and land, many unprofitable enterprises were preserved, while the new economic environment made many others loose money as well. The government tried to protect these businesses by providing generous subsidies. With a rapidly shrinking tax base, government revenues continued to decline, and the subsidy amounts exceeded available resources. As a result, the remaining difference was obtained from hyperinflationary credit expansion and heavy domestic and foreign borrowing. Total deficits in 1992-1993 were over 20 percent of GDP and the monetary supply expansion reached its summit in 1993 at more than 1,000 percent. In a span of only two years (between 1992 and 1994) prices increased by almost 500 times.[18] In September of 1996, when inflation was finally tamed, Ukraine introduced its new currency, the *hryvna*, at an exchange rate of 100,000 *karbovantsi* to one *hryvna*. However, the achieved macroeconomic stability was rather fragile, and the Asian crisis followed by the Russian stock market crash had shaken this fragile foundation considerably.[19]

This period also marks a drastic fall in the living standards. As the prices continued to increase, wages lagged far behind - between December of 1991 and August of 1993 the average wages increased only by 37% as much as prices, by 1998, the situation appeared to be even worse (see Graph 4). In 1994, 80% of the Ukraine's population received wages that were less than the subsistence level.[20]

This tumultuous hyperinflationary episode had a very negative effect - public confidence in the monetary unit and the banking system plummeted. Today, the Ukraine has one of the smallest banking systems in the world (relative to GDP), which serves as a deterrent to the development of the private sector. Funds are usually not readily available, and interest rates are very high (somewhere in the 30-40% bracket), as private lending institutions try to

[18] Ibid.
[19] P. Patterson, "Searching for Macroeconomic Stability in Ukraine" *Ukrainian Economic Review* 3 (1997), 42-64.
[20] *CI*A (1999).

compensate themselves in the presence of uncertainty.[21] According the Standard and Poor's report (1998), risks within the Ukrainian banking system are the highest among the CEE countries, higher than those of Russia and Kazakhstan.[22] Recent pressures from the IMF forced the Ukrainian government to undertake several structural reforms in the financial sector – between 1998 and 1999 it introduced international accounting standards and strengthened bank supervision.[23]

Graph 3: Real Wages (Index, 1990 = 100)



Source: Ukrainian Economic Review, III, pg. 53.

One macroeconomic indicator prevalent in almost all former Soviet Republics is the stunningly low level of unemployment. Ukraine's highest unemployment figures do not exceed 4.5%; similarly, Russia's unemployment, although higher, remained below 12%; that of Romania and Poland were no more than 12% and 16.7% respectively.

These figures, however, need to be taken with a grain of salt, since theory suggests that an acute fall in output should be accompanied by a sharp rise in unemployment. Examining the economic and social conditions of these countries seems to provide some answers to this conundrum.

Since the former members of the USSR were highly specialized in certain economic activities, cases in which one state enterprise would provide employment for almost an entire town or city were not uncommon. Although privatization is moving forward at a fairly good pace, not a single enterprise with more than 750 million hryvnas in assets has been privatized "in a way that gives effective private ownership control."[24] Since these enterprises provide livelihoods to thousands of people who would be unable to find work otherwise, managers are not willing to resort to layoffs for fear of social unrest. This unwillingness to dismiss workers is further encouraged by soft budget constraints and the readiness of the government to provide subsidies and loans to insolvent state enterprises.

Another explanation for the low level of unemployment is the irregularity of salary distributions. Salaries in the Ukraine were so low and paid so irregularly (wage arrears totaled $2.5 billion by the end of 1998) that people didn't bother to quit their jobs, while earning income elsewhere.[25] One study indicates that 70% of all the respondents (who were either currently employed or forced to take a vacation or an extended maternity leave) were engaged in some type of "survival strategy" (see Table 1).

Table 1: Proportion of People Engaged in Various Survival Strategies

	Dacha	*Trips*	*Taxi*	*Rent*	*Second Job*	*More than one strategy*
% of total	24	25	11	13	20	70

Source: Johnson, Kaufmann, Ustenko (1997), pg. 187.[26]

[21] "Ukraine" (1999).
[22] Von Zon (2000).
[23] Ibid.
[24] "Ukraine (1999).
[25] *CIA* (1999).
[26] S. Johnson, D. Kaufman, and O. Ustenko, "Formal Employment and Survival Strategies after Communism," *Transforming Post-Comminist Economies* (Washington D.C: National Academy Press, 1997), 177-201.

Finally, another major reason for low unemployment figures is the low level of unemployment benefits. Despite the rising inflation, minimum level of unemployment compensation has been constant at 16.6 hryvnas/month (less than $5), which is far below the poverty line (at 73.7 hryvnas).[27]

VI. INVESTMENT AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

Channeling of resources into developing new sectors and the improvement of the existing sectors are crucial components of economic growth. These functions can be performed by two primary actors: the state, via subsidies, and the general public, via investment. During 70 years of Soviet domination, the state was responsible for the redirection of resources in the Ukrainian economy, while both foreign and domestic investment was virtually non-existent. Privatization of state-owned property was an important reform that emerged as a consequence of Ukrainian independence. Hopes were placed high that privatization will draw domestic and foreign investors who will provide the capital needed for expansion and growth. In principle, Ukraine has much to offer to investors - its assets were already discussed, and its highly educated workforce could provide businesses with qualified staff at a fraction of a cost. However, the actual investment records suggest that investors are not in a hurry to seize these golden opportunities (see Graph 4). What is holding them back? Recent studies seem to indicate that poor business environment is what prevents domestic and foreign investors from conducting business in the Ukraine.

Graph 4: Gross Fixed Investment 1998 (1989 = 100)



Source: Bruker, pg. 58.[28]

Ukraine's gross fixed investment is on the bottom of the charts, and foreign per capita investment amounted to a meager 25 USD per person by the end of 1996 (second to last, ahead of only Belarus). That's 13 times less than Poland's, almost 3 times less than Romania's, and a little less than one-half of Russia's FDI per capita. Ukrainian officials claim that the Ukraine needs around 40 billion USD of capital to jump start the economy. However, 40 billion is the approximate influx of capital into *the entire* CEE between the years 1991 – 1996.[29]

Table 2: Foreign Direct Investment by the End of 1996 (mn USD)

	Total Volume (mn USD)	***Population (mn)***	***Per capita FDI (USD)***
Poland	13,440	38.6	348
Romania	1,595	22.6	70
Russia	5,854	147.7	40
Ukraine	1,266	51.1	25

Source: Mollers, Ukraine at the Crossroads, pg. 140.

[27] "Ukraine" (1999).
[28] H. Brucker, "A Second Divide in Europe?" *Ukraine on the Road to Europe* (New York: Physica Verlag, 2001), 41-64.
[29] F. Mollers, and A. Siedenberg, "The Interplay Between Monetary Policy and Reform Policy in Ukraine – an Overview" *Ukraine at the Crossroads* (1999) 58–79.

Ukraine's aspirations are clearly too far-fetched. To get even half-way close to this figure, the country must first address some structural problems that hinder current investment and may prove to be detrimental to future economic development.

A major hindrance to both domestic and foreign investment is the corrupt business environment and weak property rights. Monetary stabilization did not stimulate investment because it was not followed by a structural reform, i.e., the government did not become "a guarantor of property rights."[30] A group of German economists conducted a survey of 20 leading international enterprises, whose FDI contribution amounted to almost one-third of the total. The poll revealed that some of the main obstacles to investing in the Ukraine were legal uncertainty (confirmed by 100% of respondents), failure of the state to honor obligations (90% of respondents) and corruption (75% of respondents) (see Table 5).

Inconsistent legislature is an important element of legal uncertainty. Managers cannot rely on current laws as they are subject to arbitrary change or, worse yet, may be declared invalid, in which case a penalty for following that law could be applied. Since legal conditions in the Ukraine changed 6 times between 1991-1996, incidents in which managers were penalized for a legal activity after it was declared illegal were not uncommon.[31] For example, Article 3 (March 19, 1996) guaranteed acquisition of shares of an existing company. However, Articles 18 and 25 of the laws on publishing activity (passed in June of 1997) established that foreign investor's shares of a publishing house may not exceed 30%. A west European publishing house that began to print a hobby magazine after purchasing 100% of shares is now looking for someone to take over the remaining 70%.[32]

Foreign investors are not the only people guessing at which laws may now be in favor, the government officials have to play the guessing game as well. The state of confusion is so high that government employees in different regions are sometimes applying different laws. When the new value-added tax (VAT) law was introduced on July 1, 1997, some local officials continued to follow the old VAT laws, while others introduced the new ones. This state of disorder lasted from July 1 through October 1.[33]

Large quantity of decrees also adds to the confusion. For example, 65 decrees were passed between 1996 and 1997 pertaining to the tobacco industry, and the cosmetics industry was endowed with 26 decrees in 1996 alone. By comparison, only one law for the cosmetics industry, comprised of several parts, exists in Germany.[34]

Corruption and poor property rights are another major deterrent to investment in the Ukraine. Many recently conducted surveys consistently place the Ukraine on the bottom of the list when evaluating its business environment and property rights. For example, the Ukraine ranked 18/25 for its business environment[35] and a Global Competitiveness Survey conducted by the World Forum placed the Ukraine 52nd out of 53 countries, mainly due to the lack of openness of the economy, corruption and poorly functioning formal institutions.[36]

The transition process strengthens corruption. As the existing rules are being eliminated, and new constraints are still becoming effective, opportunity niches for redistribution of wealth are created. Soviet-era officials have had a long history of accepting bribes as they attempted to overwrite the existing system of equal income distribution. Since the new political body consisted mainly of old party bureaucrats, this practice was preserved and perhaps even strengthened due to the legal uncertainty that accompanied transition.

Hans Van Zon defined this transition process to be "plan" to "clan" instead of "plan" to "market",[37] as the former communist elite and state managers assumed influential positions in the government. One study estimated that more than 60% of the income of these high officials originates from bribes.[38] This system is replicated at the local levels of bureaucratic hierarchy, with tax collectors and state inspectors reaping the most benefits.

Ukrainian businesses have to endure frequent inspections by local officials. Twenty six state institutions are authorized to perform these inspections, and rules for many procedures are often not published, leaving the interpretation up to the authorities themselves. "Monomach" company director Volodymir Barabash said, "…all of these inspections are rather expensive, because unless you pay someone off with a bribe, they come back again and again to repeatedly inspect the same products."[39] Tax authorities in the Ukraine receive special bonuses for the

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[30] A. Pivovarsky, "Multinational Enterprise Entry under Unstable Property Rights: The Case of Ukraine" *Ukrainian Economic Review* 3 (1997), 65-91.
[31] Von Zon (2000).
[32] Mollers (1999).
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] W. Carlin, S. Fries, M. Schaffer, and P. Seabright, *Competition and Enterprise Performance in Transition Economies: Evidence From a Cross-Country Survey* (EBRD Working Paper No. 63, 2001)
[36] Pivovarsky (1997).
[37] Von Zon (2000).
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid., 35.

collection of fines, and according to a survey conducted in 1997, violations were found in almost one-third of the visits. Sometimes owners are not even told which violations they have committed. These inspections are also rather time-consuming – enterprise managers meet with tax, licensing and other officials approximately 103 days out of the year.[40]

Table #3: Security of Property Rights

	Poland	*Romania*	*Russia*	*Ukraine*
Use of courts				
% saying courts can be used to enforce an agreement	72.90%	86.90%	58.40%	54.70%
% who used courts in the most recent payment dispute	48.40%	28.10%	10.30%	16.40%
In last dispute with a customer % who recovered full debt	30.70%	45.80%	93.00%	62.00%
Burden of government				
% of manager's time spent on government/regulatory matters	10.30%	8.00%	18.70%	25.40%
Taxes as a % of sales	15.50%	17.20%	23.90%	24.20%
% who think firms make extra-legal payments	20.00%	20.00%	91.00%	87.00%

Source: Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff, *Entrepreneurs* (1999).

Table #4: Motives for Investment in the Ukraine
(5 – most important, 0 – least important)

Motive	*Ukraine*	*CEE*	*Russia*	*Czech Rep.*
Secure potential markets	3.65	3.08	2.96	2.63
Develop new sales market	3.5	3.22	2.95	2.75
Overcome import barriers	2.5	1.36	1.72	0.85
Secure and cultivate existing markets	1.7	2.7	3	2.57
Enhance competitiveness through primary production	1.58	2.12	1.94	2.72
Lower labor costs	1.4	2.75	2.16	3.34
Lower tax burden	1.1	1.46	1.58	1.48
Better purchasing & procurement possibilities	1.2	1.34	1.58	1.11
Longer working hours	0.68	1.38	0.95	1.73
Fewer administrative impediments	0.55	1.18	1.83	0.96
Longer machine running times	0.54	1.21	0.79	2
Less stringent environmental Constraints	0.33	0.73	.58	0.81

Source: Mollers, Ukraine at the Crossroads, pg. 145.

The judiciary system in the Ukraine is affected by corruption as well. Most businesses do not resort to courts to settle their legal disputes with customers. Only 16.4% of respondents in a survey indicated that they used

[40] Ibid.

courts in a recent disagreement (see Table 3). In contrast, the same figure for Poland was 48.4%. Strangely enough, more managers indicated that organized crime was not an obstacle to business activity than those who thought it was (see Table 5). Evidently, many prefer to deal with the members of organized crime than with government officials.

Table #5: Impediments to Investment in the Ukraine
(balance between affirmative and negative replies, %)

Motive	*Ukraine*	*CEE*	*Russia*	*Czech Rep.*
Legal uncertainty	100	37	70	-17.2
Unsatisfactory transport infrastructure	97.5	-4.4	14.2	-31
Gov. failure to abide by commitments	90	-42.4	-30	-92.8
Gov. control and remnants of command economy	80	21.2	60	-35.8
Lack of telecommunications infrastructure	80	-16.6	14.2	-31
Lack of support from the authorities	75	1.2	33.4	-7.2
Corruption	75	-19.8	-8.7	-72.4
Low productivity	-10	7.2	60	7.2
Organized crime	-10	-36.4	-34.8	-85.8
Unreliability of staff	-50	-54.6	-30	-48.2
Poorly trained labor	-60	-43.6	-20	-38
Low level of staff commitment	-60	-60	-40	-42.8

Source: Mollers, Ukraine at the Crossroads, pg. 146.[41]

At this point in the transition process, Ukraine is in dire need of fresh capital. Investment could stimulate research and development of new technology, bring in profit seeking management personnel and increase the quality of goods. However, protection and redistribution of wealth under the described conditions is costly and employs considerable resources. In addition, government regulations and administrative barriers prevent fast responses to changing market conditions. One investor compared the current situation to a "… heavy suitcase without a handle: Too heavy to keep carrying further, yet sad to just let go."[42] It is evident that Ukraine's only option is a deep structural reform that will eliminate regulatory barriers and reduce corruption. Only then will the investors take full advantage of the multitude of business opportunities Ukraine has to offer.

V. SHADOW ECONOMY

Ukraine's shadow economy has been estimated to be one of the largest in the world,[43] and, according to some observers, the size of the underground economy in the 1990's was larger than the registered GDP.[44] Inadequate legislation, high taxation, and burdensome book-keeping procedures encourage many enterprises to move their business activity underground, while state officials do not attempt to combat this movement in anticipation of monetary gains. According to the World Economic Forum (1997), tax burden in the Ukraine has been given a score of 1.58 (1-worst, 7 – best), while Russia received a score of 1.8, Hungary – 2.3 and Czech Republic – 3.6. The average tax rate in the Ukraine has been determined to be 70% higher than tax rates in the West.[45] Besides very high tax rates, enterprises are required to comply with inconsistent and burdensome tax laws, which consume a lot of valuable time and resources. For example, a survey conducted in December of 1997 indicated that businesses had to fill out an average of 16.8 different tax forms and many of these forms used different accounting standards

[41] Example: If 85% of 100% reply "true" to the question of legal uncertainty as an impediment and 15% reply "not true", the net proportion of positive responses amounts to 70% (in case of Russia).
[42] F. Mollers. P. Optiz, and C. Hirschhausen, "Are There Regional Economic Policies which Lead to 'Europe'? Voices of Ukrainian Companies in East and West," *Ukraine on the Road to Europe* (2001), 128.
[43] Johnson, *Entrepreneurs* (1999).
[44] Von Zon (2000).
[45] Ibid.

(an average of 9.2 accounting formats).[46] A decree passed by the government in May of 1998 further illustrates how complicated and resource consuming these tax laws are. The value-added tax (VAT) was ordered to be paid on the "…15th and the 25th of the month under review and on the 5th of the following month, equaling one-third of the total incurred in the preceding month's tax declaration. By the 20th of the following month the difference of the sums of the actual VAT paid each 10 days was to be established."[47] Attempts to comply with these tax laws generate large book-keeping costs and require considerable amount of time.

Table 6: Indicators of the Shadow Economy

	Poland	***Romania***	***Russia***	***Ukraine***
Taxes as a % of sales	15.50%	17.20%	23.90%	24.2%
% of sales not reported	5.4%	5.7%	28.90%	41.20%
% of salaries not reported	8.6%	7.6%	26.10%	37.90%

Source: Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff, *Entrepreneurs* (1999).

Frequent inspections also stimulate the expansion of the underground economy. A survey of the State Committee on Enterprise Development indicates that, on average, market vendors are inspected 25 times a month, and small businesses have to endure 78 inspections a year, which require 68 written responses, consuming 2 days a week of manager's time.[48] These troublesome regulations leave little time for the actual business matters, and high tax rates reduce businesses' profits considerably. Underground economy provides an attractive option to many enterprises, especially the emerging small and medium-scale private firms which have no clan connections to lobby for tax exemptions (more than three-fourths of these businesses operate in the shadow economy).[49]

The expansion of the underground economy is a troublesome sign. It indicates an increasing dissatisfaction with the government regulatory policies and unwillingness to comply with them. As more and more businesses take their operations underground, the state is losing a major source of income, taxation, causing budget deficits and government debts. A balanced budget is especially important at the time of transition when a lot of restructuring, both on the economic and the social levels, has to take place. Current situation precludes these changes from occurring because the government is struggling to pay off its vitally important accounts, such as gas imports. The underground economy also presents more opportunities for corrupt government officials, many of whom are influential political figures, to benefit from bribes. Vested interests of these individuals prevent structural reforms, which ultimately result in more movement underground. As in the case of investment, changes are unlikely to take place unless a deep revision of government policies and regulations takes place.

VI. PROGRESS OF PRIVATIZATION, EMPHASIS ON LARGE-SCALE ENTERPRISES.

Privatization became a major reform goal soon after independence. Its younger sibling, the cooperative movement that began under Gorbachev's *perestroika*, grew into a full-scale privatization campaign towards the middle of the 1990's. Shifting of operation responsibilities from the state to the public accelerated the transition process, as private owners sought to maximize their gains by hiring qualified management personnel and increasing the quality of produced goods. Privatization efforts began with the Law of Privatization Certificates passed in March of 1992, which allowed each citizen to open an account at the State Bank and use it to buy property. The campaign began with 45,000 small and 18,000 medium and large-scale state owned enterprises in 1991. By 1994, 7,000 small and 3,000 medium scale businesses were privatized.[50] Even though the privatization of small enterprises proceeded rather quickly (all small businesses had been privatized by 2000), and privatization of medium scale enterprises followed at a bit slower pace (80% of medium-size businesses by 2000), privatization of large enterprises lagged far behind.[51] As a result, government privatization targets were unmet, and revenues totaled only 11 million USD of

[46] F. L. Pryor, and M. Blackman, "The Ukrainian Industrial Sector in 1996 And 1997: Insights from the Rapid Enterprise Survey," *Ukrainian Economic Review*, 3 (1997), 20-41.
[47] Von Zon (2000), 35.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Von Zon (2000).
[51] "Ukraine" (1999).

526 million USD expected in 1995. The situation appeared to be similar in 1997, when only 380 million of expected 1 billion was generated.[52]

Table 7: Private Sector Share in GDP (unofficial estimates)

	91	*92*	*93*	*94*	*95*	*96*	*97*	*98*	*99*	*'00*
Ukraine *(% GDP)*	10	10	15	40	45	50	55	55	55	60
Poland *(% GDP)*	40	45	50	55	60	60	65	65	65	70
Russia *(% GDP)*	5	25	40	50	55	60	70	70	70	70
Romania *(% GDP)*	25	25	35	40	45	55	60	60	60	65

Source: EBRD (2001).

Why are large-scale enterprises such an unattractive item to privatize? The answers seem to be rooted in the lack of reforms in the large-scale sector and government subsidies that do not stimulate profitability of large-scale enterprises. Another important obstacle is the opposition from notable political figures – Kuchma's proposal to convert 8,000 of larger state-owned enterprises into "open shareholder's associations" was met with much resistance from the leftists in the Parliament.[53] Excessive government regulations and corruption also seem to diminish the interest of potential investors.

Budgetary subsidies to enterprises totaled 10.8% of GDP in 1996 and 9.3% in 1997. This is more than 3 times the subsidies that Polish government provided at a similar time in Poland's transition process, and analogous figures hold for Hungary and the Czech Republic (see Table 9). In 1997, 73% of liabilities in the form of taxes, compulsory payments and deductions to social insurance were covered by the government (see Tables 8 and 9).

Table 8: Arrears of Enterprises in Transition Economies for Taxes, Compulsory Payments and Deductions to Social Insurance (% of GDP)

	Ukraine 1997	*Poland 1992*	*Hungary 1992*
Taxes and levies	7.9	2.5	2.4
Social insurance	4.8	1.3	3.4
Total	12.7	3.8	5.8

Source: Lunina, Ukraine at crossroads, pg. 127.[54]

Table 9: Budgetary Subsidies to Enterprises in transition economies (% GDP)

	Ukraine 1996	*Ukraine 1997*	*Poland 1992*	*Hungary 1993*	*Czech Rep. 1993*
Budgetary subsidies to enterprises	10.8	9.3	3	2.6 - 3.2	4-4.8

Source: Tubben, Ukraine at Crossroads, pg. 134.[55]

[52] *CIA* (1999).
[53] Woehrel (1997).
[54] I. Lunina and V. Vokhart, "Special Economic Zones in the Ukraine - A Means of Promoting Investment?" *Ukraine at the Crossroads* (New York: Physica-Verlag, 1999), 119-130.

There are several consequences to enterprise subsidizing. First, write-offs of liabilities such as social insurance payments and energy bills decrease monetary transparency. As a result, real costs are underestimated, which forces the prices of products to be set lower than the actual, and causes the unseen decline in revenue to underrepresent the true number of unprofitable government enterprises. Second, soft budget constraint policies do not encourage restructuring within the firm. The large-scale sector mostly contains industrial enterprises with obsolete equipment and bad energy habits, resulting in poor product quality and high production costs. Government intervention keeps these enterprises afloat by indirectly lowering the cost of the final products. Since enterprises continue to remain competitive due to lowered costs, there is no incentive to undertake any kind of restructuring. Third, lower costs of production set an uneven competition ground in the market. Small businesses find it difficult to compete with large scale enterprises given the heavy tax and regulatory burdens that small enterprises have to endure (extra-legal payments of small businesses exceed those of large state enterprises by almost 20 times).[56] These conditions drive many small businesses underground and diminish the incentive of potential investors to start up a new enterprise.

Several key reforms need to be undertaken in order to revive the interest in privatization of large-scale enterprises. One of the most important is the imposition of hard budget constraints, which will in turn stimulate the necessary reforms within the sector. Withdrawal of government support will force large-scale enterprises to seek outside investors. In order to attract these investors, firms will need to increase their efficiency – sell unused space and equipment, reduce their energy use, close unprofitable product lines and develop new ones. Large firms will also have to address labor productivity issues. Experience of other transition economies shows that privatized enterprises experience a rise in labor productivity (see Graph 5). Since many state enterprises are overstaffed, lack of government support will force these firms to eliminate unnecessary employees, increasing their productivity and reducing costs. Another key reform is the implementation of sound bankruptcy laws. Many operating state firms are already bankrupt and their continued operation imposes a major drain on the government budget. The government should approach this goal rather carefully, though, because poorly thought out bankruptcy procedures could have unprecedented effects on the economy (disruption of supply chains, overcrowding in the courts, etc.).

Graph 5: Labor Productivity in the Private Sector (Romania and Poland)



Source: own calculations based on EBRD estimates.

Reforms in the large-scale enterprise sector will favorably influence investors' interest in large firms. However, another major hurdle, which has been discussed already, is Ukraine's poor business environment. Compared with privatization of small and medium firms, privatization of large-scale enterprises would involve many more legal points, which would generate even more regulatory obstacles. Therefore, lack of sound procedures related specifically to privatization of large enterprises could undermine the benefits of hard budget constraints and may significantly discourage potential shareholders.

[55] A. Tubben, "Special Economic Zones in the Ukraine - A Means of Promoting Investment?" *Ukraine at the Crossroads* (New York: Physica-Verlag, 1999), 131-137.
[56] Von Zon (2000).

VII. KEY ECONOMIC SECTORS: AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY

Ukraine's status as the most important economic republic of the Soviet Union was largely due to its two key sectors: agriculture and heavy industry. These two sectors dominated the economic landscape throughout the Soviet era and provided employment for millions of workers, for example, agricultural sector alone employed 21% of the labor force by the end of 1980's.[57] The decade of the 1990's, however, was marked by huge declines of output in both sectors. Agricultural production declined by almost 50%, and the level of industrial output fell to only 30% of its pre-independence levels (see Graphs 6 and 7). The initial decline in output can be partially attributed to the loss of markets in other Soviet republics; however, causes of a decade-long downfall rest much deeper – lack of structural reforms in these sectors seem to be the main impediment to the revival of the output levels.

Agriculture has been an important asset to both the Ukrainian economy and its people. The employment figures and its share of GDP (25% in 1990) suggest the economic importance of agriculture, but this sector also holds a special place in the identity of the Ukrainian people who proudly associate their country with the phrase "the bread basket of the Soviet Union." The nationalist movement that swept though the country soon after the fall of the Soviet Union linked agricultural potential of the Ukraine to its future greatness as a nation, and many others agreed that Ukraine could become one of the biggest exporters of agricultural products in the world.[58] What happened to the Ukraine's promising future? Why did agricultural output drop to such low levels? It seems that the causes of this and many other economic misfortunes in the Ukraine are all the same – lack of reforms and continued government intervention.

Graph 6: Agricultural Production in the Ukraine, 1990-1998 (in USD)



Source: Van Zon (2000), pg. 95.

Privatization of agriculture during the 1990's proceeded at a rather slow pace. Most of the farms are still under government control, some operate as collective ownerships (those constitute only 15% of the total) and privatized plots are predominantly small parcels owned and run by a single family unit.[59] Benefits of privatization can be seen from the following figures: while the output of Collective Agricultural Enterprises fell by 60% between 1990 and 1997, the output of private plots had risen by 20%.[60] However, since the number of these private farms is very low, the increased output of the private sector does not offset the total decline of output by very much.

The lack of interest in privatization of land stems from two main sources: the conservative attitude of the farm employees (when given a certificate to own a land parcel, most preferred to stay in the collective), and the high costs associated with the procedure. Survey of private farmers conducted in 1995 revealed that the government required a capital base of 25,000 – 100,000 USD to start a private farm. The actual family income of the people surveyed was 1,000 USD a year which clearly would not generate even the lowest amount needed.[61]

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[57] Von Zon (2000).
[58] J. Odling-Smee, & R. van Rooden, "Growth in Ukraine – Lessons from Other Transition Economies," *Ukraine at the Crossroads* (1999), 1-21.
[59] "Ukraine" (1999).
[60] U. Koester, and L. Striewe, "Huge Potential, Huge Losses – The Search for Ways Out of the Dilemma of Ukrainian Agriculture," *Ukraine at the Crossroads* (1999), 259-270.
[61] Von Zon (2000).

Graph 7: Index of Real Industrial Production (1990 = 100)



Source: Ukraine. Restoring Growth with Equity, pg. 34.

Since very few farms are operated as private enterprises, government intervention in the sector is still enormous. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, agricultural support will amount to at least 7 billion hryvnas in 1999.[62] Besides the monetary support, the government encourages the use of physical transactions. For example, the state still controls the inputs and outputs through a system of commodity credit (i.e., seeds and fertilizers can be repaid with final agricultural goods like wheat).[63]

This continued government intervention preserves the old structure of agricultural enterprises in which directors from the Soviet era remain in control. Since managers' salaries are not linked to farm's performance, most directors exploit the land to maximize personal gains. This situation is similar at all levels of the government hierarchy, and key players in the government as well as local officials jointly resist restructuring in order to maximize short-term profits. As a result of mismanagement and exploitation, 97% of Collective Agricultural Enterprises are bankrupt on paper and roughly 40% of farm equipment is idle, in need of repair.[64]

Another consequence of a decline in output is a sharp drop of labor productivity in the sector. Both in 1990 and in 1997, 5 million workers were employed in agriculture. As the production continuously decreased during those years (25% GDP to 11.9% GDP), employment in the sector remained roughly the same. Thus, labor productivity of workers fell sharply (down by 30% from 1990 to 1994), and the productivity of land decreased as well (down 15% in the same period).[65]

Given these disastrous conditions, one may wonder how the Ukraine is still able to generate enough agricultural output to feed even its own population. Recent studies indicate that the main source of agricultural goods in the economy is indeed not produced by the inefficient Collective Agricultural Enterprises; rather, the country is literally surviving on small household plots owned by the population.

Ownership of small plots is a commonplace occurrence among the Ukrainian population – about 28.5% of urban dwellers and 98.9% of rural population own a small private plot of land (the size of the rural plots are typically larger than the urban ones). These little parcels occupy only 11.6% of available land, but they produce 82% of vegetables, 97% of potatoes, 70% of fruits and 65% of meat produced by the entire sector (see Table 10). An even more amazing fact – because the owners of these small parcels cannot afford to invest in expensive technology and fertilizers, this output is produced using very primitive equipment (if any at all) and outdated harvesting methods. These results alone suggest the enormous potential of the agricultural sector and the benefits of private management, but similar figures are unlikely to be achieved in the state sector until the government abandons its intervention and initiates structural reforms.

The industrial sector has been the second most important economic component of the Soviet Ukraine. In 1990, it produced 17% of the Soviet industrial output, and was considered to be the highest per-capita steel producer in the world, with an annual output of 1060 kg per person (compared to 382 kg/person in the US). Ukraine's abundant natural resources also allowed it to become 5th largest producer of iron ore and 2nd largest producer of

[62] Von Zon (2000).
[63] "Ukraine" (1999).
[64] Von Zon (2000).
[65] Koester (1999).

magnesium in the world.[66] However, as price liberalization brought about increases in the costs of production, the Ukraine slowly began to loose to foreign competition.

Table 10: Household Plots as a % of total Ukrainian Production Volume for selected commodities

	1990	*1995*	*1997*
Potatoes	71	96	97
Vegetables	27	73	82
Meat	29	52	65
Milk	24	45	61
Eggs	38	56	63

Source: Van Zon (2000), pg. 96.

The increase in production costs has two main sources: heavy subsidizing during the Soviet era and inefficient energy use coupled with very energy-intensive equipment. Government subsidies to this sector still exist in the forms of tax breaks and import protection, generating distorted market incentives and limiting competition.[67] The consequences of government intervention seem to be similar in every sector of the economy, but they are particularly damaging in industry due to the enormous size of most state enterprises. The large size of these industrial firms would make them a more difficult item to privatize even if their future returns were looking fairly promising (the difficulties associated with privatization of large enterprises were already discussed). However, given the disastrous state in which these firms find themselves today, most investors would prefer to deal with the more familiar territory of small and medium-size businesses that are easier to restructure.

Inefficiency of energy use is the second crucial cause of the output decline in the industrial sector. Most enterprises use extremely primitive manufacturing methods, which often prove to be the most energy-intensive. For example, 55% of all steel products are manufactured using open-hearth furnaces, the most energy-consuming method of production.[68] In addition to the inefficient production techniques, most managers do not attempt to conserve energy by reducing the numbers of underused facilities. Again, lack of incentives stemming from continued government intervention prevents these important reforms from taking place.

As a result of general mismanagement and government intervention, labor productivity in this sector is heading in the same direction as agriculture. The latest figures indicate that productivity per worker in heavy industries is 43 tons/man/year, compared to 350 tons/man/year in Germany, 556 in Japan and 476 in France.[69] Restructuring in this sector will require a large influx of capital, estimated at $2-2.5 billion a year, while the government is able to provide no more than just write-offs and tax exemptions. Since most of the industrial enterprises have the state as their majority shareholder, the industrial sector is unlikely to see the needed capital in the near future, and the potential investors will continue to shy away from Ukraine's former "world champion".

IX. POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS

A brief overview of the economic conditions in the Ukraine undoubtedly reveals how pressing the need for urgent reforms is. This situation has one very interesting, and perhaps convenient, feature – there are only a few key reforms that need to be implemented, while the benefits generated from their implementation will improve almost every single aspect of Ukraine's economic development. This by no means suggests that these reforms will be easy to achieve and maintain; however, their concrete and laconic nature may help keep the government from diverging to more trivial and less important matters, and it may increase the government's accountability before international organizations such as the IMF or the World Bank.

The Ukrainian government played a crucial role in the development of post-independence economic trends. It implemented many policies that had proven to be very effective (monetary stabilization and inflation control, privatization of small enterprises, etc.); however, continued government intervention in other sectors of the economy along with inadequate legislation created an environment in which market conditions could not fully develop, as evidenced in almost every section of this paper. Current economic situation urgently calls for a redefinition of the government's role in the economy – the government must assume the role of a "facilitator" and abandon the

[66] Woehrel (1997),Van Zon (2000).
[67] Odling-Smee (1999).
[68] Von Zon (2000).
[69] Ibid.

"command" legacies of the Soviet past. The first step of this new mission should be the elimination of government support mechanisms. Subsidies to insolvent state enterprises are still prevalent throughout the economy, and its effects are seen in the mounting government debts and budget deficits, lack of monetary transparency in many economic sectors, inefficient energy use which results in even more deficits, and lack of investment incentives. In addition, subsidies have an indirect effect on the size of the underground economy as they create an uneven competition ground in the market where smaller private companies have to face enormous tax burdens and legal costs.

Undoubtedly, this transition has to be implemented very carefully since it may prove to be painful and will carry a load of consequences. Closure of many value-subtracting enterprises will result in layoffs of millions of workers, and unemployment will increase even further when restructuring enterprises begin to reduce the number of their employees. Without sound unemployment program this may prove to be a social catastrophe that could lead to unforeseen consequences. Ukrainian government should closely examine similar experiences of its neighboring states (Poland, the Czech Republic and others) which had proven to be quite successful in redefining the roles of their governments. To ensure that this surge of unemployment is a short-term phenomenon, the government should also encourage the development of new employment opportunities, which would bring about the second reform – restoring government's credibility and stabilizing the legal framework.

A successful subsidy-reduction program will certainly help restructure many existing firms, but it may not have as much effect on new investment in the country. Since legal uncertainty and lack of government's credibility are the most often cited causes of disinterest in potential investment projects, the Ukraine may end up with a substantial base of idle capital (remains of bankrupt state enterprises) and a large number of unemployed, but no investment to utilize either of the two components. By ensuring fair procedures, the government would eliminate causes that induce businesses to conduct their activity underground, reduce corruption and stimulate investor's interest in crisis sectors (agriculture and industry). Therefore, it is crucial that Ukrainian government revises its regulations and makes them more consistent and reliable.

These two main reforms are clearly not the only ones that will "save" the Ukraine from an economic collapse – many aspects of Ukraine's economic development are in a need of change. However, profound structural reforms will wake up the dormant market forces and create the necessary incentives for investment and, ultimately, growth. As mentioned earlier, these reforms will not be easy to implement since the government officials are vehemently opposed to any kind of structural change. If these old-regime bureaucrats are left to deal with the implementation of important reforms on their own, the Ukraine may never join the rank of its successful neighbors. International organizations that provide monetary support to the Ukraine should use this aid as a measure of accountability for the progress of the reforms. Perhaps then will the government finally adopt the resolutions that will insure the success of the Ukraine as an economy and as a nation.

X. CONCLUSION

The decade of the 1990's had proven to be very eventful for the Ukraine. The demise of the Soviet Union presented an opportunity of which the Ukraine was deprived for almost an entire century – creation of an independent Ukrainian state with an open market economy. However, the Ukraine was hit with a number of obstacles right from the very start: many markets in former Soviet republics were lost, an artificially created demand for goods was no longer present, poor quality of Soviet products prevented the shift of exports to the West, and higher energy prices caused shortages and payment arrears that consumed almost the entire budget. Given that the institution of central planning was dismantled overnight, and the new framework would take a considerable amount of time to develop, initial decline in growth was almost unavoidable. Output declines were recorded in many other transition economies, and they indeed seemed to be responses to the rupture of social and economic institutions that accompanied transition. Ukraine's main economic objective should have become the creation of its own market-oriented policies. However, the country was too preoccupied with securing its independence status, and this transitional uncertainty allowed many old bureaucratic functionaries to penetrate the government system and secure positions as prominent government figures. The highly conservative government body failed to generate a strong push for reforms, and this inactivity, unlike the Estonian shock-therapy approach, was further exacerbated by the lack of an urgent need for a change. Thus the basic characteristics of the present-day economy were conceived during the first years of transition.

A common theme that prevailed at the end of almost every section of this paper was a need for deep structural reforms and decreased government intervention. These prescriptions differ substantially from those suggested by the IMF during the first several years of transition. It was believed that financial stabilization and low inflation will generate the necessary conditions for sustained growth, but towards the end of the 1990's it became clear that these policies did not promote the anticipated growth, especially in certain sectors of the economy. Besides, the macroeconomic stability of the Ukraine was built on tight monetary policy and stable exchange rates, and without sound structural reforms this foundation proved to be rather weak. Structural reforms will give the Ukraine what it now needs the most - a healthy dose of investment. Unless these reforms are soon implemented, the Ukraine will sit on its rich resource base and devour its own economic potential. The importance of structural reforms is now widely recognized by international organizations and scholars, and many sectors of the economy are desperately awaiting their implementation.

Comparisons and Contrasts:
The Struggles and Reactions of Selected English Ports Between 1338 and 1360

by Theodore Chang

Warships landed in the harbor on a quiet Sunday morning in 1338 while most of the townspeople were attending mass. The sailors they carried proceeded to pillage and loot the town completely, killing many of the townspeople and raping the women and girls. After filling their ships with plunder, the raiders sailed out of the harbor towards home, leaving Southampton a devastated, smoldering hulk.[1] Less than a decade later, disease made a less heralded visit upon that same town. Most of the townspeople were "struck as it were by a sudden death," and those who survived long enough to be confined to their beds lasted no longer than "three days, or two days, or half a day." Disease eventually moved inland, leaving the entire nation devastated in its wake with "ruins in every city, borough and village…all having died who dwelt there.[2] The saga of Southampton is a story that was not uncommon to other port towns in southern and eastern England during the 14th century. War and disease were just two of the four apocalyptic horsemen that swept across Europe during the later medieval period. Although detached from the continent, England was not immune to the ravages that befell the rest of Europe. In fact, the close proximity of English ports to the European continent left them even more susceptible to the devastating effects of the Hundred Years War and the Black Plague.

The Hundred Years War began as a war of suzerainty and ended as a war of sovereignty. Philip IV, the last monarch of the French Capetian dynasty, died in 1328 without leaving a male heir. The French nobility promptly handed the throne to Philip IV's nephew Philip of Valois. However, in 1338 Edward III of England mounted a claim to the French throne, citing that since his mother was a daughter of Phillip IV, he was the rightful ruler of France. War began in 1337 and would not end until 1446. Early on in the war, the English achieved a series of stunning victories at Crécy and Calais before they eventually succumbed to the resurgent French. One of the lasting effects of the war was to firmly establish England and France as the preeminent nation states in Western Europe during the late Middle Ages.

The plague came to England in 1348, relatively soon after the advent of war. It was carried over by merchant ships that sailed between the continent and England. The disease quickly spread inland killing between 1/3 to 1/2 of the entire English population, and created a shortage of agricultural labor that left fields lying fallow and livestock untended. Surviving peasants began to demand higher wages, bankrupting nobles who relied on the peasants to cultivate their lands. The nobles were a valuable source of tax revenue for Edward III, and their financial difficulties left the king with a significant decline in tax revenue at a crucial time when he was still at war with France. In the ensuing decades after the plague, the sharp population decline in England continued to remain a significant obstacle to the recovery of the land.

Ports were the first English towns to be directly affected by the Hundred Years War and Black Plague. Their close proximity to the coast of France left them especially vulnerable to direct attacks from French warships. With English ports losing countless ships and sailors to the flames of war, it is no wonder that their main industries in shipping and fishing suffered a sharp decline in revenue. In the midst of war, the shipping traffic that flowed through these ports brought the first strains of plague to the island, decimating the inhabitants of these towns before sweeping inland. I chose to analyze a cross section of ports selected from southern and eastern England: Southampton, Sandwich, Dunwich, and Newcastle. While all of these towns entered the 14th century as significant English ports, not all of them remained so by the end of the century. By analyzing these towns in particular, I intend to shed light on the particular struggles and reactions of English ports to the Hundred Years War and the Black Plague. Each of these towns faced similar challenges, only varying in terms of their sizes and locations. However, even as certain towns emerged from the 14th century stronger than ever, others fell by the wayside. I believe that this divergence is correlated to the level of each town's involvement in the war. Although the Hundred Years War initially played a primary role in the decimation of English port towns, it later provided the essential foundation for the resurgence of certain ports from the dual effects of war and disease.

The Towns

Southampton was England's chief southern port, accepting a large percentage of the shipping traffic between England and the European mainland. Its main export was wool, supplied from the adjacent wool producing

[1] Jean Froissart, *The Chronicles* (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1963), 22.
[2] Derek Baker (ed.), *England in the Later Middle Ages* (Dallas, Texas: Candlewick Press, 1996), 160-161.

regions of Hampshire, Wiltshire, and Berkshire. The principal destinations of exports from Southampton were textile mills of Flanders and Northern Italy.[3] After the outbreak of war in 1337, Southampton served as the primary staging area for troops and supplies destined for the English forces on the continent, playing a major role in the English victories at Crécy in 1346 and Calais in 1347.[4] Its importance as a military staging area made it a popular target for French forces, subjecting the town to several naval assaults the first of which occurred in 1338 and was chronicled by Froissart. The Black Plague first arrived in England at Southampton, according to the accounts of the English chronicler Henry Knighton,[5] decimating the population before moving inland. Despite these setbacks, Southampton managed to maintain its status as the largest and most important port in Southern England throughout the 14th century.

Located on the southern coast of England (figure 1), Sandwich was a mid-sized port that served as a major trading artery between England and Flanders. It was one of the original Cinque ports, a league of five ports- including Hastings, Dover, Hythe, and New Romney- which were given exclusive trading rights in exchange for providing the royal fleet with ships and sailors. Important exports from Sandwich included wool to Flanders and wine to Gascony.[6] In a royal charter from 1155, the Cinque ports were also given responsibilities to "detail English vessels…and arrest all foreign vessels"[7] which had far reaching consequences. Such edicts essentially gave ships from Cinque ports license to conduct piracy around the southeastern English coast. Sandwich's close proximity to Flanders made it a natural center for smuggling and piracy. However, even as the town boomed as a center for illicit activity, it suffered a gradual decline in legitimate industries such as shipping and fishing. This decline was temporarily halted during the first decade of the war while it served as an important staging area for several of Edward III's earliest campaigns at Sluys and Calais.[8] Like Southampton, the town's position as a Cinque port made it an occasional target for French naval forces. Froissart notes that in 1339 the French "did that winter great damage to the realm of England: sometimes they came to Dover, Sandwich, Winchelsea, Hastings, and Rye, and did much sorrow to the Englishmen."[9] However, Sandwich never experienced attacks in the frequency that occurred at Southampton. Although Sandwich remained a significant port during the early part of the war, the town's decline paralleled its decreasing role during the latter part of the conflict.

Dunwich (figure 1) was a small coastal town located in County Suffolk on the eastern coast of England. At the end of the 12th century, Dunwich was one of the largest ports in England after London and Bristol, benefiting from a favorable royal charter that granted the town exclusive rights to collect shipping duties in the surrounding area.[10] However, the town suffered from a series of devastating storms in 1328 that damaged its harbor beyond repair. Despite repeated attempts to repair the damage, the harbor was never restored to its original condition. The storms also accelerated the erosion of land along the coast, submerging a significant section of the town underwater. The deterioration of Dunwich's harbor permitted nearby towns, in particular Walbenswick, to steal away most of Dunwich's original traffic from shipping and fishing. The Black Plague came in 1349, leading to the deaths of approximately 1/3 of the entire population in the town.[11] Further outbreaks of plague in 1361, 1369, and 1375 also diminished the population of the town.[12] By the end of the 14th century, Dunwich ceased to be a major port in England.

Newcastle (figure 1), a mid-sized town located in County Northumberland along the Scottish border, was the chief shipping center in northern England. Its proximity to Scotland subjected the town to intermittent attacks from both land and sea by the Scots, who were allied with the French. Since Sandwich received its ships from the north, Newcastle fell victim to the plague at approximately the same time as the coastal towns further to the south. The town appealed to Edward III for tax relief, citing that "several merchants and other rich men…have perished in the mortal pestilence lately raging."[13] The ensuing difficulties caused by war and disease prompted Newcastle to turn its primary focus away from shipping and, instead, redirected its efforts into coal mining.[14] By the end of the war, Newcastle not only remained a chief port, but it also established itself as a center for coal production in England.

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[3] Elsie M. Sandell, *Southampton Through the Ages* (Southampton, England: G.F. Wilson & Co., 1960), 31.
[4] Sandell, 37.
[5] Baker, 159.
[6] Dorothy Gardiner, *Historic Haven: The Story of Sandwich* (Derby, England: Pilgrim Press, 1954), 87.
[7] Gardiner, 22.
[8] Gardiner, 108.
[9] Froissart, 32.
[10] Mark Bailey (ed.), *The Bailiffs' Minute Book of Dunwich* (Suffolk, England: The Boydell Press, 1992), 1.
[11] Rowland Parker, *Men of Dunwich: The Story of a Vanished Town* (St. James Place, London: Collins, 1978), 244.
[12] Bailey, 2.
[13] *Calendar of the Closed Rolls 1349-1354* (Germany: Kraus-Thomson Organization, 1972), 258.
[14] Richard Welford (ed.), *History of Newcastle and Gateshead*, volume 1 (London: Walter Scott, 1884), 135.

War

As opposed to inland towns, English coastal towns were more vulnerable to attacks due to their nearness to the sea, which provided easy access not only for trading but also for French and Scottish warships. Newcastle, with its close proximity to the Scottish border, was also vulnerable to land attacks from the Scots. These assaults resulted in the physical degradation of coastal towns. The French chronicler Froissart provides some insight into the nature of this destruction in his account of the French attack on Southampton described in the opening paragraph.[15] This destruction hampered the ability of English towns to conduct trade by damaging port facilities and other vital infrastructure.

The French and Scottish naval vessels also targeted English fishing and shipping vessels, which were important industries for coastal towns. Fishing was a major business in English coastal towns, employing large numbers of boats and sailors. The towns along the southern and eastern coast of England fished for species such as herring and smelt, fish that could be easily salted and preserved for extended periods of time. Since fisheries did not depend on human cultivation prior to harvesting, fish were one of the few reliable food sources unaffected by the plague, therefore making it an important food source for England. Shipping was also a major source of industry, with English coastal towns collecting customs from vessels that carried goods between England and the European mainland. Within a matter of 6 years, the French navy reduced Dunwich's fishing and shipping fleets from 60 to 12 boats. As a result of these attacks, Dunwich claimed losing 500 men and goods valued at 2000 pounds. The town also saw its customs revenues decline from approximately 65 pounds to 14 pounds and 10 shillings.[16] Note that by this time, Dunwich was one of the smaller ports in England, suggesting that larger ports such as Southampton, Sandwich, and Newcastle suffered at least comparable if not worse losses of ships and men.

After the particularly devastating French onslaught upon Southampton in 1338, Edward III embarked on an aggressive campaign to shore up the defenses of vital coastal towns such as Southampton and Newcastle so that they would be able to ward off future attacks. These projects included rebuilding the walls of Southampton and repairing a castle at Newcastle.[17] The economies of these towns directly benefited from having the king invest resources into rebuilding their infrastructure, with the money providing a welcome influx of funds in light of their flagging fishing and shipping industries. More importantly, the rebuilding provided these towns with modern infrastructure, giving them a distinct economic advantage over neighboring towns with antiquated facilities.

The task of supplying troops also provided a means for port towns to sustain their economies at a time when fishing and shipping were declining. Edward III planned to use specific port towns such as Southampton and Sandwich for re-supplying English armies in France and Scotland. Both towns served important roles in the early English campaigns of the war at Crecy and Calais. However, Southampton would later emerge to play a larger role as the chief military staging area in the English campaigns after Calais, while Sandwich played a gradually diminishing role in the war. To the north, Newcastle served as the main English base against Scotland. Even while these three towns- Southampton, Sandwich and Newcastle- were used as military bases, at no time did Edward III ever use Dunwich in any major military capacity. The war-related activities of a town serve as a litmus test for its relative economic condition.

Edward III dispatched soldiers to defend key ports from attack. Garrisons were kept at Southampton and Newcastle to protect them from attacks.[18] The presence of the military played an important role in strengthening the towns militarily as well as economically. The troops provided a certain measure of security under which trade could be conducted. They also had money to spend, filling the coffers of local merchants. To provide an added degree of security for merchants, Edward also dispatched warships in 1359 to protect ports from further attack.[19] While these two policies provided welcome protection for the fishing and shipping fleets of larger towns such as Newcastle and Southampton, it arrived too late to protect the already devastated fleets of smaller towns like Dunwich.

Although the Hundred Years War wrought significant damage upon the infrastructure and industries of English coastal towns, it also provided a means of recovery, especially for towns with significant roles in the war such as Southampton and Newcastle. Towns responded to the damage by rebuilding their infrastructure. The towns' roles as military staging areas and suppliers served to supplement their diminished fishing and shipping revenues. The troops garrisoned in these towns and the warships that patrolled the seas provided a blanket of security that encouraged industry to be conducted. While Dunwich and Sandwich were largely unable to benefit

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[15] Froissart, 22.
[16] *Calendar of Miscellaneous Inquisitions 1349-1377* (Germany: Kraus-Thomson Organization, 1973), 56.
[17] Welford, 162.
[18] Welford, 168.
[19] Welford, 135.

from Edward III's wartime policies, Southampton and Newcastle utilized his wartime policies to maintain their status as important ports in England.

Labor

The plague created a shortage of labor in the estates and manors of England. There were not enough people to harvest crops, much less care for livestock. The remaining peasants, recognizing that their services were in dire need, began to demand higher wages from the lords. Public records from Newcastle show that workmen were being paid up to 6s.8d while plough drivers were paid 7s as opposed to pre-plague wages of approximately 2s per quarter.[20] Edward III enacted the Ordinance of Laborers in 1348 largely to curb rising wages and restrict the migrations of peasants. The law froze wages to levels six years before the advent of the plague and restricted peasants from moving about the land looking for higher wages. Violators faced imprisonment and were required to repay their excess wages to the king. In order to institute these laws, the king created special justices to hear cases involving the Ordinance of Laborers. Local sheriffs and bailiffs of counties were given the responsibility of arresting violators and collecting fines levied against them. Two years later, Edward created an addendum to the Ordinance of Laborers known as the Statute of Laborers. This law fixed the wages of workers in various professions and forbade merchants for charging higher prices for their goods. These laws were largely ineffective, however. In many cases, peasants were paid almost twice their normal rate by conciliatory lords. Furthermore, the ability of certain lords to meet the wage demands of the peasants highlights the disparity of wealth among the nobility. Those who were well off had no problems paying peasant wages to harvest their crops and livestock, leaving the poorer nobility to fend for themselves as best they could.

The demand for higher wages was invariably tied to the rising prices of food. Food was in scare supply due to the lack of labor to harvest crops and livestock. Public records from Southampton note that the price of wheat rose from 6s 8d in 1351 to 26s 8d by 1359:[21]

Year	Wheat Price
1351	6 s. 8d
1359	26s 8d
1361	2s
1363	15s

The shortage of agricultural produce caused people to turn to the sea for food. Higher demand drove up the price of fish, prompting the king to bound fishmongers to sell "such victuals for a reasonable price."[22] The diets of peasants were improving during this period as an additional consequence of the labor shortage. Most peasants ate better since wealthier nobles were offering finer foods in order to attract laborers to work their estates. In "Piers Plowman," Waster epitomizes the gluttonous peasant:

> He would not eat bread that contained beans, but only bread constructed of the finest white flour. He would not drink "half-penny ale" but only the finest lager. Bacon would not satisfy him appetite, only "fresh flesh or fish, well fried or well baked.[23]

However, these wealthier nobles were but a small minority. Most lords were unable to provide higher pay or finer food, themselves reeling from war and disease.

The tense labor climate pitted an increasingly bitter nobility against the peasantry. In the Ordinance of Laborers decreed in 1348, Edward describes the peasants as acting with "malice" and "mocking" among other things, indicating that the nobility looked upon the peasants with disdain for having the audacity to ask for higher wages.[24] Exhibiting a touch of sympathy for the nobility, the English chronicler Knighton accused the peasants of being "obstinate" about respecting the Ordinance of Laborers. He presented the nobility as being caught in a

[20] Welford, 140.
[21] Welford, 140.
[22] Albert Beebe White and Wallace Notestein (eds.), *Source Problems in English History* (New York: Harper and Brother Publishers, 1915).
[23] William Langland, *The Vision of the Piers Plowman* (London: Alexander Moring LTD., 1905), 111.
[24] White.

paradox where the lord "either lost his fruit and crops or satisfy the lofty and covetous desires of the workmen."[25] In Newcastle, several lords begged the king for relief from paying taxes, noting that their lands were either destroyed or lacked tenants to farm them.[26]

Coastal towns were harder hit than agricultural areas due to their contact with the European mainland. Inhabitants of coastal towns were the first to be afflicted and die of the plague. Among those who died included large numbers of fishermen and sailors. Fishermen from Dunwich were "wasted and depressed by the late mortal pestilence and by the king's adversaries of France plundering and slaying the fishermen at sea."[27] The combination of war and disease severely depleted the manpower available for fishing and shipping. The plague also hampered reconstruction in coastal towns by killing many of the workers involved in the building projects.

While Bertha Putnam argues in her work *The Enforcement of the Statutes of Laborers* that the enforcement of the Statute of laborers was largely successful in keeping peasants from migrating for better pay,[28] accounts from rolls suggest that the enforcement of the Statute of Laborers was lax in coastal areas. Records from county Essex indicate "a great quantity of the laborers have withdrawn from the business of agriculture, such as carters, ploughmen, and shepherds, plying these nets because of the gain and excessive wages they receive."[29] The nets mentioned in this passage were fishing nets. Peasants were actually leaving inland farming jobs for jobs in fishing or shipping. The fact that peasants were willing to risk heavy penalties by leaving their farming jobs for work in coastal towns suggest that the economic opportunities were more lucrative along the coast than inland. Such opportunities could be found in a number of areas including fishing, shipping, construction, or even smuggling.

The higher prices of fish meant higher wages for the fishermen, drawing peasant laborers away from the fields to fill the ranks of fishermen who perished in the plague. These peasant laborers essentially reinforced the ranks of fishermen and repopulated coastal towns. However, this was not the case for Dunwich, which was never able to rebuild its decimated fishing fleet and hence did not have the fishing jobs to attract peasants to repopulate the town. Dunwich even saw surviving members of the town leave for opportunities elsewhere.[30] Interestingly enough, the king expressed seemingly environmental concerns during the period. Edward specifically outlawed specially made nets that were designed to catch more fish. Called "wuderthonnes," these nets had smaller mesh that prevented any sized fish from escaping. The nets were weighed down by iron and dragged along the ocean floor, inadvertently destroying the nesting areas and eggs of the fish. The fishermen using these nets caught so many fish that they were not able to sell all of them, instead throwing the surplus away. Edward III outlawed these nets largely to preserve the fisheries from further harm. He blamed this over-fishing on "the gain and excessive wages that (the fishermen) receive."[31]

The task of supplying troops provided shipping jobs for peasants willing to migrate to the coast. There was such a dire need for men to move the soldiers and supplies in Southampton that Edward ordered his officials to comb for men from Southampton and its surrounding areas to work as sailors.[32] Ironically enough, even Edward was willing to overlook his own Statute of Laborers barring migration in favor of the war effort. There was also a corresponding shortage of ships to ferry troops and supplies across the channel, forcing the king to conjure up additional means of transportation. In one particular instance, the ship La Trinite was seized and its cargo unloaded in order to transport English troops across the channel. In another recorded incident, twelve ships were taken, their cargoes unloaded, and used to ferry troops across the channel.[33]

Although they were poor construction workers, the arrival of these peasant workers had a positive effect of helping to replenish the populations of coastal towns devastated by the plague. Even though the plague decimated the construction workers involved in the rebuilding of port towns, the resulting shortage in skilled masons and carpenters could not be helped against the urgency for defenses to be completed in coastal areas. Peasants who flocked to coastal towns in search of work filled the depleted ranks of construction workers. The peasants were attracted to construction work due to the higher wage that they would receive. Records mentioned their wage as 2s 6d a week for carpenters and 1s 9d a week paid to laborers. The sum of wages for a quarter would amount to more than 10 shillings a quarter, much more than they would have received had they continued to work in the fields.[34] Archeological records of Southampton lend credence to the extent to which peasant labor was involved in

[25] Baker, 160.
[26] *Closed Rolls 1349-1354*, 476.
[27] *Closed Rolls 1349-1354*, 620.
[28] Bertha Putnam, *Enforcement of the Statute of Laborers* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1908).
[29] *Miscellaneous Inquisitions 1349-1377*, 406.
[30] Parker, 244.
[31] *Miscellaneous Inquisitions 1349-1377*, 406.
[32] Colin Platt, *Medieval Southampton* (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), 122.
[33] Platt, 122.
[34] Welford, 153.

construction. An account in the rolls from 1352 states that "the parapet on the eastern wall…has been destroyed by wind and rain to the danger of the town."[35] However, recent archeological digs have revealed that the wall was shoddily built, with an inadequate foundation of loose un-motored rubble. At Newcastle, royal records during the plague noted that a castle had "many defects in houses, walls, towers, and turrets…and that heavy repairs and emendations are required" even though it had just been recorded as rebuilt just six years before.[36] The shoddy work related to the wall at Southampton and the castle at Newcastle implies that unskilled peasant workers were largely involved in the construction of coastal infrastructure. The time required learning masonry and carpentry was sacrificed to meet the urgent need for defensive structures to be built.

Towns that replenished their populations were invariably stronger than towns that saw a permanent reduction in population. The favorable economic policies of the war brought a migration of peasants from the farms to take up unfilled jobs in shipping, fishing, and construction in Southampton and Newcastle. Dunwich and Sandwich were unable to launch into recovery due to their lack of these job opportunities. The plight of Dunwich was so pathetic that the town even saw an exodus of men to towns with more jobs. Even though war and disease also ravaged Southampton and Newcastle, these towns utilized the war to create job opportunities to attract peasants, allowing them to replenish their vital human resources.

Economics

With the outbreak of war, Edward III restricted what goods could be traded, specifying that "no stranger or inhabitant shall take corn, wine, ale, horses, bows, arrows, or other weapon out of England…(and) no one shall take out any woolen thread as well."[37] He placed further restrictions on the destination of trading goods, restricting trade to the towns of Bordeaux, Calais, and Berwick-upon-Tweed. By adopting these trading restrictions, Edward III essentially handcuffed the ability of English ports to conduct trade with other important ports on the continent such as Flanders and Italy. Although his original intention was to punish those nations who sympathized with France, the king's restrictions on exports and their destinations particularly hurt Sandwich, which had previously conducted a bustling wool trade with Flanders. Sandwich relied upon Flemish vessels to bring cargoes of fish and other foodstuffs to England, purchase English chalk, lime, brushwood, tan, bacon, pigs, honey, cheese and wool and bring them back to Flanders.[38] However, the king's trade restrictions prevented Flemish vessels from trading in England, hurting Sandwich and other ports which were economically dependent on their trade with Flanders.

Hand in hand with Edward's trading policies were his tax policies. The primary means of royal revenue in England came from annual taxes called the tenth and the fifteenth. Local sheriffs and bailiffs were placed in charge of collecting these taxes from the various towns and counties of England. For inland areas, most of the taxes were paid by the nobility in the form of agricultural produce such as wheat or wool. In coastal areas, the brunt of tax revenue came from customs collected on shipping and fishing. The responsibility for paying taxes lay largely with merchants in towns such as Newcastle.[39] With the advent of war in 1337, Edward required significant tax revenues to finance his military campaigns in France. However, coastal towns claimed that they faced a reduction in shipping and fishing revenue that was related to attacks by French and Scottish ships. Edward III offered to make exceptions for towns such as Southampton which were not able to meet their tax obligations. Following the French raid in 1338, the town received an initial tax exemption in 1339. Southampton followed successful petition with a long succession of pleas that finally convinced the king to permanently reduce Southampton's expected tax payments in 1342.[40]

Appealing for tax relief proved even more difficult after Edward III dismissed parliament between 1348 and 1350 due to the advent of the plague. The arrival of the plague in 1348 prompted even more towns to plead for tax relief. Added to the list of towns pleading for tax relief after 1348 were the coastal towns of Dunwich and Newcastle. Newcastle appealed to Edward for tax relief, citing that "several of the merchants and other rich men" who used to pay the majority of the taxes have "perished in the mortal pestilence."[41] The death of merchants and shipmasters essentially crippled the economy of Newcastle by leaving a dearth of men capable of arranging shipping contracts or commanding vessels. The men of the town consequently claimed to be "impoverished by the said

[35] *Miscellaneous Inquisitions 1349-1377*, 38.
[36] Welford, 162.
[37] *Calendar of the Closed Rolls 1354-1360* (Germany: Kraus-Thomson Organization, 1972), 461.
[38] Gardiner, 124.
[39] *Closed Rolls 1349-1354*. 258.
[40] Platt, 120.
[41] *Closed Rolls 1349-1354*, 258.

pestilence and other adversities in these times of war," rendering them unable to pay their dues to the king.[42] At first, Edward failed to realize the extent of damages that the plague inflicted upon the town, insisting that Newcastle should still pay the taxes that they owed the king. However, Edward later moved to accommodate Newcastle's plea for tax relief. While he had included Newcastle in a list of towns he expected to pay their taxes in 1347, he specifically instructed his tax collectors not to collect taxes from Newcastle even though they were to collect taxes from the surrounding County Northumberland in 1355.[43] Dunwich received similar tax relief from Edward III. Royal records from 1349 show that the king believed that Dunwich was completely unable to pay its taxes. The tax concessions of Newcastle and Dunwich reflect the tremendous financial difficulties that port towns were having as they saw their populations decline with the plague.[44]

Even while peasants were migrating to the coastal areas, wealthy nobles were fleeing England altogether. When these nobles fled, they also took their monetary wealth with them including "horses, armor, equipments, jewels, money and other goods and chattels."[45] The king noted this stating "whereas no small part of the people of our kingdom of England have died of the pestilence, and the Treasury is much exhausted, and many men of the kingdom, with money, etc., transfer themselves to foreign places."[46] Concerned that he was losing tax revenue from the escaping nobility, Edward III finally decreed that nobles were not to leave their estates without his express permission, with the exception of "merchants, notaries, or special messengers."[47] The king admitted that "the realm would be so stripped both of man and treasure that grave danger thereto might easily arise."[48] This decree maintained the political and economic stability of England by keeping nobles at their estates and keeping potential tax revenue from leaking out of the country.

Aside from maintaining his tax base, another reason why Edward barred travel was to limit the amount of smuggled goods between England and the continent. Smuggling was especially prevalent in southern and eastern England due to its proximity to Flanders. However, Edward III lost taxes and customs on smuggled goods, diminishing an important revenue stream for the king. In Sandwich, survivors of the plague were actually bringing scavenged goods from the deceased with the intention of smuggling these valuables to the European mainland for sale.[49] With the plague killing hundreds of thousands, there was no one to protect their valuables from being scavenged by opportunistic survivors. The scavenging of the valuables hampered Edward from collecting death taxes upon the property of the deceased.

With most of England's naval resources devoted to the war, the king found it increasingly difficult to curb the activities of smugglers. The destination of most of the smugglers in southern and eastern England was Flanders, where wealthy merchants were willing to pay a premium for English goods, especially wool. England was the largest wool producer in Europe at the time. The King's decree, barring all shipping from England except to the main English base of Calais in France, frustrated Flanders who needed English wool to manufacture textiles. Sandwich's proximity to Flanders made it an ideal area for smuggling. The king instructed local sheriffs and bailiffs who proved to be extremely zealous in their prosecution of smugglers. In one instance, they seized ships for containing wool cargoes as little as "12 woolfells found bearing no official seal."[50] In another instance the king seized a ship called the "La Lawrence."[51] Laden with wool bound for Flanders, it was apparently blown off course and landed at Sandwich after departing from Southampton. The king impounded the ship for an entire year before releasing it after the masters of the ship provided the necessary documentation proving their cargo had the required permits. Smuggling was not restricted to wool, as accounts in the rolls also mention that the "La Lawrence" was suspected of smuggling flour to Europe.[52] Smuggling helped keep shipping traffic at Sandwich, which was not able to legitimately conduct trade due to Edward's trading restrictions.

However, trading privileges were not tantamount to an economic boom for towns that continued trading legitimately such as Southampton. In fact, exports of raw wool, cloth, and wine from Southampton declined to their lowest levels during the years immediately following the war and plague.[53] Exports of wool failed to reach half its prewar level, cloth exports remained steady but did not increase until the latter two decades of the century, and wine

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[42] *Closed Rolls 1349-1354*, 258.
[43] *Calendar of the Fine Rolls 1347-1356* (Germany: Kraus-Thomson Organization, 1971), 428.
[44] *Closed Rolls 1349-1354*, 620.
[45] *Closed Rolls 1349-1354*, 206.
[46] Welford, 134.
[47] Welford, 134.
[48] *Closed Rolls 1349-135*, 206.
[49] *Closed Rolls 1349-1354*, 206.
[50] Gardiner, 96.
[51] *Closed Rolls 1349-1354*, 440.
[52] *Closed Rolls 1349-1354*, 10.
[53] Platt, 121.

imports suffered as a result of the plague affecting wine production in the Bordeaux region of France. While towns permitted to trade did not experience significant economic growth, their ability to continue trading ensured their standing as economic centers. The war and plague essentially ushered the consolidation of smaller ports with larger ports and permanently established which towns were the chief trading ports of England.

Towns that did not benefit from supplying the English armies found alternative sources of revenue. Realizing that Newcastle did not have the means to pay their taxes, Edward III granted the men of Newcastle a license to mine for coal in hopes that this mining would generate enough money to pay the taxes of the town.[54] For men who previously depended on the sea for their livelihoods, this change of focus was an unprecedented change of lifestyle. The fact that the men of Newcastle were willing to abandon their focus on the sea illuminates the crippling effect that the plague wielded on their ability to ship and fish. Edward did provide relief to port towns such as Newcastle, specifically ordering his tax collectors to avoid these towns even as they collected taxes from the surrounding areas. However, innovation of the men of Newcastle essentially maintained the town by opening it to new industries. Even though the town saw a decrease in trading and fishing, it was still able to generate income through its coal mining. The coal was shipped to English forces in France and sustained Newcastle throughout the course of the war. By turning to other industries, the town of Newcastle placed itself in a position to benefit from Edward's economic policies.

Although reeling from the dual-pronged struggles of war and disease, some towns remained strong and vibrant centers for commerce while others withered away and died. The main reason for the revival of coastal towns was related to the role they played in the Hundred Years War. Edward III's economic policies were extremely favorable to coastal towns, encouraging the shipping and trade that sustained the economies of these towns. However, while Southampton and Newcastle benefited from Edward's economic policies, others saw the realities of not being able to capitalize on these decrees. Sandwich was largely a victim of Edward's wartime economic policies. Trade restrictions limited what goods the towns could ship to the mainland, essentially creating a slow and steady suffocation of their economies. Dunwich, its fleet and sailors devastated by war and plague, was in no condition to rise to the challenge. In essence, the Hundred Years War brought about a consolidation of trade and commerce to certain coastal towns, such as Southampton and Newcastle, and a decline in others such as Sandwich and Dunwich.

Natural disasters

The coastal towns of southern and eastern England were no stranger to the fierce storms of the English Channel and the North Sea. However, the combined effects of war and plague intensified the effect of natural disasters upon coastal towns. Dunwich was a prime example of a town devastated by storms. From 1316 though 1321, it was beset by fierce storms which brought harmful sand that both decreased the depth and blocked the mouth of the harbor. The sand made the harbor shallow, severely limiting the size of ships it was able to accommodate. Later on, the town attempted to construct another port further away. However, it was more difficult to access and not nearly as deep, dissuading any ship traffic that might have entered. In addition, Dunwich suffered erosion from seawater. The records note that "much of the town has been submerged by the sea since the time of Edward I."[55] To a lesser extent, Sandwich also suffered from silting in its harbor. Due to a fierce storm in 1287 that partially silted up the harbor, the town was unable to regain its status as a major port. Sandwich gradually played a lesser role during the Hundred Years War and waned in influence as well. Some might argue that the declines of these towns depended entirely upon the natural disasters that befell them. However, while natural disasters contributed to the declines of Dunwich and Sandwich, they were not entirely responsible for the deterioration of their prosperity. As argued earlier, other factors such as enemy attack, the deaths of sailors, and trade restrictions played a much larger role in impeding the recovery of these towns. Disaster was not necessarily a death warrant for a town, as seen with Southampton. Although Southampton was the most ravaged of the four towns analyzed, it also proved to be the most resilient, emerging from the mid-14th century as the strongest port town in southern England.

Conclusion

The Hundred Years War brought coastal towns into direct contact with the realities of war. In a very real way, they were the front lines of defense against French and Scottish forces. While no great land battles were actually fought in southern England during this war, the towns of Southampton, Sandwich, and Dunwich were

54 Welford, 135.
55 *Closed Rolls 1354-1360*, 56.

exposed to devastating raids by French naval vessels. In the north, Newcastle, situated close to the border with Scotland, was subject to attacks on both land and sea by the Scots. It was natural to expect coastal towns to be devastated by the plague due to their proximity and contact with trading vessels from the European mainland. Plague served to intensify preexisting problems related to war and bring about new challenges to England. The recovery of coastal towns such as Southampton and Newcastle from the war and plague was invariably tied to their importance in England's war effort against France and Scotland. Those towns that were unable to benefit from the war like Dunwich and Sandwich withered and disappeared. Thus, the cumulative effect of the plague and war was simply to consolidate economic prosperity into specific towns along the coast, while eliminating others from the landscape. Indirectly, the economic and physical consolidation of port towns paved the way for England to become a shipping magnate in the 16th and 17th centuries, with these reemerging centers serving as its windows to the world.

Appendix

Figure 1: **Map of Medieval England**

The Great Jewish Revolt of 66 AD:
Conflicts Within Conflicts

by Beau Lindsay

The Great Jewish revolt against Rome in 66 CE was not a simple conflict between a united Jewish people and the legions of Rome. The revolt was, in fact, a segmented conflict that included hostilities between Romans and Jews, the Greek-speaking population of the East and the Jews, and even Jews against their own brethren. These conflicts greatly changed the character of the war; for example, in the initial stages of the revolt, the Jews did not face any large Roman force, but instead the population of cities across the provinces of Syria and Judea. The Greek-speaking urban dwellers and the Jewish population fought a bloody cultural conflict against each other during the initial outbreak of the revolt. For both sides the confusion and chaos of the revolt brought into the open their long-standing hatred. This "Judeo-Syrian war" sapped Jewish strength in the East and supplied the Romans with allies and safe havens for their armies. The Romans also recruited many of their auxiliaries from the Greek-speaking population, thus supplementing their legions with a local force that were already consumed with hatred for the Jews.[1]

The other conflict that exhausted the Jewish ability to wage a successful revolution against the Romans was their internal conflicts. The "Jewish Civil War" contained two elements: first was the tension between southern Judea, with its revolutionary fever and the dominant elite, and the North, characterized by a more moderate approach to revolt and even an inclination to submit to Rome. Josephus himself illustrates this aspect of the Jewish civil war during his tenure as a revolutionary general who attempted to prepare the North for Roman invasion and kept the northern cities fighting. The other aspect of the inter-Jewish struggle took place in Jerusalem itself and involved several powerful warlords fighting each other for control of the ancient city. The result was the slaughter of civilians and, in Josephus' opinion, the conflict between these "tyrants" constituted a major drain on the effectiveness of the Jewish war effort.[2] Therefore, exegeses of both these conflicts--the Jewish civil war and the Judeo-Syrian conflict--will allow a greater understanding of the revolt and the course that it followed.

A) The Judeo-Syrian War

The seeds for the conflict that would erupt at the outbreak of the revolution between the Jews and the Greek-speaking eastern population were planted centuries before 66 CE. Much of the resentment that flourished in this period of violence had its origin in the Greek rule of the Jews under the Greco-Macedonian dynasty of Antiochus of Syria. As a direct result, the Jews launched a desperate revolt, led by the Maccabees, to free themselves from the Greeks. From the period of the Maccabees to the arrival of Rome, the hostilities did not cease and remained in the collective memory of the citizens of these ancient eastern cities. Occasionally, violence would erupt and the pressure would be released in an orgy of violence. Once Rome ruled the cities containing both Jewish and Greek-speaking populations, both sides had to answer to Caesar when violence occurred. Often the attitude of the current Emperor would determine if the Romans would protect the Jews or if their requests for protection would be refused. This is not to imply that the Greeks were always the aggressors, however because the principal sources for these period, Philo and Josephus, were Jewish, their accounts could be biased against the Greek-speaking population. Also, since the Jews held a unique position in regards to their religious needs it was important for them not to anger the Emperor. An example of the vacillation of the Roman rulers in regard to the Jews is clearly seen in the successive reigns of Caligula and Claudius. Under Caligula, Jewish appeals for assistance and protection against their Greek-speaking neighbors in Alexandria went unanswered, while in the rule of Claudius imperial protection was granted and he even issued an edict defending the rights of Jews under Roman rule.[3]

An incident in the Judaean city of Caesarea clearly illustrates the pressure that the hatred between the two cultures produced just before the revolt. During the last years of Nero's rule, an argument raged between the Greeks and the Jews of Caesarea in early 66 CE. The Jews claimed ownership of Caesarea because the Jewish king Herod first constructed the city. However, the Greeks countered by stating that the

[1] Tessa Rajak, *Josephus: The Historian and His Society* (London: Duckworth, 1983), 66.
[2] Josephus, *The Jewish War* Preface, 9 (William Whiston, Nashville, 1998).
[3] Josephus, *The Antiquities of the Jews* 19.5.1 and Tacitus, *Annals* 12.54, in Menahem Stern, *Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism*, volume II (Jerusalem: Lubrecht & Cramer Ltd, 1981), 76.

city was clearly Greco-Roman because there were temples and statues dedicated to the Greek gods in the city and the city was the Roman provincial capital of Judea.[4] This conflict illustrates the antipathy of these two peoples, who both wanted to make it clear that the other culture was the foreigner intruding into their city. The argument quickly led to violence and the streets erupted in bloodshed. Josephus claims that the Jews had superior numbers and wealth but the Greeks were aided by the "assistance of the soldiery," which for a greater part were "raised out of Syria."[5] This fact put the Jewish population in a dangerous position, since the Jews were exempt from military service and, as Josephus illustrates, the Greeks made up the majority of the Roman auxiliaries in the city. Thus the Jews could face a trained auxiliary unit or a Roman-peace keeping force that stood aside as their fellow Greco-Syrians assailed the Jews and it is even likely that the Syrian auxiliaries started many of these conflicts.[6] Yet, in this street battle the Jews prevailed and, as they were closing in on the last of their enemies, the Roman procurator Felix stepped in and halted the violence, with threats of great reprisals for disobedience.[7]

Small outbreaks of violence would erupt periodically, but the full extent of the animosity between these two peoples could not be unleashed while the Romans enforced peace. Thus the hatred and the violence remained temporarily under control. The Great Jewish Revolt against Rome would allow the pent-up violence to be released. With the Jews at war with Rome, the Greek-speaking natives had nothing to stop them from engaging in open warfare with the Jews. Not only the Greeks, but also the Jews used the revolt as a time to unleash a war on their enemies and, in a sense, to enact revenge on their neighbors. Josephus describes the attitudes for both the Jews and the Greeks at the outbreak of the revolt perfectly, stating "every city was divided into two armies encamped against each other."[8]

At the outbreak of the revolution, even before the Romans could react by mobilizing legions or appointing generals, there was a full-scale war in the province of Syria, with each side instituting an ethnic pogrom against the other. The Greeks could now release their hatred in violent action, with no chance of Roman retaliation against them. The Jews, also, could act upon their intense hatred, for the die had been cast and the chaos and freedom that the revolt allowed was also an opportunity for war with the Greek-speaking population. Josephus claims that as a result of the violence "it was not uncommon to see cities filled with dead bodies, still lying unburied."[9] The war was not isolated to Syria, for in Alexandria violence also erupted. The Jews had now become an enemy to the empire; an entire people had revolted. This was, at least, the defense that the Greeks would have claimed. For according to Josephus' account, the violence in Alexandria was a result of a deep Greek animosity for the Jews, dating back to Alexander the Great and his positive treatment of the Jews. Although Josephus states that the hatred of the Greek-speakers towards the Jews was "perpetual," the revolt allowed for violent action without political or legal consequences.[10]

When Rome went to war their armies were not composed entirely of legions; in fact, about half of their armies consisted of supporting units, or auxiliaries, that played specific roles in war. These non-citizen auxiliaries were raised from the provinces and in the case of the Jewish revolt, many of the auxiliaries came from the Greek-speaking population of the East. The same Greeks that were locked in a bloody cultural war with the Jews were used in the Roman army. The Roman practice of recruiting auxiliaries, in the case of the Jewish revolt, not only swelled the Romans' ranks, but also supplied the Roman generals with troops who were motivated by hatred and processed knowledge of the province that would aid the Roman reconquest. Josephus speaks of this in *The Jewish War,* stating that the auxiliaries "indeed had not the same skill in martial affairs [as the Romans], but made up in their alacrity, and their hatred of the Jews."[11]

Before Rome's legions marched into Judea, the conflict was between Greek-speaking Syrian auxiliaries and a hastily constructed Jewish militia. This meant that the "Jewish-Syrian war" that began as urban conflict between two factions spread into actual organized warfare, with the bitter personal violence that characterized the urban conflict. This was illustrated early in the revolt when the Roman commander Cestius led auxiliaries into combat and defeated various Jewish brigands. However, when Cestius retired with his regular Roman units to Ptolemais, he left the Syrian auxiliaries behind, where they continued to

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[4] Josephus, *The Jewish* War 2.13,.7.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Rajak, 71.
[7] Josephus, *The Jewish* War 2.13.7.
[8] Josephus, *The Jewish* War 2.18.2.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11]Josephus, *The Jewish* War 2.18.9

plunder the Jewish lands and slaughter the population.[12] When the Jews saw that the Roman commander had withdrawn and witnessed their enemies sacking their towns, they engaged the Syrian auxiliaries in battle and soundly defeated them. The Jews attacked both because the Syrians were vulnerable without their Roman commander, and also because of their hatred for the Syrians. The Syrians overextended themselves for similar reasons. They reveled in their ability to strike at their ancient enemies, and their excitement allowed them to let their guard down and be defeated. This battle characterized the conflict that occurred in the early stages of the revolt: small pitched battles between Roman-raised Greek-speaking Syrian units and Jewish citizen-soldiers.

Another example of Jewish soldiers fighting against Syrian auxiliaries occurred in front of Josephus' own eyes. When Josephus commanded the Jewish forces of Galilee, the Romans sent a large force of auxiliaries to assist the pro-Roman Jewish town of Sepphoris. It appears that the Romans realized the success and motivations of their auxiliaries in fighting the Jews. The Roman auxiliaries defeated Josephus and his force in a pitched battle outside the city of Sepphoris and after Josephus' defeat, he claims that the Syrian auxiliaries did not act "according to the laws of war."[13] They raped and pillaged the Jewish countryside, stealing food and killing farmers. They even captured and enslaved much of the population. Though this was sometimes military practice in antiquity, the severity of the actions by the auxiliaries must account for Josephus' outrage.

Once the legions arrived in Judea the Romans used the Greek-speaking population of Syria to assist their military efforts in a less direct but equally efficient manner. Since the Greeks of the East were loyal to the Romans, they could use their cities as bases of operation and places to safely rest and refit their armies. This was a great advantage and made the reconquest of the Jews less difficult, since there was no concern of vulnerable supply lines and lack of safe havens. However, Josephus claims that the loyalty and rejoicing expressed by the Greeks at the arrival of the Roman legions in Judea was "only partly out of good will they bore to the Romans, but principally out of the hatred they bore [to the Jews]."[14] The Romans not only used their loyal Greek subjects as auxiliaries but also in more subversive roles, of which the Greek's knowledge of local customs and the area combined with the hatred they bore for the Jews was essential. Josephus describes an action during the siege of Gamala that illustrates the Greek's value as guerilla fighters. During a particularly fierce attack by the Romans, a group of Roman solders, whom Josephus claims were Syrian, infiltrated the house of a Jewish man. At nightfall the Greek-speaking Syrian solders slit the throats of the Jewish man and his guests.[15] Josephus does not tell us who these Jewish victims were or if they had any important role in the Jewish defense of the city. Yet, by leaving the man unnamed the action appears even more brutal, displaying vicious attacks on the citizens of Gamala by Roman solders of Syrian decent who knew the area and could thus infiltrate the city.

The Greeks were not alone in their vicious attacks during the revolt, for the Jews also used the chaos of the revolt to launch similar attacks against their Greek-speaking enemies. In the beginning of the revolt the Jews sent an army to the ancient city of Ascalon whose population, according to Josephus, had long been enemies of the Jews. Josephus states, "out of anger [the Jews] marched much faster."[16] The Jews, like their Greek neighbors, used the revolt as a time of revenge and a fulfillment of the ancient enmity that the Roman occupation had repressed. However, the citizens of Ascalon surprised and crushed the Jews in battle, slaughtering most of the army. The Jews let the hatred that they felt for their neighbors outweigh the importance of conserving manpower for the defense of Judea against the invading legions.

The Jews again showed their willingness to wage a cultural war against their Greek-speaking neighbors in the area of Caesarea. Once the Jews had controlled the city though brutal urban conflict, they decided to divide their forces into several units and attack various Syrian cities. Josephus describes the results of this Jewish cultural pogrom against the Greek-speakers by stating that the Jews "laid waste the villages of Syrians, and their neighboring cities [of] Philadelphia, Sebonitis, Gerasa, Pella, and Scythopolis."[17] Josephus himself admits that he took part in the shameful warfare between the Jews and the Syrians. In his *Vita* he confesses "I too took part in the spoils of those Syrians which inhabited the cities that adjoined to us, when I conquered them."[18] Josephus, writing his autobiography, probably left out

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[12] Ibid.
[13] Josephus, *The Jewish* War 3.4.1.
[14] Josephus, *The Jewish* War 3.9.1.
[15] Josephus, *The Jewish* War 4.1.5.
[16] Josephus, *The Jewish* War 3.2.1.
[17] Josephus, *The Jewish* War 2.18.1.
[18] Josephus, *Vita* 15 (William Whiston, Nashville, 1998).

even gorier details of his forces occupation; however, the fact that he feels compelled to admit that his forces took part in the "Jewish-Syrian war" illustrates the important position this conflict had in the mind of the Jewish general. Josephus shows us in his writing that the Jews met the intensity of the Greek violence with equal violence in the initial period of the revolt.

As a result of the severity of the violence during the "Jewish-Syrian war" the Greek-speaking population essentially fought the first part of the war for the Romans. The Greeks, fighting as Roman auxiliaries, wore down or defeated the first Jewish combat units that were put together. The "Jewish-Syrian war" was characterized by flowing combat, quick sieges, pitched battles, and violent pillaging of enemy cities and villages. Also, the bloody urban conflict quickly made it apparent where a city's loyalties lay. If the cities' Jewish population was wiped out then the city was obviously pro-Roman; if, however, the Jewish community defeated the Greek inhabitants the legions and auxiliaries of Rome could attack the Jewish population. This polarization of the cities allowed for an organized Roman reconquest and Roman commanders could assume that their Syrian cities that acted as safe havens were truly secure. The "Jewish-Syrian war" and the casualties that were caused by it decimated much of the Jews' ability to face Rome in an open battle, and resulted in the series of sieges that would characterize the Great Revolt.

B) The Jewish Civil War

At the outbreak of the revolt of 66 CE, there were few Jewish political structures, save the pro-Roman king Agrippa. There was, therefore, a power vacuum left in the wake of the Roman procurators' administration. In an attempt to fill this void the priests of Jerusalem, who saw themselves as spiritual and political leaders, stepped in and assumed control. This control, however was quickly fragmented among powerful Jewish aristocrats who each controlled their "own body of followers."[19] These aristocrats battled across Judea to gain control of specific towns or regions. The "central authority" in Jerusalem opposed the conflicts between these local aristocrats and at the beginning of the revolt deployed generals and governors across Galilee and Judea and thus endeavored to control the revolt from the capital. This worked in some cases, but when the local aristocrats or the native citizens did not share Jerusalem's revolutionary ferment or felt their own power threatened, then a rejection of Jerusalem's control would occur and lead to violence.

There were two flash points for the "Jewish civil war" during the revolt. First was the North's attempt to throw off southern rule. This conflict was characterized by Josephus' attempts to solidify the revolution in Galilee and keep the North from submitting to the Romans. According to Tessa Rajak it was "Jerusalem, without consultation, which had declared war on Rome" and as a result Galilee was neither prepared nor necessarily willing.[20] The second was the battle for control of Jerusalem. Aristocrats fought bloody conflicts each vying for control of the city and in the process exhausted the supplies and manpower of their city before the Romans even arrived. Both aspects of intra-Jewish fighting undermined the Jewish ability to wage war and successively defend Galilee and later Jerusalem against the Romans.

i) Galilean Resistance to Jerusalem

The origin of the conflict between Galilee and Jerusalem occurred during the reign of Augustus. After Herod the Great's death in 4 BCE, Judea was thrown into disorder as Jews rioted both because of their delight over the death of Herod and their disgust that his son, Sabinus, might rule. The disorder turned to revolt. In this revolt, Galilee was full of revolutionary emotion while the South stayed loyal to Rome. The Romans moved to crush the disorder and laid siege to the principal city in Galilee, Sepphoris. The Romans utterly destroyed the city and, according to Josephus, the Romans "made its inhabitants slaves and burnt the city."[21] The Romans also burnt several other cities, but no population was punished like that of Sepphoris. The memory of the destruction of Sepphoris and much of Galilee had not been erased by the time of the Great Revolt, nearly half a century later. This memory of fire and slavery that the North alone experienced lingered and, when the Jews again revolted, Galilee was not once again ready to risk destruction in the hope of political independence.

Josephus gives us a first hand account of the conflict between Galilee and Jerusalem. He was chosen, by Jerusalem, along with two other priests--later dwarfed in Josephus' egocentric narrative--to be

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[19] Shaye Cohen, *Josephus In Galilee and Rome* (Leiden: Brill, 1979), 196.
[20] Rajak, 145.
[21] Josephus, *The Antiquities of the Jews* 17.10.1 (William Whiston, Nashville, 1998).

sent to prepare Galilee for revolution and warfare. Jerusalem was already attempting to exert control over Galilee by appointing commanders to the North, where a structure of local rulers already existed. In fact, these rulers composed the resistance to Josephus and his attempts to exert Jerusalem's control over the Northern revolution. This resistance manifested itself in Josephus' inability to control Galilee, where he only had support in the countryside and was unable to maintain the loyalties of the cities.[22] This was a result of the long-established aristocrats of Galilee that resented the foreign intrusion into their cities. Josephus begins his account as general of Galilee by stating that his reason for being sent there was Jerusalem's fear that "Galilee had not yet revolted from the Romans [and] some parts were still quiet."[23] This would have been alarming to the revolutionary center at Jerusalem because without complete support of all of Galilee they would be in danger of being isolated, like Sepphoris had been years earlier.

Josephus discharged his duty and prepared Galilee for the coming Roman assault. His first action, he said was to "gain the good will of the people."[24] Josephus was aware of the people's fear of revolt and, if he could reassure them in his leadership and calm their fears of Rome, then perhaps he could keep them active in the revolt. As an attempt to gain the good will of the people of Sepphoris, Josephus allowed them to build a wall around their city because he perceived that they "were rich and wealthy and ready for war."[25] Apparently the Sepphorians were tricking Josephus, because they would later use the same wall to defend themselves from Josephus' assaults once they declared loyalty to Rome. Josephus was disappointed in his hope that Galilee, if properly defended, would succumb to the revolutionary zeal that raged in Jerusalem. However, as a general Josephus could not convince the citizens of Sepphoris to overcome their fear of Rome and join the revolt. Once Josephus subdued Sepphoris by force, intra-Jewish fighting erupted in the city. In his *Vita*, Josephus claims he had to trick his troops to leave Sepphoris after they had stormed it. For if he did not, then Sepphoris would have been razed twice in one century, first by the Romans, then by the Jews themselves.[26]

During Josephus' command most of his efforts and resources were devoted to subduing Jewish cities that were pro-Roman or attempting to convince cities that were hesitant to join the rebellion. The key to understanding the northern fear of committing to the revolt was their fear of Roman reprisal. Josephus, in his *Vita*, recounts a telling incident during his attempt to keep the city of Tiberias fighting. The city was prepared to support Josephus, until they saw "a few Roman horsemen" and then immediately expelled Josephus and declared loyalty to Rome.[27] The task given to Josephus by the revolutionary center at Jerusalem appears to posterity to be impossible. Perhaps Josephus recounts it this way purposely, to excuse his failure. Yet, even excluding the questions of Josephus reliability, it is clear that Galilee was not ready to revolt. Though Jerusalem and the South were attempting to push them into the revolt, there were still memories left by the last revolt and this fear kept Galilee from fully joining the revolt.

When Josephus first arrived in Galilee to assume his command, he encountered a bitter aristocrat who saw Josephus and his command as a threat to his authority. This man was John of Gischala and his struggle to strip Josephus of his command and assert his control in Galilee represents an important factor in the "Jewish civil war." This conflict, however, was not over the issue of revolt itself, but rather who would control the course the revolt; the fight centered on "personal factors and the desire for power."[28] Therefore this conflict was waged by revolutionaries against revolutionaries, which contrasted with the struggle between Galilee and Josephus, which was between counterrevolutionaries and revolutionaries.

From the beginning of Josephus' attempt to establish his power in Galilee, John of Gischala fought to sabotage and destroy his reputation. Before Josephus could fortify his position John launched a direct assault against his forces. According to Josephus, John's hope was to "overthrow Josephus [and] himself obtain the government of Galilee."[29] This was a battle for power amongst revolutionaries, one that was debilitating the Jews' capacity to fight and Josephus' attempts to keep Galilee in the revolt. Once Josephus had repulsed John's attack, the two settled into a stalemate. Both had enough power in the area not to be ousted, but it was divided: John in upper Galilee and Josephus in lower Galilee. Shaye Cohen has even conjectured that John was one of the official governors in Galilee but was not appointed general

[22] Cohen, 214.
[23] Josephus, *Vita* 7.
[24] Josephus, *The Jewish War* 2.20.5.
[25] Josephus, *The Jewish War* 2.20.6.
[26] Josephus, *Vita* 73.
[27] Josephus, *The Jewish Wars* 2.21.8.
[28] Cohen, 206.
[29] Josephus, *The Jewish Wars* 2.21.3.

because "he was not a priest and not a native of Jerusalem."[30] John's lack of appointment and the reason for it again reinforces Jerusalem's attempt to control the revolt and even hints at eschatological reasoning behind the appointment of generals. How better to ensure divine aid than be led by a priest? However, John of Gischala would not stand for Jerusalem's decision and was determined to seize power himself and to lead the revolt against Rome in Galilee.

Josephus' work in Galilee was severely crippled by John's various actions against him. Often John would use thieves as shock troops against Josephus and cities loyal to him. This spread chaos and frightened the people. Also Josephus had to hunt the thieves down with valuable resources that would have been better used preparing for the Roman assault. John of Gischala exerted all possible effort into removing Josephus and gaining control of Galilee. There was no question that John's desire for personal power surpassed his desire for Jewish political independence from Roman rule. In fact John paid Jewish cities to revolt against Josephus and declare loyalty to Rome.[31] John used Galilean fear of Roman reprisal and unwillingness to revolt as tools to weaken Josephus and make him appear incompetent. Even though Josephus did recover these cities, it is obvious that John's actions to secure personal power, combined with other aristocrats across Judea who were fighting for personal gain, relentlessly destabilized the Jewish resistance to Rome.

Once John had been foiled by Josephus, he turned to a new method. Instead of violence, John appealed to the source of Josephus' power, Jerusalem. He sent commutations to the priests of Jerusalem denouncing Josephus as a tyrant. John was appealing to the very source of power that he earlier resisted. However, once again he was overlooked by Jerusalem, either because he was lay or because Josephus was successfully holding Galilee. Even though John always appears the aggressor in Josephus' works, it can be assumed that Josephus was also part of the power struggle that was engulfing Galilee and Jerusalem.[32] With Rome temporarily absent, Jewish aristocrats could flex their muscles and gain power, prestige, and wealth in the chaos of the revolt.

ii) Warfare Inside the Capital

Vespasian was methodical as he approached Jerusalem. By the time the Romans encircled Jerusalem most of Judea had already been subdued. However, before the Romans arrived at the gates of Jerusalem, vicious fighting occurred inside the city for political control and personal gain. The Romans had already captured Josephus, so his writings on the strife in Jerusalem are even less credible than before. This is combined with Josephus' hatred of John of Gischala and all the pro-war elite that were active in Jerusalem. According to Josephus, the citizens of Jerusalem were ready for surrender once the Romans conquered Galilee. However, Josephus' archenemy came to Jerusalem after the fall of Gischala and persuaded much of the population to continue fighting. John of Gischala attempted to persuade the Jews that the Romans were inadequate warriors and the Jews had saved their strength to defend their metropolis.[33] John was lobbying for the creation of a last stand against the Romans. The issue divided the city, but much of the youth rallied to John and his "hawk" party, which immediately engaged the "dove" party for control of Jerusalem.

The conflict in the city that started over the issue of war turned into class conflict. John and his fellow "hawkish" aristocrats obtained control of the lower classes that had nothing to gain from peace. John was also able to ally himself to the zealots, a militant group that stressed the necessity of resistance and the importance of divine aid. The poor rose up a along with the zealots and attacked the pro-peace faction.[34] The violence of this conflict enraged the citizens and turned popular support against John and his followers. As a result the war party was pushed back and forced to take refuge in the temple. Once inside the people surrounded the temple and waited for the Romans to arrive so they could surrender the city.

To save themselves and make certain that Jerusalem stayed in the war, John and the Zealots enlisted the support of the neighboring Idumeans. Though the Idumeans were denied entrance to the city by the population, they overpowered the defenders though subterfuge and immediately fought their way to the temple to free the Zealots. Once free, John and the Zealots overpowered the citizens desirous of peace and killed the aristocrats leading them. The Zealots and their allies murdered the leaders of the peace party

[30] Cohen, 222.
[31] Josephus, *The Jewish War* 2.21.7.
[32] Rajak, 144.
[33] Josephus, *The Jewish War* 4.3.1.
[34] Josephus, *The Jewish War* 4.3.4.

both openly and though mock trials that were staged publicly. With the aristocrats supporting peace destroyed, the Zealots and the other pro-war aristocrats were able to keep Jerusalem in the revolt. In fact, Josephus claims that the death of Ananus, an aristocrat who favored peace, "was the beginning of the destruction of the city."[35] Certainly with all aristocratic opposition to war shattered Jerusalem was set on a path that would lead to its destruction.

As soon as John of Gischala secured his power, other aristocrats sought his position and gained support from portions of the population by labeling John a tyrant. This was another facet of elite conflict that occurred during the revolt. However, instead of aristocrats fighting over the political course of Jerusalem, this conflict was purely for personal gain. Soon Jerusalem was divided into three camps, each lead by one charismatic aristocrat who sought power though the annihilation of the others.[36] The population was on the outskirts of this conflict; occasionally killed in the fighting or forced into starvation by the battling warlords and the Roman siege. The conflict between these aristocrats surrounded the temple. Each fraction fought to secure the temple and use it as a validation for their rule. The fighting was so severe that much of the city was burned, including "houses that were full of corn, and of all other provisions."[37] The conflict between the aristocrats left the city open for Roman assault. With the city decimated from the inside there was no hope of a long siege that could wear down the Romans. Jerusalem itself was already war weary before the Romans constructed their first siege engine. Josephus claims that the city was like a "huge body torn to pieces" and much of the population wished for the Romans to arrive simply to draw the aristocrats' focus away from internal conflict.[38] Only when Roman assaults intensified did the aristocrats cease their struggle. Vespasian and Titus knew of the internal divisions and purposely prolonged their activity to let the Jews destroy themselves. Josephus even goes as far to say that "the sedition destroyed the city, and the Romans destroyed the sedition."[39]

Although Josephus blames the defeat and destruction of the Temple and Jerusalem on the sedition, other sources, such as Tacitus and Cassius Dio, do not mention it.[40] There are multiple explanations for the lack of congruencies: first; Josephus' proximity to the event gave him a better understanding, second; that Josephus' animosity towards the Jewish elite clouded his writings and forced him to blame the revolt on them, or third; that the Greco-Roman authors did not see the importance of Jewish agitation within Judea. Regardless of the level of importance or questions of its multitude the existence of the intra-Jewish fighting must be assumed even without concurring sources because of the amount of attention it receives in Josephus' works and historically other revolutions have often suffered from internal conflicts as groups attempt to control its course.

[35] Josephus, *The Jewish War* 4.5.2.
[36] Josephus, *The Jewish War* 5.1.3.
[37] Josephus, *The Jewish War* 5.1.4.
[38] Josephus, *The Jewish War* 5.1.5.
[39] Josephus, *The Jewish War* 5.6.1.
[40] Tacitus, *Chronica* 2.30.3. in Stern, 64, and Cassius Dio, *The History of Rome* 66.4-7, in Stern, 374.

Le Menagier de Paris:
A Parisian Bourgeoisie Household in 1400

by Courtney Luckhardt

In about the year 1400, an older bourgeoisie man of about sixty living in Paris married a young girl of good family and brought her into his household. At about fifteen, she had no real experience of running a household, and so her husband kindly wrote a manual to instruct her upon her duties as his wife and mistress of the household, dealing with domestic life in the late fourteenth century. This manual is a unique source for the study of domestic life, describing the young wife's responsibilities in the home, her duties to her husband, and giving the reader a picture of her home and the medieval Parisian world in which she lived. The young wife's existence was very different from what is seen today, six hundred years later. The material world in which she lived was filled with discomforts that have largely disappeared in western societies. Insects plagued people in their clothes, their bed, and their food. Smells were everywhere; inescapable odors of excrement draining down the middle of the streets, unwashed humanity, and rotten meat. Human labor was absolutely necessary for the smooth operation of an average-sized upper class household such as the young wife's. Domestic servants, now seen as the purview of the wealthy, were not thought of as a luxury, but a necessity in a world without running water, plumbing, any machines to clean, or even carry things. Through the eyes of the author of the book, *le Ménagier de Paris*- the Goodman of Paris- and his young wife, this paper will explore the home of an upper middle class bourgeoisie, their conditions of life, and the late medieval Paris that they describe to us in staggering detail.

The House

The house was three stories, consisting of a ground floor or a basement, and two floors above that.[1] While the text refers directly to an upstairs and a downstairs, the author also describes a storage area for keeping wines and other foods, such as grain, oil, nuts, peas, and beans.[2] These were most likely kept in a basement or ground floor, and based on floor plans of medieval houses still surviving in Cluny[3] in Bordeaux, a ground floor seems likely. One reason that a well-to-do family might want a ground floor in addition to two other floors was also the issue of the smell of the street itself. The streets of medieval Paris did not have sewers or underground drainage pipes. All rainwater, wash water, and liquids of all kinds, including excrement drained downhill into the Seine. All the streets sloped towards the middle to provide this drainage ditch, and also downhill to facilitate some removal to the river. This made for wet and smelly streets however, that the well to do could afford to lift themselves out of by building multiple story houses, with the ground floor on the street itself used as storage and servants' areas.

These servants' areas include a dining room just for the servants, who would not of course eat with the master of the house. Servants were to be treated as small children, not allowed to indulge themselves, but given some leisure time to keep them happy. As the author says, "And do bid them to eat well and drink well and deeply, for it is reasonable that they should eat at a stretch, without sitting too long over their food and without lingering… and if the weather be cold let them warm themselves and take their ease."[4] The servants are taken care of, and given enough to eat, without extravagance.

The issue of warmth, even for the servants, should be emphasized. There were fireplaces in every room of the house, and during the winter months, they were constantly kept lit. Winter in Paris circa 1400 was cold and damp, and fires provided some measure of protection from both the cold and the damp. They also were nasty smoky things that could fill a room with acrid smoke. The author mentions a "smoky fire"[5] as one of the banes of man's existence and specifically tells her that a way to keep a husband happy is make certain the fire does not smoke. In the course of fourteenth century significant changes in domestic architecture took hold, namely, the flue fireplace. This type of fireplace allowed for a narrower passage of air through the chimney, causing the fireplace to have a stronger draw to pull the smoke up the chimney. The author does not mention this type of fireplace, possibly because it was too new and expensive for him to own. Fires were covered and extinguished for the night, and the author's wife was in charge of looking after this in the evenings, as well as sending each member of the household off to bed with a candle and strict instructions on how to properly put it out, most likely to guard against

[1] *The Goodman of Paris* (Eileen Power, New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co., 1928), 218: "the one upstairs, the other downstairs."
[2] Ibid. 216, long list within the text.
[3] Jean-Pierre Leguay, *La Rue au Moyen Age* (Paris: Ouest France, 1981), 113.
[4] *The Goodman of Paris*, 218-219.
[5] Ibid. 173.

unintentional fires.[6] The hazard of fire was important in the close quarters of the city, with most every building constructed of wood. Fires could rip through an urban area, destroying homes and property in a very short time. The smoke from these fires in every room should be multiplied by every other house or apartment in Paris, and the picture of this late medieval city has smoke in the air constantly, staining the buildings black, although not as bad as northern European urban centers would look in the nineteenth century from the coal smoke.

On the first floor of the house was the main reception and gathering area of the house. Guests would come up the entrance steps, their importance underscored by the fact that they were swept daily by servants, to the main floor.[7] People entered through the main hallway, which was lined with benches with cushions upon them, known from instructions to the servants about how to clean these benches.[8] They often stayed to speak to one another in this hallway, as a sort of casual gathering area. More formal gathering occurred in the main dining hall, which was the "living room" of the Middle Ages. In the main hall, people would not only eat the elaborate prepared meals, but also converse, mingle, do business, tell stories, all the things that modern people do, albeit at a slower pace. One did not just have people over for a cocktail, but for a five-course meal; family did not just visit on Christmas Day, they arrived at the beginning of Advent and stayed in one's home until Twelfth Night. Travel was complicated and slow, and so if one managed to travel, one stayed for a while. This room would have no doubt have had a large fireplace, both for warmth and for atmosphere, which presumably served as the focal pint of the hall. It also would most likely have had low windows that faced the street. They would likely have had glass, as due the richness of an upper-middle class household, although the author does advise his wife not to let the servant girls hang out the windows and call to people on the street, which leads us to believe that some may have opened, or not had glass.[9] On all the windows was drapery, which the servants cleaned with lye soap.[10]

The great dining hall would have been serviced from the kitchen directly, and therefore the kitchen cannot have been too far away. Some kitchens in the late middle ages were inside the house or attached to it, but it was just as common was for the kitchen to be behind the house, fully detached from it, so that the heat of cooking did not fill the house in the summertime. The author does not say where his kitchen is located in relation to the house, so for the purposes of trying to reconstruct this house, I have chosen to make it detached from the house. This allows the kitchen to have its own independent fireplace, one large enough to roast an ox, and not worry about the location of the chimney. With an outside staircase, it would not have been a large inconvenience for the servants to bring food from the kitchen to the dining hall, and the kitchen would also have easy access to the storage areas on the ground floor of the house, and the garden behind the kitchen, which we will come to later.[11]

The upper floor of the house contained the bedrooms and main living quarters for the author and his wife. On this third floor lay the master bedroom, which is described in some detail, including some furniture, as compared to the rest of the house. The master chamber contains a bed with bedding; white sheets most likely made of linen, fur covers, and coverlets.[12] The bed also had "tassels" on it, perhaps to draw the canopy closings around the bed.[13] It was essential that these linens and bedding be periodically aired to keep all types of vermin away, from moths, to mice, to the ubiquitous fleas.[14] The manual provides many remedies for ridding or protecting oneself of unwanted pests that infested the house and the bedroom. Some of these are common sense, others seem to be practical home remedies, and others still seem to be composed of rumor and imagination. Mosquito netting was used as a common sense remedy to flying insects that bother people at night, especially in the summertime. Perhaps a practical method of attracting insects, fleas included, the author gives as putting a bit of bread out with some glue, and a candle in the middle,[15] or the string coated with honey to which insects would stick, like modern day flypaper. Another practical remedy was a recipe for fly-poison, milk and hare's gall, which most likely did produce a toxin that might cause flies to die.[16] An ineffectual notion for getting rid of fleas was to spread a white cloth on the bed, waiting for the fleas to jump on it so one could see them, and then kill them with one's hands!

There was also an armoire for the master's and mistress' clothing, and probably more than one, although the author does not state so for certain.[17] Keeping the clothing clean and repaired was as great a task as rooting out

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[6] Ibid. 219: "make certain that …they have been wisely taught how to extinguish [the candle] it with mouth or hand."
[7] Ibid. 211 "bid the chambermaids very earth to sweep out and clean the entrances to your house"
[8] Ibid.211 "let them dust and shake out the covers and cushions which be on the benches"
[9] Ibid.219-220 "there is no dormer window or low window looking onto the road"
[10] Ibid. 215 "cause full clean lye, which hath been used on drapery"
[11] Ibid. 217-218 passage about the kitchen
[12] Ibid. 41, 171, 214, direct copy of text words "white sheets…", "fur covers…", "coverlets,…"
[13] Ibid. 174: "tassels."
[14] Ibid. 214, long passage on insect removal.
[15] Ibid. 173, direct paraphrase of longer text.
[16] Ibid. 175, direct paraphrase of longer text.
[17] Ibid. 50, long discussion of clothing within the bedchamber.

vermin within the house. The author lists clean linens as one of the key issues in keeping a husband happy and content, saying, "Wherefore love your husband's person carefully, and keep him in clean linen…well-bedded in white sheets and nightcaps, well covered with good furs… And the next day fresh shirts and garments."[18] Linen undergarments and sheets could be washed, but fancy wool dresses and clothes could only be aired, and beaten with rods to get the dust out. Cotton was as yet unknown. The author also offered several recipes for removing grease stains from clothing, some of which seem to be tried and true home remedies, but some of which seem of doubtful value.[19] Fur apparently presented its own problems for there are also solutions for how to fix fur that has either dried out and become brittle and hard, or become damp and mildewed.[20] Clothing was quite expensive, and in order to look proper and not spend lavishly, clothing was repaired and maintained for as long as possible. Obviously imported fabrics such as silk, camlet, and damask must have been sought after by members of the burgeoning wealthy professional class, and kept up in good condition once obtained.

Next to the master bedroom is a small room for the serving girls to sleep in so the mistress of the house might keep a close eye on them. The room was to have no windows so that the girls could not get into trouble with the young men outside.[21] The author does acknowledge the irony of having his fifteen year old bride look after chambermaids of fifteen or twenty years, the same age or older as she herself. He says, "Let them [the chambermaids] go to bed and arise at your own time, and do you yourself (who, if God please, will be wise ere this time) be near to guard them."[22] It is somewhat surprising to have servants directly next to the master bedchamber, but understandable given the obvious concern that people will take advantage of young women if given an opportunity, or that young women might go astray easily. To this effort of keeping young women safe and protecting the house, the wife and her trusted servants locked up the house every night before bed, with either the housekeeper or the steward keeping the keys for the night.[23]

Also on this top floor was a solar. This room was a sun parlor made to catch whatever sun there was as a pleasant room for female pursuits and socialization.[24] There is no doubt that this room would have been on the topmost floor of the house, and also presumably would have been located on the south side of the house in order to catch the sun especially in the wintertime, when it does not go across the Paris sky, but stays in the south end due to the extreme northern latitudes. The excellent light in this room would have made it ideal for needlework and even reading, since the author's wife was literate in French, since he he instructs her to read books in the language, and she was also presumably fluent in Latin as well, as is suggested by the many Latin phrases employed throughout the book.

This book survives in three separate copies, all of which date from the early fifteenth century. Manuscripts "A" and "B" were preserved in the library of the duke of Burgundy, and "A" is mostly likely the original presentation copy from the author himself to the duke, since it contains at its beginning a rare miniature of the presentation of the manual to his wife in a sitting room of sorts.[25] While we cannot know whether this is in fact a true depiction of the author's house, or what room it might be in, it is fair to assume that they would not have painted a house vastly different in size or wealth or quality from his own house. This painting gives new insight to the interior of the house, and this room was most likely a solar in my opinion, due to its prominent windows, occupants seated on a couch or covered bench, rather than at a table, as would befit the dining hall, and the lack of a bed, as would be in the bedroom. The couch has a pillow upon it with a subtly placed hint of the author's status. It displays a fleur-de-lis, the emblem of the royal house of France, and only available for use by the royal family, or their most important servants. The author could not have created a coat of arms with the fleur-de-lis, but he had the right to use it in wall hangings or pillows because he was one of the most important servants of a royal personage. Which royal person he served we cannot know, for he mentions the Duc de Berry several times within the manuscripts, but all extant copies of the manual come out of the Duke of Burgundy's personal library. Both of these men were the sons of the previous king, and the brothers of the current king of 1400. Also shown in the miniature are the windows, which do have glass, small medieval panes with cross-hatching of lead to keep all the small pieces together, since they had not yet developed the technology to make large sheets of glass. They also have shutters on the interior of the windows as well, probably to keep in the heat during the winter months. The room has a large

[18] Ibid. 171-172.
[19] Ibid. 214, long discussion of fixing clothing.
[20] Ibid. 215, discussion on fixing furs.
[21] Ibid. 219-220: "chambermaids…do cause them to sleep near you, in a closet or chamber, where there is no dormer window or low window looking onto the road."
[22] Ibid. 220.
[23] Ibid. 219: "let your house be closed and shut up by master Jehan the Dispenser or by the Béguine, and let one of them keep the keys."
[24] Ibid. 218: "the other [servant] in the solar."
[25] Georgine Brereton and Janet Ferrier, *Le Ménagier de Paris*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), xiv-xviii- discussion of the surviving manuscripts.

fireplace with chimney that takes up much of one side of the room. The floors in the painting are made of alternating blue and beige tiles, without any rushes or carpets. The floors were never mentioned in the manual, other than for sweeping, so we can see that a tiled floor as depicted in the miniature is a reasonable surface for the author's house, well-to-do and expensive. The ceiling, made of three barrel vaults, coinciding with the three windows, giving more credence to the notion that is the solar, which would have been on the top floor, allowing vaulting. The colors of the miniature are dramatic, with bright green walls, a red cloth over the bench, and the master and mistress in their finest robes. This use of color in the decoration is never mentioned in the text. The picture indicates vividly what this house might have looked like, not just dull browns of wood and plaster, but bright paint to reflect light from the large windows.

Greater Servants

Despite the seemingly endless listing of household chores given to her as part of her wifely responsibilities, they young wife did have leisure time, and time for devotions. Part of the difference between the author's wife's idea of housework and perhaps a twenty-first century idea of housework is that she supervised not only a staff of permanent domestic servants, but also delegated much of the responsibility of supervision to two head servants of the household mentioned many times by name. "Agnes the Béguine" and "Jehan the Dispenser" were the housekeeper and steward, respectively, of the author's house. While the names of the master and mistress of the house are never mentioned, these two servants are mentioned numerous times, with extremely varied responsibilities and overseeing the entire staff, professionally seeing to all the needs of the house and its occupants, only needing the mistress for decisions or for another person to supervise the needs of the house. The housekeeper and duenna, Agnes, was a béguine, which was a secular order of women who took vows like a nun, but lived in the world to make a living of some sort. She is more experienced at household management than the mistress of the house, a mere fifteen-year-old girl. Whenever the young wife has a question or does not know what should be done, the author's standard response is, "Consult the Béguine."

Jehan the Dispenser is an equally indispensable figure, for both the mistress and the master of the house. John is literate and keeps the account books. He also oversees all of the wine and food storage in the cellar, he also deals with the horses, and other sundry household tasks, plus he oversees all the money that runs in and out of the house account books. One may conjecture that this position of steward and house overseer is the occupation of the author himself at the noble household of the Duc de Berry, whom he mentions frequently, or perhaps even the Duke of Burgundy. The author knows a great deal about the practical aspects of household management, but does not appear to practice it within his own house, but for another higher in class than he, a standard hierarchal practice that leaves Jehan the Dispenser to care for the needs of a the author's own upper-middle class household.

Lesser Servants

The hierarchal nature of this society is made eloquently clear even by the division of labor among the servants, and the classes of servant working within a house at any given time. Highest up on the servant hierarchy is of course, Agnes the Béguine and Jehan the Dispenser. Below these two are the domestic house servants who live within the household year-round and contribute to it a constant fashion. These people would be the cooks, grooms, chambermaids, and scullery maids. Character is most important reference for these types of workers, maid- servants should be good girls, not ones who have gotten into trouble at home or in the country somewhere, and now run away for work in the city.[26] The master and mistress required good behavior from their servants at all times, allowing no gossip, swearing, drunkenness, or any other form of bad behavior.

Next in the hierarchy are those skilled servants who were hired with a special skill for a specific task. These include dressmakers and tailors, furriers, bakers, butchers, shoemakers, tallow-candle makers, spicers, blacksmiths, and wheelwrights.[27] These people were generally artisans or people with independent shops that rely on apprenticeship to learn the skill, and a trade union to keep the occupation up to high standards. This was somewhat of a vertical move down due to the lack of contact with members of the upper class, but it was also in some ways a horizontal move from that of domestic servant, these types of people were highly regarded as productive members of the society.

The last and lowest type of servant were those people hired for some type of seasonal or short-term work, such as harvesters, packers, wheelbarrow men, reapers, mowers, threshers, vintagers, basket bearers, wine pressers,

[26] *The Goodman of Paris*, 208-9 long passage upon domestic servants and their hiring.
[27] Ibid. 205, copied the exact list from the text.

coopers, and porters. Many of these jobs have largely disappeared today due to industrialization and the advent of modern technology, none more so than the porter. A person today can barely imagine a world in which everything must be carried. Not just groceries home from the market, but all water in the house was brought in by porters, drawing from a local well that was not on the property, since there is no mention of one. Water for cooking, drinking with wine, bathing (albeit rarely), had to be carried in manually. The wood for the fireplaces in every room of the house needed to be carried in, and then the ashes from the fireplace needed to be carried back out. All sewage, waste-water, and garbage also had to carried out manually. This lack of mobility of basic items and goods is something unfathomable to us, who are accustomed to cars, shopping carts, running water, and the conveniences of the modern age.

House Property

The house probably sat on a good-sized piece of land, judging from what we can glean from manual regarding the outside of the house. I have already placed the kitchen as detached from the house, but near it in the yard. The master also speaks about horses and stables, which would be behind the house, entered through a corridor on the ground level.[28] Also mentioned is a listing of dogs that the author finds to be honorable or noble animals, namely the "greyhound or mastiff, or little dog…always has his eye and his heart upon his master."[29] This list implies that the master might have had dogs, and would therefore need a dog kennel to house them in on the property, most likely near the stable. There is a discussion of different types of farm animals, their care, the servants in charge of the animals, and the barns; however, it seems extremely unlikely that there would be enough room on this estate in the middle of Paris to have a farm.[30] It is therefore most likely that the author owned property outside the city somewhere, rather than having all these holdings within Paris itself.

Food and Shopping in Paris

Obtaining and preparing food was a major issue within the manual. In fact, the most likely reason that this little manual was preserved in three copies was probably due to its use as a cookbook, rather than as an appreciation of all his household wisdom that tells us so much about the author's life. The household grew much of its food in a kitchen garden throughout the year; the garden was a source of fresh vegetables and fruits in the city. The summer found the household rich in foodstuffs from the garden, including peas, beans, leeks, parsley, and various "greens" of unknown variety. Winter found them eating mostly cabbage out of their garden, along with different types of squash as well.[31] The author was rich enough to buy much of his food from the markets around Paris as well. All of his meat was purchased in the city from butchers, and all of the bread was baked by bakers rather than at home, as it would have been the case had they lived in the countryside. While herbs were grown in the garden, presumably for their taste as well as some medicinal properties, the household also purchased spices from abroad (that is, beyond Paris) at specific shops called "spiceries".[32]

The spices used in the household not only speak to its affluence, but also to its fairly broad horizons in the medieval period. Things that are commonplace today were rare, and had traveled many miles along trade routes before findings their way to a market in Paris. Exotic items included almonds, powdered ginger, ground cinnamon, saffron, cloves, pepper, and bay leaves.[33] These spices attest to the expanding horizons of an upper-middle class household eager to sample all that its money could afford. There were small, local markets all over Paris, selling mostly fresh, local produce to the townspeople. Presumably, there were spiceries in many of these small marketplaces, as well as in the large, wholesale market at Les Halles. For the author's wife, all of Paris was familiar to her as a place of travel or business. In 1400, a little less than 200,000 people lived within the wall of Charles V, a vast number according to medieval standards. However, all of these people were living in an area whose longest streets stretching across the city from north to south and east to west was only about a mile and a half long each.

Therefore, in this small space, Paris itself could be walked from end to end in a short amount of time. It was not divided into boroughs as the large cities of today are, but it was a borough itself. This intimate feel of the city is borne out by the fact that the markets the author recommends to his wife run the length and breadth of the city. He tells her of the butchers all over the city, from Porte-St-Martin and The Temple in the north, Porte-St-

[28] Ibid. 176: "they cause their horses to be given fresh litter up to their bellies; these horses be unharnessed and made comfortable…"
[29] Ibid. 108.
[30] Ibid. 211-213, long discussion of the farm and its environs.
[31] Ibid. 195-204, contains extensive listing of what types of plants are grown and harvested in the garden at different types of the year.
[32] Ibid. 24: "from the spicer…"
[33] Ibid., direct list from text of book.

Germain and in the east, Porte-Ste-Geneviève in the south and the largest butcher at Porte de Paris just on the right bank of the Seine. He also sends her to the milk market at Pierre au Lait, further north on the right bank, and the Place-de-Greve, where she could buy coal, wood, and kindling as well.[34] The young wife did not carry any currency when she went on these shopping expeditions for household supplies, she merely charged all purchases to a credit account held with particular merchants, and the steward Jehan the Dispenser would go round and pay her bills later.

Wife's role within Society

This manual is by no means a "liberal" treatment of women, but the husband and author of this work is a reasonable product of his times, quite kind and tender with his young wife. He expects the typical wifely behavior of the fourteenth century, which is to be expected. He lists four ways to treat a husband, foreign to the modern relationship (or at least hopefully so). He says first that she must be obedient to his wishes and commandments. Second, that if he has given no express command about the household, she may do as she sees fit, but keep in mind his general preferences. Third, she must never do anything he forbids, even if it sounds like he is joking when he says it. Lastly, she must never be arrogant or answer back, and never contradict him in front of other people.[35] This being said however, he does mention that he does not expect the perfect love and obedience of Griselda, on whom he gives a long parable on wifely duty. "I have set the text here merely to lesson you, have not set it here to apply to you, nor because I would have such obedience from you, for I am not worthy thereof."[36] Therefore, while he is a normal medieval husband in that he expects his wife to be obedient, the expectation is not out of bounds. He even says directly, "And excuse me if the story [of Griselda] telleth of cruelty too great (to my mind) and above reason."[37] The fact that even he looks upon the tale as an extreme cautionary parable which is well know, but not a moral absolute of how women ought to behave towards their husbands, and vice versa. In fact, he is eminently reasonable on the subject, as he says,

> And all their special pleasures, their chief desires and their perfect joys be to do pleasure and obedience unto each other, and if they love each other, they care naught for obedience and reverence beyond the common, which is too small for many.[38]

This is an idea even a modern relationship can appreciate; love and respect go hand and hand, and that he who respects and loves his wife shall get love and obedience in return. While the marriage between the sixty-year-old author and his fifteen-year-old bride may not be ideal in age, it appears from this manual that she was treated well, and cherished as a wife, and almost a daughter figure at the same time.

The unique view of this manuscript has given us a view into a world long vanished; life in Paris for an upper-middle class man and his wife. Through studying the text, a clear portrait of their house and their city has emerged from something that was never meant for twenty-first century eyes at all. At the time, it was a manual for an inexperienced wife to learn from, and perhaps a cookery book for a nobleman such as the Duke of Burgundy. Now we can use it as a tool for trying to understand what life was really like for medieval people; the bugs, the stench, the class distinctions, the inconvenience of movement. The husband and wife's physical horizons do not extend out of northern France, but through trade and goods, we see those horizons expanding to the south of France for wine, and then outwards across Europe, to the Middle East for spices and luxury items. The unique interior view of this manuscript has made it an ideal source for studying the individual and in specific, the house of one man and his wife, but also showing us a man and his wife in the context of the larger European innovations of the fourteenth century. France and the rest of northern Europe are on the brink of massive change, sweeping its way from Italy

[34] Ibid. 221, direct list from text of book supplemented by map locations discussed with Dr. Rouse.
[35] Ibid. 110-111, long passage paraphrased.
[36] Ibid. 137.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.

north, arriving in northern Europe about one hundred years after the author composed this manuscript. The bourgeoisie, such as the author, will be caught up in the intellectual pursuits of the Renaissance, but the standards of living described in this text were still valid for many years to come.

Castra et Coloniae:
The Role of the Roman Army in the Romanization and Urbanization of Spain

by Frank Miranda

All right, apart from the sanitation, the medicine, education,
wine, public order, irrigation, roads, the fresh water system,
and public health, what have the Romans ever done for us!?[1]

In a nutshell, Reg- the Jewish rebel leader played by John Cleese in the memorable 1979 comedy *The Life of Brian*- has rather simplistically described for us the benefits of urbanization brought to many societies around the Mediterranean by Rome's imperial expansion. At the same time, however, the sobering treatment given to that same growth by Tacitus gives us the notion that Roman progress was simply tyranny under another name-[2] at least in the eyes of those who saw little or none of its beneficial qualities. Regardless, it is to that urbanization of empire and its curious offshoot of Romanization- with all of its positive and negative connotations- that this paper will be addressed and, specifically, the role of the Roman army in its transmission.

Reg's complaint is actually less suited to his own environment in Judea, located in the more urbanized east, than in the relatively undeveloped Roman west of the 1st centuries BC and AD. While a highly urbanized civilization equal (and some argue superior) to that of Rome thrived for hundreds of years in the east prior to the Roman's arrival, the west remained largely rural with few large settlements not inspired or founded by the previous Phoenician and Greek colonizers.[3] The kind of cities of the Roman variety would have to wait for the soldiers and veterans of the legions and the *castra et coloniae*- the camps and colonies- that resulted from their arrival.

Spain was uniquely situated within the empire and its history of subjugation and urbanization. Concerning the 200 year-long process of conquest in the Iberian peninsula, Livy comments that "Spain, although it was the first mainland province to be entered by the Romans, was the last to be completely subdued, and held out till our own times." [4] However, the stubborn natives and harsh terrain were only part of the problem: the Roman senate lacked a uniform policy in dealing with newly conquered territory and the already gradual process of urbanization was further slowed. In Spain, at least, it was left largely to the initiative of the commanders to build an empire.

Roman troops first entered Spain in 218 BC to confront Hannibal and the Carthaginians following the sack of Saguntum.[5] Following Carthage's defeat in the Second Punic War, Rome found itself in possession of a small but significant stretch of the Iberian peninsula which it organized into two provinces in 197: *Hispania Ulterior* and *Hispania Citerior*: Further and Nearer Spain. The conquest of the rest of Spain, like many ancient campaigns, was brutal; in Spain's case, it was also protracted. The last armed resistance was as late as 19 BC and insurrection continued to simmer just below the surface into the early 1st century AD. Nevertheless, Rome eventually managed to pacify the peninsula utilizing a combination of effective military action, luck, and outright treachery.

Finally, the twin processes of urbanization and Romanization- which had already been developing gradually as Rome gained its new Spanish possessions piecemeal- could get into full swing. Yet while there is little argument as to what exactly urbanization was and what it entailed, the same can no longer be said of Romanization. Today scholars debate its exact details specifically what it entailed and what it accomplished.

When Velleius Paterculus recounts the Pannonian-Dalmatian revolt of AD 6-9, he describes it as absolute proof that Roman culture had been absorbed into local society at all levels.[6] Needless to say, as some scholars have observed, being a Tiberius partisan, Velleius was hardly an unbiased reporter.[7] Still, Velleius' comments have puzzled scholars and much research and debate has gone into determining the exact nature of Romanization in Pannonia as well as when and how it began.

Yet this curious statement by Velleius becomes more interesting given the situation that was occurring when he was present- a rebellion. That there was a revolt occurring should be considered into the equation of what Roman culture was and what it entailed. As Greg Woolf has noted in his work *Becoming Roman*, Roman culture in

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[1] John Goldstone *Monty Python's Life of Brian* (Monty Python Pictures Ltd c1979).
[2] Tacitus *Agricola* 30 being the most famous: "they [the Romans] create a desert and call it peace."
[3] Leonard Curchin, *Roman Spain* (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, Inc., 1995), 103. The native Iberian settlements are more accurately categorized as *oppida* (fortified towns).
[4] Livy 28.12.
[5] See the appendix for modern Spanish place name equivalents.
[6] Velleius 2.110.5: "in omnibus autem Pannoniis non disciplinae tantummodo, sed linguae quoque notitia Romanae, plerisque etiam litterarum usus et familiaris animorum erat exercitatio…"
[7] András Móscy "The Civilized Pannonians of Velleius," *Rome and her Northern Frontiers* (Gloucester: Alan Sutton Publishing, 1983), 169-170.

the provinces should not only be defined as a result of Romanization, but in resistance to it.[8] As in Pannonia, this syncretic approach to defining Romanization is made more plausible when considering the history of the Iberian conquest.

Of course, when attempting to define Romanization, the Roman's own view of *romanitas* must also be taken into consideration. So, for instance, according to one scholar:

> it was the responsibility of Rome to provide the atmosphere most conducive to the development of these qualities [*humanitas*], whether the men were Hellenic academicians or Iberian tribesmen.[9]

Never mind the actual means by which Rome would achieve such a result, barbaric as they often were- especially in the west and especially in Spain. Regardless, the process of urbanization occurred unhindered whether or not one agrees how much or what kind of Romanization transpired alongside. The initial means by which that urbanization was relayed to Spain was the army and the settlements that were created by its presence.

The army's presence as an urbanizing force made itself known in two obvious ways: camps or forts (*castra*) and veteran settlements (*coloniae*). I will first address the colonies as they are more numerous and survived longer into Roman Spain's development.

Colonies in Spain were initially established as military settlements. Beginning with Italica in 206 BC,[10] many Roman commanders in Spain settled veterans into colonies at the end of campaigns. This served multiple purposes- as a reward for services rendered, as a ready reserve of experienced manpower available for future campaigns or to put down local insurrections, and to influence the indigenous people with Roman customs (i.e., to Romanize them). A similar example at Camulodunum in Britain is recorded by Tacitus:

> In order to facilitate the displacement of troops westward to man [the nearby garrison], a strong settlement of ex-soldiers was established on conquered land...Its mission was to protect the country against revolt and familiarize the provincials with law-abiding government.[11]

Now, in Spain, the number of major towns with veteran coloniae is impressive: Norba, Tarraco, Caesar Augusta, Emeríta Augusta, Emporiae, Valentia, and Corduba- just to name a few.

Often, former soldiers- especially the higher paid and ranking centurions- became town patrons or local magistrates, as is the case with Caius Vettius. A centurion of the 30th Legion, Vettius became one of the first *duoviri*- one of the two local chief magistrates- of Urso.[12] Veterans in these positions would have had an enormous influence in town policies and cultural development. Similarly, Richard Alston's work reveals the continuous stream of veterans into the daily life of the colony at Karanis in Egypt.[13] Possessing full Roman citizenship, the ex-soldiers were at the top of the totem pole among the native inhabitants. This was especially important as the central feature of Romanization entailed the bringing together of the local elite with that of the Roman nobility into an empire-wide ruling class.[14]

Because of this trend, veterans, like those at Karanis and Urso, became attached early to the towns located within the provinces in which they served. Note the problem some settlements had in which this did not occur:

> Veteran soldiers were drafted into the settlements at Tarentum and Antium but did not relieve the under-population of these areas since many of them drifted away to the provinces where they had served...[15]

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[8] Greg Woolf, *Becoming Roman: The Origins of Provincial Civilization in Gaul* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 19. Curchin agrees, *Roman Spain* 55, 180. Also see Manuel C. Díaz y Díaz, "Penetración cultural latína en Hispania en los Siglos VI-VIII," *Assimilation et résistance á la culture gréco-romaine dans le monde ancien* (Paris: Société d'édition <<Les Belles Lettres>>, 1976).
[9] Richard W. Bane, "The Development of Roman Imperial Attitudes and the Iberian Wars," *Emeríta* (44, 1976), 418.
[10] Appian *Iberica* 38.
[11] Tacitus *Annals* 12.32.
[12] *ILS* 2233 in Leonard Curchin, *The Local Magistrates of Roman Spain* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 166, inscription #291.
[13] Richard Alston, *Soldier and Society in Roman Egypt: A Social History* (London: Routledge, 1995) 39-41, 51, 60.
[14] For excellent studies on this, see P.A. Brunt, "Romanization of Local Ruling Classes in the Roman Empire," and José M. Blázquez, "Rechazo y asimilación de la cultura romana en Hispania (Siglos IV y V)," both in *Assimilation et résistance*.
[15] Tacitus *Annals* 14.27.

The reference to relieving under-population was yet another reason to use soldiers as colonists. Referring to Augustus' settlement policies, Hyginus Gromaticus notes "For some of these he founded new cities after enemy settlements had been wiped out..."[16]

This ubiquitous presence of citizens had a telling effect. Locals began to emulate their Roman neighbors. Regardless of the debate over how deeply Romanization penetrated the hinterlands of Spain, along the Mediterranean coast and in the south, where their presence was felt the longest, the population began looking and behaving more like the Romans. The southern province of Baetica was already heavily Romanized, and even in the interior Strabo notes that the people

> are already called "toga'd" (which is to say "peaceably inclined"), and have become transformed, clad in their togas, to their present gentleness of disposition and their Italian mode of life; these latter are the Celtiberians and the peoples that live near them...[17]

The indigenous people of the province were widely adopting Roman customs. It became so pervasive throughout the hinterlands of the empire- especially the use of Roman names- that the emperor Claudius felt it necessary to legislate against the practice.[18]

The widespread adoption of Roman names was also a common consequence of the ubiquitous military presence. Indigenous people who, for whatever reasons, found themselves in the Roman army took on the Roman *nomina*. Alston notes that several people in the register of Karanis with Roman names were not, in fact, citizens. One, an Egyptian by the name of Apion, wrote to inform his father that he had joined the fleet and adopted a Roman name.[19] There are similar examples in Spain, most prominent among these concerns the family of the Cornelii Balbi.

In the 1st century BC, the Balbi of Gades in Baetica were the epitome of the Romanized local elite. According to Cicero, Lucius Cornelius Balbus Maior had been granted citizenship by Pompey in 72 BC.[20] Yet for several generations the family preceding this event had already been using the *nomen gentilicum* of a prominent Roman military family long associated with Spain (that of the Cornelii Scipii). The subsequent rise of Lucius' nephew, Balbus Minor, through the *cursus honorum* (he became the first provincial to become a consul and celebrate a triumph) and Roman society in general is a testament to how Romanized the indigenous elite had become in which the military played a key role.

More practically, the influence of the army can be seen in the actual, physical foundation of many of these settlements. Caesar Augusta was laid out in a rectangular grid surrounded by a wall with four gates, one on each side directly opposite the other which, as Hyginus has observed, was the standard military pattern.[21] At Corduba and Tarraco, the Roman sectors are surrounded by a rampart and laid out in a military orthogonal pattern.

At Urso, Emporiae and possibly several other Baetican towns, we see a slightly different use of the veteran settlement: as a punishment colony. Land would be taken from towns that fought on the losing side and used to settle veterans not only as a reward to the soldiers but as a punishment to the residents. Presumably, the veterans could keep a much closer eye on these once enemy subjects. Examples of this type of military colonization can be observed elsewhere in the Empire, most notably in Italy where Sulla placed veteran colonies at towns that opposed him in 82 BC.[22]

In Spain, Urso had supported the Pompeians throughout the last civil wars of the Republic. The veteran colony placed there by Caesar was the result of their action. The original residents were responsible to the new Caesarian *duoviri* not only for the upkeep of the walls and other town maintenance but to serve as a reserve militia under loyalist officers.

However, establishing veteran settlements within the limits of an existing indigenous town was not the only way in which the Roman army "Romanized" or urbanized the hinterlands of Spain. There were fewer suitable towns moving progressively inland and northwards. Eventually, the Romans had to build settlements from scratch.

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[16] Hyginus in Naphtali Lewis and Meyer Reinhold, *Roman Civilizaion, Vol II* (New York: Columbia Univ Press, 1966) 212.
[17] Strabo 3.4.20.
[18] Suetonius *Claudius* 25.
[19] *BGU* II 423 in Alston 64-65.
[20] Velleius 2.51. The Balbi were enfranchised by the *lex Gallia Cornelia* (Cicero *Pro Balbo*).
[21] Hyginus in Lewis and Reinhold 217.
[22] Appian 1.96.

Some of these, as we shall see, sprung up from or just outside legionary fortresses. Others, such as Emerita, were entirely new establishments.

After the Spanish campaigns of 26 and 25 BC, Augustus founded a new settlement for his soldiers, Emerita Augusta.[23] That these were some of his longest-serving veterans is indicated in the Latin root of the town name, *emeritus*. From the beginning, it is evident that Emerita was not like other veteran settlements or forts. Although it was located in a reasonably strategic area, it was not in a very defensible position when compared to older Spanish settlements such as Metellinum. Its purpose, rather, seems to have been more civil than military. According to John Richardson, "this was to be a high-grade Roman city," designed to overawe the locals with the Roman presence and symbolic of the goals of the Empire: "power, control and peace."[24]

The other means by which the army overawed the natives and urbanized the provinces was through the establishment of encampments and fortresses. After its pacification, Spain had only one legion assigned to it, in the formerly tempestuous north. Made peaceful by the late 1st century AD, it is sometimes wondered why even that legion remained for so long.[25] The writer Josephus succinctly concludes such a presence as the Roman "ornament of peacetime."[26]

However, during the conquest and pacification phase, several legions were assigned to the peninsula. While the various tribal wars in the north lasted, the need for a strong military presence was vitally important. To the south and on the east coast, a flourishing Roman community was growing. In the interior, the discovery of Spain's vast mineral resources was just beginning and their exploitation was soon to follow. With upwards of seven legions in Hispania Citerior at one point, adequate provisioning had to be undertaken and appropriate accommodations made, making for a considerable logistical problem given the rustic conditions of the location: permanent camps and legionary fortresses were the solution.

The types of camps described in detail by Josephus and Vegetius refer mainly to the temporary campaign camps. However, even these were impressive, as Josephus notes in the 1st century AD:

> Thus an improvised city, as it were, springs up, with its market place, its artisan quarter, its judgment seats, where officers adjudicate any differences which may arise. The outer wall and all the installations within are completed more quickly than thought, so numerous and skilled are the workmen...[27]

Likewise, Vegetius refers to the marching camp, pitched everywhere the legion stopped in the field, as "an armed city."[28] If these temporary camps impressed them so, then the permanent camps and fortresses that followed must have been awe-inspiring.

The location of a fortress was selected primarily upon its strategic value- to guard a river crossing, on a hill to overlook a plain, etc. Such locations are also very conducive to a permanently established presence and thus, readily transformed later for civilian purposes. The area occupied by a standard legionary fortress was large- 50 to 60 acres on the average.[29] When the fort was built to station two or more legions, it would have covered an enormous area with massive buildings. The *praetorium*, the house of the legion's commander, was one of these.

The *praetorium* covered as large an area as the entire *principia*- the administration Headquarters of the legion. In addition to signifying a legate's status, this magnificent building could be used to overawe the indigenous population, especially their chieftains and envoys. It would be filled with all the trappings of Roman civilization- furnishings, statuary, treasures and mosaics. If the similar demonstrations that Julius Caesar prepared in his large marching tent were effective then the display afforded by a full sized *praetorium* would have been extraordinary.[30]

Additionally, the legionary fortress contained *fabricae* and other workshops, a hospital, stables and granaries. Tacitus tells us that the fortresses built by Agricola in Caledonia held a year's supply of grain and other provisions.[31] These indeed were the armed cities Vegetius was describing.

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[23] Cassius Dio 53.26.
[24] J.S. Richardson, *The Romans in Spain* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Inc., 1998), 139, 141.
[25] For more details, see R. F. J. Jones, "The Roman Military Occupation of North-West Spain," *Journal of Roman Studies*, 66 (1976), 45-66 and Ronald Syme, "The Conquest of North-West Spain," *Legio VII Gemina*, Instituto Leonés de Estudios Romano-Visigóticos (Leon: Excma, Diputación Provincial. 1970).
[26] Josephus *The Jewish War* 3.5.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Vegetius *Military Science* 2.25.
[29] Graham Webster, *The Roman Imperial Army*, 3rd edition (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 184.
[30] Suetonius *Caesar* 46.
[31] Tacitus *Agricola* 22.

Of the main fortresses in Spain, Tarraco, Asturica Augusta, Lucus and Legio- famous as the home of *legio VI Victrix* and *legio VII Gemina*-[32] the last three were all in the north. This is unsurprising, for there the Romans mined the majority of Spain's vast haul of gold. As previously noted, the north was also the last area of Spain pacified and still retained some simmering tension into the 1st century AD. These forts and camps represented exactly the kind of military establishments that could effectively be transformed into civilian settlements- and they were. The three northern posts roughly conformed to the standard shape and size of army fortresses. At Asturica, the emperor Augustus is believed to have turned over the camp to the Astures tribe for their use as a capital, hence its eponym.[33] At Legio and Lucus, the *canabae*, the civilian settlements that grew outside the walls, eventually merged with the forts.

The *canabae* originated as the place where merchants who followed the legions set up their *tabernae*- shops and cottages Other camp followers, such as prostitutes and local women with whom the soldiers formed relationships, also occupied these settlements. Gradually, they became quite large as attested during the revolt of Civilis in AD 69. At Vetera, the civilian buildings had become so large that they got in the way and had to be destroyed for fear that opposing forces could use them: "A settlement just outside the camp had grown during the long peace to the size of a small town. This was now demolished to deny its use to the enemy."[34]

The Roman army first became a colonizing force. As the *canabae* grew into a village, the impact of the army's presence was more deeply felt. Soldiers raised unofficial families and the product of these unions was significant. Livy reported that in 171 BC some 4000 offspring of soldiers and local women in Spain petitioned the senate for and were granted a colony.[35]

Upon discharge, most of these veterans remained in the small villages outside the forts with their families, which eventually became legally recognized. The legions recruited heavily among them, linking them to the army for generations to come. The veterans also attracted friends and relations to the villages, introducing new blood not only into the legions, but into the province as well. The army began to resemble a hereditary caste and the *canabae*-fort combination soon became,as Alston calls it, an "island of Roman power."[36]

The Roman army then became an urbanizing force. The highly specialized skills were put to use in the villages, towns and *canabae* outside the walls that lacked the infrastructure needed to support the forts. Many papyri discovered in Egypt and Dura-Europos attest to the continuous assignment of military duties that benefited the civilian settlements. In one scroll, soldiers were dredging harbors and manufacturing papyrus.[37] Others would be draining swamps and- as Reg complained- paving roads, building aqueducts and assembling bridges.

Eventually, the forts and villages merged- especially in the case where legions abandoned their bases. Normally, one might expect the *canabae* to suffer severe economic damage as a result of the army's departure, perhaps even disappear. However, the years of contact with the fort and its urbanizing influence often left behind an infrastructure capable of surviving on its own. Such indeed was the case at Pisoraca when the *legio IV Macedonica* departed for Mogontiacum (modern Mainz, Germany).[38]

In fact, there was to be such a close contact between legion and *canabae* in Spain that *legio VI Victrix* was heavily hispanized during its long stay and *legio VII Gemina* was raised almost entirely from within Spain. Some scholars have even gone so far as to speculate that some kind of proto-nationalism developed in Hispano-Romans serving aboard, pointing to a 1st century epitaph of a Roman soldier in Pannonia:

> Ti(berio) Cl(audio), Britti filio, Valerio, decurioni
> alae II Aravacorum domo Hispano, annonr(um) L,
> stipendiorum XXX, et Cl(audiae) Ianuariae, coniugi
> eius et Cl(audiae) Hispanillae filiae, vivis ex
> testamento. Flaccus dec(urio) frater et Hispanilla
> filia heredes faciumdum curaverunt.[39]

That the soldier identified himself as coming from "Spain" (*Hispano*) but not recognizing a specific province or city- as was the norm- or referring to Spain in the plural- as was proper- is intriguing enough, but he also named his

[32] Antonio Garcia y Bellido, "Nacimiento de la Legión VII Gemina" in *Legio VII Gemina* and Curchin, *Roman Spain*, 63, 70-75.
[33] Florus 2.30.60.
[34] Tacitus *Histories* 4.22. This is Birten, near Xanten in Germany, which was rebuilt and is still a village today.
[35] Livy 43.1.
[36] Alston 39-40.
[37] *Geneva Latin Papyrus* No. 1, Col. 3 in Lewis and Reinhold 510.
[38] Curchin *Roman Spain* 74.
[39] *CIL* III 3271 in M.P. Speidel (ed), *Roman Army Studies, Volume II*. Mavors Roman Army Researches, volume 8 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1992), 329, entry #348.

daughter Hispanilla (Little Spain). However, only two similar epitaphs have been recovered to date, and neither of them is as detailed as the Pannonian example, so we may never know if these soldiers truly felt any kind of pride in being "Spanish."[40]

Nevertheless, the Roman army's presence inexorably brought Spain within the Empire's fold- militarily, politically and culturally. In time, Spain herself would be sending out colonies, such as the 3000 Romans who settle Palma and Pollentia on Mallorca in AD 123.[41]

Whether or not these were actual citizens or natives is irrelevant: they considered themselves so and were described as such by Strabo- one way or the other, they were Romanized and attest to the growing numbers of Romans on the peninsula, be they Hispano-Romans or Romano-Spaniards. Indeed, they serve as an excellent illustration of the words of the ultimate Roman oracle, Virgil:

> *Your task, Roman, and do not forget it, will be to govern the peoples of the world in your empire. These will be your arts- and to impose a settled pattern upon peace, to pardon the defeated and war down the proud.*[42]

[40] The other two inscriptions are *CIL* XVI 48 (a.103) and *AE* 1978, 342

[41] Strabo 3.5.

[42] Virgil *Aeneid* 6.851-3.

Appendix: Spanish Place Names in the Text

Roman Spain	*Modern Spain*
Asturica Augusta	Astorga
Barcino	Barcelona
Caesar Augusta	Zaragoza
Corduba	Córdoba
Emerita Augusta	Mérida
Emporiae	Empúries
Italica	Santiponce
Legio	León
Lucus	Lugo
Mallorca	Majorca
Metellinum	Medellín
Norba	Cáceres
Palma	Palma de Majorca
Pisoraca	Herrera de Pisuerga
Pollentia	Alcudia
Saguntum	Sagunto
Tarraco	Tarragona
Urso	Osuna
Valentia	Valencia

Fitting In Space: Rose Hum Lee's Negotiation of Assimilation and Citizenship in America

by Katharine Ng

Many accounts of Chinese American history in the 1950s do not include a varied presentation of Chinese American experience. It is common to find statistics-oriented research on Chinese Americans that include their numbers, for example, in blue-collar and white-collar jobs, in higher education, and in urban, suburban, and rural settlement. It is also common to note the improved ratio between males and females as more Chinese women immigrated to the United States and the equalized numbers between American-born versus foreign-born Chinese. Most texts are also celebratory in nature, emphasizing the contributions of Chinese Americans and at the same time presenting them as victims of racial discrimination. Such accounts are helpful for obtaining a general picture of Chinese American history but Chinese American experience is very diverse and Rose Hum Lee's experience is a good example of that diversity. Lee is a Chinese American sociologist from the 1950s and understanding her life can provide more meaning to the quoted statistics as well as tell a story that is different from the usual narrative of a victimized hero. Therefore, to provide a broader picture of Chinese American experience, this paper will do a limited textual analysis of Lee's personal letters to understand her attitudes about assimilation, citizenship, Chinatown versus America, and her own status within America. With the guidance of Aihwa Ong and Lisa Lowe's theory of cultural citizenship, this examination of Lee's negotiation of assimilation and citizenship in America, will also culminate in a direct critique of Jurgen Habermas' belief in a nation's civil religion.

The Pages of History

In commenting on his own research in Chinese American history, Him Mark Lai, an important shaper of Asian American history said, "in spite of all the new areas that had been probed, there are still too many blank pages, and even more that are incomplete or poorly defined, that await further delineation."[1] One of these incomplete pages is the study of native-born Chinese Americans in the 1950s. Studies on Chinese Americans in the 1950s, like those of Jack Chen and Shih-Shan Henry Tsai, tend to emphasize a more general picture of Chinese American history. For example, in *The Chinese of America,* Chen provided information on the urbanization of Chinese Americans and the problems they had with the various immigration law changes from the 1940s to the 1950s.[2] Tsai, in *The Chinese Experience of America,* gave information on sex ratios of the Chinese population and the expanding opportunities that were available to the Chinese after World War II.[3] However, away from these more general pictures of Chinese American history are individual lives that, when explored, can provide a key to better understanding the historical experience of the Chinese Americans in the 1950s. The history of Chinese Americans' individual negotiations of how to fit into America are missing from these pages of history, and a careful examination of these negotiations can fill in the spaces left empty by the more general narratives of Chinese American history.

In order to provide another angle to the general presentation of Chinese American history in the 1950s, this paper will perform a textual analysis of the correspondence from Rose Hum Lee to her daughter, Elaine Lee, and selected published writings by Lee.[4] This limited study of a concentrated core of Rose Hum Lee's letters is meant to provide a glimpse into the past in order to better understand one angle in the historical experience of native-born Chinese Americans in the 1950s. A study of Lee's individual negotiation of the spaces represented by Chinatown and white America will shed light on how those negotiations resulted in her subsequent attitudes on assimilation and citizenship. Therefore, this paper will examine the way Lee negotiated the meanings of the spaces she occupied, how she comprehended who and which space was American or un-American, and how she understood assimilation and citizenship in relation to one's level of American-ness. Finally, this examination of Lee, with the guidance of

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[1] Him Mark Lai, "Musings of a Chinese American Historian," in *Amerasia Journal* 26.1 (2000): 22.
[2] Jack Chen, *The Chinese of America* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980): 196-213.
[3] Shi-Shan Henry Tsai, *The Chinese Experience in America* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1986): 147-149.
[4] Approximately 260 letters are in the collection of Rose Hum Lee's personal papers and the bulk of the correspondence begins in 1958 and ends in 1963. With the limits of this paper in mind, only a select few that best demonstrate the core of Lee's attitudes and perspectives will be used in this research. The bulk of the sample letters chosen for analysis are mostly from 1958 because that was when Lee first expressed, most strongly, her feelings regarding the spaces represented by Chinatown and white America in her personal letters. This was also the time when her trouble and paranoia with Chinatown harassment was starting to increase significantly so her feelings were even more magnified. Lee's published writings are chosen according to their relevance in showing Lee's attitude towards the difference between Chinatown and America and her ideas regarding assimilation and citizenship. Copies of this collection are in the possession of Henry Yu and the original collection is currently in the author's possession and being processed for library use.

Aihwa Ong and Lisa Lowe's contention of cultural citizenship, culminates in a direct critique of Jurgen Habermas' notion of a civil religion that would integrate people equally into the nation-state.

In his essay, "The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship," Habermas notes that the term nation has "the connotation of a political community shaped by common descent, at the minimum by a common language, culture, and history."[5] Habermas then argues that a nation-state, such as the United States, "can assume and maintain a republican form even without the support of such a culturally homogeneous population," if the legal protection of citizenship rights functioning as a civil religion took the place of the organic nature of the nation.[6] This normative theory of the equal social integration of people into the nation-state based on legal citizenship is too simplistic. An examination of Lee's negotiation of American-ness and her subsequent preoccupation with assimilation will demonstrate that Habermas' theory of equal integration does not fully take into account the complications introduced by factors like culture, race, and ethnicity.

The Worlds of Rose Hum Lee

Born in 1904 in Butte, Montana, Rose Hum Lee was a second-generation Chinese American who came of age in the 1920s. After graduating from high school in 1921, she soon married Ku Young Lee, a China-born student at the University of Pennsylvania, and lost her US citizenship for marrying an alien who was ineligible for citizenship. She went with him to China after his graduation, and they lived mainly in the Canton area, but marriage and life in China proved to be an unpleasant experience for Lee. Her husband's family constantly criticized her for not being able to conceive a child, something they felt was her duty as a woman, and the marriage ended in divorce with Lee returning to the United States. Upon her return from the ten-year stay in China in 1939, Lee reenrolled in college, got her Bachelor's degree in 1942 from the Carnegie Institute of Technology, received a Master's degree from the University of Chicago in 1943, and finished her PhD in sociology there in 1947. Roosevelt College, a progressive institution that emphasized higher education for anyone regardless of creed or color, recruited Lee to join their sociology faculty, and Lee began her professorship there at the same time that the college opened its doors in 1945. Lee became the first woman and first Chinese American to head a department at an American university when she was promoted to the position of chairman in the sociology department in 1956, and she remained at Roosevelt College until 1962 when she went on leave to teach at Phoenix College. A prolific sociologist and a well-respected educator and lecturer, Lee did numerous studies on the Chinese in America, as well as other studies on cities and urbanization from the 1940s until her death in 1964.[7]

However, behind this profile, Rose Hum Lee had a very interesting experience that is relatively unknown to historians who write about her.[8] In 1952, Lee married Glenn Ginn, a Chinese American lawyer, but Ginn's messy divorce from his China-born wife resulted in the ex-wife claiming the divorce was fraudulent in 1957. Lee complained that in helping the ex-wife obtain a fair settlement, Chinatown associations, especially those in Tucson, were using communist pressure tactics like monitoring her and Ginn's movement, intercepting their mail, and giving them unwanted phone calls. So, from 1957 to 1964, Lee and Ginn were continuously harassed by Chinatown, and the couple was forced to live apart in order to alleviate the harassment, with Lee in Chicago and Ginn in Tucson. In her personal letters and in the introduction to *The Chinese in the USA*, Lee indicated that she believed Chinatown used the divorce as an excuse to harass them for exposing details about Chinatown to outsiders like white Americans. According to Lee, the harassment was due to Ginn's unwillingness to stay quiet about Chinatown's dubious activities in Tucson and elsewhere in the United States. Her research and writings on the Chinese were also a suspected reason for the harassment because they were seen as a betrayal of the Chinese's secrets. This conflict caused Lee to reach a near state of paranoia about Chinatown activities and their threat to her life, as well as Ginn and her daughter's safety, and she was very unhappy with Chinatown for this disruption in her life. Consequently, Chinatown and the world outside of Chinatown became very distinct spaces for Rose Hum Lee.

Belonging to Space

In Rose Hum Lee's mind, there existed two distinct worlds that she was forced to repeatedly traverse: the

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[5] Jurgen Habermas, "The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship," in *Public Culture* 10 (1998): 399.
[6] *Ibid*., 405.
[7] Biographical information on Rose Hum Lee was cited from biographical profiles from the materials in her collection of personal papers and Henry Yu, *Thinking Orientals* (New York: Oxford UP, 2001).
[8] The only study to mention Lee's trouble with Chinatown from the 1950s to 1960s is Yu, *Thinking Orientals.*

world of America and Chinatown. "Mine is the 'marginal generation'…neither Chinese nor all American,"[9] wrote Rose Hum Lee. Lee's use of the term marginality referred to the spaces and cultures represented by Chinatown and America, and her sense of belonging to those spaces. She felt that she did not fully belong to Chinatown because, even though she was Chinese and knew the language and customs, she did not conform to their lifestyle. Yet Lee did not feel that she fully belonged to America either because even though she legally and culturally identified herself as American, her placement in America was unstable due to her ethnicity. However, the harassment Lee experienced from the Chinese in Chinatown magnified her understanding of the difference between the spaces inside and outside of Chinatown, and consequently affected her attitude about Chinese assimilation and citizenship in America. Lee's dilemma of marginality in regards to cultural and spatial belonging is a contradiction to Habermas' belief in the equal integration of people into the nation-state based on a civil religion.

The Space of Chinatown

Rose Hum Lee detested the existence of Chinatown and disliked its separatist construction. In her book, *The Chinese of the USA*, Lee wrote that Chinatown was different from other communities because it "attempt[s] to maintain a set of distinctive institutions, such as Chinese churches, tongs or Merchants' Associations, stores selling curios…shops handling the few items of Chinese merchandise…and restaurants catering to a dwindling clientele.[10] Chinatown had its own associations, churches, businesses, and networks that required little contact with non-Chinese, and Lee detested this because she felt these were separatist actions that contributed to Chinatown's isolation and inability to assimilate into American culture. If the Chinese continued separating themselves into these spaces, then their assimilation would never be possible. Thus, Lee saw Chinatown as a fermenting space for unassimilated Chinese to seclude themselves in order to recycle their old-fashioned traditions and to avoid assimilation.

Besides being a haven for unassimilated Chinese, Lee also often painted Chinatown as a dangerous place without any respect for the law. In telling her daughter about Ginn being harassed by Chinatown, Lee wrote:

> What got me worried was the dogging of his trail and that one or many of the men involved are Tong members. Pop's life would be in danger and I had visions of his being shot and his freedom restricted. It is restricted and I do not sanction the Chinese taking the law into their own hands.[11]

These images of tongs hunting them down and the paranoia over what the tongs might do appeared repeatedly in Lee's personal letters. To Lee, Chinatown was a lawless place separated from the rest of America, and the people within that space had no respect for the law. Moreover, Chinatown's seclusion from America, which hindered the Chinese's assimilation, was the reason for the continual existence of the lawless tongs and their illegal activities.

To Rose Hum Lee, Chinatown was a lawless, separatist, and un-American place, but ironically, Lee was forced to return and interact with Chinatown for her research as a sociologist. Part of Lee's value as a Chinese American sociologist, within a field dominated by white male academicians and white audiences, was her role as an interpreter for the Chinese to white Americans. For that reason, Lee had to study and interact with the Chinese in Chinatown in order to keep her value as the middleman. The majority of Lee's research was based on the Chinese communities in America and she was often invited to do lectures on Chinese art and customs, the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), and, of course, the Chinese in America. Lee enjoyed her lectures on Chinese art and customs and made a lucrative career from them as well as from selling assorted Chinese curios afterwards.[12] What she disliked, however, were the Chinese in Chinatown who, in her opinion, were not making a good faith effort to assimilate into American society. She saw Chinatown as a space that was infested by "village women, recent arrivals from China who use tears—suicide threat tactics to get what they want, etc." and tongs that did "their worst [through]…pressures, threats, extortion of money, and support of parasites."[13] Instead of assimilating and reforming their immoral ways, the Chinatown Chinese were holding onto their old ways and not changing their involvement in illegal activities like gambling, smuggling, and illegal immigration, and Lee felt that the arrival of new Chinese from China was aggravating the problem. With these new immigrants, Lee felt that "another

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[9] Rose Hum Lee. Letter by author, 8 November 1955. Lee's personal correspondence is currently in the author's possession. Copies are in Henry Yu's possession.
[10] Rose Hum Lee, *The Chinese of the United States of America* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong UP, 1960): 68.
[11] Letter by author, 13 August 1957.
[12] Yu, *Thinking Orientals,* 159.
[13] Letter by author, 13 August 1957.

generation has to go by before the children of these newly arrived families will be weaned away from Chinatown life."[14] Chinatown was the unprogressive ghetto that was reluctant to give up its attachment to tradition and immoral activities, and its salvation would only come through the American-born generation.

Although Lee disliked association with Chinatown, she was motivated to do her research on the Chinese in order to show America the difference between the Chinese that were inside and outside of Chinatown. In describing the ignorance of Americans, Lee wrote:

> What makes it hard for Americans to believe is that the suave Chinese who stage operatic performances and spend such large sums on this can be gamblers or tong people…The Americans would think of what the Chinese cling to as exotic and quaint and they don't look behind what is presented for them to see. A pity![15]

Again, Lee saw Chinatown as a place filled with conniving and scheming Chinese, but she also saw them as putting up pretenses to hide their vices from ignorant Americans. As a result, Lee saw her research as revealing "a side which the larger society does not see and the frustrated persons do not want the [Americans] to know."[16] (8 Jan. 1958). It was Lee's mission to reveal to America that Chinatown was not simply a harmless exotic tourist attraction, but rather a place of many vices that were hidden from the average unsuspecting observer. "While a person who speaks the truth is unpopular and subjected to pressures, in the long run the others have to learn it's better to come out with hidden practices," wrote Lee.[17] According to Lee, few Americans were suspicious of the reality of the illegal dealings of the Chinese in Chinatown, and as the middleman, Lee was obliged to reveal the truth to her audience. There was a sense of a noble mission in Lee because she felt that she had to take the lead in educating white America on who the Chinatown Chinese really were, and to make clear the difference between the assimilated Chinese of America and the unassimilated Chinese of Chinatown. Clarification of this difference was Lee's way of marking the boundary between Chinatown and a white America to which she would belong. Chinatown was where the unassimilated Chinese dwelt, while the assimilated Chinese belonged to America just like white Americans. Thus, while Lee desperately wanted the Chinese to assimilate and wished to keep her distance from recalcitrant Chinese, she was also compelled to traverse the borders of Chinatown because her concern over revealing Chinatown's vices and marking the difference between assimilated and unassimilated Chinese required her to do so.

Chinatown was Un-American

Rose Hum Lee's comments about the Chinese of Tucson, Arizona's Chinatown, encapsulated the way she saw Chinatown as un-American. Lee's stepson, Gerald, was born and raised in China and in Lee's view, Gerald was "behind" in assimilation and would have "many more problems to overcome" than those who were born in America. In order to show Gerald, " a whole new way of life—far removed from the narrow-thinking, tradition-bound Chinese he saw in Tucson," Lee invited him to stay with her in Chicago.[18] Lee saw herself as "more advanced" and therefore more fit to teach Gerald how to become a part of American culture instead of being held back by unprogressive Chinese in Tucson's Chinatown.[19] Lee saw the Chinese of Chinatown as narrow-minded because she felt Chinatown was a separatist space that shielded the Chinese's illegal activities from America and fostered the Chinese's continued reverence for oppressive traditions like patriarchy. Abhorrent of Chinese involvement in illegal activities such as extortion, gambling, and human and narcotics smuggling, Lee believed that "there will be a generation, at least, before the ideas of honestly earned money can permeate the [Chinese] here."[20] In her opinion, it was "awful to be around a community that's cursed like this one is."[21] Rose Hum Lee's view of Chinatowns in general as being backward and detestable stemmed from her belief that the activities of the Chinatown Chinese were un-American and that they were extremely resistant to and unwilling to make an effort towards assimilation. Lee strongly detested the associations in Chinatown and the intrusive and restrictive traditions they operated by, but she held hope for native-born Chinese Americans to change Chinatown because they would be less influenced by Chinese tradition. Moreover, her hope for a native American-born generation to induce change in Chinatown

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[14] Letter by author, 23 April 1958.
[15] *Ibid.*
[16] Letter by author, 8 January 1958.
[17] Letter by author, 22 January 1958.
[18] Letter by author, 8 November 1955.
[19] *Ibid.*
[20] Letter by author, 23 April 1958.
[21] Letter by author, 8 January 1958.

demonstrates that Lee perceived the Chinese in Chinatown as foreign. Their foreignness was an explanation for their inclination to hang on to tradition and dubious activities, and was also an obstacle to their will and ability to assimilate.

Rose Hum Lee's criticism of Ginn's ex-wife, Yee Shee Ginn, was also indicative of Lee's view that Yee symbolized the negative aspects of Chinese tradition and the foreign and unassimilated traits of Chinatown. In response to Gerald's sense of responsibility and duty to Yee, Lee wrote:

> I tried to explain to him then that these were not normal (ours here, anyhow) ways of repayment to parents. Neither should parents dangle and press their demands by mouthing these phrases; to do so gives evidence of basic insecurity. I am certain he never thought of the difference between giving of one's energy, heart, and thought willingly without thought of repayment as contrasted to the kind he's been accustomed to. [Ginn] is totally different, in that he expects none, but it took [Gerald's] contact here with me to drive the difference home.[22]

Lee perceived Yee's desire for her son to support her and take care of her as abnormal because it was an un-American tradition. Yee demanded her son to support her because, being China-born, she was still attached to the restrictive traditions of China, and her demand was representative of the negative traditional ways of the Chinese. Having experienced criticism for being unable to fulfill her reproductive duty as a woman in her first marriage, Lee detested demands that were enforced by tradition, something she felt the unassimilated Chinese of Chinatown were prone to doing. For Lee, one should have the freedom to choose his actions and not be bound to do something simply because it is dictated by tradition. If one allowed the self to be bound by tradition, like Yee, then it only meant that insecurities lay underneath, and since "becoming a part of the [American] culture takes time" and "the willingness to…be insecure," then those who were tradition-bound would never succeed in becoming American.[23] Therefore, to Lee, Yee's attachment to tradition proved that, like the other Chinese in Chinatown, she was not an assimilated American and was not making an effort towards that goal.

Aside from recognizing the negative and restrictive traditions of Chinatown to be un-American, Rose Hum Lee also felt that the communist influence in the Chinatown community was oppositional to the freedoms of American life, and was further proof of its foreign and unassimilated character. In the context of the Cold War and the intense atmosphere of anti-communism in the United States in the 1950s, it was especially appalling for Lee to see the Chinatown Chinese engage in what she felt were communist tactics. In addition, her own experience with Chinatown's harassment reinforced her conviction that communism had permeated Chinatown. In explaining Chinatown's harassment over Yee and Ginn's divorce, Lee wrote:

> Were this capable of being handled in the American way which I want—the matter would have been solved. But as they are using the Chinese secret societies and old-fashion village pressure tactics, plus (I think and am convinced of) Communist tactics, the whole situation is very complicated, mean, vicious, insidious, tyrannical, upsetting mentally and emotionally.[24]

Evidently, to Lee, Chinatown was un-American because it did not use the American way to settle the messy divorce between Ginn and Yee. The American way was the superior solution because it would settle the divorce through a court of law rather than through a secret tong and its communist tactics. Additionally, communism during the Cold War period was seen as a foreign menace to the United States and the free democracies of the Western countries.[25] Through its engagement in communist tactics, Chinatown became one of the "evil forces" opposed to "the ultimate goodness and justness of life."[26] The secrecy and the communist tactics were all against the kind of freedom, justice, and openness that American society professed. Therefore, for Lee, her perception of Chinatown's use of un-American bodies like the tongs and engagement in communist tactics furthered her belief that Chinatown was indeed foreign and unassimilated.

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[22] Letter by author, 8 November 1955.
[23] *Ibid.*
[24] Letter by author, 13 August 1957.
[25] For a more detailed discussion on how communism and the Cold War were perceived by people in the United States, see David Caute. *The Great Fear.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978; J. Ronald Oakley. *God's Country: American in the Fifties.* New York: December, 1986.
[26] Letter by author, 13 August 1957.

Rose Hum Lee was also highly suspicious of the communist leanings of Yee and the immigrant women of Chinatown. Lee stated her fear of this in her letter:

> The reason I say communist tactics are used is that [Yee], several years ago, despite [Ginn's] forbiddance, sent $3,500 to the Communist Government…she could have taken up with such party members, although she may not be herself one. Also, many of the Chinese women coming in now grew up during a period when such tactics were used and they could have learned them.[27]

It was suspicious to Rose Hum Lee that Yee had sent money to Communist China, and she theorized that Yee might have had close relationships with communists in China to risk sending remittances. Under the Trading with Enemy Act of 1939, the US government declared it illegal in 1950 to send remittances to Communist China, Hong Kong, and other places that could otherwise transfer the money to China.[28] Yee's remittance incriminated her in Lee's mind because sending money to China was equal to trading with the enemy. Additionally, many of the Chinese women involved in harassing Lee were new immigrants and were therefore susceptible to Red China's influence. Lee believed that Yee and these immigrant women were apt suspects of communist affiliation because they were China-born and had been brought up with Chinese tradition. Before their arrival in the United States, they could have been influenced by communism and could have brought their communist tactics to Chinatown to further hinder the assimilation of the Chinatown Chinese. In analyzing the harassment, Lee speculated that "Tucson has a large number of them," and was "fully convinced that [Ginn] is being subjected to pressure tactics that resemble what have occurred in China" and that "forcing people to marry or stay married is a part of this line."[29] These women's background and activities concretely proved to Lee that they were not assimilated and that their China-born status was the cause for their attachment to traditions, repressive tactics, and communism. So, in Lee's mind, Chinatown once again came to symbolize the antithesis of a modern and free America when Yee and the women in Chinatown went against the American way of settling matters and resorted to using threats and tyrannical communist tactics to separate her and Ginn.

The Need for Cultural Citizenship

Cultural citizenship, as put forth by Aihwa Ong and Lisa Lowe, is used to give or deny people access to full membership into the nation-state because it is an implicit and hard-to-obtain requirement in addition to legal citizenship. As defined by Ong, cultural citizenship is "the cultural practices and beliefs produced out of negotiating the often ambivalent and contested relations with the state and its hegemonic forms that establish the criteria of belonging within a national population and territory."[30] Cultural citizenship is not a requirement put forth in the citizenship books of a nation-state like the United States. Yet, it is implied in society that, in order to belong to the nation, one must manifest outwardly the signs of possessing the cultural practices and beliefs that the dominating powers of the nation-state have put forward. Lowe, in complement of Ong's theory, also acknowledged that "it is through culture that the subject becomes, acts, and speaks itself as 'American.'"[31] One may possess legal citizenship, but without the conferral of cultural citizenship, one would be seen as an outsider to the nation and would consequently be denied membership into it.

Hence, in taking Ong and Lowe's theory of cultural citizenship, Lee's preoccupation with the Chinese's assimilation was rooted in her consciousness of the fact that the Chinese needed to be seen as cultural citizens in order for them to belong to America. Lee's own experience with losing her citizenship and her awareness of the continuing discrimination of the Chinese in America made her conscious of the necessity for Chinatown Chinese to assimilate. The Chinese needed to erase their cultural difference in order to be accepted as Americans. That was also why Lee was so fixated on marking the boundaries between the recalcitrant Chinese and the assimilated Chinese Americans. She did not want America to confuse the fact that the Chinese inside and outside of Chinatown were different. She herself wanted to be recognized as a legal and cultural citizen, different from the unassimilated cultural and legal aliens in Chinatown.

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[27] *Ibid.*

[28] L. Ling-chi Wang, "Politics of Assimilation and Repression: History of the Chinese in the United States, 1940 to 1970" (Unpublished Manuscript. Asian American Library, University of California, Berkeley)

[29] Letter by author, 13 August 1957.

[30] Aihwa Ong, "Cultural Citizenship as Subject-Making: Immigrants Negotiate Racial and Cultural Boundaries in the United States," *Current Anthropology* 37 (December 1996): 738.

[31] Lisa Lowe, *Immigrant Acts* (Durham: Duke UP, 1996): 3.

Thus, while stressing the need for Chinatown Chinese to assimilate, Lee also pushed for the recognition of Chinese Americans who were assimilated. In an early article for "Survey Graphic," Lee emphasized that World War II was a "stepping stone toward complete assimilation" for Chinese Americans, and many of them "speak no Chinese" and "they live on close terms with their American neighbors."[32] World War II was a stepping stone because it opened up opportunities for Chinese Americans to work and live outside of Chinatown, so the chance for contacts outside of Chinatown and assimilation into American life were increased. For Lee, this was an opportune time to point out that many Chinese Americans were just like other Americans.

Lee's obsession with assimilation was due to her recognition of the need for cultural citizenship in order to obtain full membership into the American nation. If Habermas' notion of a civil religion functioning to equally integrate people into the nation-state was true, then Lee would not have felt the need to be so obsessed with cultural assimilation. Many of the Chinatown Chinese that Lee criticized for not assimilating were actually legal citizens. If legal citizenship was enough, then why push for cultural assimilation? For Lee, legal citizenship was something that could easily be taken away because the Chinese were perceived as foreign aliens. Cultural citizenship, on the other hand, was an outward sign of belonging, and if the Chinese were perceived to be a group that belonged to the American nation, then full membership would not be a problem. Therefore, as demonstrated by Lee's fixation on assimilation, Habermas' civil religion does not take into account how perceived difference in culture (and the ethnicity that culture is linked to) can complicate the integration of people into the nation-state.

The Space of White America

To Rose Hum Lee, Chinatown was a space that was symbolic of the negative traditions that Lee disliked, whereas the space represented by white America was much more attractive because Lee associated it with freedom and modern womanhood. Like many of the more affluent second-generation Chinese Americans of her time, Lee did not live in Chinatown and had spent most of her life outside of Chinatown; therefore, she was able to maintain an "intellectual and emotional distance from the Oriental community that she wanted so desperately to leave behind."[33] Lee was distanced from Chinatown by her position in society and by her ideals of assimilation. To Lee, the world outside of Chinatown was a modern world that was uninhibited by any traditional mores such as restrictive gender roles. As suggested by Henry Yu in *Thinking Orientals*, Lee's divorce and return to the United States is symbolic of her "repudiation of what she understood as the traditional roles of Chinese womanhood but also as an idiosyncratic attempt at Americanization."[34] America was a space that represented the exact opposite of everything that was Chinatown. Chinatown was narrow-thinking, tradition-bound, and evil, whereas America was just, liberal, and honest. This was the reason why Lee could not believe that one of her prime harassers was an American-born female. "What surprises me is that this dead dodo, an American-born female, would stoop to such tactics. She knows better," wrote Lee.[35] It was astonishing to Lee that a woman born and raised in America could be like the unassimilated Chinese because she should have known and respected the American way of life. That woman should not have practiced the tradition and tactics of the Chinatown Chinese; instead she should have respected Lee and Ginn's right to act as they pleased. Therefore, Chinatown was symbolic of patriarchy, meddlesome associations, and dangerous tongs, while the space represented by America was symbolic of freedom, modernity and unrestricted womanhood.

Although Lee was well-versed in Chinese history and culture, she was still completely committed to the ideal of the dissolution of all Chinatowns and the complete assimilation of all Chinese Americans into American society. Apart from positive cultural practices like cooking Chinese food or learning about Chinese art, both of which Lee also practiced herself, Lee's prescription for total integration into white America required that Chinese Americans aim to be like white Americans in every way. Certain Chinese cultural practices were safe and curious spectacles for people to learn about, but what she perceived as restrictive Chinese traditional ways must be replaced by American ideals like freedom and equality in order for America to accept the Chinese.[36] Hence, it was acceptable for Lee to exhibit certain Chinese practices that she had reason to be proud of in the American context, such as her knowledge of Chinese art, but to reject those she considered to be negative Chinese practices like socializing with Chinatown tongs.

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[32] Rose Hum Lee, "Chinese in the United States Today," in *Survey Graphic* 31 (October 1942): 444.
[33] Yu, *Thinking Orientals*, 132.
[34] Ibid., 130.
[35] Letter by author, 8 January 1958.
[36] Yu, *Thinking Orientals,* provides an insight into the commodification of "Oriental" identity and the fascination with exotic Oriental things.

A Real American

Rose Hum Lee distinguished herself as a successful example of assimilation and believed that anyone could assimilate if they made the effort like she did. "I learned to be different. No one is born the way one is now," wrote Lee.[37] However, Lee defined her American identity largely by her juxtaposition of Chinatown practices with American life, and she constantly negotiated the positive and negative aspects of both worlds in order to select which ones to highlight and which ones to shadow. She stressed the best of both worlds by highlighting her knowledge of positive Chinese cultural practices and presenting herself as a modern example of American womanhood through her achievements in America. "No doubt, too, the Chinese here are mad at Pop and me; we do not go to Chinatown. Often we are critical (quietly) of associational activities," explained Lee to her daughter. She disliked mingling with Chinatown's associations because "too many Chinese confuse public position with private gain. The idea of community service, without profit to one's self, is foreign."[38] Hence, to Lee, it was American to be independent and to perform community service without gain for the self, whereas community service for personal gain was immoral and selfish, and was something that the un-American Chinese were prone to doing.

Another aspect to Lee's sense of modern womanhood was her achievement in America. In her letter to Elaine, Lee wrote:

> I shall never forget the faces of the women in Chinatown when they heard me say I got my PhD. The look of envy and greed came forth and instead of congratulating me for having arrived after years of struggle and sacrifice and malicious gossiping about my 'loose ways,' they smirked. I guess, too, they're mad because I don't socialize with them…Well, I'll never do that now.[39]

Lee understood herself to be wholly different from the women in Chinatown because they were unassimilated, and their pettiness was proof of that. In the 1940s, it was an extraordinary feat that Lee, a Chinese American woman, managed to obtain a PhD and a position in an American university when many Chinese Americans with college degrees were working as waiters in Chinatown's restaurants. Thus, Lee was her own proof of what hard work could bring. She understood herself to be an assimilated and modern woman, different from the Chinese women in Chinatown who were petty and jealous of her achievements. Lee believed that the Chinese women in Chinatown were envious and avaricious because she, as an assimilated and modern Chinese American, could do many things "the rest wish they could do, hate us for being able to, and yet refuse to admit they could if they tried."[40] Therefore, it was the Chinatown Chinese's own fault that opportunities were limited to them. If the Chinese in Chinatown made the effort like Lee, then they too would become assimilated in America and would be able to enjoy its positive attributes.

Moreover, as previously mentioned, Lee felt that if Ginn and Yee's messy divorce and Chinatown's subsequent harassment could be handled her way, "the American way," then everything would have been already resolved. Everything opposite of the Chinese was American, so in contrast to secret societies and pressure tactics, Lee would have utilized something she felt was honest and straightforward like the court of law. Again, Lee defined herself by what the Chinese were, so if the Chinese were sneaky and immoral, then she, as an American, was honest and upright. Lee may have lost her legal citizenship in the past, but her sense of cultural citizenship to the American nation was strong and continually invigorated by her constant juxtaposition of the negative aspects of Chinatown with the positive aspects of America.

Rose Hum Lee's continual reassertion of her own American identity reveals how she saw herself as a cultural citizen of the American nation. Following Ong and Lowe's mapping of the cultural citizen, it is obvious that Lee understood she must act, behave, and speak like a white American in order to attain full membership into the American nation. That was the criterion to belonging to the American nation. Without that cultural capital, Lee would have been no different from the Chinese in Chinatown. Again, Lee's understanding of this requirement complicates Habermas' normative theory of equal integration based on legal citizenship. As a state, America accepted legal citizenship, but as a nation, it also required cultural citizenship in order for national membership to be official, and Lee understood this reality.

[37] Letter by author, 8 November 1955.
[38] Letter by author, 13 August 1957.
[39] Letter by author, 8 January 1958.
[40] Letter by author, 22 January 1958.

The Ultimate American

Although Rose Hum Lee argued for full assimilation into white America and was extremely proud of her own success at assimilation, she was also conscious that she could never attain the ideal full membership into the American nation. One particularly glaring proof of that unattainable ideal was Lee's status as an interesting and exotic Oriental academic in the eyes of white academicians and white audiences. As a professor and researcher in sociology, Lee's value as a sociologist in academia should have been universal. However, Lee's professional capacity was based on her knowledge of the Chinese in America, and that capacity was in turn based on her Chinese ethnicity. Lee's authority and knowledge were thus not universal because she was specifically valued as an insider to the Chinese community, and her "insider" status was based on the perception that she had special access because she was Chinese. Furthermore, as pointed out by Henry Yu, it was always "the exotic and non-American part" that made the Oriental academic interesting.[41] For example, it fascinated many of Lee's audiences that Lee could speak English flawlessly even though she had an Oriental body and was dressed in a *cheong sam* (a traditional Chinese long dress) when she gave her lectures. What was amazing was that this seemingly foreign and exotic body could speak English more perfectly than the average American.

Hence, due to her unique ability to understand the Chinese, Lee's value as an expert was also related to her access of white space in America. She was given more access to America because she had knowledge that whites valued; thus, she would be given continued access as long as she, as an Oriental academic, could be the cultural interpreter of the Chinese for America. Lee recognized that her ethnicity and knowledge of the Chinese and Chinese things were obstacles to her full assimilation, but she saw her ideal in her daughter Elaine.

Although Lee was proud of her relatively successful assimilation, she was also conscious of her belonging to the "marginal generation," where one knew of and was caught in between two ways of life. Yet, Lee did not see Elaine as marginal and had great hopes for her assimilation. In regard to Elaine's assimilation, Lee wrote:

> All the studying and going out into American life during the past twenty years was to make sure you didn't have to be 'marginal.' It has paid off and for that I am thankful.[42]

In commenting on the problem of the Chinese in Chinatown, Lee wrote:

> I'm glad I decided you should not experience it; to this end I worked to let you know the life that is untarnished by such. Get your bearings with the people and the society to which you belong. If things are easier for you, my efforts are rewarded.[43]

Rose Hum Lee was happy and relieved that Elaine was distanced from the Chinese and Chinatown. She saw herself and her husband as the "buffers to spare [Elaine]" from the pressures of Chinatown's oppressive traditions and meddling. Somehow, by sparing Elaine from having to learn about and associate with the Chinese, Lee felt that she had saved Elaine from being marginal and had given her the opportunity to be a full American. And if Elaine was saved from being marginal, then she would not have to deal with any knowledge of another way of life. Once Lee told Elaine, "You are an American now; the fact that your ancestry is Chinese is not important."[44] Elaine's ethnicity was not important because Lee felt that she had fully shielded Elaine from the negative aspects of Chinese culture and from association with unassimilated Chinese. Elaine would not be forced to choose between the different ways of life and thus be haunted by the fact that she chose one and denied the other. The only choice presented to Elaine would be the American way of life, so the decision would be easy and obvious. Consequently, Elaine's path to assimilation in America would also be smoother than the one Lee had to struggle with. Elaine would belong to America.

Yet Lee's hope for Elaine to be saved from marginality reflected her own feelings of being haunted by knowledge. Lee understood that her knowledge of Chinese things and Chinese people was an obstacle to her own erasure of marginality, which was a hindrance to her assimilation. And although Lee had tried to convince Elaine that her ancestry was not important, she realized that in America, her ethnicity was very important.

Rose Hum Lee was not naive about the reality of race and the role it played in keeping even cultural citizens from attaining complete membership into the American nation. In a later letter to Elaine, Lee wrote:

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[41] Yu, *Thinking Orientals*, 160.
[42] Letter by author, 8 November 1955.
[43] Letter by author, 8 January 1958.
[44] Letter by author, 13 August 1957.

> The fact that you can't lose your physical identity is something beyond my control…We've the added unpleasantness from the [Chinese] themselves which you don't have. You can go to concerts, live with your classmates, date a Caucasoid, etc.[45]

Lee pushed for assimilation and the ideal of cultural citizenship, but she was not ignorant of the fact that racism was an obstacle to full acceptance in America. By 1956, Lee had already progressed from just advocating assimilation to the "eradication of all evidences (physical) of 'foreignness.'" "Ideally," Lee wrote, "the completion of the processes [of assimilation] includes the mixing of cultures and genes so that there are truly no 'dissimilar people.'"[46] It was obvious to Lee that cultural citizenship was not enough for national membership into white America and that only racial citizenship, in addition to cultural citizenship, could truly give one unlimited access to the nation. Since not all people could be considered white, the mixing of genes would produce a population of people with indeterminate racial or ethnic origins, so national membership would no longer be able to exclude people on the basis of physical appearance. Of course, both Lee and Elaine were excluded from this possibility. Nevertheless, Lee made the best of what she was given and encouraged Elaine, whom she felt was closer to the top on the ladder of assimilation, to do the same. Relations with Chinatown or restrictive Chinese traditions did not hinder Elaine, so Lee believed that, unlike herself, Elaine had the freedom to live life unbounded by gendered restrictions or the watchful eyes of Chinatown.

Again, Lee's recognition of racial citizenship as a criterion for full membership into the American nation represents a challenge to Habermas' contention of a civil religion that would promote equality. Besides being based on legal rules and culture, membership into a nation-state is also based on race. Therefore, even if the legal books of a nation-state profess to accept people by way of legal citizenship, the reality is that the perceived difference in people's culture, ethnicity, and race still forms a basis upon which a nation-state makes its membership exclusive.

Conclusion: Filled Gaps

Habermas' suggestion that a civil religion could effectively be the integration tool of a nation-state falls apart when one considers Rose Hum Lee's experience with assimilation and her individual negotiation of white America's criteria for citizenship. When Lee married Ku Young Lee, she lost her citizenship because the Cable Act of 1922 stated that women ceased to be citizens when they married an alien ineligible for citizenship.[47] Lee eventually regained her citizenship through naturalization when she divorced her husband and returned to the United States. But this incident in her life is indicative of how Habermas' civil religion left out the possibility of the nation-state using race and ethnicity as a means of giving or denying people membership into the nation-state.

Rose Hum Lee's subsequent and lifelong obsession with assimilation after her return to the United States was due to her attempt to attain cultural citizenship in order to solidify her claim to legal citizenship in the United States. As suggested by Ong and Lowe, the criterion to cultural citizenship is established by the nation-state, and it is through culture that one is ultimately legitimized as a real member of the nation-state. Legal citizenship could be taken away, but if Lee espoused the outward appearance of an American, then it would be beyond doubt that she was just like any white American. Therefore, Lee distanced herself from the space of Chinatown and repudiated all the Chinese aspects she felt were negative and restrictive like domestic gender traditions for women, intrusive clan associations, and scheming tongs. She was also critical of the Chinese who had dangerous communist leanings and who clung to Chinatown and its traditions. To her, they were not real citizens because they were not assimilated. Instead, Lee saw them as a kind of cultural and/or legal alien who stuck out like a thorn on the side of America. Lee repeatedly stressed that she belonged to the American space because of her American-ness. Her achievements in American society and the progressive principles that she possessed were proof of that American-ness. She also took the lead in hailing other Chinese Americans to follow her example and argued that anyone could achieve assimilation if they tried hard enough. So, contrary to Habermas, legal citizenship was not enough to integrate citizens into the American nation, which required individuals, like Lee, to obtain cultural citizenship before their integration could even be considered.

Lee was also conscious of the fact that she and Elaine (as well as the rest of the Chinese in America) would never get to the top of the ladder of assimilation. They all lacked one criterion: whiteness. Lee understood that, besides cultural assimilation, racial citizenship was the ultimate key to membership in the American nation. Since

[45] Letter by author, 22 January 1958.
[46] Rose Hum Lee, "The Marginal Man: A Re-Evaluation and Indices of Marginality," in *Journal of Human Relations* 4.3 (Spring 1956): 28.
[47] Sucheng Chan, "The Exclusion of Chinese Women" in *Entry Denied* (Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1991): 128.

not everyone could be white, then the mixing of the races would produce a group of people of an indeterminate race. Thus, to Lee, if people could not be distinguished by culture or race, then everyone would be accepted equally into the nation. Hence, Lee's understanding of racial citizenship introduced another complication to Habermas' normative theory of equal integration. Besides culture and ethnicity, race was also a powerful factor for the nation-state in determining people's membership.

Finally, Rose Hum Lee's individual negotiation and subsequent understanding of white America's criteria for assimilation and national membership is an interesting and valuable addition to the general (and sometimes very statistical) history of Chinese Americans in the 1950s. It is important to know that the demographics and available opportunities of Chinese Americans changed after World War II, but even more fascinating are the different angles of historical experience that appear when one examines the individual's negotiation of the conditions in society. Through Lee, it is possible to see and better understand what it was like for a professional American-born Chinese woman to navigate the maze of how to fit into an exclusive society based on legal, cultural, and racial belonging. Lee's experience provides a different kind of history to the record of Chinese Americans in the 1950s, and it fills in the gaps left by general histories that rarely offer a more personal and close look at the unique historical experience of certain individuals. Ultimately, it is through these individual experiences that history can continually be written and rewritten with the goal of completing blank and poorly defined pages.

Aristotle and the Abrahamic Faiths on the Eternity of the World

by Katie J. Nolan

The Greek philosopher Aristotle has had a tremendous impact on thought throughout history. His treatises and theories did not remain in ancient Greece but survived in the minds of countless intellectuals. Through reading his works, many of the world's greatest minds came to believe in Aristotle's flawlessness. Others, however, quickly saw the threat that Aristotle posed to their religious outlook of the universe and reality. Many of Aristotle's ideas were highly controversial; one of those ideas is his assertion that the world was eternal. This idea was in contrast to the doctrine of the creation of the world by God that was held by Muslims, Jews, and Christians. Over the centuries, philosophers were forced to reconcile the Philosopher's theory of the eternity of the world with their own religious beliefs. Each went through this process in a somewhat different way. However, the extent to which they influenced each other is evident in the similarities of their theories as well as in their efforts to disprove previous theories of other intellectuals.

Aristotle is regarded as one of the greatest philosophers in human history. During his lifetime between 384 and 322 BCE, he created his own philosophical school called the Lyceum, and he completed many works which covered topics such as logic, physics, metaphysics, politics, ethics, the soul, and nature. His work was first transmitted into the Semitic world by Syriac-speaking Christians who lived in or near Byzantium. They translated his work from Greek into Syriac first and then into Arabic or directly into Arabic.[1] However, most or Aristotle's writings were either unknown or ignored by the Christian West until many centuries later.[2]

By the ninth century the Muslim world had created a distinct intellectual tradition, and Aristotle played a large role in that tradition. Muslim philosophers "attempted to assimilate the Greek philosophical tradition as they knew it and to formulate a conception of Islam as a religion in philosophical terms."[3] The most notable of these philosophers were al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, al-Ghazali, and Ibn Rushd. However, "this incorporation of Aristotle into the 'house of Islam' did not pass unchallenged, and at times the Islamic opposition to Aristotelian philosophy was quite strong."[4] The world of these Muslim scholars influenced the philosophical traditions of Judaism and Christianity for centuries to come.

In the Middle Ages, the majority of Jews was living in the Muslim world and spoke Arabic. "The Arabic translations of Aristotle eventually became a part of the Jewish philosophical tradition, which, although small, comprised a continuous series of notable thinkers throughout the Middle Ages."[5] Jewish philosophers such as Maimonides, Albalag, Narboni, Ibn Daud, Gerson, and Crescas used not only translations of Aristotle but "Jews became familiar with the teachings of Aristotle, at times interspersed with neo-Platonic doctrines, through the summaries, commentaries, and independent works of… Islamic philosophers."[6] The works of these Jewish intellectuals, along with the Muslim works, influenced the way Christians dealt with Aristotle and their reconciliation of him Christianity.

Western Christendom had access to Aristotle during the Middle of the first millennium, but his theories were not popular until another five hundred years. "In the sixth century the Roman writer and civil servant Boethius translated some of Aristotle's logical treatises into Latin; but these first fruits were to be the only works of Aristotle available in the Latin world until the late twelfth century." [7] When Aristotle's works were first translated from Arabic to Latin, they were usually accompanied by commentaries of Islamic and Jewish philosophers. Later Latin translations were made directly from the Greek, although these were less common until the fifteenth century. Aquinas is the most highly regarded Christian Aristotelian. His goals were "to do for the Christian world what Maimonides and Ibn Rushd had tried to do for their coreligionists: establish a philosophical interpretation of the religious beliefs of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam within the general conceptual framework of Aristotle's philosophy."[8] Although there were many aspects of Aristotle's thinking that the three religions readily accepted, such as his

[1] Mircea Eliade (ed.), "Aristotelianism," *The Encyclopedia of Religion* (New York: Macmillan, 1987).
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] "Aristotle," *Encyclopedia Judaica* (Jerusalem: Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1972).
[7] Eliade.
[8] Ibid.

development of logic, strong opposition to Aristotle and his theories, which did not always support or agree with Abrahamic tradition and thought, sometimes arose.

Jewish, Christian, and Muslim thinkers found differences in the teachings of their own religions and Aristotle on the concepts of God and the world. Aristotle's Supreme Being was a God that did not take part in creation or the lives of humans. "Aristotle's God had not created the eternal universe and would not destroy it; his sole function was just to get things moving. God took no interest in the fate of human beings."[9] This Unmoved Mover set the world in motion, but it was not personal. Because the Unmoved Mover merely set the universe in motion and did not create anything, Aristotle held that the world was eternal. "The World in Aristotle's system is finite in Space but infinite in Time.[10] Aristotle asserted theories that were in direct opposition to Abrahamic tradition that taught of an all-powerful, personal, creator-God. Also, Aristotle asserted that this eternal world was not set into motion by the will of God, its motion was a necessary effect of God. Religious theologians found these theories to be very deterministic and limiting. However, because Aristotle was so highly regarded, his concepts of the world and God could not simply be ignored but had to be either adapted to Abrahamic theology or rejected completely as flaws in the great philosopher's thinking. Of course, many intellectuals attempted the former.

Each individual philosopher reconciled Aristotle's concept of the eternity of the world differently with his own religion. Al-Kindi (803-873 CE) was one of the first Muslim philosophers to attempt to reconcile Aristotle with Islam. This reconciliation needed some modification of the traditional Aristotelian system, but in regards to the concept of the world, Al-Kindi seemed to reject Aristotle's theory completely. Al-Kindi assumed a "creation from nothing in time through a divine creator."[11] This assertion was completely different from Aristotle's: one assumes a creator and a creation from nothing and the other assumes a mover and a moved form that is as eternal as the mover. Al-Kindi's theory also is in contrast to Aristotle's idea of time and eternity. "Al-Kindi's argument can be reduced to the assertion that there cannot be infinite time and, since time, body and movement are closely interlocked and interdependent, the world and the movement of the stars etc. must be limited in duration as well."[12] Therefore, neither the world nor creation can be eternal because nothing is eternal except God.

It is evident that even at such an early date, Al-Kindi was familiar with a Christian's work. John Philoponus was a sixth century Alexandrian Christian neo-Platonic Aristotelian philosopher, and many similarities exist between al-Kindi's and his work. One of the reasons that religious philosophers did not like Aristotle's idea of an eternal world was because it implied a limit to God's power. If God simply put the world into motion then he had no power over it or in it as he was subject to the same laws that ruled the world. Al-Kindi rejected this restricting of God and instead asserted that there was a "division between the realm of God's creative activity, *ibda*, and the world of nature which follows laws established by Aristotle."[13] Al-Kindi's God created all and had complete authority over all unlike Aristotle's Unmoved Mover. Al-Razi (865-925 CE), the next great Islamic philosopher, held to many of Al-Kindi's ideas. He claimed that the world was created and not eternal, like Al-Kindi and in contrast to Aristotle. However, he made a small change to traditional Islamic thought: he did not believe that creation came from nothing. Instead, he asserted that "the world came into being in time whereas matter alone is eternal."[14] Although he argued that matter is eternal, he still argued for the existence of God who is a creator and a director.

Many Muslim thinkers went even further from tradition and "developed a doctrine of eternal creation, whereby the universe eternally emanates from God, its first and ultimate cause."[15] Al-Farabi (870-950 CE) and Ibn Sina (980-1037 CE) reconciled Aristotle and Islam in many similar ways, both in this different mode of thought. Both al-Farabi and Ibn Sina believed in "eternal creation and emanation."[16] Hence, the eternity of the world was produced by an eternal creative emanation. Ibn Sina furthered this by asserting, in agreement with Aristotle, the concept of the "world being co-eternal with" God.[17] They also challenged traditional Islamic teachings by arguing that the world was not directly caused by God. "According to them the world had been created not directly by God but by a hierarchy of necessary causes

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[9] C. Warren Hollister, J. Sear McGee, and Gale Stokes, *The West Transformed: A History of Western Civilization* (Fort Worth: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000), 95.
[10] Masarrat Hussain Zuberi, *Aristotle, 384-322 BC and al-Ghazali 1058-1111 AD* (Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1986), 14.
[11] Richard Walzer, *Greek into Arabic: Essays on Islamic Philosophy*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 188.
[12] Ibid., 190.
[13] Ibid., 193.
[14] Zuberi, 16.
[15] Eliade.
[16] Walzer, 187.
[17] Zuberi, 14.

starting with God and descending through the various Intelligences which moved the celestial spheres."[18] In this model, God is the first Intelligence, which creates the second, which creates the third, and so on, until the last Intelligence is created which is the active Intellect of mankind.[19] Al-Farabi's interpretation of creation and time is somewhat more complex than it seems. He argues that "the creation of the world can be an eternal one, that something can be caused without a beginning, i.e., from eternity."[20] Therefore, the world was eternal yet it was also created. Al-Farabi defended Aristotle by claiming that this idea was part of Aristotle's own and that Aristotle had, in fact, not claimed the eternity of the world without a beginning.[21] While al-Farabi was defending Aristotle, Ibn Sina "at times surrendered, or at least reinterpreted, fundamental axioms of philosophy in favor of the religious viewpoint."[22] These men changed the way Aristotle was viewed by Muslims and many others to come.

Al-Ghazali (1058-1111 CE) another great Islamic philosopher attacked the views of al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. He asserted that God created the world, and he refuted "the eternity and incorruptibility of the world and of time and motion."[23] His discontent with the idea that the world is everlasting was supported by his opinion that "it is inconceivable that some thing which has a beginning in time should proceed from the Eternal without there being an intermediate period."[24] The world could not be both created and eternal at the same time. Furthermore, he argued that "the doctrine of emanation does not succeed in showing how the many could have proceeded from the one, or the material world from the spiritual"[25] in regards to divine will. To him, the theory of eternal emanation left many holes in the history of creation that the creationist theory had not. Al-Ghazali disagreed with Aristotle that the world was set in motion by God out of necessity because it limited the power of the absolute God. Instead, he claimed that "He created it when He willed it."[26] Al-Ghazali was also familiar with Philoponus' works about creation of the world from nothing.

Ibn-Rushd (1126-1198 CE) is seen as different from other Arabic philosophers even though his theories are very similar to al-Farabi's and Ibn Sina's. He agreed with al-Farabi and Ibn Sina in eternal creation and emanation. He attempted a reconciliation of an eternal world and the biblical concept of creation by using the notion that "nothing preceded the world but an eternal creator, namely God."[27] Therefore, the universe was created, but "like its cause, [it] is eternal."[28] This theory is very similar to al-Farabi's. Like al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, he also asserted that the world was not directly created by God but by a hierarchy of necessary causes starting with God. While al-Ghazali held that God could and did act in the world, Ibn Rushd believed that the idea that God willfully acts in the world is false. "The pure Act [God] does not know the world of generation and corruption and therefore does not govern by its providence."[29] Ibn Rushd was also familiar with Philoponus' work and accredits his knowledge of Philoponus to al-Farabi. Overall, many Muslim scholars adopted the idea of eternal creation and emanation. They all found a way to keep God in the process but his role was changed for many intellectuals.

Jewish philosophers attacked the problem of Aristotle's eternal world in a different way. Many criticized and rejected Aristotle's eternity all together and defended biblical doctrine of creation. Others were heavily influenced by Islamic Aristotelians and incorporated the theory of eternal emanation into their own. Ibn Daud (1110?-1180? CE) rejected the Islamic assertion that God did not directly create the world and mankind. He renounced "the attempt to explain the celestial spheres and the Intelligences as emanations from God…he regards heaven and earth as immediate creations of God."[30] Even though he believed that the world was created by God, he still believed that the origin of the world was beyond the understanding of man: "man [is] unable to comprehend how the world proceeded from God, every attempt

[18] A.C. Crombie, *Medieval and Early Modern Science* (Garden City, NY: Double Day, 1959), 57.
[19] Fernand Steenberghen, *Aristotle in the West, the Origins of Latin Aristotelianism* (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1970), 18.
[20] Carl Johannes Rautzenberg, "The Influence of Arabic Aristotelianism upon the Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas," dissertation (University of Chicago, 1930), 138.
[21] Zvi Cahn, *The Philosophy of Judaism: The Development of Jewish Thought Throughout the Ages, the Bible, the Talmud, the Jewish Philosophers, and the Cabala until the Present Time* (New York: Macmillan, 1962), 142.
[22] Ibid., 142.
[23] Walzer, 191.
[24] Zuberi, 50.
[25] Cahn, 191.
[26] Zuberi, 50
[27] Rautzenberg, 137.
[28] Steenberghen, 19.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Cahn, 146

to penetrate this ultimate mystery of the origin of the world [is] a misuse of our powers."[31] This idea was borrowed by many later Jewish philosophers.

Muslim theologians greatly influenced Maimonides (1135/8-1204 CE), as many of his theories were open disagreements with the Islamic reconciliation of Aristotle and religion. Maimonides objected to the theory of eternal creation, and he compiled many proofs against the doctrine of emanation. Instead, "he advances his own theory of temporal creation,"[32] a creation that occurred due to God. Maimonides not only "attempts to refute the eternity of the world so as to not disturb the Pentateuchal version of creation"[33] but he also "rejects the emanationist theory of the Muslim Aristotelians since it fails to account for the origin of matter."[34] Al-Ghazali's influence on Maimonides is evident in an argument asserted by Maimonides that the doctrine of emanation does not explain how the many could have proceeded from the one, or the material from the spiritual. Other influences include the Kalam theologians who maintained the doctrine of temporal creation like Maimonides. However, even though the Kalam proofs influenced him, he refuted their proofs of creation.[35] Like Ibn Daud, he finally asserted that humans are incapable of finding the truth about the origin of the world: "the question of whether the world proceeds from God in an eternal emanation, or whether it has a temporal beginning…is incapable of a solution one way or another."[36] Therefore, Maimonides did allow for the possibility of an eternal world.

Maimonides belief in a temporal beginning of the world led him to be able to create theories about divine will. For example, he "links the concept of 'free creation'…with the temporal beginning of the world."[37] He asserted that it is out of God's free, perfect, and divine will that the world was created, even though how and why this occurred may forever be a mystery. He claimed that the Muslim "attempt to explain the eternal procession of the world from God as an eternal activity of the divine will [hides] the opposition between a necessary consequence and a free creation."[38] Therefore, since God is omnipotent and absolute, the world must have a beginning and must not be co-eternal with Him. Instead, the laws of nature do not apply to Him and everything is subordinate to Him. Because of this power, Maimonides claimed, God exerts general providence to the world and an individual providence to man.[39] Miracles, he claimed, are examples of God's free will and active providence in the world. He believed that "the affirmation of the world's eternity implied strict determinism, which rules out…the possibility of miracles. In turn, the denial of miracles implies a serious restriction on God's omnipotence."[40] Miracles are only possible in a world created by a divine will, and God would not be God without this absolute power.

Gerson (1288-1344 CE) another prominent Jewish philosopher, also rejected the eternity of the world and the emanationist theory. He held that "the doctrine of emanation, and its underlying idea of an eternal procession of things from God, to be self-contradictory."[41] He believed it was impossible for something to be eternal and created at the same time. However, from here his theory took a different turn: he denied the possibility of a temporal beginning to prime matter. "Matter cannot possibly have come into being…[and] cannot be derived from God."[42] Instead, God "produced only the new total of forms."[43] Therefore, although Gerson did not agree with Islamic philosophers that the world itself or creation was eternal, he did not believe creation came out of nothing. With this assertion, Gerson separated himself from much of Jewish thought by stating that God was more like the Unmoved Mover of Aristotle's works that Yahweh of Jewish history. He stated that "God's act [was] limited to the unique act of creation."[44] While matter was already in existence, God created the form of the world. God was not the cause of miracles or providence. However, he did cause the entities that control them. God created a "multiplicity of immaterial essences" and these are not only "the source of the natural order, but they are also the cause

[31] Ibid.
[32] *E. Jud.*
[33] Cahn, 201.
[34] *E. Jud.*
[35] *Ibid.*
[36] Cahn, 155.
[37] Ibid., 165.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid., 171
[40] Eliade.
[41] Cahn, 211.
[42] Ibid., 213.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid., 223.

of prophecy, providence, and miracles."[45] These essences are similar to al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Ibn Rushd's Intelligences and illustrate Islamic influence ever further on Gerson.

Crescas (1340-1410 CE) sought to combine the concept of creation out of nothing with that of the eternal creation of the world by God's design and will.[46] He disagreed with Maimonides that an eternal world did not allow for a world of divine, free will. Instead, he claimed that there was "the possibility that an eternal world would also be the work of the divine will."[47] He asserted that God was the "absolute and sole cause of the world" but believed that Gerson's view that matter was independent of God was impossible.[48] After Crescas, there was "greater emphasis on the possibility of miracles, [and] the doctrine of temporal creation gained greater adherence."[49] Therefore, each prominent Jewish philosopher developed his own unique theory about the creation of the world being influenced differently by Islamic intellectuals.

Of the Christian Aristotelians, none has had such a huge impact on Western thought or is so well known as St. Thomas Aquinas. Because most Christian philosophers received their information of Aristotle with Muslim and Jewish commentaries, Christian ideas are heavily influenced by previous works. Philoponus, who had such a large impact of Muslim theologians, rejected Aristotle's ideas of the eternity of the world. Aquinas stated that "there was neither matter nor time nor movement before God created the world."[50] He ideas came straight from Christian theology as he also asserted that the laws of nature do not apply to God's power and, therefore, do not limit them.

Many other Christian theologians created their own ideas about Aristotle and his theory. The Latin Averroists were Christians who were highly influenced by Ibn Rushd and believed that the world emanated from God. In 1277, the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, condemned the philosophy and science thesis of Aristotle and Muslim philosophers as heretical and false because they went against the scriptural teaching of the creation of the world.[51] Saint Basil believed that none of the Greek philosophers should be highly regarded since they all contradicted one another.[52] St. Bonaventure of the thirteenth century opposed "all philosophical conceptions incompatible with Christian doctrine of creation…eternity of the world, creation by intermediaries or progressive emanation, denial of providence."[53] Instead he asserted that God is the cause of created world, and He governs it with His providence. However, St. Bonaventure did oppose the idea of creation out of nothing. The ideas of these Christian theologians illustrate the level of Muslim and Jewish influence as well as their inclination to stick to Christian doctrine.

Aquinas (1225-1274 CE) was influenced tremendously by Islamic and Muslim thinkers and most of his ideas owe credit to them. He believed that God created the world and knows when it will end. He further argued that "all finite existents, the heavenly bodies included, must be efficiently caused by a subsistent existence."[54] Also, if a being is subsistent, then there can only be one; that one is God. However, Aquinas does not close the door on the possibility of an eternal world. Echoing al-Farabi, he believed that creation could be eternal because something can be caused without a beginning from eternity. Therefore, "the possibility of an eternal world, as a created world is probable, i.e., it is possible that something was always and yet was created by God."[55] This idea that the world was created from eternity and that the world is later than God only according to its essences but not according to its time, is a line of development that "started with the Greek deism of Antiquity and continued though the Arabic where it was transformed…but it culminated finally in the theistic attitude of the Christian Scholastics."[56] Maimonides' reconciliation of Aristotle to Judaism was of great significance to Aquinas on this issue as both saw the eternity of the world as a possibility. Overall, Aquinas "inclines toward the eternity of the world rather than to the biblical conception of creation" which illustrates how important it was for Aquinas to find ways to keep Aristotle, the great and faultless philosopher compatible with Christianity.[57]

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[45] Ibid. 215-216.
[46] *E. Jud.*
[47] Cahn, 231.
[48] Ibid., 230.
[49] *E. Jud.*
[50] Quoted in Walzer, 192.
[51] Eliade.
[52] Lawrence P. Shrenk, *Aristotle in Late Antiquity* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1994), 133.
[53] Steenberghen, 153.
[54] Denis Bradley, *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good: Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas' Moral Science* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 104.
[55] Rautzenberg, 137.
[56] Ibid., 143.
[57] Ibid., 145.

Aquinas believed that God created the world. However, this was a creation of divine will not necessity. Furthermore, Aquinas argued that "God creates and structures creation in general and the human mind in particular."[58] Therefore, he asserted that because God was creator of all things, all things were subject to His divine providence. Miracles fall under this area of divine providence. He claimed that "a miraculous event derives immediately from the First Cause and not from created, intermediate causes."[59] Therefore, it is God directly who causes miracles out of His divine, free will. Aquinas did not incorporate the idea of Gerson or Ibn Rushd into his own that asserted that although the world was created by God it was more created out of necessity, and God had no providence or power to act by His will in the world. Therefore, while many Christian intellectuals criticized Aristotle's ideas, Aquinas sought desperately to embrace them, and he was helped by early religious Aristotelians.

Different individuals reconciled Aristotle differently with their own religious tradition. Full agreement between the intellectuals on how Aristotle should be adapted to religion was never attained. Muslim philosophers generally accepted the theory of eternal emanation. If something creates, then it went from potency to act. This meant that the creator was influenced by external factors. To them, God could not be affected by external factors and therefore, eternal emanation best fit His power. Jewish philosophers felt more inclined to keep with Jewish theology, and many finally decided that the truth about the reality of the world was beyond their comprehension. Christian intellectuals went both ways; some did not give Aristotle any credit and others, like St. Thomas Aquinas, praised his work. At the present, scientific proofs have shown that the world had a beginning. However, the debate continues. Did God create the world or was it a reaction of gases floating in space? Perhaps, as many Aristotelians have claimed, the answer will never be found.

[58] Bradley, 366.
[59] Ibid., 449.

The Revolutionary Potential of the Peasants According to Lenin and Mao Zedong

by Pavitra Mohan Ram

Introduction

The "revolutionary potential" of the peasants refers to the significance of the peasant class in establishing a Communist government and society. Vladimir Illyich Lenin and Mao Zedong were the influential founders of the revolution in their respective countries, and hence the revolutions in China and Russia were primarily guided by the ideology of these two leaders. Karl Marx, the father of communism, played an influential role in the dogma of both Mao and Lenin, yet practical problems in their respective nations forced the two to revise their ideology to suit the situations of their countries. Dialectic thought drives socialist leaders to resolve the basic contradictions in society, and the leaders' attempts to do this have led them to converge in many areas. Pragmatism, however, forced the leaders to deviate from a strict dogma and to develop new theories on revolutionary practice. It is commonly believed that Lenin ignored the peasant element in Russia, whereas the slogan of "Peace, Land, Bread," used to pacify peasants in the Ukraine suggests otherwise. When examining the revolutionary potential of the peasants, it is equally relevant to refer to the role of the revolutionary proletariat. Due to their pragmatism, Lenin and Mao share fundamental similarities in terms of their assessment of the revolutionary potential of the peasants, yet Mao held a more genuine belief in the peasantry.

Traditional Marxist Considerations

Lenin and Mao traveled in a unique direction away from classical Marxism. Karl Marx attested to the "idiocy of rural life,"[1] and firmly proclaimed a proletarian revolution as the only path to be followed. Marx suggested that the history of nations is characterized by a "constant war" between its urban centers and the countryside, since they lie in contradiction to one another, and the periods in history which are rural-based indicate times of stagnation and retrogressive development.[2] Marx maintained that the peasantry would eventually be dominated by the urbanized, industrialized sectors, and then disappear as a class. This view was shared by Engels: "Our small peasant, like every survivor of a past mode of production, is hopelessly doomed. He is a future proletarian."[3] According to Marx, there is no active role for the peasant in what he believes to be the inevitable transition from feudalism to capitalism and then to socialism - they could only hope to fall under the leadership of urbanite intellectuals. Peasants were viewed as pathetic, mindless toilers; they were only concerned with the acquisition of land, and were 'reactionary' rather than 'revolutionary.' In what appears to be a direct attack on Mao, had it not been before Mao's time, Engels proclaims,

> Hence a man who will say that this revolution can be more easily carried out in a country, because, *although* it has no proletariat, it has no bourgeoisie *either*, only proves he has still to learn the ABC of Socialism.[4]

Showing some leniency, Marx suggested that the alliance of the bourgeoisie and proletariat would be too weak to surpass autocratic and feudal forces in the East, and would therefore require the active support of the peasantry.[5] However, this was further qualified by the fact that this period would be short-lived and that the rural element could not be trusted. It is interesting to note that Lenin used Marx's sparse words on this issue later in defending his call for worker-peasant alliances, in which they would play a more influential revolutionary role.

The Task of Classifying Peasants in Relation to the Revolution

Lenin and Mao made class distinctions within the peasantry, attributing different levels of revolutionary potential to each subsidiary class. In March 1926, Mao wrote the *Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society* in which he identified the peasant as part of the semi-proletariat, at a time when he regarded the industrial proletariat as

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[1] Esther Kingston-Mann, *Lenin and the Problem of the Marxist Peasant Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983):.9.
[2] John Wilson Lewis, *Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974): 209.
[3] Ibid,.212.
[4] Ibid, 215.
[5] John G. Gurley, *Challengers to Capitalism* (New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc.,1988):.66.

the leading force in the revolution.[6] Mao later revised his analysis to place the peasantry in separate classes consisting of rich, middle and poor peasants. The rich peasants, or rural bourgeoisie, contributed to anti-imperialism, one of the greatest threats to China, and were therefore tolerated. The middle peasants would join the fight against imperialism and landlords and would accept socialism, rendering the class a 'reliable ally of the proletariat.'[7] The poor peasants are identified as the class with the most revolutionary potential, having been exploited for millennia in a country where ninety percent of the population owned only twenty to thirty percent of the land. Lenin distinguished three subdivisions within the peasantry, each with conflicting class interests. Twelve percent of the rural population of Russia consisted of rich farmers, termed *kulaks* ("hard-fisted" in Russian), who held thirty one percent of the land. The middle peasants held only seven percent and are described as small proprietors. The poor peasants consisted of eighty-one percent of the rural population and held only thirty-five percent of the land.[8] In terms of subsidiary classes of peasantry, Lenin and Mao were in agreement that the poorest section of the peasantry was the most revolutionary.

Chinese Communism's Urban Beginnings

Following the 1917 October Revolution in Russia, Marxism emerged in the city of Shanghai. A study group was formed under the leadership of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao in 1918, which provided the leadership for the beginning of an urban-based revolution, starting with the incitement of the workers. Even after the establishment of the CCP in 1921, the revolution continued to be urban-based, as illustrated by the increase in Communist-led trade unions in comparison with the neglected agrarian centers. The All-China Labor Federation (ACLF) convened in 1927, boasting 3 million workers and revealing the party's focus on the labor movement, as shown in the increase in number of strikes. This came to an end, however with the split of the United Front when Nationalist forces started to attack the Communist forces in the 'White Terror' of 1927. The structural characteristics of the city, i.e. the high concentration of population and the functional differentiation of socioeconomic life[9] led to their downfall, as infiltration proved too difficult and the Nationalists found the purge relatively easy to perform. This era shows remarkable similarities to that of Lenin's experience, in that it supports the Marxist assumption that the revolution would start in the cities. The end result, however, shows the CCP flourishing in the countryside because they were able to implement their ideals rather than simply propagate their doctrines.

The city was determined by Mao to be an unsuitable setting for a revolution, another reason for the relative increase in the revolutionary potential of the peasants as compared to the proletariat. As in Russia, the city was considered to be a convenient location for the attainment of the revolution, yet its sociological and structural characteristics made this difficult. The successful and rapid establishment of the CCP in 1921 was partially due to its access to a wealth of intellect, transport facilities and mass media, which was vastly improved during the May Fourth Movement. However, Chiang Kai-Shek's nationalists used these same facilities against the Communists, and the embryonic movement was thus suppressed because the GMD had infiltrated the city to the extent that even the covert movements of the CCP were immediately noticed. The CCP was forced to the countryside where it became a revolutionary threat with its naturally defensive environment and the establishment of autonomous bases. In the countryside the CCP no longer had to deal with outside forces that undermined the party's development, was able to achieve mass mobilization by implementing social and economic reforms without interference, and succeeded in establishing the Red Army, which proved to be immensely important in the success of the revolution.

Mao's Reports and Their Cry for a Rural Revolution

From 1927 onwards, Mao strongly advocated a rural-based revolution predicated upon investigations he conducted in the countryside. In his words, "without the poor peasants there would be no revolution. To deny their role is to deny the revolution."[10] Although urban-based intellectuals played leadership roles in the revolution, it can forcibly be said that the revolution in China was led by the peasantry. 'Maoism' is unique to any other form of socialism; it defies the basic Marxist-Leninist assumption that capitalism is a prerequisite for socialism. This deviation developed because China saw capitalism as a symptom of foreign imperialism and because of the absence of competing socialist theories. This raises the question of the appropriateness of applying Western theories to a significantly different environment. China was agrarian-based and therefore the urban proletariat, which was

[6] Mao Tse-Tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung Volume I* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965): 19.
[7] Ibid, 323.
[8] Christopher Hill, *Lenin and the Russian Revolution* (London: Penguin Group, 1971):.70.
[9] Ibid,.258.
[10] Kamal Sheel, *Peasant Society and Marxist Intellectuals in China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989): 241.

supposed to be the class with the most revolutionary potential, made up only a minute amount of the population. In his *Investigation of Peasant Movement in Hunan* in March 1927, Mao proclaims:

> …several hundred million peasants will rise like a mighty storm, like a hurricane, a force so swift and violent that no power, however great, will be able to hold it back. They will smash all the trammels that bind them and rush forward along the road to liberation.[11]

Although this claim was denounced as "an utter fantasy"[12] by an unnamed Western scholar, this immense faith in the peasantry's potential was partly due to the view that urban centers were dominated by imperialist forces and were 'alien influences.' Mao also suggested that rural education was superior to urban education, and noted that their "cultural level has risen rapidly."[13] In the same report, Mao attributed seventy percent of revolutionary achievements to the peasants, reiterating their revolutionary potential. These differences between Chinese cities and the countryside made a rural-based revolution more appropriate.

Although the *Investigation of Peasant Movement in Hunan* is by far Mao's most famous report, the *Report from Xunwu* is equally important in terms of Mao's attempts to adapt Marxist theory to Chinese reality. Instead of attending a major conference in Shanghai attended by the Party Central of the CCP in May 1930, Mao journeyed to Xunwu County where he crystallized his method of inquiry -- the 'investigation meeting' (*diao cha hui*) -- which was to become the key element in the 'mass line' movement.[14] At the time, Mao was accused of being a "mere empiricist,"[15] and yet the investigations led to the important connection between theory and practice, which Mao referred to as 'seeking truth from facts' (*shishi quishi*)[16] in his essay *On New Democracy* written in 1940. The reports were written despite attacks by Wang Ming, Li Lisan, the other members of the twenty-eight Bolsheviks, and the Central Committee of the CCP, which at the time followed the Russian model of dictatorship of the proletariat in alliance with the intellectuals. Criticism did not sway Mao, who strongly believed that "without investigation one has no right to make pronouncements."[17] This is reflected in his essay *On Practice*, written in July 1932 in order to persuade Party members against dogmatism and empiricism and to illustrate his theory of knowledge.[18] Likewise, Lenin acknowledged that "Practice is higher than [theoretical] knowledge, for it has not only the dignity of universality, but also of immediate actuality."[19] It was due to these investigations that Mao was able to advance his revolution by transforming the disasters of 1927[20] into the implementation of a revolutionary base in Jiangxi. Mao recognized the error of applying the Russian model to China through his investigations and thus adapted Marxist theory to suit the Chinese revolution.

Historians' Assessments on the Rural Revolution in Russia

'Paradox' is the word commonly used by historians to describe the proletarian revolution that occurred in Russia, a country where peasants made up ninety percent of the population. However, according to Richard Pipes the revolution was not actually led by the proletariat. Since the industrial workers of Russia were only "superficially urbanized, they carried with them to the factory rural attitudes only slightly adjusted to industrial conditions."[21] The historian also suggests that the February 1917 incidents did not involve a proletarian revolution; rather the workers simply "played…the role of a chorus that reacted to and amplified the actions of the true protagonist, the army."[22] Pipes supports his claims by maintaining that the proletariat in Russia had no interest in politics and were insignificant, comprising only two percent of the population. Nevertheless, Pipes does not imply that the peasants were the true revolutionaries, as they were only revolutionary in that they did not acknowledge the private ownership of land, advocating instead ownership through the *mir.* [23] John Channon argues there was no Bolshevik sponsored rural revolution and that the so-called 'Rural Revolution' of 1917 to 1918 "had seemingly little to do with

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[11] Tse-Tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung Volume I,* 23.
[12] John K.Fairbank, *The Cambridge History of China Volume 13* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986):.303.
[13] Kamal Sheel, *Peasant Society and Marxist Intellectuals in China,* 242.
[14] Mao Zedong, *Report from Xunwu* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990): 25.
[15] Ibid,.26.
[16] Tse-Tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung Volume I,*.339.
[17] Zedong, *Report from Xunwu,*.34.
[18] Tse-Tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung Volume I,* 295.
[19] Ibid,.297.
[20] This refers to the the split with the Guomindang, and the failure of the Autumn Harvest Uprisings.
[21] Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Bolshevik Regime 1919-1924* (London: The Harvill Press, 1994): 494.
[22] Ibid, 497.
[23] A village commune.

the revolutionary aspirations of the poor peasants or with Bolshevik influence."[24] Instead he argues that the revolution was promulgated at a village level as a "rational response of the community to a swift and dramatic increase in the man-to-land ratio."[25] Despite the lack of Bolshevik influence in the countryside and the presence of rural autarky, Lenin had definite ideas on the revolutionary potential of the peasants.

Lenin's Recognition of the Peasants

In the face of much criticism by early Russian Marxists who, according to Esther Kingston-Mann, were "rooted in denial of…sociological insights,"[26] Lenin formulated an ideology that featured the peasantry as a revolutionary ally. Vera Broido suggests that Lenin was a mere opportunist who recognized the "desperate and dangerous" mood of the peasantry and "harnessed it to his advantage."[27] Lenin would have recognized the peasantry to represent the "sphinx of all the Russias"[28] (Turgenov) who, if on your side, would assure your victory. Esther Kingston-Mann defends Lenin in saying his opportunism had not "invalidated his real political insights or defined the overall character of his theory and practice."[29]

Lenin was careful not to overlook the peasant question, which Stalin referred to as the 'national question.' Lenin believed the peasantry to be a potential revolutionary ally to the workers because of its antagonism to feudalism, and saw the peasantry as a tool to resolve the contradiction between industrial workers and feudalism. He attempted to formulate a Marxist peasant policy in his address "To the Rural Poor" (1903), in which he called the peasantry to realize their need for political and civil liberty, to be aware of the materialistic reasons for their poverty, and to finally recognize the urban workers as a body with similar goals. Maurice Meisner argues that Lenin only turned to the peasants when he discovered the failure of the bourgeoisie in the urban centers to uphold its political role, and saw the 'petty bourgeoisie' as a substitute that could play a role in his political strategy. However, Lenin never let go of his fundamental belief that workers were the central revolutionary force in Russia, and only accepted the peasantry as an ally led by the proletariat in the bourgeoisie-democratic phase in history:

> …all Russian workers and all the rural poor must fight with both hands and on two sides; with one hand – fight against all the bourgeois, in alliance with all the workers; and with the other hand – fight against the rural officials, against the feudal landlords, in alliance with all the peasants.[30]

Lenin saw the peasantry as a petty bourgeoisie whose main concern was attaining private plots of land, and although it was capable of revolutionary action, leadership could only lie in the hands of an urbanite. Only under the leadership of the cities could they hope to achieve the abolition of feudalism, the nationalization of land, and the establishment of a provisional revolutionary government. Lenin summarizes his perspective when speaking of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1905: "…the real 'possibility of holding power' -- namely, in the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, in their joint mass strength, which is capable of outweighing all the forces of counterrevolution."[31] It is interesting to note that on the day of Lenin's death, January 24, 1924, the First National Congress of the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party included the peasantry in their strategy for national liberation.

Contradictions in Policy towards the Peasantry

Lenin and Mao's policy towards the peasantry sometimes seems contradictory and ambiguous, yet this can be explained in relationship to their period of ideological development. From 1917 to 1919, the era of the May Fourth Movement in China, young Mao Zedong gave great importance to the student movement. Despite his limited knowledge of Marxist thought, Mao was captivated by the victory of the Russian Revolution, and following the May Fourth movement, he supported Li Ta-chao's idea of proletarian China. Therefore from 1921 to 1923, Mao played an active role in the labor movement in Hunan, known as his 'workers' period,' which explains why he

[24] Edith Rogovin Frankel, *Revolution in Russia: Reassessments of 1917* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): 118.
[25] Ibid, 118.
[26] Kingston-Mann, *Lenin and the Problem of the Marxist Peasant Revolution,* 171.
[27] Vera Broido, *Lenin and the Mensheviks: The Persecution of Socialists under Bolshevism* (Worcester: Billings & Sons Limited, 1987): 64.
[28] Hill, *Lenin and the Russian Revolution,* 68.
[29] Kingston-Mann, *Lenin and the Problem of the Marxist Peasant Revolution*,172.
[30] Ibid,.64.
[31] Robert V. Daniels, *A Documentary History of Communism in Russia* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1993):.21.

echoes Lenin in referring to the revolution as "a joint dictatorship of the revolutionary classes under the leadership of the proletariat."[32] From 1923 to 1924, Mao was known as the 'organization man' who played a primarily bureaucratic role in the Communist Party's Central Committee. It was only from 1925 onwards, following his rhetorical question, "At present we are hardly able to carry out our work among the workers in the cities; how could we have time to work in the villages?"[33] His realization that the Chinese revolution lay in the hands of the peasants is announced in his address to the Second Congress of the Kuomintang in January 1926: "We have concentrated too much on the cites and ignored the peasants."[34]

Although Lenin is seemingly consistent in his evaluation of the peasantry, there are discrepancies in these evaluations and how he put them into practice. Lenin is best known for his demands for the "the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry,"[35] and yet there have been times when he has contradicted this appeal. The Narodniks, early Russian socialists who advocated the support of the peasantry, were criticized in the late 1800s to early 1900s by Lenin, who supported G.V. Plekhanov, the founder of the first Russian Marxist group who argued the "development of the capitalist mode in industry and agriculture…as the achievement, not of the peasantry, but of the industrial proletariat."[36] Despite his views on the dictatorship of the proletariat,[37] Vera Broido argues Lenin "had no understanding of the workers as human beings and…when they proved too backward, too ignorant and too undisciplined to run the factories…he felt no compunction about sending them to concentration camps."[38] In January 1919, Lenin used the workers as scapegoats to explain the standstill in industrial production, saying that they had not 'learned' and formed the Tsektran (Central Committee of trade unions of transport workers), which served as a symbol of oppression for the working class. The Tsektran overlooked the militarization of labor with commissars acting as watchmen over workers and managers. In 1921, however, the New Economic Policy induced an abatement of labor relations, suggesting Lenin had learned some lessons from the disaster caused by War Communism.

The Common Vision of the Rural Proletariat

Mao and Lenin hypothesized that a rural proletariat would develop out of the peasantry. In his essay on *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1899), Lenin exaggerated the development of capitalism in his nation by saying that the village commune was in dissolution and that a rural bourgeoisie dominated the countryside. He maintained that the capitalist farmer and the agricultural worker would replace the peasant. During the Great Leap Forward of 1958-61, Mao attempted the industrialization of the countryside by calling for the construction of backyard steel furnaces, a task ending in failure. Realizing that their premature attempts to spark a socialist revolution of the proletariat had failed, the leaders once again reverted to revising Marxist theory in order to resolve practical problems. When it came to land reform in the civil war era, Mao enforced different programs in different regions, either radically confiscating land or reducing rent as specified in his letter to Liu Shaoqi on February 3, 1948.[39] Mao won peasant sympathy during a period of struggle against Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek's government with the slogans "Anti-starvation," "Anti-persecution," and "Anti-civil war," showing remarkable likeness to Lenin's slogan of "Peace, Land, Bread." In *The Present Situation and our Tasks,* Mao suggested that the key to victory over class enemies was the solution of the agrarian problem, a notion supported by Liao Kai-lung in his statement "That the People's War of Liberation could so speedily be brought to a victorious conclusion was due in a large measure to the successful implementation of the agrarian reform programme."[40]

A Question of Sincerity

Lenin often allowed the peasants to suffer in order to achieve his aims. The Land Decree of 1917 expropriated land, yet its unequal distribution disappointed peasants' expectations of a 'Black Repartition'. Moreover, knowledge that the decree was only temporary and that collectivization was on its way was suggested by the Decree on the Socialization of Land in April 1918. War Communism was a time of severe hardship for peasants

[32] Mao Tse-Tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung Volume II* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967):.327.
[33] Lazlo Ladany, *The Communist Party of China and Marxism* (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1988):.52.
[34] Fairbank, *The Cambridge History of China Volume 13,* 811.
[35] Daniels, *A Documentary History of Communism in Russia*, 21.
[36] Gurley, *Challengers to Capitalism*,.66.
[37] Roy Medveded, *Leninism and Western Socialism* (Worcester: Blackwell Press Ltd., 1981):.34.
[38] Broido, *Lenin and the Mensheviks: The Persecution of Socialists under Bolshevism*,.57.
[39] S.M. Chiu, *Chinese Communist Revolutionary Strategy, 1945-1949* (New York: Princeton University, 1961): 18.
[40] Liao Kai-lung, *From Yenan to Peking* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1954): 70.

whose food was forcibly extracted for cities and troops. Although there is not much information on the matter, an anti-Communist peasant uprising of 1918-19 is known to have been suppressed. A directive issued by Lenin on May 26, 1918 instructed the Red Army to battle the peasantry who withheld food or fuel. Bertrand Russel relates how Lenin described "with a chuckle how the government had forced the *muzhik* [peasant] to take worthless paper for money."[41] It was only in 1921 with the advent of the New Economic Policy that the peasants could market their grain, after Lenin's realization that the peasantry would no longer tolerate his decrees.

Mao abandoned the peasantry during the Great Leap Forward in favor of industrialization, yet he was more genuine in his desire to include the peasantry. The mass line movement suggests that he wanted the peasants to be directly involved in the revolution, and did not intend to merely exploit them in order to further the revolution.

General Differences between Chinese and Russian Communism

Leninism and Maoism proved to be a unique brand of communism, with Maoism deviating more from classical Marxism. In both Russia and China, the revolution was led by 'professionals,' yet in Russia it was the urban workers rather than the peasantry that lent decisive support to the revolution. In China, four classes as well as non-communist parties were allowed to coexist in a limited fashion, yet in Russia only one class and party was permitted. In addition, the nature of the Chinese and Russian revolutions differed to a large extent. The Chinese revolution involved the seizure of power from rural bases over a long period of time, whereas the Russian revolution consisted of uprisings in urban areas over a very short period of time. Mao denied the universal applicability of the Soviet model and asserted the Chinese model as a prototype for the rest of Asia during the Bandung Conference of 1955, which signaled the irreversible separation of the Russian and Chinese revolutions.

Conclusion

Lenin and Mao's revolution differed greatly in terms of their nature, yet in terms of their assessment of the revolutionary potential of the peasantry, they showed remarkable similarities. Both advocated the alliance of peasantry and proletariat as a requisite for a successful revolution, although Lenin tended to place more emphasis on the role of the proletariat. If Lenin had lived on and Stalin had not pursued rapid industrialization, it would be interesting to see if the peasantry would have continued to play a large part in the post-revolutionary era, since in the April Theses of 1917 he mentions, "we must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasants."[42] A man described by Leon Trotsky as having "not only the outward look of a muzhik, but …in his innermost being,"[43] Lenin himself revolutionized the role played by peasants in Russian Marxism, but acknowledged peasants more as a means to an end, and with less sincerity than Mao. Mao was pragmatic enough to recognize the incompatibility of Chinese reality and classical Marxism, and with this recognition led his party to victory.

[41] Richard Pipes, *The Russian Revolution* (London: Fontana Press, 1990): 743.
[42] John Daborn, *Russia: Revolution and Counter Revolution 1917-1924* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991):.66.
[43] Leon Trotsky, *On Lenin* (London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1971) :145.

A Victim of Modernity: The Decline of the Kibbutz in Israel

by Joshua Sternbach

Beginning in 1964, Bruno Bettleheim, an accomplished author and social scientist, sought to understand the child rearing methods in Israel. Of particular interest to him was the communal living environment of the kibbutz, and how this lifestyle influenced the development of children and young adults. In the process of presenting the findings of his research in his work, *The Children of the Dream*, Bettleheim uncovered a utopian society unlike any other. Difficulties that plagued American middle class youth during this time, issues such as drug use and delinquency, were entirely absent in the more socially isolated kibbutz system. While kibbutzniks comprised only 4% of the Israeli population, they represented 15% of Knesset members as well as a disproportionate number of the fighting forces.[1] The communal arrangement was producing respected leaders in several areas of society.

Modern times, however, have not been nearly as kind to the Kibbutz, as membership has steadily dropped over the past few decades. In addition, several kibbutzim have been forced to relinquish their original socialistic beliefs, and in some cases adopt capitalistic practices. Although Bettleheim revealed several strong ideological values of the early Kibbutz movement, the system as a whole was unable to defend itself against the rapid modernization of Israeli society. Specifically, the traditional kibbutz has declined primarily as a result of a weak, religion-free educational system and an unstable Israeli economy.

In order to represent fully the downfall of the kibbutz cultural movement, it becomes necessary first to explain its successful beginnings. Here the stronger points of the kibbutz provide valuable clues to the system's innate flaws.

The significance of some of the revolutionary child raising methods of the kibbutz originated in reaction to the traditional Jewish family of pre-Zionist Europe. The original Kibbutz movement mixed socialist, Zionist and Tolstoyan values along with a revolt, (called Wandervogel), against the highly structured educational system of the German Gymnasium, which many of the kibbutz founders had attended in their youth.[2] These European descendants, particularly frustrated with the memory of their overly aggressive and domineering Jewish mothers, implemented changes in order to alter the mother's role in the lives of children. Most importantly, the sexes were separated on a kibbutz, allowing for absolute equality between men and women. Even in communal labor, no job traditionally held by men, (such as farming), would exclude women if they wished to join.

In addition, religion and materialism were virtually abandoned altogether. The origin of this decision was once again based on the effort to move away from the impoverished European Jewish ghetto family, in which both material goods and religion were stressed heavily by the parents. Bettleheim addresses this when he comments, ". . . doing away with the family structure and striving for utter equality between the sexes was part of a larger desire for equality in all things."[3] In terms of the lives of children, however, the most significant changes were made in the relationship with their parents.

Traditionally, the typical American mother fears giving up her children to others and at the same time pressures her child ardently in areas such as school and personal conduct. This pressure arises as a result of her need for her child to prove, through his actions, that she is an exemplary mother. The kibbutz mother, on the other hand, relinquished her child rearing responsibility by turning her child over to a metapelet, or child handler who worked for the kibbutz. This decision set the premise for the entire parent-child interaction: if mothers do not devote as much of themselves to their children (as American or European mothers might do), the children will ask for less in return.[4]

This arrangement gave rise to several substantial advantages for the kibbutz child. First, children held the opportunity to pursue entirely unique lives while carrying on a satisfying existence in the presence of their peers. Second, the fact that time between parent and child was limited to only a few hours a day guarded against the establishment of any type of Oedipal complex (this pertains particularly to Bettleheim considering his subscription to the theories of Freud).[5] More simple, however, is the notion that limited time between parents and children diminished the possibility of a "separation anxiety," within the child. Even if a particular child found it difficult to be separated from his mother or father, he had his metapelet and, more importantly, his peer group for communal support.

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[1] Bruno Bettleheim, *The Children of the Dream* (Toronto: Collier-Macmillan Canada Ltd., 1969): 15.
[2] Ibid., 21.
[3] Ibid., 23.
[4] Ibid., 33.
[5] Ibid., 36.

This overall effort that each kibbutznik took in order to ensure against dependent parent-child relationships related back to the overall theme of equality. In following these predetermined rules, children preserved what Bettleheim terms, the "collective superego."[6] By this he means the overall communal spirit, and when it did happen to be damaged by an individual, this individual felt the guilt of the entire community for trying to disrupt communal happiness. This guilt was profoundly more intense compared to that produced only by one's individual conscience. Pressure from the surrounding community, indeed, only increased as kibbutz youth moved from early childhood to adolescence.

The kibbutz adolescent confronted several critical dilemmas as he progressed in his education. One such dilemma, for instance, involved the fact that the kibbutz strongly discouraged any promiscuous behavior, fearing that it might lead to a disruption in the collective social fabric. Young men and women near the peak of their sexual existence showered and slept in the presence of members of the opposite gender, yet they were not allowed to act on their natural desires. As Bettleheim points out, this was particularly difficult because it required the adolescent to repress what was natural in the hope that it would serve the greater good.[7]

Repression became necessary for other issues as well, particularly those that existed outside the kibbutz. Specifically, Bettleheim noted an instance where some of the children expressed an interest in the culture of American society (e.g. movies, Hollywood, television, etc.). The adult members of the kibbutz rejected such youthful curiosity in the same manner as they did the issue of promiscuity, claiming it could only cause harm to the collective ego.[8] Similarly, the kibbutz made no promise of providing any of its younger members with a college education, invariably causing adolescents to repress any hopes of such a dream. These acts of repression were entirely productive from the point of view of the kibbutz, as Bettleheim quoted one particular educator as saying, "Any repression that leads to identification with kibbutz values is good and desirable because it builds the ego."[1] As cruel as the kibbutz educational system may appear, it did, however, provide its pupils with certain advantages that were unobtainable in other schools.

The kibbutz adolescent experienced a unique comfort as a result of not having to repress certain issues that the American middle class child would. As previously mentioned, the notion of the domineering parent is entirely unknown to the kibbutz youth. Parents, by way of the extremely limited time they spent with their children, were essentially unable to become overbearing in any way. A child in the Diaspora may have found it necessary to rebel against the authority of his parents as a way to achieve greater independence, yet the kibbutz insured against such a stressful endeavor. Even economic dependence, a particularly prevalent issue in the older Jewish ghettos, was essentially eliminated by the classless and communal arrangement of the kibbutz system. As a result, adolescents never had to feel the burdensome pain that comes from having less money than others in the surrounding community. Peer groups thus tended to be closely knit, as the importance of group solidarity was placed higher than the role of the individual.[2]

The early Kibbutz movement, although unorthodox in some areas, tended to promote admirable qualities in young men and women. In turning over children to be raised by the community, parental freedom increased and, by extension, both genders were able to coexist in near perfect equality. In fact, in 1955 one member remarked, in reference to his kibbutzniks, that they, ". . . went so far as to print a pamphlet [whose] theme was that the only obstacle in the way of achieving true equality of the sexes was the unfortunate physical difference between men and women."[3] Greater equality then led to increased autonomy among the children, who were left to interact with their peers without worrying about their parents' economic or social status.

For as many strong ideologies that the system possessed, however, the kibbutz in modern day Israel is no longer thriving. Recently, kibbutzim have seen their basic principles eroded, and then replaced by more mainstream arrangements. For instance, nearly a third of kibbutzim now have some type of differential in their members' incomes, while about half charge their members for recreational activities that used to be free. Even the distribution of shares of kibbutz assets to the members has been discussed, something that undoubtedly would have been unheard of in the 1960's.[4] Ironically, this recent decline has been a direct result of the aspects that were once very strong in the early kibbutz philosophy. The first of such failures involved the overall educational system within the kibbutz.

[6] Ibid., 125.
[7] Ibid., 204.
[8] Ibid., 221.
[1] Ibid., 215.
[2] Ibid., 230-274.
[3] Ibid., 23.
[4] Daniel Gavron, *The Kibbutz* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000): 11.

The first critical error in the overall teaching of the kibbutz lifestyle was that it lacked a strong religious infusion. The original founders of the movement were adamant in preserving an atheistic society, mostly in an effort to boost overall equality and maintain a communal atmosphere. Although these ends were met temporarily, the long-term effects of a religion-free society were more deleterious. Yeheskel Dar, a member of one of the early kibbutzim, Degania, had the following to say when asked why four generations of education had failed to pass on communal values:

> They thought that living it was enough . . . They did not really teach kibbutz life with texts about equality and community, in the way that religious educators instill religion with biblical and talmudic texts. They definitely overestimated the influence of the social structure.[5]

By removing religion altogether, the kibbutz found it difficult to ensure the continuity of its own convictions. The Jewish religion has prevailed throughout thousands of years of adversity, mainly as a result of the way it has been taught and passed on to younger members. The kibbutz, unfortunately, made the conscious decision to discard this intense type of education, and therefore was unable to maintain a cohesive membership for a prolonged period of time.

Moreover, the overall message of the kibbutz education is not one that stresses the pursuit of individual success. Daniel Gavron describes Chen Vardi, a young man who spent a few months abroad before returning to live at Degania, "His biggest problem was with what he saw as the mediocrity and dependence of the members . . . He concluded that the kibbutz education created mediocrity. Anyone striving for excellence was derided as a shvitzer, a boaster."[6] This is not to say that kibbutz children didn't grow up to become upstanding members of Israeli society; clearly they have. For the child who *did* happen to have extraordinary ambition, however, that child most likely found the kibbutz education repressive. As a result, kibbutzim began to lose the members that had the best chance of actually achieving significant prosperity on their own. A member of the newer kibbutz system commented, "You won't hear a kibbutz kid saying he wants to be the best or to earn the most . . . Is that a bad thing? I don't know."[7] Undoubtedly this *is* a bad thing considering that success has been rapidly leaking from the third and fourth generations of the kibbutz system.

A history of fluctuation in Israel's economy, however, has played an equally critical role in shaping the demise of the kibbutz. During the 1950's, the Israeli government reached an agreement with West Germany, in which the latter nation granted large credits to Israel in recognition of the terrible sufferings inflicted upon Jews by the Nazis. In addition, survivors and refugees were personally compensated for their businesses, property, and loss of education.[8] Although this extension of funds was certainly justified, its effect on the kibbutzim amounted to a mixed blessing. While oftentimes the money was used to build additional public facilities, such as a swimming pool or larger dining hall, the new income also served to weaken the common thread of equality. Gavron interviews one recipient of such funds, Haim Zeligman, who, although acknowledging that the money helped both his kibbutz and the State of Israel, felt it was the beginning of the end of kibbutz values. He commented, "Suddenly we became rich, we in the kibbutzim and everyone else. The collective ethos declined, and all of us became much more materialistic and individualistic. The money that came in from Germany had an enormous influence on everything."[9] For the kibbutzniks, unfortunately, the situation would only escalate in the decades to come.

The Israeli economy also broke kibbutzniks from their faith by luring members away from a communal setting and into the world of high finance. The period between the 1950's and 1970's saw a substantial increase in the output of the national economy. This growth led to an increase in both income and living standards for the entire population. As Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak mention in *Trouble in Utopia*, ". . . from the standpoint of class consciousness, were the possibilities for upward economic mobility opened up by these processes . . . opportunities for upward mobility were found not only in larger wage differentials but also in the availability of new job opportunities."[10] As the gross national product began to climb, kibbutzim did not suffer immediate adverse effects. As time progressed, however, they did begin to lose some of their brightest members to the fruitful job market. Even when some of these career-oriented members returned to the kibbutz, they were generally unable to completely reassume the kibbutz philosophy. Gavron observes such individuals:

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[5] Ibid., 172.
[6] Ibid., 37.
[7] Ibid., 132.
[8] Ibid., 61.
[9] Ibid., 62.
[10] Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, *Trouble in Utopia* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989)

> Their aim is to develop and improve their kibbutz, without too much regard for kibbutz principles. Many of them studied economics and business management at universities in Israel and abroad and were far more impressed by the ideas of competition and efficient administration than they were by the ideals of equality and mutual help.[11]

Even during a thriving economy the kibbutz existence found itself threatened by the competitive nature of its surroundings. As national economic success later began to dwindle, the kibbutz would only encounter extended hardship.

In the 1970's, kibbutzim began taking loans from banks, but instead of investing this money in potentially profitable enterprises, such as factories or businesses, they used the funds to improve living conditions. This was similar to the use of German money in that it involved the construction of public buildings and libraries. In the early 1980's, inflation in Israel surpassed 400 percent, and by 1985 the government was forced to take drastic measures to bring the economy under control. It achieved this by devaluating the Israeli currency by 15 percent, freezing wages and prices, and leaving interest rates extraordinarily high. Although this method succeeded in causing the inflation rate to drop significantly, interest rates nevertheless remained high. As a result, the collective kibbutz debt climbed to between $5 and $6 billion, an amount that could never be repaid.[12]

Such an immense debt caused kibbutz members to break from their traditional communal mentality. For one, several kibbutz members began to resort to the national stock market, a point which Gavron articulates:

> The fact that the kibbutz money managers were speculating on the Tel Aviv stock exchange is in itself a sign of flaw in the kibbutz educational system. The founders would never have dreamed of such behavior. Even the most pragmatic among them could not have imagined making money without earning it.[13]

Certainly difficult times often require drastic measures, but kibbutz members belong to an organization that is explicitly opposed to seeking profit. These speculators attempted to earn money without the consent of other kibbutz members, yet felt justified in taking control of their funds. Such activity runs contrary to the basic tenets of trust and equality that were once inherent to the system. Israeli society in general, however, must share a significant portion of the blame for helping to cause distress in the kibbutz community. As Horowitz and Lissak point out, "Many of the major problems of Israeli society are related to the overburdened nature of the system. In the economic sphere, inflation and the balance of payments deficit reflect the failure to balance demands to raise living standards and . . . promote economic growth with the resources at the disposal of the system."[14] The kibbutz movement, in recent times, has had the unfortunate circumstance of existing in a modernized society in which it cannot find the necessary financial support.

The internal defects of the kibbutz coupled with the external pressure of a precarious Israeli society have continuously burdened this communal experiment. Certainly any group living in Israel in the modern era will undoubtedly experience difficulty in establishing and maintaining a strong identity. The nation itself, by nature, is one that involves multiple societal cleavages. Examples of this include the orthodox versus the secular population, the Ashkenazim and Sephardim, as well as Jews and Arab groups. The kibbutz, too, has struggled with its counterpart; the ever-expanding surroundings that comprise the nation of Israel.

Although the kibbutz movement has recently faced difficulty, it cannot be considered an overall failure. The founders of the kibbutz came to Israel with the intent not only of pioneering a new type of system, but of producing a new kind of Jew. After witnessing the near destruction of the Jewish people during World War II, the recent citizens of the young Israel knew they had to create a state that would no longer accept malevolence in any form. The phrase "never again," was adopted specifically so that worldwide Jewry could easily embrace an attitude of courage and self-sufficiency. In this view, the kibbutz was indeed a success because it fostered an original relationship among Jewish people. Those raised in the communes treated one another as brothers, regardless of gender or age. Perhaps the kibbutz may not last throughout Israel's future, but it has already contributed heavily to the formation of its past.

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[11] Gavron, 159.
[12] Ibid., 145.
[13] Ibid., 159.
[14] Horowitz and Lissak, 239.

Warren Brown. ***Unjust Seizure: Conflict, Interest and Authority in an Early Medieval Society*****.**
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001. 224 pp. Hardcover $39.95.

Warren Brown is a recent graduate of UCLA's Ph.D. program in history and is currently a professor of medieval history at the California Institute of Technology. As much research begins, his dissertation turned 224-page book began as an off-handed remark by an advisor about a number of sources regarding early medieval Bavaria that lay unused in German archives. Specifically, Brown draws upon the records of the cathedral of Freising, which were composed between the years 824 and ca. 855 by a local priest on the orders of the bishop of Freising, Hitto. Residing in the Bavarian archives of Munich, this ninth century manuscript of about seven hundred records provides a wealth of information that has never been called into question. More importantly for Brown's research, these records contain about one hundred records of disputing and conflict.

Brown synthesizes two distinct lines of scholarship, incorporating both Anglo-American work on culture, power, and disputing that focuses on the state of post-Carolingian Europe as well as the turn in German scholarship away from institutional and law oriented work towards the study of social processes. These two highly interrelated fields of research have seldom been merged in a completely synthetic way, a task that Brown willingly takes on in his pursuit of how central authority and social norms interacted in disputes throughout the eighth and ninth centuries—a time frame presenting three incarnations of political authority, each with its own attendant changing situations.

The book expands upon Brown's previous *Viator* article on norms of conduct and their use in early medieval Bavaria, vastly increasing the number of examples by drawing upon the rich literature the Freising sources provide. This research points not to law and state-imposed judicial action to maintain order, but rather the existence and use of rules of conduct, that were enforced by a variety of means by an offenders peers. Brown enlists a number of ordinary disputes between a variety of individuals and social strata to define what the norms in question are and how they operate. As the records in question are those of the church of Freising, the bishops of the city play some role in every one of these disputes. However, bishops are not always the central players. Thus, their records give us a unique perspective, one that places bishops in the position of third party to a number of disputes. This is useful because the bias of the documents then can be tested in situations other than those where the bishops have a reason to obfuscate.

Brown's analysis of these issues of norms and central authority takes him through an evolving maze of unique practices and conventions over the course of about 150 years. He seeks to elicit what effect central authority had on the resolution of disputes and how that power actually worked itself out on the ground—if indeed it was utilized at all. Indeed, he does conclude that the reach of centralized authority was rather short, and divides this into three general periods, each with specific characteristics.

Brown's first period is that of Agilolfing family rule from the fifth century to the year 787 when Charlemagne invaded. Most recorded conflicts during this time were between land-holding kindreds and these conflicts were almost always over property disputes. Here, Brown states bishops and the Agilolfing duke ordinarily intervened as an arbiter, without resorting to any outside judicial authority. Conflict, was then settled by a combination of self-help justice and negotiation, usually with the help of the current bishop or duke. The second period is one of relatively strong Carolingian rule ushered in by Charlemagne's invasion. It traces a clash of expectations between parties (usually the church and individuals who donated property to the church), one of which invokes formal, legal rights, and the other of which invokes customary norms. Brown's third and final period (spanning a few chapters) traces the unraveling of Carolingian rule in the mid-ninth century, and a return to dispute resolution governed by the old norms of the Agilolfing period, albeit somewhat altered customs that had been affected by the rather brief period of direct Carolingian rule.

Brown concludes that the power of the central government in settling disputes was extremely limited in all periods. This was usually the case, except as a result of the actions of particularly charismatic or influential individuals such as Arn of Bavaria. Between 794 and 810 in his capacity of archbishop, Arn functioned as what Brown terms an "authority figure" (105). However, even Arn's authority was dependent on his personal and political connections and not on his institutional position as both Carolingian *missus* and local bishop of noble birth. Therefore, to name but one example, Brown makes a strong case for the fundamental decentralization of power in early medieval Bavaria. Even under the centralized power of the Carolingian monarchy the practical power of the state to intervene in conflict was severely limited.

The influence of previous work in the field becomes obvious in Brown's conceptions of social interaction. Both the Anglo-American and German traditions of scholarship are represented in the work.

Gerd Althoff's theories about the structure of kin solidarity groups (see his *Verwante, Freunde und Getreue*) and more tacitly Bernhard Jussen's notions of changing cultural perceptions figure as prominently in his research as Steven D. White's and Patrick Geary's influential essays on typologies of conflict resolution do. Although he draws upon these works, Brown's book is not merely a summary of the present historiography. Far more than that, he takes the best existing research, pairs it with a set of hitherto un-researched documents, and then injects his own notion of social interaction in the primacy of norms to explain the processes of Bavarian society—original scholarship at its best.

However, there are some questions left unanswered by the book. Brown (and furthermore, most of the historians he cites) draws heavily upon theories of legal anthropology, especially Simon Roberts' 1979 classic *Order and Dispute*. Roberts appears in a few footnotes and his work is only indirectly and very briefly discussed in the introduction to the book. Legal anthropology provides a highly defined framework from which to begin any investigation into the conflicts of stateless or semi-stateless societies. (Or, as Robert Ellickson's much more recent work *Order without Law* suggests, such studies have much to say even regarding modern states.) Adapted to the study of Europe through historical rather than ethnographic sources, this framework is used in a rather profound but completely tacit way to support Brown's argument. Perhaps the book would have benefited from a more thorough exploration of the anthropological bases upon which it stands.

Another, related question that is begged by Brown's book regards the critiques of social scientific theory used in history to explain ritual and other customs whose meaning are not explicitly outlined in our source materials. Most notably in recent works such as *The Dangers of Ritual*, Philippe Buc deals with the extent and nature of knowledge gleaned from social customs and rites, questioning what we can really learn from such explorations. Buc is cited and briefly discussed in *Unjust Seizure*. Brown simply writes, "Buc's recent work on the written representation of public ritual his made it quite clear that one aspect of the competition for power in the Carolingian world consisted of the struggle for control over the meaning and representation of events" (184). Undoubtedly Brown disagrees with Buc's interpretation of the extent to which evidence based on culture and ritual can be used. As a reader, however, it is disappointing to not find his reasons in print.

Despite these minor points, Brown has skillfully laid out his vision of political power, conflict processes, and society in eighth and ninth century Bavaria. Not only does it succeed in the stated goal of joining two distinct historiographical traditions, it also enters the uncharted territory of the Freising records, sorting out the complex affairs of the bishops and others who appear in the stories over a significant span of time with both clarity and impressive style. It is another highly useful addition to an underrepresented field of historical research.

Brian Smith
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Contributing Authors

Oleysa Baker, a native of the Ukraine, moved to the United States in 1995. While attending Bakersfield College, Oleysa was an active student and a high achiever, serving as a student body Senator, maintaining a 4.0 grade point average and earning both an Academic Achievement Award and a Presidential Award for Outstanding Academic Achievement. She is currently a fourth year Mathematics-Economics major, maintaining a 3.83 GPA. Additionally, Oleysa is a member of the Mathematical Association of America, a Research Assistant in the Department of Economics and an Editorial Assistant at the Department's journal, *Review of Economic Dynamics*. She plans on attending graduate school in Economics in the fall of 2003

Theodore Chang is currently double majoring in History and Business Economics with a minor in Accounting. Ted also serves on campus as an ASK Academic Counselor in the College of Letters and Science and works with at-risk youth around the Los Angeles area as a team leader in the Americorps Program. He was recently inducted as a member of the Golden Key National Honour Society and is attending UCLA on a National Merit Scholarship. In the course of his studies, Ted has primarily focused on classical and medieval history, with an emphasis on English history from the late medieval period. This paper was written under the watchful tutelage of Professor Teofilo Ruiz, who provided the initial encouragement for the author to pursue his research project. Ted eventually intends to submit a revised version of this work as his honors thesis.

Beau Epoch Lindsay is graduating this June with a double major in History and Classical Civilizations. The paper that Beau submitted to this journal was also presented at the 2002 Phi Alpha Theta Regional Conference at Loyola Marymount University where it was awarded third place. It comprises only one chapter of his History Department honors thesis written under the guidance of Professor Ronald Mellor and for which he was awarded second place in 2001 at the annual departmental thesis contest. Beau has been a member of Phi Alpha Theta for two years and is currently the chapter Treasurer, in which capacity he has both managed the financial aspects of the organization and planned academic events. For the last two years he has also dedicated himself to the study of Greek and Latin, and intends to pursue graduate study in either ancient history or classics.

Courtney Luckhardt is a junior majoring in History with an emphasis on medieval studies. Under the guidance of Professor Richard Rouse, Courtney is currently working on her honors thesis which focuses on medieval Wales and Brittany. She is also a recipient of the 2002 Beinecke Brothers Memorial Scholarship that will provide a total of $32,000 for her first two years of post-baccalaureate study. After graduation in spring 2003, Courtney intends to pursue her Ph.D. in a medieval European history program beginning in the fall of that year. Her goal is to attend either Harvard University or UC Berkeley.

Frank Miranda is a senior majoring in History with an emphasis on the Roman and late antique periods. Frank is also involved in outreach with the Academic Advancement Program and has served in various capacities with Phi Alpha Theta over the past two years, including as the current chapter President. In 2001, he was awarded an Undergraduate Research Development Stipend from the UCLA Undergraduate Research Center which he used to work on the paper submitted to this journal. This paper- supervised by Professor Ronald Mellor- was also awarded first place at the 2002 PAT Regional Conference at Loyola Marymount University. As a Wasserman Research Scholar, Frank is currently writing an honors thesis under the guidance of Professor Claudia Rapp. In 2002, he received the prestigious Charles and Sue Young Undergraduate Student Award from the College of Letters and Sciences. His additional accolades include the Cesár Chavez Memorial and Ebell Flint Scholarships, Golden Key and publication in the 2002 issue of *Westwind*. Frank will be graduating *summa cum laude* this June with College and Departmental honors.

Katherine Ng will be graduating in June with College honors in History and Asian American Studies. She is currently finishing up her honors thesis with Professor Henry Yu. The thesis contains a more in-depth look into Rose Hum Lee's lifelong intellectual struggle with assimilation and belonging in America. She would like to take this opportunity to thank Professor Thu-Huong Nguyen-Vo whose discussions with the author sharpened many of her arguments. Katherine would also like to note that this essay and the forthcoming thesis would not have been possible without the assistance of Professor Yu whose generosity and guidance during his intellectual history class proved invaluable.

Katie J. Nolan is a History major, with a minor in Near Eastern Languages and Cultures. Katie is particularly interested in the history of Jewish, Christian, and Islamic relations in the late medieval period. Upon entering college, she was awarded the Regent's Scholarship for $7000 from UCSB. In 2001, Katie was awarded the Undergraduate Research Development Stipend from the UCLA Undergraduate Research Center which helped to finance her work with the Center for Near Eastern Studies in developing the MEARO (Middle Eastern American Resources Online) database. In addition to membership in the Alpha Lambda Delta and Golden Key National honor societies, Katie is currently the Public Relations Officer for the UCLA chapter of Phi Alpha Theta. She will be graduating *summa cum laude* this June and plans on studying history at graduate school. Katie's essay was originally written for a class entitled 'Study of Religion 120: Abrahamic Religions: Traditions in Tension" during spring quarter 2000.

Pavitra Mohan Ram is a second year international student who is double majoring in History and French. The essay she submitted to this journal was originally written for the International Baccalaureate Program's Extended Essay requirement in her senior year of high school, and it was this work that truly sparked her interest in pursuing History as a field of study

Brian Smith is a fourth year History major and Political Science minor who will be graduating this June with College and Departmental honors. Brian completed his honors thesis under the guidance of Professor Patrick Geary and plans on pursuing a doctorate in early modern European intellectual history, specializing in the Scottish Enlightenment. His work has also appeared in the 2001 issue of *Westwind*, the journal of the UCLA Undergraduate Research Center, for which he received the Vice Provost's Prize for Best Non-Fiction Essay. Brian is a member of Phi Alpha Theta and participated in the chapter's award-winning delegation to the 2002 PAT Regional Conference at Loyola Marymount University.

Joshua Sternbach is a third-year student majoring in History and Pre-Medical Studies. Joshua is an active member of Phi Alpha Theta, having served as the UCLA chapter's Membership Secretary for the past year. He is also a member of several other campus organizations, including Golden Key National Honour Society, the College Honors Program, the Student Health Advocates (SHA), the Order of Omega, the UCLA Ski Team, and Beta Theta Pi Fraternity. In addition, Joshua has assisted in the laboratories of the Life Sciences Department as an Undergraduate Assistant, and is a clinical volunteer for the Arthur Ashe Student Health and Wellness Center. He has been an eight-time recipient of his fraternity's alumni honorarium, and in 2001 was awarded the Interfraternity Council (IFC) Merit-based Scholarship.