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Acknowledgements

WELCOME to the fourth volume of *Quaestio*, the annual publication featuring UCLA's finest undergraduate historical research. *Quaestio* (Latin for 'inquiry') is a publication of UCLA's Theta Upsilon Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta, a national history honors society. The journal was established in 2002 by then Editor-in-Chief Frank Miranda, and under the leadership of past Editor-in-Chiefs Armen Adzhemyan and Brad Ng has continued to successfully publish the best original undergraduate research.

This year we received many excellent submissions, and had the privilege of publishing exciting student research on a range of historical topics.

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Sincerely,

Jeric Tao Huang
Editor-in-Chief

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John Hudgens is currently a fourth year History major and East Asian Languages Minor at UCLA. Before coming to UCLA, John obtained his Associate's Degree in History at Orange Coast College where he was also recognized as a dean's list recipient. The discourse "A Gray Survival Method" was written for Dr. Damon Woods' History 97M class on South East Asian history as a research assignment to explore opposing points of view for major events in history. Though the piece is written on South East Asian history, John is currently studying a wide range of history to prepare for his career aspiration of teaching history at the secondary level.

A Gray Survival Method By John Hudgens

The Age of Imperialism is seen as a time when Western powers dominated the globe and colonized all those who were "uncivilized". In accordance with Rudyard Kipling's, "The White Man's Burden", countries from Western Europe along with America brought modernity to the backwards peoples of the world. Yet, there were some exceptions to this rule, some countries were deemed to already be on par with European civility and allowed to maintain their sovereignty. Here the question arises, did these countries earn their independence through clever diplomacy, or were they allowed to survive by the Western powers' good graces? We will delve into the reasons surrounding the sovereignty of Siam (Now known as Thailand) during the reigns of King Mongkut (1851-1868), and his son King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910). During this half century, Siam was dangerously close to becoming incorporated into a Western empire. This essay will strive to determine whether it was due to the cunning diplomacy of the father and son Kings, or was due to the manipulation of Western powers that delivered Siam as the only unconquered country in South East Asia.

Before immediately investigating the question, some historical background is necessary. Siam's first contact with the Western world was in 1511 in the form of a Portuguese envoy sent by Affonso de Albuquerque. As the Portuguese dominance in exploration began to wane, the Dutch, English, French, and Spanish eventually came to Siam for evangelical or commercial reasons. The foreigners were well received by the then King Narai, who allowed Western extraterritoriality in his country, and was even tolerant towards evangelical attempts as Exell notes, "Such was his confidence in the religion of his people."¹ Foreign influences were steadily encroaching on domestic matters until a watershed in Siamese history occurred. A Greek man by the name of Constantine Phaulkon led a band of French conspirators against King Narai in order to convert him to Christianity. As a result, the nobility revolted, dethroned the King, and began merciless persecution of foreigners in Siam. As a backlash against the attempted take over by foreign interests, Siam entered a period of isolation, similar to that of Japan's that lasted 150 years.

The year 1851 saw a change in Siamese politics. England and America were becoming restless with constant Siamese deflections in regards to unfair trade conditions and would soon commence hostilities had it not been for one incredible person. King Mongkut was crowned on April 21, 1851. Shortly thereafter, he enacted major reforms in relation to the import duties and the export of rice that America and England had wanted to discuss. From there on he began a process of rapid modernization in his country, from infrastructure to government to defense. He also opened Siamese doors to many foreigners, especially the British, which can be seen in the Bowring Treaty of 1855. This treaty not only granted extraterritorial rights to Great Britain, but it also allowed the British to buy goods directly from the producers, thus relinquishing the royal monopoly on all goods, and granting British merchants lower taxes. Mongkut greatly desired a friendship with Britain as she was

the greatest power in those days.

As the throne was passed to Chulalongkorn in 1868, Siam's future became more tumultuous. Established nobles had regained their power and sought to turn back the clock on Siamese reforms, and France was increasingly encroaching on Siam's border from their Indochinese Empire. The year 1893 marked a grim point in Siamese history as French ships, which were denied access to Paknam, simply barged their way through and killed thirty Siamese soldiers to their loss of four. This incident outlined the major differences between the vastly technologically superior Western powers, and the Siamese who depended on such technology. As a result of the Gunboat Incident at Paknam, the French demanded land cessions in Cambodia as reparations for the act. In addition, lawlessness was running rampant in the northern Shan States which was hindering British commercial prospects in the area. Consequently, Britain demanded Siam grant British India the land to these semi-independent states in order to control them more effectively. With France and Britain slowly nibbling away at Siam's borders, the two super powers' territories were finally bordering each other in the north. In order to prevent any full out war over disputed land in the east, the two nations decided to keep Siam as an independent buffer state between the two Western behemoths.

In an environment where two long time rivals were expanding their spheres of influence, did the Siamese Kings really have any control over their own destiny? One thought is that King Mongkut and Chulalongkorn were actually the reasons why Siam maintained its independence while other countries were conquered by Western might. One can see how the Kings saved their country through Westernization and through the diplomacy tactics they each King employed to ensure Siam's survival.

As a Buddhist monk, King Mongkut realized the power of Western countries as he had read about the fall of China at the hands of the foreign jackals. In an effort to

save his own country from a similar fate, the ruler realized, “his nation could not resist all foreign intrusions, [and] it was wiser to accept what was good rather than to have more than he wanted thrust upon him by superior power.”² By recognizing the might of countries like Britain and France, he realized that Eastern/Asian ways could not compete against the advanced Western ways. Therefore, he had to fight fire with fire and quickly adapt his country to their ways not only to fight off would be intruders, but to assimilate into Western ways and be seen as an equally civilized country. Mongkut's son followed tradition as, “The real leadership in reform and modernization came from the King (Chulalongkorn), who chose his men carefully, educated them... while at the same time he was taking particular care to ensure that the subsequent generation of Thailand's leaders would be even better educated and prepared for public office than they were.”³ By carefully picking and educating his own men, Chulalongkorn ensured that the entrenched nobility could no longer stint his much needed reforms. Instead, he entrenched his own, like-minded men in order to perpetuate the modernization of Siam for future generations.

King Mongkut realized Western ways of thought were vital when dealing with the Western countries. In order to be seen as an equal, you had to think equally. Just before Mongkut's ascension to the throne Sir John Bowring wrote in reference to a British and American merchant who wished to deal with the isolated Siamese government that, “both [merchants] recommended to their governments that to the only way to secure new agreements with Siam would be by a warlike demonstration.”⁴ Had Mongkut continued with the conservative isolationist policies of the nobility then Siam would have surely been invaded by Britain, looking to expand her Indian Empire. In fact, Mongkut sought to befriend the British in a most enticing way, by appealing to them commercially. To do so, Mongkut agreed to the terms of the Bowring Treaty of 1855 which not only granted several tax laws that were favorable to British subjects, but, “it

granted extraterritorial rights authorizing the residence in Bangkok of a British consul who was given civil and criminal jurisdiction over all British subjects in Siam.”⁵ Though this may seem like an infringement on Siamese rights, it works in their favor. By allowing British citizens commerce and protection in Siam, it also grants Siam a type of defense against other foreign powers that would try to harm the country, and thus the British subjects in Siam.

King Chulalongkorn's reign demanded delicate diplomacy as the two major European colonizers were continuously gnawing away at Siam's territory. To prove that he was no less of a ruler than his father, Chulalongkorn was,

“Firmly committed personally to reform and vitally convinced of its importance to the survival of the nation, he had to battle and overcome the resistance to change and modernization. This was a slow, painful, and delicate task, to which few men would have been equal. He accomplished it with great skill, consummate patience, supreme determination, and a single-minded dedication to the ultimate good of the nation.”⁶

The dedication Chulalongkorn exhibited was not without its rewards. He managed to maintain the reforms necessary to allow the country to adapt to the changing political environment. By remaining open minded to Western influences, he maintained favorable alliances with countries that could help his own. In 1897 King Chulalongkorn toured Europe in an attempt to stabilize the tumultuous politics in South East Asia. Tuck notes that, “Chulalongkorn's resistance to French demands, however, had already been encouraged at Berlin by the Kaiser, who raised the tempting possibility of a four-power guarantee of Siam.”⁷ Knowing that his country was not fit to defend itself against a powerhouse such as France, Chulalongkorn instead put pressure on France back at home. By maintaining friendly ties with France's biggest rivals, Britain and Germany, Siam put pressure on the territory hungry French, which helped ensure their independence as a nation.

Recognizing that other Western powers played a big

part in defending Siam from France, could it be possible that Siam's freedom was manipulated by the Western powers? This opposing thought explores the question that Siam actually had no control over its independence and was the mercy of foreign powers, only interested in their own spheres of influence. The use of Western diplomacy to maintain Siamese sovereignty is expressed through land cessions by Siam, Anglo-French relations, and the weakness of the Siamese government.

Land cessions to Britain and France were a result of a Siamese attempt to satiate the two powers' hunger for land as a tactic to avoid war. The French Colonial Party forced the King of Cambodia to accept French rule, which meant that French territory was claimed not only over his lands, but disputed lands between the once independent Cambodia and Siam. Despite Mongkut's desire to keep his land, "Due to English indifference King Mongkut had to recognize French suzerainty over Cambodia in 1867 at last."⁸ Further despite the King's wishes, he could not save his land without the assistance of another Western power. All of his power lay in how well he could back up his word; with Britain not interested in defending land that was not in their commercial interest, it had no significance to the crown. Land cession also went to the British as, "1904 started the Anglo – Thai talks on the boundary question in the South, and in 1909 Thailand had agreed to cede the four [Malay] provinces... in return of which Britain gave up extra-territorial rights over British subjects in Thailand."⁹ In order for Siam to gain jurisdiction over people in its own country they had to forfeit land to the British for them to relinquish their rights. In order to gain some sort of power, the Siamese government had to appeal to the British crown to revoke certain terms of the Bowring Treaty.

Though Siam had to appeal to each of its foreign neighbors directly, the relationship between the Anglo and French government played a significant part in determining the fate of Siam. In an attempt to have an empire similar to

their neighbors across the channel, France desperately wished to annex Siam into their Indochinese Empire. Siamese annexation had even been casually mentioned that, "Siam will inevitably be taken over by us (France) or by them (Britain) one day; better that the morsel falls to us."¹⁰ A conquest of Siam would increase trade in the area, which at this time was pitifully low. Expanding their land holdings would also allow France to contest England for more territory in the East. In a push to prevent their Empire from bordering France's, the two powers signed a treaty that, "Thailand, all Thailand, should be the buffer State between the British and French possessions."¹¹ This treaty is written proof that the State's independence was not due to crafty Siamese diplomacy, but rather was due to selfish British diplomacy. In order to prevent any war with France, the British found it prudent to also prevent any more of their territory from bordering one another. Thereby granting a Siamese state a type of immunity against both sides.

These foreign interests proved to be a main reason that Siam passed many of the reforms that it did. In an attempt to win over the British as an ally, the Siamese did almost everything asked of them. Many of the reforms done that are seen as diplomacy on the Siamese part, is little more than obedience on their part as, "everything was spurred on because the lack of it caused uneasiness and damage to foreign interests and so it must be organized and continually improved."¹² The modernization of the country, thus, was not to adapt to a Western political environment, but to provide for that very environment. Western services such as adequate policing, railroads, and the postal service were instated in Siam in order to please the British entrepreneurs and make them feel at ease. The fact that foreigners were above the law in Siam wasn't so much a problem with the natives as it was with France as, "The initiative in this departure (abolition of extra-territoriality) was, surprisingly, taken by France, the power of all others most jealous of any curtailment of extraterritorial rights in Siam."¹³ Not only did

allies of Siam have a say in domestic affairs, but so did those not for Siamese independence. French influence over the abolishment of extraterritorial rights in Siam proves how the “independent” country was little more than a game to the Western powers.

Napoleon once said that history was written by the victorious. Though this may be true, it is also troubling for an historian. As proved by the previous two view points, facts on historical events can vary significantly often making the truth ambiguous. Therefore, it is our jobs as historians to sift through the fabrication and alteration to try and discover this truth. Throughout my research on Siam during Western imperialism, I found that the reason the country remained independent was not strictly because of one aspect or the other, but a melding of them both. Just as in real life, history has its shades of gray. Therefore, the independence of Siam during the Age of Imperialism can be attributed to Siamese diplomacy, Western interests in the region, and the omni-present nature of Western influence.

Siamese diplomacy played a very significant role in the longevity of the State. In order to protect his country, King Mongkut realized that he must ally himself with a Western power, if he is to remain independent of them. To gain the friendship of the world's most powerful Navy, “King Mongkut opened his country... and gave up his royal monopoly of trade for the sake of getting their friendship.”¹⁴ For a weak country like Siam, Mongkut realized that he must risk it big in order to win favor with a powerful country. By appealing to the commercial interests of Britain he was able to win favor with them and have their powerful influence on his side. Chulalongkorn perhaps took a more cautious route by, “being careful to see that his foreign advisers came from different national backgrounds.”¹⁵ Chulalongkorn realized that although Siam has close relations with Britain that may change. By keeping ties with advisers from different countries, not only could Chulalongkorn develop different insights from different

Western cultures, he also maintained a semi-neutrality to try and prevent his country from becoming overly British.

Despite the best efforts made by the Kings, foreign interests were also at the forefront for the decision of Siam's fate. The situation was very similar to a child challenging adults – though Siam tried as it could, it just did not have the power to hold its own against the world powers of France and Britain. Such is seen in the 1893 Gunboat Incident at Paknam as, “Two French Gunboats, the Inconstant and the Comete have passed the bar despite the fire of the forts and of a few Siamese boats who pitched in on their passage. The loss of the French consists of three dead and two wounded. The Siamese have 31 dead and 30 wounded...”¹⁶ Despite an attempted Siamese blockade of French ships into the Paknam harbor, the Western navy literally ran over the puny Siamese defenses. Diplomacy worked for the Siamese Kings in the early stage of Western contact, but once France became aggressive, there was nothing the tiny State could do. Therefore, “From the time of France's establishment as a colonial power in Cochinchina, the concern of the British Foreign office was to see Siam remain independent, serving as a buttress to British security in the region.”¹⁷ Though not for Siamese interests, Britain wished to maintain the Asian country's sovereignty nonetheless. Through the fear of war with the French, the British sought to maintain a Siamese buffer state.

Another, more unknown force behind Siamese independence was the presence of Western influence. This influence goes beyond diplomacy and foreign interests. It is the basis of modernization not just in Siam at this time, but in developing countries today. King Chulalongkorn was so dependent on his Belgian adviser, Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, that when thinking about his leaving, the King remarked, “I could not sleep last night for fear that you would perhaps leave us.’ And taking my [Chao Phya Abhai's (General Adviser)] hand which he [The King] lays on his heart, He said, 'Thank you, my faithful adviser'.”¹⁸ The

dependence of such a Western influence gave rise to a new variable to Siamese independence. It was neither Siamese nor Western diplomacy but a mixing of the two. It was this modernizing factor that helped Siam maintain its independence and unity. Such modernization is also seen as King Mongkut, "had an English officer to train his soldiers, Captain Impey, and later also a Frenchman, Lamarche, to train his guards"¹⁹ This training of the guards, though not directly related to Siamese independence, represents another facet of modernity. The fact that two countries that would perhaps want to take Siamese land are helping train its defense forces also shows how the forces of East and West bond to adapt to the new environment. This melding of forces represents the duality of causes in history and how there is always a double vision for events in the past.

¹E. K. Exell, *Thailand: Lands and Peoples*. (London: A. and C. Black LTD, 1960), 54.

²Wendell Blanchard, *Thailand: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture* (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1958), 36.

³Lauriston Sharp, "King Chulalongkorn the Great: Founder of Modern Thailand" from *Studies in Thai History* by David K. Wyatt (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 1999), 281.

⁴Abbot Low Moffat, *Mongkut the King of Siam* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1968), 43.

⁵Moffat, 44.

⁶Angkhomsat Parithat, "Interpreting the History of the Fifth Reign" in Wyatt, 281.

⁷Patrick Tuck, *The French Wolf and the Siamese Lamb* (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 1995), 192.

⁸Manich Jumsai, *History of Anglo-Thai Relations* (Bangkok: Chalermit, 1970), 99.

⁹Jumsai (1970): 252

¹⁰Tuck, 239

¹¹Jumsai (1970): 247

¹²Jumsai (1970): 95

¹³Jumsai (1970): 95

¹⁴Manich Jumsai, *King Mongkut and the British* (Bangkok: Chalermit,

1999), 1.

¹⁵Blanchard, 36

¹⁶ Walter E.J. Tips, *Siam's Struggle for Survival* (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 1996), 84.

¹⁷Tuck, 241.

¹⁸Tips, xiii.

¹⁹Jumsai (1999): 65.

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The Basis of Apartheid: Three Historians' Interpretations By Monica Voicu

Dozens of books have been written about the history of South Africa, and more specifically about the development of the state sponsored policy of extreme racial segregation known as apartheid. This paper presents a comparison of three different historians' interpretations of the rise and nature of the apartheid policy. FA van Jaarsveld, C.F.J. Muller and Hermann Giliomee, all prominent Afrikaner historians, each present arguments for the causes and discuss the nature of the policy that was in place in South Africa from 1948, when the National Party took power, until the system collapsed in the 1990s. Each of the aforementioned historians utilizes their own distinct approach; my focus here is to examine and compare their analyses of the development of apartheid as the official state policy.

In his book, *From Van Riebeeck to Vorster*, FA van Jaarsveld provides not only a historical interpretation of apartheid, but argues toward what appears to be a political justification for it as well. Writing in the mid-1970s, van Jaarsveld emphasized historical factors such as the fall of Western colonialism after World War II, the subsequent rise of Black nationalism inside and outside of South Africa and

the threat it posed to white supremacy as critical to the development of the policy of apartheid. He wrote that the liberal, laissez-faire policy of prime minister Jan Smuts' government in regards to the Bantu led to the worry among whites that racial integration was imminent, and this threatened the future of white supremacy in South Africa. Also, there was external pressure from the currently de-colonized countries of the world for South Africa to follow suit and abandon its tradition of segregation. South Africa "found itself hurled unexpectedly into a maelstrom of race relations within the framework of a unitary world."¹ These historical factors, according to Van Jaarsveld, led to an expression of "determination for self-preservation, continued existence and the arrangement of society in such a way that the various peoples which history had brought together in the union, could continue to co-exist peacefully."² If the government had agreed to the demands of the outside world, it would have meant "national suicide for the Whites." Thus, a policy of separation, suggests van Jaarsveld, was necessary to ensure the survival of white supremacy.

What was the nature of this policy? Van Jaarsveld described the system of apartheid as something that will, "ensure the evolution of a new future in which the separate population groups will co-exist in peace, security and prosperity, without any group losing its identity"³ He presents apartheid as a policy in keeping with traditional race relations in South Africa, saying that it was "not new or strange" to the country, because the Afrikaners had developed a system of segregation even back in the days of Jan van Riebeeck, first commander at the Cape. The policy of apartheid was in essence a continuation of these "traditions of segregation and trusteeship," one that "takes into account the developments in Africa and the national aspirations of the different population groups as they find expression."⁴

Van Jaarsveld explains that the policy of separation was fueled by the recognition among whites of the presence of both a white and a black nationalism, and their desire to

avoid conflict. The whites, he maintains, want to preserve their distinct culture and have a say in their own national interests in a white area of South Africa. A policy of separate development was seen as a way to "enable South Africa to remain a bastion of Western civilization in Africa" and "at the same time it is to lead the Bantu towards a greater degree of civilization."⁵ He claims that the policy of apartheid is not designed just for the benefit of the whites, but also to promote the "social, cultural and political development of the Bantu."⁶ He describes the policy of apartheid as an "opportunity" for the Bantu, one that would allow them to develop their own institutions and culture as separate from the Afrikaners.

In his work, Van Jaarsveld presents the issue of apartheid from an Afrikaner nationalist's perspective, discussing it from the viewpoint of a small white minority who wished to preserve its culture and maintain political supremacy in its own domain. His analysis of the policy of apartheid reads like a political justification, one that is riddled with undertones of ethnic and racial prejudices and a paternalistic attitude. For example, in a brief description of the rise of Western domination, Van Jaarsveld writes, "The Westerners were so powerful on the cultural, economic, political and military fronts that the indigenous non-Whites generally accepted their authority and rule as superior without resistance."⁷ It is clear from reading his work that van Jaarsveld is writing from a colonizer perspective, and his interpretation suggests that he is supportive of the policy which he views as an "attempt at finding a solution to the racial problems of South Africa on an ethically justifiable basis."⁸ Throughout the book, he refers to the policy as 'separate national development' rather than the more negatively connotated 'apartheid,' a term that "caught on in an international world which regarded nationalism as evil and which believed that there should be only one utopian world government...they gave to the term ideological connotations with the propaganda value similar to that which the term

"Nazism" is endowed."⁹ He also uses many supportive arguments justifying apartheid. For example, when discussing criticism from the outside world, Van Jaarsveld seems to justify apartheid by giving examples of other countries - Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the US - that began as minorities but gained supremacy by subjugating indigenous people.

Another prominent Afrikaner historian, writing around the same time as Van Jaarsveld is C. F. J. Muller. In looking at Muller's discussion of apartheid, I consulted two editions of his book *Five Hundred Years*, one from 1975 and the other from 1981. This book is commonly used by Afrikaner university students studying history in South Africa. I found it surprising, then, that Muller only dedicates a scant seven pages of his 541 page 1975 edition of the book to discussion of the policy, although he does expand his discussion in the 1981 book to some twenty odd pages, and devotes many more to racial issues in general.

In the 1975 edition, the discussion of the events leading to the creation of apartheid is written by B. J. Liebenberg and is presented in a dry, factual manner with little interpretation or analysis. Liebenberg emphasizes historical factors as a basis for the rise of apartheid. He points out that after World War II, foreign criticism of the country's traditional racial policy had an effect opposite to that intended."¹⁰ Instead of following the rest of the world in anti-colonialism and accepting the Africans as equals, the Whites perceived the rise of the black man as a threat to their survival. This issue became of central importance in South African politics. According to Liebenberg, it was the National Party's stance on the racial question that enabled it to defeat the United Party in 1948. The author recognizes an important landmark: a critical choice was made between two possible solutions to the racial question. "When the nation was confronted with a choice between integration and segregation it chose segregation or apartheid, a term which was destined for world-wide notoriety."¹¹ The discussion of the develop-

ment of apartheid as an idea and policy stops here; the rest focuses on the specific laws and measures taken in the implementation of the policy.

The 1981 edition of the book offers more information and analysis on the development of apartheid. Whereas in the 1975 book apartheid was mentioned in a chapter encompassing the years 1931-1961, in the more recent edition the years 1939-1948 have been given their own chapter (still written by B.J. Liebenberg). Whereas before there had been only two pages that discussed race relations after World War II, there are eight in the new edition and they include discussions of the African National Congress as well as the Fagan and the Sauer commissions. Liebenberg provides more analysis in the new version; for example, when describing the election of 1948, he gives numerous reasons for the defeat of the United Party, whereas in the 1975 edition of the book, he barely glosses over the reasons for the United Party loss, focusing more on the strong points of the party.

Another interesting change is that while in the 1975 edition, only two pages are given to the topic of the United Party Administration, in the 1981 edition, Hertzog is given his own chapter and there are seven pages devoted to the discussion of his racial policies, perhaps as an implied precursor in apartheid ideology. Other additions include an update chapter about South Africa between 1961 and 1978. Although the 1981 version is a bit more detailed and includes a little more discussion and elaboration on apartheid, in comparison to the other historians I address in this paper, the approach taken in Muller's text is largely fact-based and does not elaborate much at all. Perhaps this approach, as well as the relatively small amount of information about apartheid, can be attributed to Muller's ambitious task of covering five hundred years of South African history. Alternatively, perhaps it is indicative of Muller's feelings about what he considered important and worthwhile focusing on in South African history.

Hermann Giliomee also tackles the development of apartheid in his recently published book, *The Afrikaners: Biography of a People*. In comparison with the other historians, Giliomee provides a methodical and comprehensive discussion of apartheid, looking at its historical roots as well as its ideological and theoretical beginnings. Giliomee credits the DRC (Dutch Reformed Church) ministers and missionary strategists as "the first in the field to formulate an apartheid ideology."¹² Although it was originally applied in relation to mission's policy, by the 1930s the idea was extended out of that sphere into educational policy and subsequently applied living spaces. In 1944, J.D. du Toit, drawing on the ideas of Dutch theologian Abraham Kuyper, provided the first published theological defense of apartheid. Around the mid-1930s, apartheid became a secular doctrine as well. Giliomee traces the theoretical development of the secular policy of apartheid by studying the positions of the different scholars that conceived it. The apartheid plan that was developed between 1943 and 1948 was conceived by "Stellenbosch academics, Die Burger journalists and a small circle of western Cape NP [National Party] politicians who moved into D.F. Malan's orbit."¹³ These intellectuals included anthropologists, sociologists, historians and scholars of African administration and law.

The academics employed historical, ethnic and racial justifications in their approach. In the historical arena, it was argued that the whites and blacks were, in effect, both colonizers from the outside that had arrived in South Africa at around the same time, so therefore the blacks were no more entitled than the whites to claim the South African territory as their native land. Although this sounds like a ridiculous argument now, Giliomee states that it wasn't until the late 1950s when a consensus was reached in the liberal academic community that Africans had indeed spread to eastern South Africa fifteen to twenty centuries earlier.¹⁴ Another historical argument that Giliomee cites as being used by intellectuals to justify a policy of separation was the

argument that segregation had always been the norm in South Africa from the very beginning. This is an argument that is mentioned in both van Jaarsveld and Muller's assessments of the emergence of the policy of apartheid.

The ethnic argument was espoused by scholars like anthropologists P.J. Schoeman and Werner Eiselen. For Eiselen, "the real task in South Africa was not the solution of a race problem but 'the creation of effective arrangements for the peaceful existence of different ethnic groups.'"¹⁵ In a 1943 pamphlet written by Stellenbosch scholars P.J. Cortze, F.J. Language and B.I.C. van Eeden, the emphasis is on the demoralizing effects of city life upon the social structures of indigenous natives. The solution they proposed was a radical apartheid, which would solve the problems of the blacks by re-establishing their original social order.¹⁶ Blacks would be pulled out of the economy, moved into reserves and white laborers would replace them in the workforce. Yet "what was probably central to the thinking of the three scholars," Giliomee points out, "was only mentioned as an aside. The withdrawal of black labor from the common area was indispensable for the 'sound national evolution of the Afrikaner people.'"¹⁷ In addressing this fact, Giliomee suggests that there no doubt existed economic motivations, and here they were sheathed as purely ethnic considerations.

Nationalist scholars also emphasized race as a rationalization for the policy. Giliomee states that many Afrikaner nationalist scholars rejected the idea that blacks were biologically inferior to whites or that there were any links between race and intelligence. He says that although many National Party leaders "increasingly purged racist expressions" from their speeches, however, the "sanitized vocabulary of apartheid made little difference to the reality that the policy resulted in the pervasive stigmatization of all people who were not white."¹⁸ The policy of apartheid was inherently racist, but in the eyes of Afrikaner nationalists this racism was linked to survival; they viewed racial exclusivity as the only way to maintain their survival as a *volk*. This

point was emphasized by many Afrikaner scholars, who stressed their numerical minority as the main factor in their demand for a policy of separate development. This argument resonates in Van Jaarsveld's book, where he asserts that the policy of separate development was the only way for Afrikaners to maintain their self-determination and culture and not as a matter of racial discrimination per se. In his discussion of the fall of colonialism, Van Jaarsveld says that, "it was expected of the Whites that they sign their death warrant and abandon the country to a non-White government...merely because the Whites were smaller in number, as if statistics were the criterion."¹⁹

Giliomee points out that the racism-for-survival argument breaks down in apartheid's discrimination against the colored people, who were neither a different civilization nor a threat to the Afrikaners. According to Giliomee, the colored people were just "victims of the white-black struggle." He asserts that even moderate nationalists were ready to endorse discrimination against the colored people because they feared that allowing them too much equality would give the blacks the wrong idea, namely that it was a possibility for them also.

By 1943, the "idea of apartheid was becoming crystallized."²⁰ Intellectual circles, as previously mentioned, were beginning to embrace the idea, and in 1944, D.F. Malan became the first person in parliament to employ the term. Giliomee points to speeches by Malan and Paul Sauer as revealing the context in which the apartheid as an idea matured. He explains that their ideas were not of the racial ideology that existed in Europe at the time but were "firmly rooted in the Cape Afrikaner experience of slavery, with its ideology of paternalism, and British colonialism, with its stress on indirect rule and trusteeship."²¹ It was in keeping with these lines of thinking that Malan sought a policy in which "subordinate" people had to be helped to develop their own society, separately from white communities.

In 1945 the National Party (NP) adopted apartheid as

its official racial policy, and two years later Malan appointed Sauer to head a commission to transform apartheid into a comprehensive racial policy. In late 1947 the commission published a report which was to become part of the NP platform for the 1948 election. The report "combined the dual nature of NP thinking: both racist and 'ethnicist,' both religious and secular."²² It offered two extremes for the racial policy of South Africa: either the system of separate development (apartheid) or the policy of gelykstelling (social leveling). The report used religious language to justify the rejection of equal rights among men. The report was not very clear on the amount of segregation that would occur in the economic sphere, however, and Giliomee states that this reflects the contradictory nature of the nationalist movement.

After World War II, the United Party also sought to deal with the race question by formulating its own commission, led by Henry Fagan, to investigate the African urbanization issue. The Fagan report challenged NP assumptions about the feasibility of transferring blacks to African reserves, and it cited three options for South Africa: "total segregation (partition), which it called 'utterly impracticable,' equality (no racial discrimination) which it also rejected, and an in-between one, which it endorsed."²³ The report did not have a final, definite solution but instead an evolutionary approach which recognized the shifting relationship between the races.

The publication of these reports right before the 1948 election led to increased interest and debate about racial policy among Stellenbosch University academics. But exactly how important was the issue of apartheid to the 1948 elections?

The importance of the apartheid policy as the ticket to the National Party victory over the United Party in 1948 is a point of disagreement between Muller and Giliomee. According to Liebenberg in Muller's book, the attraction of the NP's apartheid policy was "by far the most important reason for the swing away from the United Party and

towards the National Party."²⁴ Liebenberg writes that the whites were feeling insecure about the post-World War II gains in independence by previously colonized countries, and the National Party "exploited this feeling of insecurity to the full." Liebenberg states that in April 1948 Malan told voters that the question they would have to answer in the following election was not only whether "the White race would be able, in the future, to maintain its supremacy and its civilization but whether it would want to do so; or would it drift irresolutely and aimlessly, or even, in the case of some people, unintentionally, until it disappeared forever, without honor in the Black sea of South Africa's non-White population."²⁵ In Muller's history, the question of apartheid was the issue of the election of 1948.

In contrast to Muller/Liebenberg, Giliomee states that "apartheid as a policy plank had played a relatively minor part in the campaign."²⁶ He also cites a speech of Malan's, saying that he "referred specifically to apartheid only in a single, ambiguous sentence when he said that the question was 'whether there could be apartheid at the same time as justice, peace and cooperation between whites and non-whites.'"²⁷ He asserts that there were other factors that were much more important to the voters, namely the view that the UP government had discriminated against Afrikaners in the previous eight years, along with concerns about food shortages and rationing and the treatment of ex-servicemen.²⁸ These factors were determined by analyzing letter columns of popular Afrikaans papers like Die Burger and Die Transvaler in the months before the elections, and he found although editorials did reiterate the racial question, only about one in ten letters mentioned a similar concern.

Giliomee points out that in the early years of National Party rule the government was still struggling to finalize its apartheid plan. It was during this time that five Stellenbosch academics proposed forming an institute to study the racial issue. These academics, along with the Broederbond, formed the institute (SABRA) in late 1948. It was within this

select group that the concept of total segregation developed, an idea which was to have significant impact of the government policy of apartheid, which dominated South African politics until the 1990s and is still having an impact on the people of South Africa.

Van Jaarsveld, Muller and Giliomee all used different approaches in their interpretations and discussions of the development of apartheid. Van Jaarsveld seemed to be providing us not only with a historical background but also an unapologetic justification of the policy. His discussion of apartheid focused mainly on apartheid as a viable solution to the racial problems of South Africa and as a means of maintaining the self-determination of Afrikaners. In contrast, Muller's ambitious *Five Hundred Years* 1975 edition barely mentioned apartheid; although more information and analysis were added in the 1981 edition but the discussion of apartheid appeared very basic when compared to the other works. Giliomee appeared the most critical of apartheid out of the three academics; not that he outright rejected apartheid in his work, but his recognition that the policy stigmatized the non-whites and that it had inherently racist foundations despite its denial of the fact demonstrates a more balanced viewpoint than that of Van Jaarsveld and a more thorough method than that of Muller. The various approaches taken by these authors reflect the historians' particular biases, interests and objectives in writing history. And as a student of history, they reminded me that, especially with controversial issues like apartheid, there is no such thing as a correct or impartial interpretation and studying a variety of sources is key to a better understanding of history.

¹FA van Jaarsveld, *From Van Riebeeck to Vorster 1652 - 1974* (Johannesburg: Perskor Publishers, 1975), 253.

²Ibid., 253.

³Ibid., 383.

⁴Ibid., 383.

⁵Ibid., 384.

- ⁶Ibid., 384.
- ⁷Ibid., 401.
- ⁸Ibid., 385.
- ⁹Ibid., 385.
- ¹⁰C.F.J. Muller, ed. *Five Hundred Years: A History of South Africa* (Pretoria: Academica, 1975), 424.
- ¹¹Ibid., 427.
- ¹²Hermann Giliomee, *The Afrikaners: Biography of a People* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2003), 459.
- ¹³Ibid., 465.
- ¹⁴Ibid., 465.
- ¹⁵Ibid., 467.
- ¹⁶Ibid., 467.
- ¹⁷Ibid., 467.
- ¹⁸Ibid., 469-470.
- ¹⁹Van Jaarsveld, 404.
- ²⁰Giliomee, 475.
- ²¹Ibid., 475.
- ²²Ibid., 477.
- ²³Ibid., 478.
- ²⁴C.F.J. Muller, ed. *Five Hundred Years: A History of South Africa* (Pretoria: Academica, 1981), 463.
- ²⁵Ibid., 463.
- ²⁶Giliomee, 480.
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Tristan Greenleaf was born and raised in Lancaster, California. He graduated Quartz Hill High School at 15 and began attending Antelope Valley Community College. At age 17 he received his associate of arts degree in letters, arts and sciences. After spending a year working and deliberating he transferred to UCLA, where he decided to major in history with a focus in the medieval and philosophical. In 2006, he graduated with a bachelor's degree in history at the age of 20. He is currently running his own business and looking ahead to graduate school. Social Contract Theory and Thomas Hobbes continue to be among his interests.

The Evolution of Capitalism in the Intellectual Legacy of Social Contract.

By Tristan Greenleaf

"Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains. Many a one believes himself the master of others, and yet he is a greater slave than they."¹ This is Social Contract, the basic forsaking of rights such that others will mutually forsake their rights. These "rights," based on natural law-or Man's "Right to every thing; even to one another's body,"² are called "Natural Rights" and are defined by John Locke as "Life, Liberty, and Property;" of these Locke states, "every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself... labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his."³ These Natural Rights come into direct contest with Natural Law in the arena where Natural Law reigns unhindered by any device of society, known by Hobbes and all who follow his intellectual lineage as the "state of nature."

The state of nature is that state in which men are bound to constant opposition in order that they may secure their Natural Rights. Natural Law shows that any man may trespass into the Natural Rights of another, but this action is not without consequence. Thus, Hobbes puts it, "if any two

men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is principally their owne conservation, and sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other."⁴ One can see how men are set in opposition, attempting to outdo one another in pursuit of money in a capitalistic society. In the Middle Ages money and property were as much of a concern as they are now. As the social contract evolves it addresses how man protects these rights by turning to a sovereign. As I will soon show, when sovereignty is backed by monetary power it becomes a sign of corruption.

Yet the question persists, when all of society seeks that power, how can there exist an incentive for an uncorrupt government? Hobbes concluded, "as long as this Naturall Right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man... in such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture... and the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short... [Yet] passions of Man, are in themselves no Sin [nor] are the Actions, that proceed from those Passions, till they know a Law that forbids them."⁵ By this Hobbes indicates that men must externalize their internal sense of logos and ethos to the masses-in doing so they agree to give up or transfer their rights and "the mutuall transferring of Right, is that which men call Contract."⁶ Thomas More put it, "In order to our supporting the pleasures of life, Nature inclines us to enter into society; for there is no man so much raised above the rest of mankind as to be the only favourite of Nature, who, on the contrary, seems to have placed on a level all those that belong to the same species."⁷ And so we see that humanity-that is, each individual thereof makes a contract upon entering into a society such that they may preserve their rights as what Rousseau called "proprietors."⁸

Rousseau stated that the change from state of nature to the Civil State was a substitution of "justice for instinct [in

the conduct of man]."⁹ In this change a system of governing must be instituted for the society. This system is heavily speculated upon by the many minds of this tradition. The most pervasive of Utopian governments is that of socialism. This is possibly due to the lack of socialistic equality in almost the entire Western tradition. Thus, Hobbes, among others looks at the initial body of government as a "commonwealth," in an admiration for simplicity and equality. "A commonwealth is said to be instituted, when a multitude of men do agree, and a covenant... shall be given by the major part... to be their representative; every one, as well he that voted for it, as he that voted against it, shall authorize all the actions and judgments... in the same manner, as if they were his own."¹⁰ The point of this is that differing views are subjugated to the majority so that there can be finality and power in numbers as a society against the rest of the world. Rousseau mirrors this axiom stating, "the citizen gives his consent to all the laws, including those which are passed in spite of his opposition, and even those which punish him when he dares to break any of them."¹¹

The contracts of society can come in numerous forms-the previously stated commonwealth was entirely overshadowed by the common monarchy seen throughout history. Despite these variations, John Locke held that there should be a basic set of premises to a beneficial society. In civil law, once a people enter into a contract-that is a social contract, the cornerstone to civilization-a good and just civilization will not take these natural rights away from the minorities in any form; including the advancement of only the majority or scapegoating against a selected minority for the wishes of any, except under circumstances that those rights have been duly sacrificed in that they are given to a body to use justly to enforce any harmful actions made against the implicit contract of the civilization. "All men may be restrained from invading others rights... and the law of nature be observed... the execution of [which] is... put into every man's hands, whereby every one has a right to punish

the transgressors of that law to such a degree."¹² Locke posits this because without the law of nature for natural rights there can be no subsequent laws. "The citizen is no longer the judge of the dangers to which the law-desires him to expose himself... because his life is no longer a mere bounty of nature, but a gift made conditionally by the State."¹³ A social contract is foremost a contract between all the peoples of a society; all must consent to this contract either in an explicit or implicit manner. "By what right any prince or state can put to death, or punish an alien, for any crime he commits in their country. It is certain their laws, by virtue of any sanction they receive from the promulgated will of the legislative, reach not a stranger: they speak not to him, nor, if they did, is he bound to hearken to them."¹⁴ Rousseau saw this in a similar manner and added that when a society enters into a social contract it does so by the majority, an unwilling member of the society is then alien. "If then there are opponents when the social compact is made, their opposition does not invalidate the contract, but merely prevents them from being included in it. They are foreigners among citizens. When the State is instituted, residence constitutes consent; to dwell within its territory is to submit to the Sovereign."¹⁵

The enforcer(s) of a contract should theoretically be an external force but this has historically almost never been the case; rather the enforcer is a participant who is bound within the social contract as a citizen but also exercises powers to enforce the contract. In this instance, since we are referring to an individual, it is a sovereign and as such exploitations and preferences are often made. We can see this in an early state looking at two Athenian political parties in the 7th century BCE, the poor, called "Hektemeroi," and the Wealthy who "jointly chose Solon as arbitrator and [Eponymous] Archon, and entrusted the government to him."¹⁶ Solon was to be a moderator-he was considered the wisest man in Athens, and as such he would use his wisdom to rule without preference. Overall Solon is record-

ed as having fulfilled this role-he was one of few. As we will see time and time again, when justice is entrusted into the hands of one it is almost never blind.

Since a time prior to even Plato thinkers have speculated on the ideal form of government. These ideal claims have shaped the course of governments to varying extents throughout history even in modern times with Karl Marx's influence of the Soviet Union with his Communist Manifesto-which he heavily based upon the legacy of the social contract. Several characteristics are ascribed to the aim of government. When Rousseau stated, "social contract sets up among the citizens an equality of such a kind, that they all bind themselves to observe the same conditions and should therefore all enjoy the same rights"¹⁷ he meant that a government should promote equality and security of a sort that cannot be found in the state of nature. Cicero felt that laws of society should be in accord with laws of nature, "True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions."¹⁸

Many writers viewed this aim of inequality to mean that government should ideally be socialist. In his book *City of the Sun* Tommaso Campanella envisions a Utopia encountered by a fictional Sea Captain; he describes it thusly, "the race is managed for the good of the commonwealth, and not of private individuals, and the magistrates must be obeyed. Every man who, when he is told off to work, does his duty, is considered very honorable."¹⁹ While Campanella advocates this ideal equality prevalently throughout his book, only in this passage does he touch upon what there is to enforce the responsibility of his Utopians. Likewise Thomas More states of his Utopians "there is no unequal distribution."²⁰ However, we see the word honor in Campanella. Honor is an incentive to follow the social contract-though it doesn't come at a cost of an enforcing sovereign. This element is ideal and belongs in

ideal government. Instances where honor holds society in tact are almost negligible throughout history. As such, an ideal socialist government is equally negligible. Lycurgus accomplished the institution of honor as enforcement to his Spartan socialism, but at the cost of certainly brainwashing through his repetitive conditioning. Plato tells of Socrates' sacrifice to his society for honor, seen in juxtaposition to Crito who stated, "Socrates, it seems to me the thing you are undertaking to do is not even right-betraying yourself when you might save yourself."²¹ Socrates takes the approach that he must follow through with the implicit rules of the society as social contract orders despite Crito's pleas that Socrates save himself. While Crito is functioning in a conventional moral sense (thinking of himself, thinking of punishments, and weighing the two), Socrates thinks along the post-conventional lines of social contract and what he owes to his society. While justice is rarely blind, men are rarely honorable.

Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke considered men to be on an equal level in the state of nature. Hobbes put it that, "nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he."²² Hobbes shows his genius in this contention, however, as he also mentions in his description of the state of war in nature, these variations in innate gifts of humanity do not find equilibrium without strife. As earlier quoted from Locke, civil law must be based on natural law; and therefore the state of strife in the pursuit of equilibrium is transferred along with natural rights into society. This constant contention has seated and reseated men and minorities into positions of authority throughout history, and this constant pursuit of authority for power over another falls not within the enforcement of the

social contract for it is the state of man; in which social contract finds its basis.

As previously mentioned, by far the most common form of government between Plato and Rousseau was the monarchy; often a dynastical sovereign backed by "Divine Right" or something similar. The presence of God in politics existed prior to Christianity, Cicero stated, "there will [be] one eternal and unchangeable law... valid for all nations and all times and there will be one master and ruler, that is God, over us all, for he is author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge."²³ From Augustine to Hobbes most, if not all, intellectual pursuit in the Western tradition was made on behalf of Christianity. It was from this foundation that a new validation to authority appeared in society that which came to be known as Divine Right of Kings.

The Divine Right of Kings led to the establishment of totalitarian rule in the epic of Western History. The acquiring of authority by a minority within society violates the terms of the social contract (in its favoring of the majority). Hobbes stated of Nature, "the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself."²⁴ The dominance of authority for the gain of a minority is likely the foremost abuse of centralized power. Once a minority secured power they employed social and religious concepts as their validation to keep power. This was done through a variety of methods such as the concept of "royalty." Another method practiced, dating back to the early Middle Ages, employed by Charlemagne was "Chrismation", where the Pope would anoint a king with Chrism, or holy oil, to indicate the divine origin of kingship akin to that of King Saul or King David. Kings often employed power to break their part of social contract as sovereign. Despite their transgressions the majority followed them because of religious justification. This type of government blurred the line division between economy and religion. Money had become the religion, as it is today whether it is combined with the beliefs of science,

Judaism, Christianity, Islam, or any other religion. It is in response to this tradition that Rousseau states, "[a] sovereign never has a right to lay more charges on one subject than on another, because, in that case, the question becomes particular, and ceases to be within its competency."²⁵ As mentioned, the ideal sovereign would be a moderator, favoring majority rule and having no whimsical use of power. While Solon may have been recorded as having abided by this, it is so sparsely the case that David Nirenberg attributes "the rise of persecuting mentalities to... the creation of a monetary economy [and] the rise of centralized monarchies."²⁶

On occasion that these monarchs would run into trouble with the majority, and would often times resort to scapegoating. In his book, *Communities of Violence*, Nirenberg tells of an instance in which a king chose to allow inequality to secure his authority: "In contrast to the previous year, the king seems to have maintained a studied silence with respect to these attacks against his Jews. Perhaps this was because Philip recognized that he was in a precarious position, unable to protest the attacks openly without incurring more direct rebellion."²⁷ However, it was often not the case that royalty would pass the blame upon the minority, but rather society would blame a minority for incurring the privilege/authority of the sovereign: "For vast majority... the events [of the king blaming the majority for fiscal problems] constituted an object lesson: Jews and their affairs had brought the judicial and fiscal apparatus of the state to bear upon their towns and villages.... strategies of accusation were adapted to "national" political events by local populations seeking to meet local needs."²⁸ Nirenberg previously stated, "the machinery of royal fiscality therefore grew more oppressive at the same time as resources were diminishing producing conflict."²⁹ Such behavior was a direct violation of the social contract according to Rousseau "as the citizens, by the social contract, are all equal, all can prescribe what all should do, but no one has a right to demand that

another shall do what he does not do himself."³⁰ This true equality was never seen in the Middle Ages, or at any other time in history. As Norman Cohn records in his book *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, "The proportion of bond and free in the peasant population differed greatly from century to century and from region to region...even amongst the population of a single village there were usually great inequalities."³¹

From the basis of minorities achieving sovereign power, and the practice of Divine Right of Kings or minority scapegoats to validate the sovereign's rule, we can see that the majority of institutionalization of religion and ethnic stereotyping come as products of political pursuit for power—the condition of nature as outlined by Hobbes instituted into social systems. Remember that Rousseau defines an act of sovereignty as "legitimate, because [it is] based on the social contract, and equitable, because common to all; useful, because it can have no other object than the general good, and stable, because guaranteed by the public force and the supreme power."³² If sovereignty is defined as such then no acceptable individuals ever strive for it. Sovereignty puts one in a position where they must act upon the needs of many and never upon their own—this is a large disincentive for proper use of the potential power. It would therefore seem that despite the social contract these conquests for power are humanly inherent and cannot therefore be ruled away by law or contract. It was Rousseau who accepted this and presented a revolutionary view directly in opposition to Hobbes' conventional inviolability of the sovereign. He stated: "the Sovereign, being formed wholly of the individuals who compose it, neither has nor can have any interest contrary to theirs."³³ Going on to say that any individual in opposition to the sovereign may show this opposition provided it does not violate their natural right. Once again, we see this trend of violence, even in idealistic conjecture—a trait of humanity that carried over from the state of nature. Nirenberg states of violence that it

"has functional aspects which need to be incorporated into our understanding of social order."³⁴

Hobbes feels that the laws of a sovereign are entirely just because they are backed by natural law and therefore subjects of a sovereign must follow this law unless it opposes natural rights. In this part of Hobbes' belief Rousseau did not exactly differ; however, Hobbes continues in favor of Divine Right of Kings. He attributes a divine quality, the basic state of nature (formed by God) to this in his full justification. In this Hobbes is conventional in his viewing reasoning and philosophy as the tools and language of theology, the legacy of Augustine. Rousseau and Locke, however, believe in a sort of survival of the fittest perspective where, as mentioned, anyone can oppose the sovereign. Rousseau strays from Hobbes in this, making the distinction that though "he who makes the law knows better than any one else how it should be executed and interpreted... nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private interests in public affairs, and the abuse of the laws by the government is a less evil than the corruption of the legislator, which is the inevitable sequel to a particular standpoint."³⁵ He later elaborates, "Were it possible for the Sovereign, as such, to possess the executive power, right and fact would be so confounded that no one could tell what was law and what was not; and the body politic, thus disfigured, would soon fall a prey to the violence it was instituted to prevent."³⁶

The views of Locke and Rousseau give a great deal of due regulation to the power of sovereignty and in doing so diverge from Hobbes. This is in suit with the revolutionary nature of their time-just as Plato wrote on the pertinent issues he observed-and theorized from the historical usage of government in his day and others much the same. Locke, in the revolutionary spirit, went so far as to say that the natural state of man was to be under the control of no legislative body other than an extension of the law of nature, in accordance he posited that "[no man can be taxed unless

he gives] the Consent of the Majority, giving it either by themselves, or their Representatives chosen by them."³⁷ Here we see bold words, preaching the reemergence of democracy in the Western world. Locke continued, "he who attempts to get another man into his absolute power, does thereby put himself into a state of war with him; it being to be understood as a declaration of a design upon his life."³⁸ Society was devised to bring widespread security to nature; but it is the case that there are some who feel they may have had more security outside of civil law and social contracts.

It is often the case that the poor constituents of a society will not have sufficient incentives to participate in the social contract. There may be a subconscious notion that had they been born into the state of nature-or, at least, outside of an oppressive and unjust government, they would have had more of their natural rights satisfied. "To understand [this] we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man."³⁹ Historically the poor have never retained this right from the state of nature-it is no wonder that the incentives of social contract are not great enough for them to uphold their end. As a result, we see many breaches of contract from this portion of society.

The ramifications of broken contracts spread like waves through a society. If an individual of a certain class is unsatisfied and breaks the law, the society can either punish him or allow his actions to detract from the incentives of all other participating members of the society, setting an example. "He who wishes to preserve his life at others' expense should also, when it is necessary, be ready to give it up for their sake."⁴⁰ This may be true; but in such a case it can be made blatantly obvious what is meant by a "sovereign never has a right to lay more charges on one subject than on

another."⁴¹ That inequality could very well constitute the unfair forfeiture of an individual's life. Clearly the stakes are high. And it is from this context and this intellectual tradition that we see the philosophical revolution to democracy-it is no longer the case that the "covenant... shall be... their representative"⁴² but rather that "the Consent of the Majority [will have] their Representatives chosen by them."⁴³

"Instead of emphasizing local or even individual opinions about minorities, they focus on collective images... the actions of groups or individuals are ignored in favor of structures of thought that are believed to govern those actions."⁴⁴ This is why Western society has evolved to a state of understanding that we must not just have equal representation, but specifically equal representatives because not all are able to represent themselves effectively.

Despite the intellectual legacy, from a historical standpoint, there are several truths to be observed in society: minorities fight for power despite the social contract dictating majority rule, individuals seek power at whatever cost, and a majority will blame a selected minority for trouble as though it were a tax write off-this they would do on many levels, Nirenberg shows that "the individual prostitute could stand for the collective lust of a community."⁴⁵ Though these acts are seemingly amoral, they are rights of man under natural law. As Hobbes stated of nature it is "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short."⁴⁶ The state of nature is not unjust "for where no covenant hath preceded... no action can be unjust."⁴⁷ Civilization does not make us civilized; it is merely an institution to protect the privileged members therein. The use of institutionalized religion serves to support the authority of minorities. The true motivation and point of leverage has, ever since its creation, been that by which we can obtain the physical means toward contentedness: money. The shift towards capitalism was no great feat of genius or economical ingenuity, but was rather the natural evolution of social contract government

due to human greed and lust for inequality.

The social contract gave way to social stratification of labor which in-turn led to social segregation and the competition of minorities. The tension of economic and religious segregation were accentuated in the Middle Ages and set the stage for modern civilization-we see many of the same segregations today. In this period the poor, the ill, and the practitioners of unconventional faiths-especially those who were female-were at the bottom of the social hierarchy. The question is, do we truly see a difference today? Maybe Thomas More was right about the negativity of an over proliferation of laws.

The complex intermingling of society with interwoven networks of religion and government make for one of the most complicated of all historical lineages; it is both the most integral to understanding ourselves modernly and the most complicated, causing the seemingly spontaneous generation-based opinions and origin beliefs that plague all history from antiquity to present. Life is a search for contentedness. Whether we build barbarous societies that tower upon the earth as monuments to our hubris, or live off the earth for our humbling sustenance and survival, we have a search in life, and that search is for meaning. Everyone has their set of beliefs; many minorities and individuals have been singled out and persecuted for this throughout history. Unfortunately, the persecuted are perpetually the unprivileged members of civilization. Cicero stated, "True law is right reason in agreement with nature."⁴⁸ The world is presented to us all as a puzzle-over seemingly countless generations many have tried to decipher the truth of it all. "Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils -- no, nor the human race, as I believe -- and then only will this our State have a possibility of life and behold

¹Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract, Or Principles of Political Right*, Book 1, Ch. 14.

²Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (1660) Part 1, Ch. 14.

³John Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, Ch. 5 "Of Property", Sec. 27.

⁴Hobbes, Part 1, Ch. 13.

⁵Hobbes, Part 1, Ch. 13.

⁶Hobbes, Part 1, Ch. 14.

⁷Thomas More, *Utopia*, "Of The Traveling of the Utopians".

⁸Rousseau, Book 1, Ch. 8. "The Civil State".

⁹Rousseau, Book 1, Ch. 8. "The Civil State".

¹⁰Hobbes, Part 2, Ch. 18.

¹¹Rousseau, Book 4, Ch. 2. "Voting".

¹²Locke, Ch. 2 "Of the State of nature", Sec. 7.

¹³Rousseau, Book 2, Ch. 5. "The Right of Life and Death".

¹⁴Locke, Ch. 2 "Of the State of nature", Sec. 9.

¹⁵Rousseau, Book 4, Ch. 2. "Voting".

¹⁶Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, 5.2.

¹⁷Rousseau, Book 2, Ch. 4. "The Limits of the Sovereign Power".

¹⁸Cicero, *De Republica*, (106-43BCE).

¹⁹Thomas Campanella, *City of the Sun*.

²⁰More, "Of the Religion of the Utopians".

²¹Plato, *Crito*, Crito to Socrates, 45c.

²²Hobbes, Part 1, Ch. 13.

²³Cicero, *De Republica*, (106-43BCE).

²⁴Hobbes, Part 1, Ch. 13.

²⁵Rousseau, Book 2, Ch. 4. "The Limits of the Sovereign Power".

²⁶David Nirenberg, *Communities of Violence: Persecution of Minorities in the Middle Ages*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1996): 5.

²⁷Nirenberg, 65.

²⁸Nirenberg, 108.

²⁹Nirenberg, 19.

³⁰Rousseau, Book 3, Ch. 16. "That The Institution of Government is Not a Contract".

- ³¹Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, (New York: Oxford University Press: 1970): 54.
- ³²Rousseau, Book 2, Ch. 4 "Limits of Sovereign Power"
- ³³Rousseau, Book 1, Ch. 7. "The Sovereign".
- ³⁴Nirenberg, 241.
- ³⁵Rousseau, Book 3, Ch. 4. "Democracy".
- ³⁶Rousseau, Book 3, Ch. 16. "That The Institution of Government is Not a Contract".
- ³⁷Ramon M. Lemos, *Hobbes and Locke: Power and Consent*, (Athens: University of Georgia Press: 1978): 81.
- ³⁸Locke, Ch. 3 "Of the State of War", Sec. 17.
- ³⁹Locke, Ch. 2 "Of the State of nature", Sec. 4.
- ⁴⁰Rousseau, Book 2, Ch. 5. "The Right of Life and Death".
- ⁴¹Rousseau, Book 2, Ch. 4. "The Limits of the Sovereign Power".
- ⁴²Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Part 2 Chapter 18
- ⁴³Lemos, 81.
- ⁴⁴Nirenberg, 5.
- ⁴⁵Nirenberg, 154.
- ⁴⁶Hobbes, Part 1, Ch. 13.
- ⁴⁷Hobbes, Part 1, Ch. 15.
- ⁴⁸Cicero, *De Republica*, (106-43BCE).
- ⁴⁹Plato, *Republic*, Book 5 "Philosopher Kings", Sec. 1, 471c-480a.

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**The Importation of Iberian Patriarchal Gender Ideology
on the
Indigenous Peoples of the New World
By Pouya Gharavi**

One of the most intriguing social consequences of the Spanish conquests across the Americas was the importation of patriarchal gender ideology. In the time following the conquests, patriarchal gender ideology would prove to be a passionately contested social battlefield in colonial Latin America. It would be fought both inside homes as well as in institutions, and it can be seen as a clash between indigenous Mesoamerican and the Iberian traditions in which Iberian patriarchy clashed with the indigenous female population as well as African slave women under Spanish rule. By looking at specific examples ranging from the role of patriarchal institutions such as marriage, to individual situations such as domestic labor, and the evolution of indigenous household rituals such as sweeping, this paper argues that the social consequences of the imported patriarchal gender ideology on the native peoples as well as the African slave women of the New World was far-reaching, despite individual efforts to defy it. These arguments will be greatly augmented by the work of multiple scholars in the field, including Susan Migden Socolow, who argues strongly in *The Women of Colonial Latin America* that the role of the

Catholic Church is paramount to the establishment of Iberian patriarchy. Further, Sandra Lauderdale Graham's *Caetana Says No* will be used to analyze the role of marriage, slavery, and patriarchy in 19th century Brazil. Finally, the issue of gender complementarity is brought forth by Louise Burkhart's essay, *Mexica Women on the Home Front*.

In all likelihood, there was no single entity more responsible for the development and installation of patriarchal gender ideology than the Roman Catholic Church. A defining characteristic of colonial Latin America was the position and power of the Roman Catholic Church. Catholic missionaries entered the country with the Spanish conquerors and immediately began working to convert Native Americans to Christianity. The church played an important role in transferring Spanish culture and civilization to Latin America. Friars and priests set up hospitals, monasteries, and schools in urban areas, and they established missions on the frontiers. They helped to expand and solidify Spanish control over the indigenous peoples of colonial Latin America, introducing Spanish culture and language to the Native Americans as they attempted to convert them to Christianity. The missionaries also became important intermediaries in conflicts between Native Americans, colonial settlers, and royal officials.¹

The views of the Roman Catholic Church regarding marriage, premarital purity, and male and female honor were a great influence on Iberian gender ideology. It was the church that decided what constituted acceptable sexuality, with whom and how. It was believed that marriage should be standard for all but the most devout and the church stressed the importance of female virginity before marriage and even chastity thereafter. As Susan Migden Socolow argues,

"There was no room for female sexual pleasure outside marriage. The ideal of the time was to keep women under control through enclosure. Only by remaining in their homes, convents, orphanages, prisons, or other institutions could women be protected from their "natural weak-

nesses." Only when placed under male religious guidance could women's unbridled sexuality be prevented from wreaking havoc on society. The growing strictures placed on women was for their own good, the good of men, and the survival of Christian society."²

The church developed its position on gender ideology via a belief in paternalism, a stance in which the dominant position of the father over the wife and children is the norm. Accordingly, women needed restrictive regulations defining their conduct (due to their "natural fragility") whereas men were by definition morally superior: "A man's role was to guide and control, a woman's to obey, whether within the context of kinship, marriage, or the church. As a result, a woman's place in society was defined primarily by her relationship to a man or a religious institution."³ A good summary of a woman's place, her most critical social attribute, was that she was a nun, a wife, or a daughter. It was indeed the church as well as a woman's family that was obligated to establish and enforce a woman's socially acceptable behavior. Interestingly enough, the church viewed their stance on patriarchy as working to protect women's virtue and it did so by using ecclesiastical visits, enclosure, as well as the confessional as methods of keeping female sexuality in check. A "good woman" was virtuous, pure, resigned to her lot in life, passively obeying her father, brother, husband, and confessor.⁴ As we will see, the end result of these campaigns against sexuality had a great effect on patriarchal gender ideology for both Iberian women and the native women of the New World.

Perhaps there was no more critical social function of the era than that of marriage. The importance of the family to social order was a cultural value of paramount importance to Iberians and the church as well as the state valued marriage as a critical institution for the development of a colonial society. Marriage also established other important social functions, such as defining the legitimacy of children and providing an overall protection for women. Marriage defined

legitimacy and it was used as a marker of social status. Thus, marriage was closely tied to race, social status, and economic conditions in colonial Latin America. It should come as no surprise that marriage was governed by the Roman Catholic Church since it was a religious sacrament and rules were defined by canon and civil law. Not only did the church perform the wedding rites, it also set the requirements for the marriage to be legally binding. Lastly, a marriage was legitimate if both the husband and wife had chosen to take the sacrament without restraint. In theory, the Roman Catholic set of guidelines was to be a strong deterrent against forcing women into marriages they opposed. As we will see in the following paragraph, this was clearly not always the case.

In her book on slavery in 19th century Brazil, Sandra Lauderdale Graham gives us the story of Caetana, a slave girl of perhaps seventeen, who provides a sound example of a woman with a specific social and ethnic background, forced into abiding by a patriarchal gender ideology while at the same time trying her best to defy it. Caetana was a Brazilian slave girl working at the Rio Claro plantation when her master Captain Luis Mariano de Tolosa emphatically decreed that she should marry. A slave marriage blessed by the church and made legally binding would seem an unusually gracious ending to a tale of slave love. As Graham so ardently puts it, "far from it."⁵ Instead, Caetana was placed into a situation (forced marriage) exasperated by both the orders and wants of her master but also by patriarchal social structures found within her family unit. When Caetana refused to consummate a marriage that was repulsive to her, her uncle and godfather Alexandre threatened to "flog her if she did not submit to her husband."⁶ Hence, when the patriarchal social order was threatened, a slave family chose to punish one of their own rather than suffer embarrassment at her hands.

There are multiple interesting social currents occurring here: To master Tolosa, Caetana's obstinance wasn't

much of an issue as long as Caetana appeared a properly married woman. Beyond her master's orders, however, it was her own uncle's assertion of patriarchal authority that made her situation that much worse. One would want to believe that Caetana's male kin would come to her aid, especially when confronted with a forced and unwanted marriage. This however, was not the case. First and foremost, Alexandre, her uncle, was clearly insulted by a perceived affront to his standing as a male patriarch, despite his and Caetana's standing within the Rio Claro plantation. As Graham puts it, "Perhaps he thought she should be brought into line: patriarchy at its untroubled work of controlling an unruly female by threatened violence."⁷ Caetana's refusal to consummate her marriage shocked not only her husband, but her increasingly frustrated uncle, as well as her entire family. When viewed from "the outside", this denial was an "unthinkable and preposterous affront" that Caetana should deny her "obvious role" in society.⁸ As it was, she not only faced the orders of her master, but also from her kin, who was himself a slave. Even within the structures of marriage (and slavery), the established patriarchy of the time was a convincing and demanding authority. She struggled against the male authority of her owner and her uncle. As Graham convincingly argues, "Her story demonstrates that patriarchy was not solely the right of a white master, but was claimed as well by a slave man."⁹

In an ironic twist of fate, facing her uncle's threats, Caetana ran to the one person who initiated the circumstances that plagued her life: Tolosa. As Graham shows, there was a reversal of expectations. Caetana did not flee her master and seek refuge with her family. Instead, she fled to her master for shelter while her family was either threatening or ambiguously non-committal.¹⁰ In a display that is highly indicative of the effect of patriarchy, even among slaves, Caetana's female kin stayed silent while her male counterparts were rallying against her. Clearly, the affront to patriarchal norms was the mitigating factor. It was Tolosa, as

master of slaves, who instigated the marriage for reasons steeped in patriarchal social norms, and it was he, and only he, who could provide a protecting arm for Caetana, even from her own kin. As slave master, he was the chief patriarch and while initially Tolosa was intent on enforcing his will, he eventually backtracked and helped Caetana. In doing so, Tolosa displaced Caetana's uncle from his patriarchal pecking order within the slave family. In the end, Caetana's resolute determination confounded the typical patriarchal institution. It is clear that marriage, by way of the Catholic Church, provided Tolosa and Alexandre the power to exercise their "patriarchal authority" and this social institution was transferred with exceptional speed and discipline to the Americas. Unfortunately, this included disciplining and punishing Caetana as long as it was not "arbitrary or excessive."¹¹ A perfect explanation of the state of things can be found with the fact that Alexandre was within his legal (and moral) rights if he did indeed physically punish Caetana. This was the socially acceptable method of punishing disobedient women and making sure they conformed to female behavior that was acceptable during the era.

The importation of patriarchal gender ideology by Spaniards into the Americas would prove to be a social battle, not only in marriage but in other sectors of life as well. Another example of such a struggle can be found in the shifting domestic role of women in the Americas. As described above, the submission of women under men played a pivotal role in Iberian society. In the following paragraph, this paper will show that when imported into the Americas, this submission proved to be a thorny transition, forcing different realizations of women's role in society, especially in domestic affairs.

In Louise Burkhart's essay *Mexica Women on the Home Front*, it is made very clear that the lives of women in Aztec Mexico should not be viewed as domestic or even subservient to men, but in a state of gender complementarity. Burkhart specifically looks at the relationship of house-

work and religion and argues that they were a very important part of daily life. This is in stark contrast to the typical designation of women and their work as merely domestic, thereby implying the lesser status of their work. Burkhart points out that the "women of Aztec Mexico occupied a symbolic and social domain that was separate from and complementary to that of men."¹² For example, brooms, through the 'power of sweeping', held a valuable place in keeping order, leading Burkhart to argue that the broom was the woman's weapon. Much like a priest sweeping the temple for ritual purification, the Aztec woman would wake before dawn to sweep the house of the night's debris, forcing the "regeneration of order" and "protecting her family from dangerous forces."¹³ Children were not allowed to play with brooms and they were left outside, much like a battle-worn sword. One can see the importance of such a ritual act by the fact that baby girls were given brooms while baby boys were given arrows and shields. Even gods swept! Quetzalcoatl was the god of wind who swept roads for the rain gods. Another example of the ritualistic act of sweeping can be found with the idea that if the man of the house was gone away to war, then the woman's sweeping should become even more diligent. This is an important argument because it displays not the idea that women were submissive to men or even that they were largely actors in a domestic sphere, but that they were warriors of their own right, guarding an equally important sphere of Aztec social order, namely the home, with the broom as their weapon.

The ritualistic nature which indigenous women practiced their housework was often a bane to those who wished to promulgate the Christian faith. Another fascinating aspect of patriarchal gender ideology importation is the fact that much of the colonial discourse on this topic was concentrated on the role of these aforementioned rituals and their relationship to idolatry. Again we have another social battle involving native women that is viewed as an old tradition and an affront to the social norms of the colonists. This situ-

ation was problematic because while various priests would choose what was acceptable from the native religion to the new, Christian religion, often times what was fine to one priest would not be fine with another. As Burkhart states, "what seemed harmless or even commendable with one priest might to another reek with the Devil's own stench."¹⁴ More specifically, friars who were well aware of the ritualistic and religious overtones of sweeping were worried about "idolatrous" consequences and sought to rationalize women's domestic customs with Christianity. Prohibiting sweeping in the home would have been ridiculous and would have further alienated the domestic native population (i.e. women). Thus, the Franciscan order accepted the sweeping of churches and their courtyards by nuns as an act of religious fidelity. Further, the act of sweeping in the home was accepted as devotion to God and saints. This fact cannot be overstated, as it provides us with a solid example of the conquering religion and ideology accepting the female domestic rituals of the native religion in order to smooth the transition. And just as this process was occurring with the male in his respective habitat, it too was happening in the home; and with equal importance, with women in Aztec Mexico at the helm, broom in hand.

The importation of patriarchal gender ideology was one of the most fascinating consequences of the Spanish conquests across the Americas. Patriarchal gender ideology would prove to be a passionately contested social battlefield in colonial Latin America in the time following the conquests. Fought both inside homes as well as in institutions, it was a quarrel between indigenous Mesoamerican and the Iberian traditions in which Iberian patriarchy clashed with the indigenous female population as well as African slave women under Spanish rule. The role of patriarchal institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church and marriage, individual situations such as Caetana's, and the evolution of indigenous household rituals such as sweeping, all played integral parts in the importation of patriarchal gender ideology on the

native peoples as well as the African slave women of the New World. The effects were long-lasting, regardless of individual efforts to confront it.

¹Encarta

²Socolow, 6

³Socolow, 7

⁴Socolow, 8

⁵Graham, 2

⁶Graham, 58

⁷Graham, 58

⁸Graham, 59

⁹Graham, 62

¹⁰Graham, 59

¹¹Socolow, 67

¹²Burkhart, 26

¹³Burkhart, 34

¹⁴Burkhart, 27

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George Ramirez recently graduated with a double major in History and Anthropology. While attending UCLA, his research interests concentrated around the areas of intellectual and social history. Additionally, George has participated in archaeological research through his volunteer work for the Welqamex Archaeological Research Project. Outside of academia he has been politically active through participation demonstrations and writing articles for political organizations in his hometown of San Jose, California. In being an inducted member of Phi Alpha Theta, he has participated in many activities associated with the society, and has served as a copy editor for this edition of *Quaestio*. George hopes to either pursue graduate work in History or attend Law School. He would like to take this opportunity to thank Professor Russell Jacoby for his time and scholarly insight in helping him improve the paper that appears in this journal, and last, but not least his family, friends, and especially, Jennifer Avina.

Anarchist Ideology and Noam Chomsky By George Ramirez

Many people, including those within academic circles may have been surprised to find that Noam Chomsky whom is credited with revolutionizing the study of linguistics would describe his political beliefs as "anarchist" or "libertarian socialist." In an interview conducted by David Doyle, Noam Chomsky explains his reasoning for being an anarchist: "I was attracted to anarchism as a young teenager, as soon as I began to think about the world beyond a narrow range...I think it only makes sense to seek out and identify structures of authority, hierarchy, and domination in every aspect of life, and to challenge them; unless a justification for them can be given, they are illegitimate and should be dismantled, to increase the scope of human freedom."¹

Another example of his political leanings can be seen in his 1970 introduction to Daniel Guerin's book *Anarchism*:

From Theory to Practice, in which Noam Chomsky quotes and endorses the French anarchist Octave Mirbeau who writing in the 1890's stated that "anarchism has a broad back, like paper it endures anything."² Chomsky continues by stating that various types of anarchist beliefs and actions have appeared; however "it would be hopeless to try to encompass all of these conflicting theories to some general theory or ideology." Chomsky then cites the agreements and criticisms of various thinkers who shaped the ideology of anarchism such as: Rudolf Rocker, Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, Wilhelm von Humboldt, and Anton Pannekoek among others. In summation of the piece, Chomsky showcases his belief in the importance of anarchism by quoting the prominent anarchist thinker Rudolf Rocker: "The problem of freeing man from the curse of economic exploitation and political and social enslavement remains the problem of our time," and as long as this continues the "revolutionary practice of libertarian socialism will serve as an inspiration and a guide."³ This paper will look into the influences and inspirations that made Noam Chomsky attracted to the ideas of anarchism as well as his own interpretation of it.

Avram Noam Chomsky was born on December 7, 1928 in Philadelphia Pennsylvania, to Dr. William Chomsky and Elsie Siminofsky. Noam's father William was a scholar and teacher of Hebrew, who authored a noted study entitled, *Hebrew the Eternal Language* (1957). The research that William pursued was of such importance that the New York Times obituary described him as "one of the world's foremost Hebrew grammarians." One such book that Noam read in early form when he was twelve, was a study of thirteenth-century Hebrew grammar that his father edited and annotated called, *David Khimi's Hebrew Grammar (Mikhlol)* (1952). The scholarly commentary within the book was of great liking to Noam: "My idea of the ideal text is still the Talmud...I love the idea of parallel texts, with long, discursive footnotes and marginal commentary, texts commenting on texts."⁴ Noam was thus significantly influenced by his

father's scholarly endeavors in the area of language.

His mother Elsie was a teacher and an activist who like Chomsky's father taught Hebrew. Elsie was also very much in demand as a speaker on subjects such as politics and the community. Due in part to his mother's political sensitivity, Noam was encouraged to look outside his own world and get involved in the area of politics. Being that his mother was more left leaning than his father, her political beliefs seemed to have geared Chomsky towards having a great concern for social and political issues. Therefore, early on Noam was exposed to both the scholarly and political ideas of his parents. According to author Carlos Otero, Chomsky had stated that "During childhood, there was always plenty of discussion in [our] home about really interesting and important issues."⁵ One of the issues he mentions dealt with a mainstream form of Zionism at the time, which was considered a product of Western European Enlightenment. Thus, Noam and his family were very much in tune to discussing topics of an intellectual nature.

Regarding his family's political views, Chomsky describes his parents as having been "normal Roosevelt Democrats, deeply Zionist and interested in Jewish culture,"⁶ while many of his cousins, aunts, and uncles belonged to the Jewish working class and had ties to communism. Additionally, many of his relatives were involved in radical political movements that were widespread during the time of the Depression. In a letter to author Robert Barsky, Noam Chomsky explained that many in his extended family were members of the Communist Party, some were anti-Communists (from the left), and others Roosevelt Democrats.⁷ A diverse amount of political affiliations were found within the Chomsky-Siminofsky family, which allowed Noam to become exposed to several political beliefs and opinions.

Being that Noam's extended family did not resolve issues in a narrow sense, he was brought up to have his own interpretations and choices regarding any number of situations.

According to Barsky, the encouragement that Noam received from his relatives, community, and in particular his school allowed for him to become a careful analyst and observer. For instance, Noam attended a Deweyite school by the name of Oak Lane in Philadelphia until he was twelve, where students were instructed to create and explore freely rather than to follow a set of rigid principles. The school was based on the ideas of both John Dewey and Wilhelm von Humboldt, who believed that self-fulfillment should be provided through education; and that through this education, one can explore a challenging environment in his own way.⁸

At Oak Lane, the primary emphasis was on creativity rather than on grades, where each student was encouraged to engage in their own interests either individually or within a group. Additionally, there was no singling out the importance of one activity over another, with competition as a whole being devalued. The educational atmosphere provided a broader sense of acceptance and diversity than Chomsky had seen for his own children, who early on knew the 'dumb' from the 'smart' kids.⁹ Therefore, Chomsky grew up with a sense of competing with himself rather than others, and on concentrating on creativity over out ranking his peers.

In addition to attending classes at Oak Lane, Noam wrote for the school newspaper where it can be said that he wrote his first politically oriented article. After his tenth birthday, he wrote an editorial on the fall of Barcelona during the Spanish Civil War. In it he described the elimination of the anarchist movement, which allowed for both industrial and agricultural workers to take control of their own affairs without coercion from above.¹⁰ The connections that Noam made as a ten year old about a complex foreign conflict can be attributed to both his familial and educational influences which fostered an optimism towards exploring ones own interests and openly analyzing them.

After attending Oak Lane, at the age of twelve Chomsky attended Central High School, which was also

located in Philadelphia. There, Chomsky was surprised to find how different it had been when compared with Oak Lane. Specifically, he had problems with the competitiveness and focus on excelling over other students. The practices of the high school were, for Noam, "the manner and style of preventing and blocking independent and creative thinking and imposing hierarchies..."¹¹ In comparing the two schools, Chomsky believed that though all schools could be run in the fashion of the Deweyite Oak Lane, they would not be tolerated within a society that is based on authoritarian institutions; society preferred the model followed at Central High School. Overall, the regiment-oriented Central High School introduced him to the system of indoctrination and false beliefs that caused him to block much of the memories that he had had of the institution.

Due to Chomsky's experience at Central High School, no real outlet existed for political debate, which in turn prompted him to take a train to visit his relatives in New York City. In particular, many of his hours there were spent with an uncle who ran a newsstand on Seventy-Second Street, where he had been taught about Freud and was exposed to the ideas of various Marxist sects including: Stalinist, Trotskyite, non-Leninist. While Chomsky was visiting with his uncle, the stand became a center for lively political debate, in which mostly professional Jewish intellectual émigrés participated. Noam describes the Jewish working-class culture that he experienced while he was in his teens in New York: "It was highly intellectual, very poor; a lot of people had no jobs at all and others lived in slums and so on. But it was a rich and lively intellectual culture...I think, the most influential intellectual culture during my early teens."¹²

Though some of Noam's relatives had ties to the Communist party, he was increasingly moving towards anarchism as a political philosophy. The stimulating discussions that Noam had partaken in as well as the readings he did while assisting his uncle at the newsstand brought much

light to the ideas of anarchism. One of the authors that Chomsky read avidly at the time was the anarchist historian Rudolf Rocker. In particular, Rocker had a big impact within the Jewish anarchist movement and is known for presenting "a systematic conception of the development of anarchist thought towards anarcho-syndicalism."¹³ Anarcho-syndicalism is a branch of anarchism that focuses on the labor movement; it sees the force for revolutionary social change coming from labor unions. Many of the ideas that Chomsky would investigate and analyze in the future was set forth by his reading of Rocker's 1938 book *Anarcho-Syndicalism*. Thus, early on Chomsky was introduced to a left-libertarian movement that he would associate himself with to the present day.

Further solidifying Chomsky's belief in anarchism was the critique of Bolshevism by Rudolf Rocker. In his book *The Tragedy of Spain* (1937), Rocker explains the fear of the Soviet Union and the United States in the possible success of anarchism in Spain. Essentially, Rocker describes the Bolsheviks as justifying their totalitarian practices by defending the proletariat against counterrevolutionary acts. Though the totalitarianism was covered in ideology and objectives that appeared to be libertarian, Chomsky in concurring with Rocker felt it nevertheless was a tyrannical dictatorship that would never move toward liberation. The fear that Bolsheviks had of the apparent successes of libertarian socialism in Spain according to Rocker, had much to do with the possibility that the followers would believe that "the much vaunted 'necessity of dictatorship' is nothing but one vast fraud which in Russia has led to the despotism of Stalin and is to serve today in Spain to help the counter-revolution to a victory over the revolution of the workers and the peasants."¹⁴ The Spanish Revolution as shown by Rocker, demonstrated to Chomsky that though the Soviet Union and the United States had numerous differences, they shared a commonality in trying to suppress movements of liberation. Therefore, early on in his teens Chomsky knew well the

importance of anarchism for those trying to escape tyranny, and that there were significant reasons that powerful entities were rallying against it.

In addition to Rocker, another figure that tremendously influenced Chomsky especially in the area of the Spanish civil war and left-libertarian movements was the British author and novelist George Orwell. A book of particular importance to Chomsky was *Homage to Catalonia* (1938), in which Orwell describes the Spanish Civil War, the success of the anarchist movement that took root, and its eventual defeat by the communists among others. Much of what Orwell wrote about in the book confirmed what Chomsky had believed before he read it while he was still in his late teens. That an anarchist or libertarian society could meet the needs of the collective as well as the individual thus fueled his previously held anarchist convictions.¹⁵

While Chomsky was an undergraduate at the University of Pennsylvania, he met and befriended linguistics Professor Zellig Harris. Through Harris, Chomsky received his formal introduction to the field of linguistics in 1947, which would eventually lead to his B.A, M.A., and Ph.D. in the field. What inspired Chomsky to major in linguistics were the lively discussions that he would have with Harris, along with reading the proofs to his book, *Methods in Structural Linguistics*. While studying under Harris, Chomsky was encouraged to take graduate courses in philosophy, as well as read books on psychoanalysis in addition to his study of linguistics. The influence that Harris had upon Chomsky was tremendous regarding his academic pursuits in researching topics in linguistics and related fields, however, "it was not Harris's linguistics that first attracted Chomsky: he was tantalized by his professor's politics."¹⁶

Chomsky's worldview as a teenager was very much shaped by Harris's political convictions, and this fit well with his own anarchist beliefs. As an example, Harris's teaching style was seen as encouraging rather than preventing individual creativity, which to Chomsky displayed an anarchist

or left libertarian spirit to teaching. At another level, much of the political interests that Harris had were shared with Chomsky through the New York City based group Avukah. According to a pamphlet entitled *Program for American Jews* (1938), the founding members wanted Avukah to be enticing to "Jews interested in the survival of the Jewish people, to Zionists, to Jews not interested in the existence of a Jewish group, and to socialists."¹⁷ Being that Chomsky was very much attracted to his family's concerns relating to Jewish cultural issues and politics while he was attending the University of Pennsylvania, Avukah's goals and interests were quite valuable to him.

In becoming better acquainted with Avukah through Harris, Chomsky was able to find strong links between his and his professor's political positions. For example, in a 1942 issue of Avukah's periodical *Avukah Student Action*, Harris writes about how the dangers of fascism were not limited to Europe. According to Harris, if fascism came to America, it would thrive from the social and economic inequalities of society. Additionally, he describes fascism as existing because of insecurity and fear, while being aided by the interests of big-business. To combat this threat, Harris suggests creating social programs that would better society while making a commitment towards social progress.¹⁸ Much of what Harris writes concerning fascism had been echoed by Chomsky in later years, thus revealing the connection he had had with him in analyzing the nature of political ideologies. Therefore, both Chomsky's linguistic and political interests found approval from Zellig Harris, which then partly influenced him to pursue each with great intensity.

In being a scholar and political activist, Noam Chomsky manages to balance the two despite the outcry by many that despise him as being 'anti-American' or 'un-patriotic.' Chomsky understood that one could become both a scholar and political activist from seeing the way British mathematician, logician, philosopher and activist Bertrand

Russell lived his life. Specifically, Russell motivated his thinking in the areas of logic and philosophy, which Chomsky has delved into since his teenage years. In addition to his great contributions in the area of mathematics and philosophy, Russell was a political activist who acted on the behalf of the down-trodden while he was connected to the culture of the university as a scholar. A strong proponent of popular liberation, Russell was consistent with his beliefs even if it would cost him his reputation or freedom.

Though Russell came to be known as a radical a bit later in his life than had Chomsky, they both seemed to adopt the view that the "ruling classes owned the means of production and were therefore driven to legitimize their power."¹⁹ Views such as this and the political activism that went along with it starting around the 1910's and again in the late 50's caused much trouble for Russell's academic career-- he received a jail sentence during World War I, was barred from teaching at City University in New York, and was kicked out of Trinity College at Cambridge University all for being critical of government policy. According to Chomsky the vilification of Russell's actions caused his reputation to suffer, and is now "known mostly for his work in the early century, when he was still a nice gentlemanly type."²⁰

In comparing Russell to Albert Einstein who was another leading figure within the same generation, Chomsky explains that both agreed of the dangers that humanity faced; however, they chose different paths in tackling them. Chomsky describes Einstein as choosing to live a comfortable life in Princeton working on his research projects and occasionally speaking his mind on political issues; while Russell led demonstrations, got attacked by cops, and wrote extensively on the many maladies of the time. Einstein therefore was exalted for his greatness, while Russell was reviled.²¹ The relentless commitment that Russell had for being an activist influenced Chomsky to engage in personal sacrifice and become an active participant in challenging the

established order. Thus, Chomsky went from being intellectually involved in radical politics since childhood, towards being engaged and outspoken about his anarchist beliefs.

When asked to define the term anarchism in a 1976 interview, Noam Chomsky responded by stating: "anarchism is used to cover quite a range of political ideas, but I would prefer to think of it as the libertarian left and from that point of view anarchism can be viewed as a kind of voluntary socialism, that is as libertarian socialist or anarcho-syndicalist or communist-anarchist, in the tradition of say Bakunin and Kropotkin and others."²² In preferring to think of anarchism from a left libertarian point of view, Chomsky believes that the essence of anarchy has to do with "the conviction that the burden of proof has to be placed on authority, and that it should be dismantled if that burden cannot be met."²³ The structures of authority and domination that exist in a given society should therefore, according to Chomsky, justify their existence or otherwise be dismantled in order for humanity to increase its degree of freedom.

To increase the scope of human freedom is essential for those that identify themselves as being in line with anarchist thinking. The anarchist historian Rudolf Rocker, who traces the development of anarchist thought, explains the concept of freedom and what it means to the anarchist: "freedom is only a relative not an absolute concept, since it tends constantly to become broader and to affect circles in more manifold ways. For the anarchist freedom is not an abstract philosophical concept, but the vital concrete possibility for every human being to bring to full development all the powers, capacities, and talents with which nature has endowed him, and turn them to social account."²⁴ Thus, in the struggle to challenge structures of authority and domination, achieving freedom is a great motivating factor for anarchists towards bringing about the full creative potential of all humanity.

Chomsky in his introduction to Daniel Guerin's *Anarchism, From Theory to Practice*, goes on to further

describe what anarchism sets out to do, in spite of the absence of a specific and detailed social theory. In it, Chomsky states that "many commentators dismiss anarchism as utopian, formless, primitive, or otherwise incompatible with the realities of a complex society. One might, however, argue differently: that at every stage of history our concern must be to dismantle those forms of authority and oppression that survive from an era when they might have been justified in terms of the need for security or survival or economic development, but now contribute to -- rather than alleviate-- material and cultural deficit."²⁵ Acknowledging this, Chomsky does not believe that there will be any doctrine of social change, fixed for the present or future. Therefore, Chomsky believes in maintaining great skepticism when encountering any proposed free-reaching doctrines.

Being that Noam Chomsky identifies himself as being an anarchist, he has consistently been critical of other leftist political ideologies. In particular, Chomsky criticizes state socialist societies (such as those under Lenin or Stalin) for the ways in which they prohibit the working class from participating in the decision-making process. Chomsky explains that, "In the state socialist systems, the national plan is made by a national bureaucracy, which accumulates to itself all relevant information, makes decisions, offers them to the public..." This form of decision-making is in much contrast to that of the anarchists who believe that the decisions should be made by "the informed working class through their assemblies and their direct representatives, who live among them and work among them."²⁶ The significant differences regarding the decision making process by both anarchists and state socialists begs the question of which group can truly define themselves as being socialist.

The anarchists along with Chomsky insist that, in Rucker's words, "socialism will be free or not at all. In its recognition of this lies the genuine and profound justification for the existence of anarchism." With this belief in mind,

anarchists stand opposed to the modern world's socialist states. In respect to the authoritarian society that was created by Lenin and Trotsky, Chomsky tries to find out the reasons why they may have labeled themselves as "socialist": "For leadership of the so-called 'socialist states,' the pretense serves to legitimate their rule, allowing them to exploit the aura of socialist ideals... to conceal their own often brutal practice as they destroy every vestige of genuine socialism." In affirming the anarchist Mikhail Bakunin's warning that the "'red bureaucracy' would prove to be the most vile and terrible lie that our century created," Chomsky describes Lenin as calling for "unquestioning submission to a single will" and demanded that "in the interests of socialism" the leadership must assume "dictatorial powers" over the workers who must "unquestionably obey the single will of the leaders of the process.... eliminating any vestige of workers control...." Because of the triumph of state socialism under figures such as Lenin and Stalin, Anarchists as well as left Marxists have often been marginalized. Thus, Chomsky sees the authoritarian practices of the so-called "socialist states" as being detrimental to the struggle of the anarchists who would like to carry out what he terms "real socialism."²⁷

In reading Rudolf Rocker's interpretations of what anarchism was capable of, Noam Chomsky was better able to clarify the strand of anarchism to which he would align himself with. Chomsky therefore came to the conclusion that it was the branch of anarchism known as anarcho-syndicalism that would best serve people living within a highly industrialized society. In viewing labor unions as instruments to accomplish revolutionary social change, anarcho-syndicalists have the hope of replacing capitalism and the state with a society that would be self-managed democratically by the workers. Further on, in trying to alleviate the class divisions within any particular society, it is a goal of the anarcho-syndicalists to abolish wage slavery and most forms of private property.²⁸

The basic principles of anarcho-syndicalism include:

workers' solidarity, direct action, and workers' self management. In upholding the principle of workers' solidarity, anarcho-syndicalists believe that all workers regardless of gender or ethnicity are in a similar situation in relation to their bosses. It is then apparent that any gains or losses made by some workers will in time affect all workers. Therefore, to achieve the anarcho-syndicalist belief of liberation, the workers themselves must support each other in their class conflict. Direct action is also a principle that is applied by anarcho-syndicalists, whereby instead of using indirect action in which one would elect a representative to a government position, an individual or group would use direct action to directly attain a goal that would allow the workers to liberate themselves. Finally, anarcho-syndicalists believe that the workers' organizations -- the organizations that struggle against the wage system -- should be self managed. Through self management the workers would make all the decisions that affect themselves without the use of bosses or "business agents."²⁹

Noam Chomsky strongly feels that it is anarcho-syndicalism rather than other forms of anarchism, that is the appropriate political system for people in an industrial society. For instance, when asked in an interview as to whether or not there is something inherently pre-industrial about the applicability of anarchist ideas, presupposing a rural society with simple technology and small-scale economic organization, Chomsky responded by stating: "As far as anarchist reactions are concerned there are two. There is one anarchist tradition.... say of Kropotkin as a representative- which had much of the character you describe. On the other hand there is another anarchist tradition that develops into anarcho-syndicalism which simply regarded anarchist ideas as the proper mode of a highly complex and industrial society." In analyzing the two views, Chomsky goes on to say that he believes the latter is correct because the possibilities for self-management are raised over a broad scale due to industrialization and the advance of technology. With this in

mind, he tells of the benefits to the workers: "workers can very well become masters of their own immediate affairs... in direction and control of the shop, but also can be in position to make the major substantive decisions concerning the structures of the economy, concerning social institutions, concerning planning regionally and beyond."³⁰

In describing his vision of a future society, Noam Chomsky provides his interpretation of what the political constitution of an anarchist society would look like. With much resemblance to the goals of the anarcho-syndicalist movement, Chomsky details how anarchism would work in a modern society: Beginning with "organization and control in the workplace and the community, one could imagine a network of workers' councils, and at a higher level, representation across factories, or across branches of industry... and on to general assemblies of workers' councils that can be regional and national and international in character." He further states that: "one can project a system of governance that involves local assemblies -- again federated regionally, dealing with regional issues, crossing crafts, industries, trades and so on... at the level of the nation or beyond, through federation and so on."³¹ Thus, in Chomsky's view, a future society could very well operate in an anarcho-syndicalist fashion in which organization and control starts in the community, and proceeds on towards the representation of workers within a regional, national or possibly international framework. Overall, Noam Chomsky has contributed greatly to the fields of linguistics, philosophy, and foreign policy. However, it is his life-long involvement within the anarchist community that has inspired so many to become active and work towards changing the world for the betterment of humanity. Chomsky's tireless commitment in supporting non-hierarchical models of political organization and exposing the efforts of state socialist or capitalist societies to crush them has allowed people to discover a perspective that is quite often marginalized by the mainstream press. In addition to much of his work that is available in print,

Chomsky also lectures widely on various topics pertaining to political issues that revolve around his anarchist beliefs. Though he is as committed as ever towards speaking out against the illegalities and wrongs perpetrated by various public and private tyrannies, Chomsky would gladly prefer to concentrate on his linguistic work if only the world would go away. However, with no evidence of a peaceful horizon any time in the near future, the world can be assured that Noam Chomsky will continue to disseminate his anarchist message for the purpose of achieving a free and just society.

¹Noam Chomsky, interview conducted by Kevin Doyle

²Octave Mirbeau, quoted in James Joll, *The Anarchists* (Boston, 1964) pp. 145-6, cited in Daniel Guerin, p. viii.

³Rudolf Rocker, quoted in Guerin, p. viii.

⁴Chomsky, quoted in Jay Parini, "Noam Is an Island," *Mother Jones* Oct. 1998: 36-41, cited in Robert Barsky, p. 10.

⁵Chomsky, quoted by Carlos P. Otero, cited in Robert Barsky, p. 11.

⁶Chomsky, quoted in James Peck, p. 11.

⁷Chomsky, cited in Barsky, p. 14.

⁸Chomsky, cited in Peck, p. 149.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁰For more insight into Chomsky's take on the 1936 Spanish Civil War and the anarchist revolution that developed, see the interview entitled "The Relevance of Anarcho-Syndicalism," in Barry Pateman, pp. 134-135.

¹¹Chomsky, quoted in Peck, p. 6.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹³Chomsky, quoted in Rudolf Rocker, p. vi.

¹⁴Rudolf Rocker, *The Tragedy of Spain* (New York, 1937), cited in Barsky, pp. 28-29.

¹⁵Barsky, p. 26.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 50.

¹⁷Avukah, *Program for American Jews*, Avukah Pamphlet Service (New York, 1943), cited in Barsky, p. 60.

¹⁸Barsky, pp. 68-69.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 32.

-)20 Chomsky, interviewed on July 25, 1995, cited in Barsky, p. 33.
- ²¹Chomsky, interviewed on March 31, 1995, cited in Barsky, pp. 32-33.
- ²²Chomsky, interview conducted by Peter Jay on July 25, 1976, for a broadcast by BBC's London Weekend TV, published in Pateman, p. 133.
- ²³Chomsky, interview conducted by Doyle
- ²⁴Rocker, p. 31.
- ²⁵Chomsky, quoted in Guerin, p. viii.
- ²⁶Chomsky, interview conducted by Jay on July 25, 1976, for a broadcast by BBC's London Weekend TV, published in Pateman, p. 146.
- ²⁷Chomsky, quoted in Pateman, p. 150.
- ²⁸"Anarcho-syndicalism," *Wikipedia*,
- ²⁹*Ibid.*
- ³⁰Chomsky, interview conducted by Jay on July 25, 1976, for a broadcast by BBC's London Weekend TV, published in Pateman, p. 136.
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The Ideologies of the Mughal and Ottoman States on the Management of Religious Differences in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries
By Ananth Krishnan

Seeking a thorough understanding of the political ideologies of the Mughal State with regard to its management of religious differences is seemingly a path that has been very well traveled. The rich literary tradition of political Islam that preceded the Mughals has allowed for a clear understanding of the development of schools of political thought that finally culminated in the intricate, broad and often ambiguous politics of Akbar in the sixteenth century. Understanding the political and religious ideologies of the Mughal state is not really possible unless viewed in the light of these schools of thought.¹ These political philosophies were indeed instrumental in shaping the broad, often pragmatic yet still intricate political philosophy of the Mughals that was designed to simultaneously create a stable, plural system of rule as well as a unified culture that transcended the religious and cultural diversity of its subjects.

Attempting a similar exercise in the Ottoman case is an altogether different story. The absence of such a rich tradition of political Islamic literature necessitates a different method of garnering an accurate understanding of the ideology of the state towards its non-Muslim or *zimmi* subjects. The social histories from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are indeed useful in this regard, allowing for a more

thorough understanding of relations between Muslims and *zimmis* on a more common level. While the *kadis* and various tax records do indeed provide a valuable insight into the daily life of an Ottoman entrepot, the absence of a great depth of political literature has slightly limited the scope of the exercise.

Nevertheless, comparing the political ideologies of the two empires with regard to religious differences still emerges as a very productive exercise, albeit with some limitations. The ideologies of the two empires, garnered from these two quite different methods, reflect certain striking commonalities that are also drawn out over similar themes. The creative tension in political Islam reconciling politics and religious law is reflected in both states, as is the emergence of a pragmatic political philosophy with horizons that often stretched beyond the narrow limits prescribed by shari'a law and orthodox Islam. Thus, conducting this comparison of ideologies is also further enhanced by examining the nature of legal realms in the two states, in light of the tension between secular law and shari'a law.

Islamic Schools of Political Ideology

In Mughal India, the political philosophy of the state was influenced and shaped by the weight of a rich tradition of political Islamic thought. From the more orthodox and narrow philosophies of Ziya al-Din Barani and the *adab* tradition, to the relatively more plural *akhlaqi* texts and Nasirean ethics, the ideas of the Mughal kings on political governance, law and the various applications of the shari'a were the result of a long history of interactions that were also, rather importantly, not just confined to the world of Islam. In India especially, there emerged a preponderance of texts and treatises that specified the norms of governance and pertained to the management of religious differences, and these texts became an integral part of the Indo-Persian tradition.²

Ziya al-Din Barani is regarded as the most widely read political philosopher of pre-Mughal India.³ Barani, like many political philosophers before him, attempted to unravel the dilemma faced by Muslim kings - which Barani understood was especially evident in the Indian situation - with respect to the challenge posed by the separation of social reality and shari'a tradition. Instead of a policy of accommodating the non-Islamic elements of society, which had been a solution consistently proposed by some earlier theologians, Barani instead suggests an outright repudiation of all non-Islamic elements, and a stricter conformity with the shari'a. For Barani, a ruler could either be in conformity with what the shari'a defined or directly opposed to it - there was no room for interpretation or accommodation; there was no space between. Specifically, with respect to governance in India, Barani suggests that the duty of a good Muslim king extended beyond measures such as levying *jizya* and other taxes on Hindus. The king should establish the supremacy of Islam by completely removing the non-Islamic elements, even by extreme actions like slaughtering all Brahmans.⁴ Barani resolved this dilemma by establishing an extremely close connection between looking to the faith (*dindari*) and concern with the world (*jahandari*).⁵

Barani's guidelines for governance were often impractical, especially given a climate like Mughal India where Muslims constituted a minority, making it unreasonable (and probably unfeasible) to alienate the majority of the subjects or even execute all their priests. Yet, as Alam describes, Barani himself had to have a small degree of accommodation, purely on the grounds of necessity. According to Alam, the narrowness of Barani's outlines can be understood from the historical climate of his time. Despite the longevity of their existence in India, the rule of the shari'a in India had not been securely established.

***Akhlaq* Ideology in Mughal India : Co-operation in Political Organization**

At the other end of the spectrum existed the *akhlaqi* tradition, which focused instead on achieving cooperation in political organization primarily through the establishment of justice. Justice in turn was dependent on social harmony, which the *akhlaqi* treatises suggested could only be achieved by the King balancing the interests of the various groups.⁶ For *akhlaqi* proponents like Tusi, the interpretation of the shari'a consequently becomes a broader exercise than as was the case in Barani's ideality. More importantly, in most *akhlaqi* literature, the judicial rights of the *ri'aya* are not necessarily tied to their religion; nomenclatures like *Zimmi* and *kafir* do not even find themselves in most *akhlaq* treatises. The broad horizons of the *akhlaqi* tradition presented a far-removed alternative from the adabi tradition, which was favoured by most orthodox Muslim scholars.

Alam suggests that Tusi's treatise was amongst the most favoured readings of Mughal elites during the reign of Akbar. Indeed, there is a great degree of correlation between the political ideas described in the writings of Abu'l Fazl and those that appeared in *akhlaqi* treatises such as Tusi's. The Mughals were drawn to the plural aspects of the *akhlaqi* tradition, which presented a paradigm that might possibly be applied to create a stable rule in the diverse social landscape of the Indian sub-continent.

In his work *Insha*, Fazl refers to a royal code of conduct that was issued by Akbar to princes, high nobles, *mansabdars*, and *kotwal*:⁷

"When they are free from their public work, they should read books written by the pious and the saintly, such as the ones on *akhlaq* that cure moral and spiritual ailments...

And they should not interfere (*muta'arriz*) in any person's religion (*din-o-mazhab*). For, wise people in this worldly matter - which is transient - do not prefer that which harms. How can they then choose the disadvanta-

geous way in matters of faith - which pertains to the world of eternity? If he [the subject] is right, they [state officials], would oppose the truth [if they interfere]; and if they have the truth with them and he is unwittingly on the wrong side, he is a victim of ignorance and deserves compassion and help, not interference and resistance."

The Mughal adoption of *akhlaqi* norms is also evident in their interest in other religions and traditions. Akbar for instance, encouraged the translation of texts like the *Mahabharat*. Fazl writes:

"He [Akbar] has noticed the increasing conflict between the different sects of Muslims, on the one hand, and the Jews and Hindus on the other, and also the endless show of repudiation of each other's faith among them. The sagacious mind [of his Excellence] then decided to arrange the translations of the sacred books of both the communities, so that... they both refrain from indulging in hostilities and disputes, seek the truth, find out each other's virtues and vices and endeavour to correct themselves."⁸

Thus, by appropriating *akhlaq* treatises and Nasirean ethics that opposed the norms of Barani, the Mughals sought to arrive at a political system that could be applied to the plurality of the Indian context, to allow the creation of stable rule that transcended religious differences. As Alam suggests, the political ideologies of Mughal India can only be understood in light of the history of the political tradition that preceded these ideologies. The Mughals chose to separate themselves from the *adabi* tradition of Barani that was evident in Central Asian kingdoms such as the Safavids. The Mughals probably realized that the narrow limits of the *adabi* treatises might have possibly created problems of governance in a context that undoubtedly required a broader vision.

Dissent From Within Islam

There was a significant degree of dissent among the Persian elite with regard to the increasingly broadening lim-

its of political Islam under the Mughals, which adds an interesting dimension to the emerging literary tradition. 'Abd al-Qadir Badauni of Akbar's court scolded the court for the non-Sunni tendencies that he came to perceive, and the tolerance of Hindu customs that it prided itself on. He wrote, "Hindustan is a wild place, where there is an open field for all manner of licentiousness, and no one interferes in another's business, so that every one can do just as he pleases."⁹ The broadness of the Mughals' *akhlaqi*-influenced shari'a, and their substantial deviance from *adabi* norms caused some orthodox Muslims to perceive a significant weakness in the rule of the Mughals, and even a serious threat to the faith. Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi, an important theologian of the early seventeenth century, in a letter to Mir Muhammad Nu'man wrote:

"The spread of the illustrious shari'a comes from the efficient care and good administration of great sultans, which has lately slackened, causing an inevitable weakness in Islam. The infidels of India [thus] fearlessly destroy mosques and build their own places of worship in their stead... The infidels freely observed the rituals of infidelity, while Muslims are unable to execute most Islamic ordinances."¹⁰

While balancing the interests of various groups was of the utmost importance to the Mughal state, it should not be mistaken that the rulers readily paid for this objective by willingly sacrificing the shari'a; as many believed the case to be. On the contrary, Jahangir considered the enforcement of the shari'a during his reign to be one of his most important achievements.¹¹

The point of divergence between the state and its critics can be fixed at the problem of interpretation of the shari'a, which has been a consistent bone of contention in the history of political Islam. The shari'a of the Mughals was influenced by the broadness of *akhlaqi* norms, and consequently developed an ambiguity that allowed it to transcend the limitations of its legal definition.¹² Mughal scholars justified this development by declaring open the door of *ijtihad*,

thus permitting a change in form of the juridical shari'a. The broadness of *akhlaqi* norms enabled the development of a practical political philosophy that extended beyond elements of law. The differences between the conceptions of Barani and Tusi alone illustrate the degree of variation that was possible in political and legal realms within political Islam. This allowed the Mughals to develop their own political ideology, which it must be said is heavily guided by a sense of pragmatism. While the *akhlaqi* way allowed them to incorporate this pragmatism into an otherwise rigid political tradition, this incorporation was neither smooth nor without dissent from within, as shown earlier.

The Roles of Sufis and Literature in Mughal Plurality

Besides the *akhlaqi* shari'a and their own pre-existing ideas related to the *Tura-i-Chengizi*, the ideology of the Mughals came to be increasingly influenced by Sufi ideas and practices. Sufis were gaining in prominence from the 11th and 12th centuries, and received great patronage under the Delhi Sultanate, especially during the reign of Iltutmish. The Sufi way created conditions for the assimilation of Hindu ideas into Islam; the process of balancing various interests thus began to take on new meaning. The idea of *wadat al-wujud* allowed for the development of a religious synthesis and assimilation.¹³ This doctrine was crucial to the ideologies of Akbar and Jahangir, by encouraging the practice of cultural and religious accommodation.¹⁴ In this period of cultural exchange, Mughal nobles began to further explore works of the Hindu tradition, as more works of Sanskrit literature began to be translated into Persian. Through the process of assimilation under Sufis like Bansawi, an increasing number of local non-shari'a practices began to be incorporated into Indian Islam. Sufis like Bansawi sought to maintain social order through this incorporation of local gods and myths, however 'un-Islamic' his actions might have been in the eyes of orthodox purists.

This process of assimilation by the Sufis was also reflected in the emerging Indo-Persian literary tradition. Pre-Mughal Sufi poets like Amir Khusrau and Hasan Sijzi composed works that went beyond religious differences, as these lines from Khusrau illustrate:

"I went to the church of the Christian and of the Jew
And saw that both were facing You
The desire to meet You took me to the temple of idols
And I heard the idols singing your love songs."¹⁵

Under the Mughals, Persian literature was greatly developed. The Mughals sought to reinforce their imperial authority with a lingual superiority, and more importantly, to create a political culture that would transcend Indian religious identities. Persian, for them, became the means to this end; Persian thus grew into the language of the Empire and played the role of a unifying force that would allow the Mughal state to create an uniform system of allies that would transcend each of their cultural differences.¹⁶ These emerging religious, cultural and literary developments that arose out of Islam's contact with Hinduism were in tune with the broad horizons and plural contexts of Mughal political ideology, which sought to bring under the common banner of 'justice' the various peoples of the Indian sub-continent.¹⁷

As has been explained, this effort to expand the horizons of political Islam faced substantial dissent from Muslim scholars who attacked its 'non-Islamic' tendencies. The *wahdat al-wujud* of the Sufis obviously angered the 'ulama and orthodox elites. There was also a significant degree of dissent from Hindus, which should not be glossed over. There are instances of Hindu-Muslim disputes and competition between Hindu yogis and Sufis. The dissent from within and outside Islam were thus quite prominent; nevertheless, as Alam explains, it was definitely not the case that the dissent was strong enough to significantly alter either the *akhlaq* norms or the cultural and literary homogeneity that was fast

emerging.¹⁸

Ottoman Histories, Historiography and Political Ideology

In the case of Ottoman histories and historiography, it is harder to conduct such an exercise where a development of the political ideologies of the Ottoman sultans is theoretically charted in the light of a long tradition of treatises. There is an absence of such an abundant tradition of political texts and treatises in this regard, and Ottoman historiography has tended to focus more on other aspects of state. There is a dearth of literature that deals with political ideologies of the state with regard to its management of religious differences across the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, unlike the Mughal case where several treatises, and later histories as well, that often directly addressed this issue. With respect to political ideologies of the Ottoman state, some of the discussion has been centred on the early years of the Empire's founding. It also seems the case, as Cemal Kafadar suggests, that most Ottoman histories in this area were tailored to fit various other premises. For instance, the rigidity of Ottoman systems and the narrowness of Ottoman Islam became common themes, especially among European scholars. How accurate their theses might or might not have been is much beyond the scope of this paper, but one consequence that is clearly evident is in the light of these histories, certain themes became marginalized as a result of the repetitiveness of others. Acculturation in the Ottoman context, for example, was neither treated often nor with enough depth. Of course acculturation was often reflected upon, but often only in passing during the discussion of other themes, such as the spread of the early Ottoman state under the gazis.

These fleeting ideological reflections themselves are not without significance. From these points in various Ottoman historiographies, it is possible to gain some under-

standing of the degree of pragmatism and flexibility that existed in the early Ottoman state that is known for its supposed rigidity (though they pre-date our period of interest). Lindner's inquiries regarding the **gazi thesis** are but one example. He questions the validity of Wittek's thesis by describing some of the actions of what he perceived was a pragmatic and flexible state - some which can even be loosely termed as acculturation processes - such as the recruitment of Byzantines into the armies, wars raised against other Muslims, and importantly, the absence of substantial evidence that reflected any large-scale persecution against Christians. Lindner believes that the early state displayed moderation and an "interest in conciliation and mutual adaptability," also allowing a degree of freedom for pre-Islamic cults and heterodoxy.¹⁹ The critiques of the **gazi thesis** are useful in this regard, as they highlight ideologies of the Ottoman state that are closer to the realm of managing religious differences, given that they are drawn from the opposite end of the gazi spectrum. For instance, Jennings points out the participation of Christian forces of Balkan vassals in Ottoman campaigns, which goes a small way in questioning ideas of a religiously rigid and narrow political state.

Thus, the materials at hand - namely social histories and legal discourses drawn from official records - have necessitated an exercise vastly different from the Mughal scenario.

Muslim-*Zimmi* Interactions in Ottoman Social History

Jennings provides a concrete examination of the treatment of *zimmis* by the Ottoman state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, albeit in a very different form. Jennings' work is not centred around political ideology, as has been the exercise so far. Instead, his sources are derived from Ottoman *kadi* registers and judicial records, which recorded orders from Istanbul, as well as the details of local disputes

and everyday transactions. This different methodology has both restrictions and benefits for our purpose.

His research allows us to gain a different insight into the mechanics of Muslim-*zimmi* relations, moreover in the realm of 'common' people. The Mughal political ideologies that have been discussed were generally limited to the world of elites, and as suggested, their impact in local realms is difficult to gauge. However, the absence of many influential bodies of political literature in the Ottoman case nevertheless makes it a challenging task to clearly trace the history of the political ideologies of the Ottoman sultans, as was the objective in the Mughal exercise. The population registers of the Ottoman town of Kayseri in central Anatolia reveal a diverse society with a sizeable *zimmi* population, mostly comprised of Armenian Gregorian Christians and Greek Orthodox Christians. The growth rate of the *zimmi* population even exceeded that of the Muslims: the number increased from 326 adult tax-paying male *zimmis* in 1500 to 1,816 by 1583.²⁰ *Zimmis* in Kayseri paid a significant amount of tax as *cizye*, though Jennings observes that the tax was not great enough to severely economically disadvantage the *zimmi* community with respect to the Muslims. The court registers reveal instances of disputes Muslims and *zimmis* regarding the collection of tax. However, there were also disputes between *zimmis* themselves, usually regarding where a *zimmi* was supposed to pay the tax.

Certain records indicate instances of conversion of *zimmis* to Islam.²¹ It seems that the procedure for conversion was simple, and not strictly enforced. A *zimmi* would simply declare that he left "vain religion" for Islam, and would praise the greatness of Islam. The process was important with regard to registration and tax purposes, as the *zimmi*'s name would be officially changed. Given the sparsity of instances of conversion in the records, Jennings suggests that registration might not have been mandatory. There are also instances of conversions within the *zimmi* community itself, although these instances are rarer still. In

some instances, the conversion of a *zimmi* to Islam posed certain problems for the *zimmi*, who ended up having to sever ties with his family. A *zimmi* who had converted to Islam was allowed to keep all his inheritances from before his conversion, despite certain restrictions regarding the inheritance of Muslims from *zimmis*.

The attitude of Ottoman administration towards conversion seems to be dictated by a sense of pragmatism more than anything else. The process itself seems to have only carried a significance for tax purposes. The infrequency of its appearance in registers reveals a process that was neither overly celebrated nor encouraged. However, there are a few instances of *zimmis* being forced to convert. Interestingly in these cases, the shari'a court acted to protect the interest of the *zimmi*. The shari'a court provided a refuge for the *zimmi* community, and the Muslim community also seems to have been forthcoming in providing witnesses for these cases to support the *zimmis*.²²

Records of money lending and property exchanges reveal a great degree of interaction between Muslims and *zimmis*. One of every five instances of loans and credit involved an inter-religious exchange (or 17.6%). *Zimmis* were also involved in the transfer of properties. In this realm also, 17% of transfers were inter-religious; 174 plots of land and 134 residences and other buildings acquired owners of a different religion.²³ *Zimmis* acquired property at a faster rate than Muslims.

The inter-religious interaction indicates that Muslims and *zimmis* often lived close together, and the separation into different residential communities was not as rigid as often suggested. Around 10% of the population lived in mixed mahalles, which were predominantly Muslim.²⁴ Some of the villages around Kayseri were also mixed, and some were even predominantly *zimmi*. It is also evident that there were no real restrictions regarding one's occupation.²⁵ As Haim Gerber confirms, ethnic divisions of labour only applied to the higher echelons of employment.²⁶ In most

occupations in the cities and rural areas as well, there is evidence of Muslim and Christian participation, especially from the categories of occupation names.

The Muslim-*zimmi* interaction allowed for a degree of assimilation and acculturation.²⁷ From the account of the Armenian Simeon of Poland, who traveled across the Ottoman Empire in the early 17th century, it seems that the Armenians in Kayseri no longer spoke Armenian. The *kadi* registers also list many Christians with Turkish names, and there was seemingly no language barrier between the Christians and Muslims. Whether these *zimmis* are to be considered 'Turkified Christians', or 'Christianized Turks' has been a matter of much debate. Nevertheless, what is certain is that there was some degree of cultural and economic exchange between the different religious communities.

It has been suggested that the religious ideologies of the Ottoman state were not intended to create such a climate of acculturation and interaction, and on the contrary, the Islamic law of the Ottomans was divisory and repressive towards *zimmis*. The evidence presented by Jennings does paint an altogether different picture. An actively enforced segregation of the population is non-existent at Kayseri, as also are any obvious measures of repression. Still, it must be taken into account that Jennings' sources are mostly official, and that a history written using documents drawn from *zimmi*-related sources would possibly raise some questions. But despite these possible differences, the existence of a certain degree of economic and cultural exchanges is hard to dispute given the extensivity of the records. It is also clear that Muslim-*zimmi* interactions were not at all restricted at Kayseri; on the contrary, it can be argued that they were indeed encouraged. Properties and monies freely exchanged hands, and there were hardly any restrictions on the entrance to most occupations. The attitude of the Ottoman state towards these religions can probably be best described as one of pragmatism. Burgeoning economies in places like Kayseri and thriving trade at ports like Bursa

were built on the productive interactions of the Muslims and *zimmis*. The Ottoman state indeed was not so rigidly bound to narrow ideologies (such as the *adabi* type) to actively repress the interests of *zimmis*. Much like the Mughal State, the Ottoman state was led to a good degree by a rational pragmatism that is clearly reflected in its treatment of *zimmis*.

Ottoman Law and Mughal Law

Given that Ottoman political ideologies and Mughal records of social and economic history are both relatively sparse, it is perhaps productive to extend this comparative assessment to the realm of law to gauge the treatment of non-Muslims within the states, with regard to the realms of secular and shari'a laws. We have already briefly described the rather broad, ambiguous nature of the Mughal shari'a, that was in no small way influenced by *akhlaq* norms; Mughal shari'a evolved into a political form that enabled the Mughal state to create a political culture that would transcend the religious and cultural identities of its subjects, and thus extend beyond the realm of law.

From the Ottoman *kadis*, it seems that customary law did not differentiate between Muslims and *zimmis*; the difference was perpetuated by the shari'a.²⁸ Still, as described, in the case of Kayseri (and also in the case of Bursa), the shari'a was still a refuge for *zimmis*, who readily and voluntarily took their cases to the shari'a courts. While this was a source of some strife for the leaders of the *zimmi* communities who sought to apply their own legal systems, this indicates the broad potential of Ottoman shari'a. In fact, the highest courts of law in the Ottoman Empire, the *divans* of the Grand Vizier, were even open to *zimmis*, and according to the letter of the law, "every subject of the sultan, Muslim or non-Muslim, rich or poor, could bring his case, however trivial, before them."²⁹

In the Ottoman case, there was a conflict between

the secular *kanun* law and the shari'a.³⁰ While the *kanun* was intended to "amplify" the shari'a, there were instances when it sought to supersede it. The *kanun* law in some respects sought to restrict as much as possible the application of severe shari'a penalties. Thus, there effectively existed a separate secular law outside the realm of the shari'a, although it must be said that some legists like Ibn Khaldun did not recognize its legality.³¹

There are certain striking parallels between Mughal Law and Ottoman Law, regarding the tension between the secular and religious aspects of law. Like the Ottomans, the Mughals sought to restrict the influence of the religious 'ulama, so as to have a degree of control across both secular and religious realms. Towards the end of the sixteenth century, Akbar garnered the right to issue binding decrees even within the realm of the shari'a, in cases of disagreement.³² However, it must be said that the local reflection of Mughal Law was slightly different from the case of the Ottomans. In the Ottoman local realm, the nature of the courts was not greatly separated from that at the centre. *Zimmis* did indeed have their own systems of law, but the diffusion of shari'a law into both Muslim and non-Muslim realms is very evident from the *kadis*, as described before. In the Mughal case, the jurisdiction of local rajas and zamindars held in local realms, thus creating a system where there were overlapping administrative agencies.³³

Towards the end of the seventeenth century, under Aurangzeb, while the separation between the two legal realms was still reduced, the outcome was strikingly derived from the opposite end of the spectrum. Aurangzeb sought a return to a more orthodox shari'a-minded law, and he also re-instituted the *jizya* and abolished several taxes which he believed went against the spirit of shari'a law. This shift in Mughal Law occurred around the same time a similar shift took place in Ottoman Law, where a return to a more orthodox shari'a was effected.³⁴ A comparative assessment of the ideologies of the Mughal and Ottoman states in this

regard undoubtedly reflects certain common themes. The two empires faced similar tensions in negotiating politics, economy and religion, and their ideologies reflected these tensions, albeit often in very different realms.

¹See Alam, Muzaffar, *Languages of Political Islam* (Delhi:University of Chicago Press, 2004).

²Alam,, 75.

³Ibid., 31.

⁴Ibid., 36-37

⁵Ibid., 39

⁶Ibid., 55-57

⁷Ibid., quoting Fazl, 61-64

⁸Ibid., quoting Fazl, 65-66

⁹Ibid., 76, from Badauni's *Muntakhab al-Tawarikh*

¹⁰Ibid., 77, from *Maktubat-i Imam Rabbani*, letter no.92 to Mir Muhammad Nu'man

¹¹Ibid., 77

¹²Ibid., 78-80

¹³Ibid., 91

¹⁴Ibid., 94-114

¹⁵Ibid., 119

¹⁶Ibid., 133-139

¹⁷Ibid., 140

¹⁸Ibid., 157-168

¹⁹Kemal Kefadar, "Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State", 48-51

²⁰RC Jennings, *Studies on Ottoman Social History in the 16th and 17th Centuries* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1999) 348-349

²¹Ibid., 360-365

²²Ibid., 365

²³Ibid., 366-367

²⁴Ibid., 399

²⁵Ibid., 401

²⁶Haim Gerber, "Muslims and Zimmis in Ottoman Economy and Society: Encounters, Culture and Knowledge", 111

²⁷Jennings, 398-404

²⁸*Ibid.*, 404-405

²⁹Uriel Heyd, *Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law* (ed. Menage) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973) 226

³⁰*Ibid.*, 180

³¹*Ibid.*, 182-183

³²*Ibid.*, 317

³³Radhika Singha, *A Despotism of Law: Crime and Justice in Early Colonial India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1-5

³⁴*Ibid.*, 317-318

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**A Survey of Anti-Extravagance in the Roman Republic
and Empire
By William Kolkey**

Few empires in history controlled as much wealth or enjoyed as much luxury as Rome during its zenith. Fewer empires witnessed as much opposition to this wealth and luxury as did Rome. From the ending of the Second Punic War to the founding of the principate, the Roman senate passed no less than eight ordinances curtailing luxury. Censors stripped the status of senators who dined too lavishly. Emperors as diverse as Nero, Hadrian, and Aurelian passed laws combating extravagance. All the while, philosophies like stoicism and cynicism encouraged austerity among their converts. This essay will survey the history of the Roman anti-extravagance movement in an effort to understand the reasons behind its growth and popularity. Emphasis will be placed on the anti-extravagance attitudes embodied in sumptuary laws, censorships, and stoic and cynic philosophies.

The anti-extravagance movement began amidst the broad social changes that took place in the second century BC. The century had brought unprecedented prosperity to the Roman people, as victorious Roman armies imported

into Rome plunder from Eastern campaigns. Often, this plunder consisted of luxuries unheard of by the average Roman, luxuries which the historian Livy cites as including "coaches of bronze, valuable robes for coverlets, tapestries and other products of the loom."¹ But while this plunder from abroad enriched Rome, it impoverished its modesty. Rome soon found itself subsidizing greater affluence, excess, and splendor. Livy describes some of this extravagance in detail:

"Female players of the lute and the harp and other festal delights of entertainments were made adjunct to banquets; the banquets themselves, moreover, began to be planned with both greater care and greater expense. At that time the cook, to the ancient Romans the most worthless of slaves ... began to have value, and what had been merely a necessary service came to be regarded as an art. Yet those things which were then looked upon as remarkable were hardly even the germs of the luxury to come." ²

In this atmosphere of unprecedented opulence, the anti-extravagance movement emerged. It was endorsed by members of almost every social stratum. The poor urbanite and the wealthy senator assailed extravagance. Importantly, their criticisms were not so much directed toward wealth, but instead focused on the ostentatious display of wealth. Indeed wealth, as long as it determined the power and influence of a given Roman, would continue to be encouraged.³ But luxury, which served no purpose but to gratify desire, was opposed by both powerful government and lowly philosopher.

Within the Roman government, censors and legislators both actively opposed the consumption of luxury. The censors themselves had a long history of fighting extravagance, dating from the earliest days of the republic. But in the second century BC, the office intensified its efforts, thanks mainly to the efforts of Cato the Elder. Cato himself was the epitome of classical Roman virtue. Plutarch describes him as "impervious" to a life of hedonism or

enfeeblement - a man "more famous and celebrated" than Demosthenes for his virtues.⁴ A hardened ascetic, Cato shunned elaborate clothing, fine foods, and wines.⁵ He was often praised for his self-discipline, and quickly became an example of virtue to his peers. As a censor, he adopted a hostile position against extravagance, often publicly condemning it.⁶ At one point in his career he even reassessed the value of luxury items in an attempt to force their owners to pay higher taxes.⁷ Ultimately, Cato's efforts seem to have inspired his successors to employ similarly aggressive tactics combating luxury. Cato's biographer Alan Astin points out that it was in this manner that "the three succeeding censorships resembled [Cato's] in many respects, in marked contrast to the three that preceded it."⁸ And even after those censorships, other censors continued to rebuke extravagance. In 125 BC the office censured the senator M. Aemilius Porcina, ostensibly for his opulence.⁹ Valerius Maximus tells the story of the censors M. Antonius and L. Flaccus, who expelled a senator for dismantling an anti-extravagance law while serving as a tribune.¹⁰ No doubt succeeding censors continued in this tradition.

But censors alone could not weed out extravagance, a circumstance which prompted the legislation of sumptuary laws. These laws included in 215 BC the Lex Oppia, which forbade women from wearing colored dresses or adorning more than a half ounce of gold; in 181 BC the Lex Orchia, which restricted the attendance of guests at banquets; in 159 BC the Lex Fannia, which limited the costs of foods allowed at banquets; and the Lex Licinia, which included a number of provisions restricting other extravagances.¹¹ The Lex Licinia had been passed at the beginning of the first century BC, and was soon followed by two other sumptuary laws. After them, sumptuary laws were not passed until the founding of the principate by Julius Caesar, who created a law outlawing meats he considered too extravagant for the Roman palate.¹² Other laws included one passed by the

emperor Tiberius, which legislated that men could only wear silk and gold ornaments during religious ceremonies. Nero passed a law limiting the types of foods allowed at suppers. And so too did the emperors Hadrian, Alexander Severus, and Aurelian pass sumptuary laws in an effort to combat extravagance.¹³

Understanding why censors and lawmakers reacted so aggressively to extravagance can be difficult. Few records exist detailing the reasons for the passing of a sumptuary law or the decisions of a censor. But despite these difficulties, three plausible theories can be advanced.

The first theory suggests sumptuary laws and strict censorships resulted from a deeply rooted cultural opposition to luxury. Before Rome's enrichment in the second century, the Romans had long valued the virtue inherent in a simple lifestyle. In their writings, the ancient Roman historians often reminisced on the frugality and temperance of the early Romans. The historian Sallust describes early Roman life as having "the greatest possible concord, and the least possible avarice."¹⁴ Livy depicts early Rome in a similar fashion, writing that back then "poverty ... went hand in hand with contentment."¹⁵ In sum, virtue in early Rome meant living austerely, and indeed, the heroes of early Rome often were those who practiced modest lifestyles. The famous Roman king Numa Pompilius, for example, won notoriety through his "discipline, endurance of hardship, and study of philosophy" which had conditioned him to go without luxuries.¹⁶ Lucretia, a paragon of female virtue, earned her title by choosing to work at home instead of joining other noblewomen at a lavish banquet.¹⁷ The war hero but later turned traitor Gaius Marcius Coriolanus was celebrated for his indifference to wealth and pleasures.)¹⁸ Other anecdotes testify to a similar admiration for asceticism.¹⁹

And even during and after the second century BC, these values, if less practiced, continued to be admired and encouraged. Cato the Elder's asceticism, for example,

remained famous throughout Roman history. Cicero mentions him over 60 times in his writings, making him the spokesman for his piece "On Old Age."²⁰ Seneca considered him "the historical embodiment of a stoic sage."²¹ Other noteworthy Romans, meanwhile, continued to preach the old Roman virtues while condemning extravagances. In the first century BC, the popular poet Horace in *The Simple Life* reminded his followers that "most of the pleasure is in yourself, not in the odors of expensive foods."²² And as late as the second century AD, the poet Juvenal blamed luxury as the cause of crime and lust, branding it as "more deadly than armies."²³ Many other literary works contained similar messages.²⁴

Ultimately, the continued admiration of the early Roman lifestyle suggests that sumptuary laws were attempts to resurrect the practice of that lifestyle's values. The harsh attitude adopted by censors toward luxuries is especially unsurprising when considering this theory, as one purpose of the censorship was to ensure that Romans practiced traditional virtues.²⁵ Sumptuary laws were likely passed for the same reasons of seeking to restore Roman values.

Another theory explaining anti-extravagance attitudes suggests the movement resulted as a response to corruption. Starting in the second century BC, corruption became rampant throughout the empire. Livy in his history describes some of this corruption in detail, recounting complaints from Spaniards over Roman officials' avarice and acts of extortion.²⁶ This corruption became even worse later on, as Romans started taking bribes from state enemies like Jugurtha.²⁷ Jugurtha's famous quip "Rome is a city for sale" only underscores the state of depravity. This corruption necessitated an explanation for it. According to many Roman intellectuals, the cause of corruption was luxury.

Livy, for instance, blames the vices and corruptions of the Augustan age on the "sinking of the foundation of moral-

ity as the old teaching was allowed to lapse."²⁸ The "old teaching" to which Livy refers is the anti-extravagance attitude of early Rome, which had helped the Romans stay free "from the vices of avarice and luxury."²⁹ The Roman historian Florus makes a similar point, arguing that

"it was the conquest of Syria which first corrupted [the Romans], followed by the Asiatic inheritance bequeathed by the king of Pergamon. The resources and wealth thus acquired spoiled the morals of the age and ruined the State, which was engulfed in its own vices as in a common sewer."³⁰

The historian Sallust also agrees, arguing that in the second century "avarice subverted honesty, integrity, and other honorable principles."³¹ The historian Polybius similarly argued that when used improperly, wealth "contributes more than anything else to the corruption of the body and soul."³²

Considering the connection that many Roman scholars drew between extravagance and corruption (or in some cases, even excessive wealth and corruption), the attacks by censors and lawmakers on extravagance become more understandable. One particular speech by Cato illuminates this mentality.

Perhaps one of his most famous speeches, Cato's apology of the Lex Oppia acts as a blatant repudiation of luxury. The speech begins with a description of Rome before the second century. Cato explains that the early Romans had been uncorrupted by luxury. As proof of this, Cato recounts an episode in which the Greek king Pyrrhus "tried to corrupt with gifts the minds of [Roman] men and women."³³ The Romans, still ever virtuous, refused to accept the enemy's bribes.³⁴ But, Cato continued, luxury had since perverted Roman values. Because of extravagance, the same episode would have resulted in women "standing in the streets" waiting to receive gifts from Rome's enemies.³⁵ Hence the Oppian law was made necessary. The law would fight Roman corruption by limiting extrava-

gance, which, Cato remarked, "had been the destruction of every great empire."³⁶

Indeed, the speech draws a clear link between extravagance and corruption. But apart from Cato's eloquent apology, little other evidence exists explaining the exact reasons for the severity of censors or the passing of sumptuary laws. Ultimately, the historian can only speculate on the precise reasoning behind the senators' and censors' assaults on extravagance.

The two above theories offer the best explanations for sumptuary laws and the strict attitudes of censors toward extravagance. Another theory, however, does supplement the other two, but only in explaining sumptuary law. The theory, advanced by Professor David Daube, argues that sumptuary laws sought more to protect Roman income than enforce ascetic virtue. Daube points out that pressure to seem fiscally generous (in the context of throwing elaborate banquets, etc.) would have coaxed many Romans to spend more than they would have preferred.³⁷ Daube concludes that sumptuary laws were passed to protect against these social pressures, thus allowing the rich an excuse for frugality.³⁸ Of course, this theory only explains sumptuary laws that restricted extravagances in a social setting, where peer pressure might encourage the spending of money. Furthermore, as even Daube admits, his theory ignores unrelated cultural factors (like those explained above) which might have influenced the passage of sumptuary legislation.³⁹

It should be finally pointed out that despite the efforts of censors and lawmakers, extravagance continued to proliferate throughout all corners of Roman society. For ultimately, the rebukes of censors and the laws of senators could never stop the rich Roman from flaunting his wealth. Hence appears the Trimalchio of Petronius' famous satire, who displays his wealth unabashedly, without restraint or taste. Other successful Romans - indeed most successful Romans - mirrored Trimalchio's tendency to invest in luxury and sub-

sidize extravagance.⁴⁰ The problem was so pervasive in the first century that the Roman emperor Tiberius became reluctant to pass sumptuary laws, as they would have been unenforceable.⁴¹

It is perhaps the failure of the Roman government's top-down approach to fighting extravagance that encouraged the growth of the anti-extravagance philosophies. Of these, stoicism and cynicism were the most prevalent, but other philosophies like Mithraism and Epicureanism were also popular.

Stoicism came to Rome in the second century BC, around the same time as the infusion into the city of extravagances and luxuries.⁴² The philosophy slowly attracted converts, but did not become popular until about a century later, at which point it had recruited such noteworthy advocates as Marcus Porcius Cato (the Younger) and Cicero.⁴³ By the first century AD, stoics could be found in law courts, street corners, and lecture rooms.⁴⁴ The philosophy continued to grow in popularity, and by the second century had a large following; among the educated and elite, stoicism had even become the preferred creed.⁴⁵

The writings of the great stoic philosophers, starting with Cicero and ending with the emperor Marcus Aurelius, give insight into the nature of the philosophy and the mindsets of its adherents. Stoic philosophy can be broken into three categories: logic, physics, and ethics.⁴⁶ Most stoic writings, however, give little attention to physics and logic, and instead focus on ethics. This emphasis on ethics testifies to the importance the stoics placed on morality, which was in turn linked with the question of how life ought to be lived. Cicero makes the connection poignantly clear in his *Tusculum dialogues*, writing that "in order to live a happy life the only thing we need is moral goodness."⁴⁷

The question for the stoic then becomes what is moral goodness. Cicero in his fifth *Tusculum dialogue* answers by defining moral goodness as something "inca-

pable of any shortcomings ... and dependent on nothing but itself."⁴⁸ In short, moral goodness meant having enough virtue to eradicate desires outside of what an individual could himself provide.⁴⁹ This, in turn, meant having no desire for pleasure. Without this virtue, unhappiness was almost assured, for, in Cicero's words, the "cravings [for pleasures] cannot ever be sated." Or, to rephrase, once addicted to luxuries, an individual becomes miserable in want of more.⁵⁰ This is where anti-extravagance philosophy enters stoic thought. It is not that the stoics regarded extravagances as immoral; instead, they considered immorality as the lust for extravagances. Consequently, Cicero's opposition to extravagance stayed confined to a criticism of luxuries as unnecessary excesses.⁵¹ As stoicism became more popular, stoics started taking harsher stances against needless luxuries. In the first century AD, Seneca writes how forceful stoic opposition to extravagance led him to forego oysters, mushrooms, perfumes, hot baths, meats, and even soft mattresses.⁵² Later on, the famous stoic philosopher Epictetus not only encouraged his followers to shun luxuries, but told them to also avoid extravagant foods, drinks, and clothing.⁵³ By the second century AD, the stoic opposition to extravagance becomes noticeably greater than the opposition of two centuries earlier.

Along with stoicism, cynicism reached its peak in popularity during the second century AD.⁵⁴ For the most part the philosophy was confined to Rome and the Eastern Empire, attracting converts largely from the urban proletariat.⁵⁵ Its tenets, like those of stoicism, preached simplicity and the rejection of extravagances. Altogether, in fact, cynicism's teachings on extravagance varied little from those of the stoics. Even Dio Chrysostom, the most famous of the cynic philosophers, used much of the same arguments as the stoics when rebuking extravagances. In his discourse *On Virtue*, Dio argues much like Cicero that luxuries must be avoided because "it is impossible ... to dally with [pleas-

ure] for any length of time without being completely enslaved."⁵⁶ For, according to Dio, the attraction to pleasures leads to hardships which are "most hateful and difficult to endure."⁵⁷ If anything, the cynic approach to extravagance is a simpler one than that which is taken by the stoics. Cynic philosophical discourses often lack the elaborate reasoning of comparative stoic discourses, possibly because cynicism was preached to a largely less educated crowd.

All in all, it can be difficult to reconcile the popularity of stoicism and cynicism amidst the extravagances of Roman life. For many, the philosophies surely had a real and significant ideological appeal; others may have had a different reason for becoming the philosophies' adherents. But one fact is certain: while many Romans professed to be stoics and cynics in the first and second centuries, few of them practiced their philosophies' tenets.

For the cynic movement, the philosopher Lucian offers the best analysis concerning the disparity between the cynic philosophy and its followers. In the *Fugitive*, Lucian writes that many cynics, while dressed like philosophers, live "their life [as] an abomination, full of ignorance and boldness and depravity."⁵⁸ He continues by noting that "no two things are more utterly opposed than [the cynics'] precepts and their practices."⁵⁹ Seneca makes a similar observation when discussing the students of stoicism. In one of his letters, Seneca writes that

"a large proportion of the philosopher's audience is made up [students] ... who regard the lecture-hall as a place of lodging for periods of leisure. They're not concerned to rid themselves of faults there, or acquire any rule of life by which to test their characters."⁶⁰

Seneca continues by opining that these students attend lectures merely for the enjoyment of hearing their teachers' wise aphorisms, which unfortunately will never be put into practice.⁶¹ Ultimately, Seneca concludes

"No one ... lets humanity down quite as much as those who study philosophy as if it were a sort of commercial skill and then proceed to live in a quite different manner from the way they tell other people to live."⁶²

Altogether, the hypocritical philosopher was a common enough sight to cause many Romans to become leery of philosophers. Epictetus testifies to this when encouraging those who study philosophy to prepare themselves for ridicule.⁶³ This ridicule, Epictetus argues, will only vanish once the philosopher proves himself by staying faithful to his principles.⁶⁴

Ultimately, the abundance of cynics and stoics who failed to practice their creed is evidence for what might have been the real appeal that cynicism and stoicism had on their converts. As mentioned previously in the essay, the anti-extravagance ideals preached by stoics and cynics in the second century were ideals admired by the Roman public. And indeed, despite the wary attitude some might have had toward philosophers, those who professed a belief in an anti-extravagance philosophy generally were regarded in high esteem. The historian Donald Dudley suggests that it may have been the respect afforded to cynicism that encouraged many urbanites to become cynics.⁶⁵ Similarly, many educated Romans might have turned stoic for similar reasons of social prestige. This, if nothing else, explains the popularity of the philosophy along with the unpopularity of its actual practice.

The failure of the anti-extravagance movement teaches important historical lessons. In one sense, the movement's failure testifies to the ineffectiveness of legislating morality.⁶⁶ Similarly, the failure of stoic or cynic philosophies to effectively curb extravagance provides testimony to the irresistible siren's lure of luxury. Indeed, Valerius Maximus in the first century AD wrote an age-old truth when describing luxury as "that cozening evil, which is somewhat more easily denounced than avoided."⁶⁷ But despite its failures, the movement did have one success. By propagating

ideas relating to the corrupting force of luxuries and pleasures, the anti-extravagant movement created the fertile ground which would later prove conducive to the growth of the most historically enduring of anti-extravagance faiths: Christianity.⁶⁸

¹ Livy. *History of Rome* 39.6.

² Ibid.

³ Shatzman, Israel. *Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics* (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1975) 46.

⁴ Plutarch. *Life of Cato* 4.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Alan E. Astin. *Cato the Censor* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978) 91.

⁷ Plutarch, *Life of Cato* 18.

⁸ Astin 103.

⁹ Shatzman 242.

¹⁰ Valerius Maximus. *Memorable Doings and Sayings* 2.9

¹¹ William Stearns Davis. *The Influence of Wealth in Imperial Rome* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1910) 159-161.

¹² Davis 161.

¹³ Ibid 162, 163.

¹⁴ Sallust. *The Conspiracy of Catiline* 9.

¹⁵ Livy 1.1.

¹⁶ Plutarch. *Life of Numa Pompilius* 3.

¹⁷ Livy 1.57.

¹⁸ Plutarch. *Life of Gaius Marcius Coriolanus* 1.

¹⁹ Plutarch's Lives, etc.

²⁰ Cicero. *Selected Works* (England: Penguin Books, 1971) Preface, 211.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Horace. *The Complete Works of Horace* (New York: Random House, 1936) 45.

²³ Juvenal. *The Satires* 6.290-294.

²⁴ Plutarch's Lives, Plutarch's Moralia, Pliny's Letters, etc.

²⁵ Plutarch. *Life of Cato* 16.

²⁶ Livy 43.2.

- 27 Davis 12.
- 28 Livy 1.1.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Florus. *Epitome of Roman History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929) 215.
- 31 Sallust. *The Conspiracy of Catiline* 10.3.
- 32 Polybius. *The Histories* 18.41.
- 33 Livy 34.4.
- 34 Ibid.
- 35 Ibid.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 Daube, David. *Roman Law: Linguistic, Social, and Philosophical Aspects* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1969) 124.
- 38 Ibid.
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- 40 Andrew Dalby. *Empire of Pleasures: Luxury and Indulgence in the Roman World* (New York: Routledge, 2000) 266-271.
- 41 Tacitus. *The Annals of Imperial Rome* (England: Penguin Books, 1996) 144-145.
- 42 E. Vernon Arnold. *Roman Stoicism* (New York: The Humanities Press, 1958) 99-100.
- 43 Arnold 108-109.
- 44 Ibid 111.
- 45 Ibid 402.
- 46 Seneca. *Letters from a Stoic* (New York: Penguin Books, 1969) Preface, 16.
- 47 Cicero, *On the Good Life* (New York: Penguin Books, 1971) 52.
- 48 Ibid 53.
- 49 Ibid 61-63.
- 50 Ibid 63.
- 51 Ibid 105.
- 52 Seneca. *Letters from a Stoic* 205,207.
- 53 Epictetus. *Enchiridion* (New York: Prometheus Books, 1991) 33.
- 54 Donald R. Dudley. *A History of Cynicism* (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1998) 143.
- 55 Dudley 143, 147.
- 56 Dio Chrysostom. *Discourses I-XI* (Cambridge: Harvard University
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Press, 1949) 391.

57 Ibid 391.

58 Dudley 145 [Quoted in].

59 Ibid.

60 Seneca. *Letters from a Stoic* 201-202.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid 212.

63 Epictetus 22.

64 Ibid.

65 Dudley 147.

66 Davis 159.

67 Valerius Maximus, *Memorable Doings and Sayings* 9.1.

68 Arnold 409.

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The Castles of Edward I in North Wales **By Alan Smyth**

Castles are the ultimate symbol of the middle ages. They dominated the landscape at the time and to this day still inspire awe, even in a ruined state. During the reign of Edward I of England the castle was at the height of its dominance. The experience of centuries of building fortified homes had raised the science of castle building to such a technologically advanced stage that they had become almost impervious to contemporary siege tactics, bar the lengthy process of starvation. This dominance would only become undone by the development of gunpowder and cannon, which was still some years off. Surprisingly, it is not to London, the south of England or even continental Europe that has the distinction of claiming the most perfect examples of the period, but Wales. While during Edward's reign he did build and modernise some castles elsewhere, such as Rushen castle on the Isle of Man, Kidwelly castle in Carmarthenshire, and the additions to the Tower of London,¹ it was in the remotest parts of the small Principality of Wales that he would initiate the building of the finest examples of castles of the period anywhere in Europe.

Edward I was responsible for initiating the building of eight castles in Wales, but it is the most famous and impressive four, Harlech, Conway, Caernarvon and Beaumaris, that shall be focused on in this paper. In dealing with these castles, the reasoning behind their building, their function in north Wales, their designers and builders, their cost, and their subsequent contribution to history all need to be dealt with, as well as describing the details of the castles themselves.

The first question that is raised is why these huge fortresses were built in the quite strategically unimportant north of Wales. Edward I is most famous for his war with France, going on crusade to the holy land, and his exploits in subduing the Scottish rebels, under their charismatic leader William Wallace. Yet, following his accession to the throne in 1272, his first major crisis came in the form of a revolt by the native Welsh in the north of the country, led by the Welsh prince Llywelyn ap Gruffydd, who had refused to pay homage to Edward on several occasions since he was crowned king of England. Wales, particularly in the north, Llywelyn's stronghold, had always been problematic for England, as shown by the many Norman fortresses dotted around the Marches in the south, the only part of the country they had convincingly controlled. The Welsh had for the most part remained Welsh, i.e. not bowing to the pressure from England to Anglicise. The Welsh society at the time was quite similar to Ireland, with a similar legal system based on compensation and the use of hostages, etc.² Indeed, 'much of north Wales was remarkably remote, reliant on self-sufficiency rather than on the workings of a market economy'.³ These cultural differences allowed Llywelyn to rally his people behind him when Edward's army invaded in 1277, despite the prince being seen as a harsh ruler, who severely taxed his subjects. Edward, fed up with the insubordination of Llywelyn, had assembled a feudal host, backed up by paid soldiers, at Worcester on 1 July 1277. He entered Wales with a strong force of 800 cavalry

and around 2,500 infantry, a number which would rise to 15,000.⁴ Sticking to the coastal rim of the country, he cut off supplies to Llywelyn's lands in the mountains around Snowdon, seizing Anglesey and its rich crops, which were then harvested to both feed Edward's troops and to starve the Welsh. This 'Siege of Snowdonia'⁵ was soon over, with the hopelessly unprepared Llywelyn seeking terms. The Treaty of Conway was agreed on 9 November 1277, and was very harsh to Llywelyn, forcing him to pay a huge indemnity of £50,000 (which he would later get dropped) as well as turn over all the land seized by Edward to him, except Anglesey. The Welsh subdued, Edward ordered the building of the first phase of his Welsh castles to secure the new royal demesne, with Aberystwyth and Builth in the south and Flint and Rhuddlan in the north. Although far from as impressive as his later castles, these were big undertakings, and represented his serious wish to keep these new Welsh lands, as well as justify the spending of some £23,000 on the war.

Wales was not finished with Edward I however, as seen by the Second Welsh war of 1282-3. Under the Treaty of Conway Edward had released Llywelyn's brother Dafydd from captivity, and it was Dafydd who led the attack on the English Hawarden castle at Easter, 1282, aggrieved, like other Welsh lords who had supported Edward in the first war, at not getting better treatment from the monarch.⁶ Three other forts were taken simultaneously in an orchestrated attack. Putting his brother's treachery behind him when faced with the prospect of having a go at the English, Llywelyn himself joined in by attacking Flint and Rhuddlan. Edward could obviously not tolerate this defiance, and decided to make his second war on Wales one of conquest for once and for all. Less than two months after the initial attack a force had been assembled at Worcester and Edward led this army to Wales. By August he had command of 750 cavalry and 8,000 foot, and a smaller force under Reginald de Gray took Hope Castle, protecting the King's

flank from Dafydd.⁷ Despite early good tactical acumen displayed by Edward, through his sending of a naval force to take Anglesey, things soon descended into a stalemate. There were talks of peace, with Edward making several generous offers to Llywelyn and Dafydd, all of which were rejected. The prospect of a truce ended on 6 November 1282, when an English force under Luke de Tany was driven into the sea at Anglesey.⁸ Following this the English were desperate for revenge while the Welsh, sensing an upturn in their fortunes, smelt blood. As the winter began, Llywelyn was killed trying to escape Snowdonia on 11 December, thus robbing the Welsh of their most recognisable ruler, perhaps the only man capable of uniting the country.⁹ Edward's fortunes improved after this, taking the town of Bettws-y-Coed and Dolwyddelan castle on 18 January 1283. A series of English victories culminated in the taking of the last native Welsh castle on 25 April and the capture of Prince Dafydd on 21 June. With his capture and grisly execution, where he was drawn by a cart to the scaffold, hung, had his bowels burned and was then quartered, the war was over. It had been very costly for Edward, with J.E. Morris calculating that it cost £60,000 to subdue the Welsh for the second time. However, a 'proper settlement of Wales now had to be devised, a real test of the English king's statesmanship',¹⁰ and to this end he would spend thousands more building his greatest castles, those being Harlech, Conway, Caernarvon and, following the rebellion of 1294-5, Beaumaris.

This second phase of castles was built as a part of a plan to subdue Wales fully, keeping it under English control. They were but one part of a jigsaw that included a full territorial settlement, where English and Welsh supporters of Edward were given grants of land, keeping only Anglesey and Snowdonia for the crown in addition to the gains from the first war. The castles were designed to fulfil a different purpose to the native Welsh forts, which were merely refuges to retreat to in times of war. Edward intended his

new castles to 'be easily supplied, to serve as bases for the operation of large armies, to act as administrative headquarters, and to protect mercantile settlements'.¹¹ They had to keep watch and control over the native Welsh peoples, to withstand the best weapons they could bring to bear if they rebelled again, and to then be used as bases from which to counterattack. There was a uniform nature to these new buildings, in that 'each of the Edwardian castles had a fortified borough dependant on it'.¹² These boroughs were founded between September and November 1284, when Flint, Rhuddlan, Conway, Caernarvon, Bere, Criccieth and Harlech were granted charters,¹³ and they became the main thrust behind Edward's attempt to colonise North Wales. His aim was not to try to 'civilise' the natives, but rather to create English enclaves within Wales. Despite a slow uptake, by 1298 there were 110 burgesses at Conway and 62 at Caernarvon.¹⁴ It was these two towns that were the jewels in the crown of the Edwardian foundations, as on top of having world class castles, each had extremely secure fortified towns attached, the walls of which for the most part remain preserved today. These English outposts would remain, but would not stay purely English for too long. This was probably for the best in the long run, as the resentment caused by having several modern towns full of foreigners in the midst of the native Welsh would have been a cause of the rebellion of 1294-5.

Edward was a very ambitious man, as shown by the huge array of achievements that he could boast of during his career. Everything came at a price however, and his projects in Wales did not come cheap. Money at the time used the form of pounds, shillings and pence, with twelve pence in a shilling, and twenty shillings in a pound. It is the value of this money that is the most important to help demonstrate how much Edward spent on his Welsh castles. A knight at the time would have earned two shillings per day while at war, with an ordinary infantryman earning just two pence a day.¹⁵ This was obviously a decent wage, as out of

the knight's two shillings he had to pay his retinue, with the infantryman probably sending money home to support his family. It is estimated that between 1277 and 1304 Edward spent over £80,000¹⁶ on his work in Wales, a huge sum, especially when the figures for fighting the two wars in the first place are also added. However, when the numbers of workers involved in the building itself are revealed, it is easy to see where the money went. At Beaumaris alone in 1295, there were 400 masons, 30 smiths and carpenters, 1000 unskilled workers and 200 carters, or to put it another way, thirteen to fourteen per cent of the total number employed in trade and commerce in London at the time, to build just one of these castles.¹⁷ How Edward funded this was a feat perhaps more startling than the wars and castles themselves. Given that the traditional sources of revenue at the time, such as money collected by the Sheriffs from Royal lands, money from justice, or from Episcopal vacancies, only raised about £13,000, £1,200 and £1,700 per year respectively, there was a massive deficit gap.¹⁸ To make up the shortfall, he borrowed money from Italian bankers, notably the Riccardi of Lucca, from whom he borrowed over £200,000 in the first seven years of his reign, managing to repay all but £23,000.¹⁹ More profitably, he imposed a tax on the value of moveable property, reviving an innovation of the reigns of King John and Henry III. This, during the course of his reign, raised half a million pounds, and was key to both his campaign of war and conquest in Wales, as well as the later wars in Scotland and Gascony.²⁰

The man to whom the use of this money was entrusted was Edward's chief architect on the project, James of St George, the 'master of the king's works in Wales'.²¹ The two men had a personal relationship, having met when Edward was returning from the crusades, when he stayed in the castle at St Georges d'Esperanche in Savoy, which James had also designed.²² Early in 1278 he was recruited by Edward and sent to Wales. There he stayed, designing

all the major castles including Harlech, Conway and Caernarvon, until he was summoned to Gascony in 1287, before returning to oversee the construction of what would be architecturally his finest castle, Beaumaris, in the 1290s. His work obviously pleased Edward as he was made master of the king's works for life in 1284, and his wife Ambrosia was 'accorded the rare privilege of a future widow's pension', which was a great honour.²³ Many of James' countrymen were also involved heavily, with figures such as John de Bonvillars, William Circon and Otto de Grandson among the brains behind the brawn of the small army of English skilled and unskilled workers.²⁴ Savoyard building techniques are evident throughout the castle, with the sockets in the walls for sloping or inclined scaffolding, opposed to the English horizontal scaffold, still visible in the walls.²⁵ James' designs draw inspiration from around the world, including St Georges d'Esperanche, with its symmetrical plan and octagonal towers echoed in Caernarvon. Indeed, Caernarvon has perhaps the most links with the past, given its Roman heritage, being built in a style very similar to Constantinople. King Louis of France's Aigues Mortes is another possible influence, as it is a formally planned town with its own port, like all the Welsh Edwardian castles.

Having dealt with the background to the whole project, the reasons why the castles were built, who built them and paid for them, there is nothing left than to look to each one in turn. Harlech is the smallest of the four later Edwardian castles, and was built between 1285 and 1290. It is a rectangular fort perched atop a crag, the bottom of which the sea would have originally come right up to, defending one side of the castle and giving it a harbour. It is concentrically planned, in that it has a curtain wall enclosing an outer bailey with a taller, more substantial inner wall, from which defenders could fire at the enemy over the heads of archers on the outer wall.²⁶ The east and south sides, facing the land, were protected by a moat, and had thicker walls of between nine and a half to twelve feet thick,

compared to the west side which were only eight feet thick, but with steep cliffs falling down to the sea. To gain access to the outer bailey attackers had to ascend a steep, rock-cut stairway, passing through three gates before even reaching the curtain wall.²⁷ A more direct entrance was from the top of the cliff, over two drawbridges and through the main gatehouse, which was the strongest point at Harlech. During its building there were on average 868 workers onsite every week, and it eventually cost Edward around £8-9,000 by 1290.²⁸ Harlech has had perhaps the most eventful history of the four later Edwardian castles. It saw its first siege in 1294 during the revolt of Prince Madog, who was repulsed by its garrison of only 37 men. It began to fall into decay as early as 1400, but it would see military action during the revolt of Owain Glyndwr. In 1403-4, the Welsh besieged the castle, leading to a mutiny in the forty-strong garrison. They imprisoned the castle's Constable who wanted to negotiate with the Welsh, but he eventually escaped. Owain himself came to the siege soon after and it is not long before the garrison, not hopeful of the siege being broken, decided to surrender. This became the rebel Owain's greatest victory, and he made Harlech his headquarters and even held a Parliament there. Eventually however it fell to 1,000 men under Gilbert Talbot in 1408-9, and its capture spelt the end of his revolt.²⁹ Harlech also played a major role during the War of the Roses. Following the capture of King Henry VI at Northampton in 1460, Queen Mary fled to Harlech castle. She did not stay too long however and soon left for Scotland, when Henry's half-brother Jasper Tudor made it his headquarters. It had the distinction of being the final Lancastrian stronghold to surrender to the Yorkists on 14 August 1468.³⁰ It was also involved in the Civil War, when Sir Hugh Pennant defended it with 50 men for Charles I in 1646, holding out until March 1647, when it was yet again the last place to surrender, leaving Alan Phillips to dub it the 'castle of lost causes'.³¹

Conway castle and town when taken together form

one of the most complete and secure walled towns in Britain, rivalled only by its near neighbour Caernarvon, which while perhaps being a more impressive castle, had weaker town walls.³² Conway is the complete package, a secure castle perched on a rock, with an estuary on one side, river Gyffin on another, protecting a town with a strong triangular wall that was defended on one side by the sea. While the town walls were not as strong as the castle's, averaging only five feet thick, they would have been a formidable obstacle to all but the most determined attacker, due to their 24 feet height, and towers at regular intervals.³³ The castle itself was easily defensible. Its rectangular shape, with eight round towers that could fire upon all parts of the walls, along with strong barbicans covering the gates at either end, were sufficiently powerful enough to protect King Edward I himself during the rebellion of Prince Madog, when he was effectively besieged in Conway from Christmas 1294 to March 1295,³⁴ 'forced to subsist upon salted meat, coarse bread, and water sweetened with honey'.³⁵ Conway's defences were like the others designed by James of St George, who oversaw its hectic building schedule, which peaked in the summer of 1285 when there was a total of 1,500 working on the site. Conway ended up being the most expensive of all Edward's Welsh castles, with the castle, town walls and dock costing £20,000.³⁶ Despite this huge cost, the castle was, like the others, falling into disrepair by 1400. It still had its part to play in history however, being the place where Richard II made landfall from Ireland in 1399, and it was in Conway that he was convinced by the Earl of Northumberland to make for London to punish his enemies. It was a ploy however, and the king was ambushed soon after leaving, and taken to Flint castle, where he abdicated. Conway therefore played its part in fulfilling one of Merlin's mythical prophecies, in which he predicted that 'there would be a king in Albion who after reigning some twenty years should "be undone in the parts of the

north in a triangular place."³⁷ Given that Richard had indeed been on the throne for twenty years and Conway's town walls are triangular in shape, this fits very well indeed.

Caernarvon 'has always been par excellence the Royal castle of Wales.'³⁸ Intended as both a fortress and a palace, it was designed to be the chief fortress of the Royal Welsh Demesnes.³⁹ Even in its architecture it has royal and classical links, being built in a similar style to Constantinople. This distinctive style included octagonal rather than the usual round towers as were built at the other Edwardian castles, as well as the two tones of stone used to create a distinctive striped effect. Edward also tried to directly link it to Britain's Roman past in 1283 by supposedly reburying in Caernarvon the body of Magnus Maximus, the Romano-British General who led a rebellion to Rome, described in Gildas' *De Excidio Britanniae et Conquestu* as being a tyrant, who was also the father of the Emperor Constantine.⁴⁰ It also has a more modern legend surrounding it, which may have originated during the reign of Elizabeth I, but which says that Edward promised the Welsh people a new Prince would be born for them in Wales who would not speak a word of English. As the future Edward II was born in Caernarvon and could not speak at all at the time, this 'prophecy' was fulfilled.⁴¹ Whether Edward actually said this or not is irrelevant, as in 1301 the title of Prince of Wales was born, with its first holder, the future Edward II, using Caernarvon as a base from which to tour Wales during his first five weeks as the Prince. This tradition was revived in the twentieth century, first in 1911, and then with the investiture of the current Prince of Wales, Prince Charles, taking place in the grounds of Caernarvon. The building of the castle commenced in 1283, with the half of the wall that runs along the river from the keep-like Eagle tower to the North-East tower completed by 1292.⁴² This formed a circuit with the completed town walls, but unfortunately when these were overrun during Prince Madog's

rebellion in 1294-5, the unprotected and incomplete castle was sacked. Following this, most of the work was finished by 1301, with smaller jobs dragging on till 1327, over forty years after it had begun, and at a total cost of £19,000. Nevertheless, the finished product is very impressive, and was a hugely formidable fortress, even if it was never finished within the baileys to the full splendour of the plans. A strong wall with two levels of mural passages dug into the walls on the river side, allowing three levels of archers to cover the river approach, combined with nine octagonal towers and two heavily fortified gatehouses, left its mark on the landscape, as well as on the minds of the native Welsh it was supposed to be watching over. Its defensive capabilities were tested in 1404 when Owain Glendower, the last of the Welsh chieftains, laid siege to the castle with French allies and using the most up to date siege equipment, was kept out by the garrison of just 28 men, thus proving conclusively that Caernarvon was one of the most powerful fortresses of its time.⁴³

Beaumaris castle was a product of the Welsh rebellion of 1294-5, led by Prince Madog. At the time the Welsh were being taxed heavily, on top of being actively encouraged to go to fight for Edward in Gascony. Resentment that had been building boiled over with a series of pre-meditated attacks across Wales on English castles.⁴⁴ The only castle to fall was Harlech, but the king himself was besieged in Conway for several months. The leaders were eventually caught, and either executed or imprisoned, in what turned out to be a good practice run for Edward's campaigns in Scotland. The longest lasting and best things to come from the rebellion in the long term were the completion of Caernarvon and the green light for work to start on a castle that James of St George had doubtless dreaming of being given permission to build, his ultimate architectural masterpiece, Beaumaris castle.⁴⁵ It is the ultimate concentric castle, 'similar to those developed on the continent and in Syria by the Crusaders...[which]...consisted of complete sets of

walls within walls, defended at the angles by round towers from which cross fire can be directed against anyone attempting to scale or breach the curtains.⁴⁶ The inner set of walls at Beaumaris is fifteen and a half feet thick, with six strong round towers and two large gatehouses opposite each other.⁴⁷ This wall covers the smaller curtain wall, with its twelve small towers and two gates set off-centre from their corresponding gates in the inner wall, an old technique that can be found in Iron Age ring forts. Outside of this wall was a deep saltwater moat, with a drawbridge to access the gates and even a fortified dock that could accommodate ships of up to forty tons.⁴⁸ As it was the last of Edward I's great Welsh castles to be built, begun in 1295 and battle-ready but not fully complete in 1298, at a cost of only £7,000, it was not actually involved in much military action. It did however remain a formidable fortress for many years, serving its purpose of guarding the fertile Anglesey Island admirably, and impressing English dominance upon the local population at the same time.

In conclusion, Edward I's conquest and settlement of Wales was a remarkable achievement, and one which still stands to this day, in the form of the continued inclusion of Wales as subordinate to the English throne and through the office created by Edward for the heir to the crown, the Prince of Wales. Among these lasting achievements are however the castles themselves, which are still as striking today as they were then, and are an unmistakable sight on the landscape of North Wales. There is a debate however over whether Edward was wise to bother building such extravagantly sophisticated and expensive castles in a country with as little power as the remaining Welsh princes could muster. It is one in which it is hard not to agree with his decision, even if we ignore modern bias in being grateful that he did build them so we could still have them today. Wales had always been a problem for the English, and traditionally castle-building had been the way to try to subdue them. The Normans had done it, Edward's predecessors

had done it, and it was therefore natural that he would try to use the best technology available to do the same. The Welsh had proven what they could do to him during the second war of conquest in 1282-3, when they took his earlier castles of Flint and Rhuddlan. Therefore he ordered new ones built, and it was in one of these, Conway, that he took shelter during the rebellion of 1294-5, proving their worth to him. The psychological factor is not to be underestimated either, as just as they are impressive to enter in the modern age despite their ruined state, they would have been even more imposing in the thirteenth century, and tales of 28 men holding out in one against an entire army would have made any potential rebel think twice before taking one on. For these reasons Edward was justified in erecting these magnificent buildings, and the fact they are still here today is a testament to all involved in their design and construction.

¹O'Neill, B. H. St. J., *Castles: An Introduction to the Castles of England and Wales* (1954) p. 17.

²Prestwich, Michael, *Edward I* (1988) p. 171.

³*Ibid.*

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 179.

⁵Prestwich, Michael, *Edward I* (1988) p. 180.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 182.

⁷Prestwich, Michael, *Edward I* (1988) pp 189-90.

⁸*Ibid.*, pp 191-2.

⁹*Ibid.*, pp 193-4.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 201.

¹¹Prestwich, Michael, *Edward I* (1988) p. 207.

¹³Harlech, Rt. Hon. Lord, *North Wales* (1954) p. 24.

¹⁴Prestwich, Michael, *Edward I* (1988) p. 216.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶Prestwich, Michael, *Edward I* (1988) p. xvi.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 214.

¹⁸Harlech, Rt. Hon. Lord, *North Wales* (1954) p. 24.

¹⁹Prestwich, Michael, *War, Politics and Finance under Edward I* (1972)

p. 178.

²⁰Prestwich, Michael, *War, Politics and Finance under Edward I* (1972) p. 206.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 179.

²²Taylor, Arnold, 'The Beaumaris Castle Building Account of 1295-1298', in Kenyon, John R. and Avent, Richard (eds.), *Castles in Wales and the Marches* (1987) p. 125.

²³Prestwich, Michael, *Edward I* (1988) p. 209.

²⁴Taylor, Arnold, 'The Beaumaris Castle Building Account of 1295-1298', in Kenyon, John R. and Avent, Richard (eds.), *Castles in Wales and the Marches* (1987) p. 126.

²⁵Prestwich, Michael, *Edward I* (1988) p. 209.

²⁶Prestwich, Michael, *Edward I* (1988) p. 211.

²⁷Phillips, Alan, *Beaumaris Castle* (1975) p. 4.

²⁸Toy, Sidney, *The Castles of Great Britain* (1966) pp 170-3.

²⁹Phillips, Alan, *Harlech Castle* (1974) p. 5.

³⁰*Ibid.*, pp 9-10.

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 14.

³²*Ibid.*, p. 16.

³³Harlech, Rt. Hon. Lord, *North Wales* (1954) p. 26.

³⁴Toy, Sidney, *The Castles of Great Britain* (1966) pp 258-60.

³⁵Prestwich, Michael, *Edward I* (1988) p. 221.

³⁶Phillips, Alan, *Conway Castle* (1961) p. 6.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 5.

³⁸Phillips, Alan, *Conway Castle* (1961) p. 8.

³⁹Harlech, Rt. Hon. Lord, *North Wales* (1954) p. 23.

⁴⁰Phillips, Alan, *Caernarvon Castle* (1968) p. 3.

⁴¹Prestwich, Michael, *Edward I* (1988) p. 214.

⁴²Phillips, Alan, *Caernarvon Castle* (1968) p. 4.

⁴³Phillips, Alan, *Caernarvon Castle* (1968) p. 11.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁴⁵Prestwich, Michael, *Edward I* (1988) p. 220.

⁴⁶Taylor, Arnold, 'The Beaumaris Castle Building Account of 1295-1298', in Kenyon, John R. and Avent, Richard (eds.), *Castles in Wales and the Marches* (1987) p. 125.

⁴⁷Harlech, Rt. Hon. Lord, *North Wales* (1954) p. 24.

⁴⁸Toy, Sidney, *The Castles of Great Britain* (1966) pp 173-5.

⁴⁹Phillips, Alan, Beaumaris Castle (1975) p. 11.

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The Bound Feet of Chinese Immigrant Women By Trisha Lim

Introduction

To Americans, the most peculiar aspect about the appearance of the Chinese immigrant woman in the mid 19th to early 20th century was her bound feet. Like her male counterpart who came to America with his hair styled in a queue, the Chinese woman brought the traditional Chinese fashion of three inch feet encased in embroidered silk "lotus shoes." But bound feet was more than just a fashion trend, it was a cultural badge that represented their lives in China. Thus, when Chinese women brought their bound feet to America, they also brought the lifestyle associated with bound feet. The fashion of bound feet restricted the lives of Chinese immigrant women in America by forcing them to maintain Chinese tradition in American society and by literally restricting their mobility. In addition, bound feet also contributed to the changes in their lives by predisposing Americans to an adverse view of the Chinese.

History and Significance of Bound Feet

Bound feet embodied the traditional gendered values

of Chinese culture. The practice of footbinding began in tenth century China after Emperor Li Yu became so enamored with a dancer who had tiny feet that he made her his concubine. Small feet therefore symbolized eroticism, femininity, propriety, and status as an increasing number of women imitated the fashion. The dichotomy of chastity and prurience appealed to the men and by the early thirteenth century, bound feet were the aesthetic ideal.¹ A Chinese proverb insists a woman's foot "at three inches is a golden lotus, at four inches a silver lotus, at five inches a brass lotus, at six inches an iron lotus, and at seven inches-shameless."² Men strongly preferred women with bound feet as they associated natural feet with masculinity.³ They also believed that bound feet increased sexual gratification and fertility.

The Confucian patriarchal values that pervaded Chinese culture encouraged footbinding with its ideology of women's subordination to men. Though neither men nor women chose whom they married, men had the right to divorce, have concubines, and discipline their wives if they felt their wives deserved it. Confucianism reduced a woman's purpose in life to marrying and bearing sons that would continue the family name and bloodline.⁴ Up until the 1911 Chinese Revolution, a woman in China had very few rights. Tradition required women to stay inside the "inner chambers" to take care of the children and the household. They were also occupied with sewing and embroidering lotus shoes for themselves or to give as gifts. By restricting mobility, bound feet ensured women would not stray far from home. Betty Chen, a Chinese American woman who grew up in New York, said of her mother, "I think they mutilated her to keep her at home and to keep her pregnant."⁵ Because they solidified male dominance, bound feet determined the marriageability of a young girl. Women accepted the Confucian values as truths and appreciated the practice of footbinding because it increased their chances of marrying and having comfortable lives. Men enjoyed the power

they derived from their wives' bound feet because bound feet preserved the traditional social and gender hierarchies.

Bound feet also symbolized status as only women or daughters belonging to affluent families could afford to have them. Bound feet exempted a woman from labor, displaying her family's opulence.⁶ Footbinding was not usually practiced by lower class families because they needed the females to work, which required the use of their feet to perform arduous labor. A missionary in China observed that men and their natural footed wives worked on farms together.⁷ Yet some lower class families bound the feet of their daughters in hopes they would marry into rich families. When this tactic was unsuccessful, the unmarried daughters had no choice but to toil in the fields with their bound feet. But for daughters of middle to upper class families, bound feet usually guaranteed marriage into upper class families. The Chinese culture expected a well-off husband to provide for his wife and children at home, which explains why Chinese immigrants in America were predominantly male.

Chinese Immigrant Women in America

There are two distinct groups of Chinese women who immigrated to the United States. The first group arrived from 1834 to 1875 and consisted mostly of prostitutes and servants who had been sold by their families or brought against their will. Because these women usually belonged to the lower class, the majority did not have bound feet. In 1872, Rolander McClellan, a California writer, remarked, "So far, no small-footed women have arrived in America, because all the immigrants have been...of the poorer classes who cannot afford the luxury of small feet."⁸ But there were actually a few prostitutes who had bound feet because they had been kidnapped from rich families in China and smuggled into the country.⁹ This first wave of female immigration ended in 1875 with the Page Act, a law that required Chinese women to prove they were not prostitutes before

they could enter the country, which discouraged even the Chinese women who were not prostitutes from immigrating.¹⁰ But in 1882, the Chinese Exclusion Act barred the Chinese, except certain classes, from immigrating to America. The threat of miscegenation compelled legislators to allow Chinese men to send for their wives and families. Sui Sin Far, a Chinese British writer who lived in San Francisco, noted that "none but a well-to-do Chinaman could afford to send for a bride across the sea."¹¹ Most Chinese women in this second group of immigration came as the wives of Chinese merchants, a group that was exempted from the exclusion act. Some of these women had bound feet, as their merchant husbands were successful and could pay for their journeys to and living expenses in America.¹²

Chinese women seldom emigrated because of the cultural and familial obligations and because their bound feet limited the distances they could travel. Louise Leung Larson, who emigrated from China with her parents in 1902, recalls her family's passage to Los Angeles: "Mama stayed in their stateroom practically the entire time; her bound feet made it difficult for her to get around."¹³ Bound footed women were often accompanied by their husbands during the journey because their bound feet crippled them. Unlike most immigrant women who came to America in the later 19th century and aspired to be independent and liberated, most Chinese women after the exclusion act immigrated to reunite with their husbands and sons. Life for them in America remained unchanged from what it had been in China. They continued to depend on their husbands economically because they could not work outside the home. They took their household responsibilities seriously because domesticity was their only niche.¹⁴ They were confined to the household not only because of their Confucian ethics and bound feet, but also because the scarcity of women in Chinatown put young Chinese women in danger of being kidnapped. Bound feet made it difficult to run should a

woman have been abducted. Some Chinese immigrant mothers bound the feet of their American born daughters so their daughters would remain inside the home.¹⁵

But not all Chinese immigrant women willingly accepted the secluded life that bound feet necessitated. A San Francisco Chinese woman expressed her jealousy of the natural footed women of the working class:

...they are richer than I, for they have big feet and can go everywhere, and every day have something new to fill their minds; while, poor me! In China I was shut up in the house since I was 10 years old, and only left my father's house to be shut up in my husbands house in this great country. For seventeen years I have been in this house without leaving it save on two evenings.¹⁶

Natural footed women had the freedom of exploring the streets and shopping at the markets while not having to worry about being kidnapped. Bound footed women kept themselves busy by doing domestic work, making themselves beautiful and having their hair done for their husbands, and playing card games with their servants. Occasionally, husbands let their wives have a dinner party or invited storytellers to come over to keep their wives entertained, but any recreational activities were limited to inside the home.¹⁷

The only times Chinese men permitted their bound footed wives to walk in public were during certain holidays, such as Chinese New Year, or if they were escorted by servants. Most of the time, the women traveled by carriage, even if their destination was one block away.¹⁸ In addition to the risk of abduction within the Chinese community, Chinese women were in danger of racial violence outside of their community; the Chinese faced discrimination because of American nativism and the labor competition between white and Chinese workingmen. Compounded by the anti-Chinese sentiment, bound footed women had no choice but to maintain their socially isolated lives.

American Views of Chinese Immigrant Women

Even before Chinese women began immigrating, Americans had negative preconceptions about them from books, missionary journals, and newspaper articles. A missionary journal from 1835 epitomizes Chinese women's bound feet as "the inefficiency of the ethical systems of the Chinese... Not only the minds of the people, but their bodies also, are distorted and deformed by unnatural usages."¹⁹ The first Chinese woman in America had bound feet and was brought to the country by P.T. Barnum as an exhibit for the American Museum. She was later joined by another bound footed woman in 1850 for Barnum's "Chinese Collection." Barnum displayed them as oddities to satisfy Western curiosity. Furthermore, Americans believed all Chinese women adhered to the fashion of bound feet. An American encyclopedia published in 1868 reports that "the women are small and coarse in appearance, with universally small feet."²⁰ Chinese women were depicted as subservient, exotic human anomalies.

For Americans, the sexual allure and subjugation associated with bound feet confirmed that the Chinese were immoral people and an undesirable group of immigrants. Chinese customs like concubinage and foot binding defied the Anglo Protestant definition of familial sanctity, though Chinese men did not normally keep concubines in America nor were there many bound footed women in the country before the 1880s. Americans constructed the image of the Chinese as their antithesis, from which they derived their cultural and moral superiority.²¹

There was, however, a bound footed courtesan in San Francisco named Ah Toy who immigrated on her own will. She earned her riches by servicing a sizeable white clientele, which included a police officer named John A Clark. Clark's girlfriend said of him, "This poor ignorant creature had actually expended thousands of dollars upon this dirty dog [Ah Toy]."²² Newspapers frequently covered sto-

ries on Ah Toy, including her marriage to a white man named Henry Conrad.²³ The extensive media coverage of a successful, bound footed prostitute inadvertently led to white women fearing that bound feet fetishism would lure their men away. Their resentment intensified the animosity towards the Chinese.

Because Chinese immigrant women kept their feet bound, and both the men and women maintained their traditional dress, white Americans deemed them unassimilable. *The California Senate Address* of 1876 reports, "During their entire settlement in California they have never adapted themselves to our...mode of dress. Impregnable to all the influences of our Anglo-Saxon life, they remain the same stolid Asiatics that have floated on the rivers and slaved in the fields of China for thirty centuries of time."²⁴

Concurrently, Eastern and Southern Europeans were immigrating to the United States and adopting American fashions. These feelings contributed to the racist and nativist sentiment manifested in the series of Chinese Exclusion Acts.

After the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act only allowed the more desirable classes of Chinese into the country, more women with bound feet came to America than prior to the legislation. By this time, it was commonly known to Americans that bound feet represented status among the Chinese. The 1877 *Report of the Joint Special Committee to Investigate Chinese Immigration* includes the testimony of a San Francisco man stating that bound feet reveal high class.²⁵ Efforts to uphold the law by keeping unwanted classes of Chinese out of the country compelled immigration officials to rely on bound feet as a determinant of whether a Chinese woman belonged to the merchant class or not. An immigration official reported that "there has never come to this port, I believe, a bound-footed woman who was found to be of immoral character, this condition of affairs being due, it is stated, to the fact that such women, and especially those in the interior, are necessarily confined to their home and

seldom frequent the city districts."²⁶ In 1895, immigration officials detained seven Chinese females applying for immigrant status because they did not have bound feet and were believed to belong to the laborer class.²⁷ In this context, bound feet became a ticket for admission into the United States.

Though bound feet qualified their exemption from the exclusionary law, this second wave of Chinese immigrant women were scrutinized after their admittance into the country. In the midst of progressivism at the turn of the century, bound feet caught the attention of sympathetic Protestant missionaries. Already intervening in Chinese brothels rescuing prostitutes, the missionaries shifted their focus on the bound footed Chinese women. They believed that footbinding violated familial sanctity, though that is precisely what the practice symbolized in Chinese tradition. American missionary women established the moral standards by which they felt every woman in America should live. They put forward the notion that the liberation of Chinese women depended on Christianity.

Like the educated elitists who dictated the fashion of lower class women in the name of feminism at the turn of the century, Protestant missionary women dictated the fashion of Chinese women who they felt belonged to a culture of inferior morality.²⁸ They visited the homes of Chinese women and ordered them to unbind their feet, trying to convince them that they should not tolerate their subordinate status to men.²⁹ In attempts to convert the Chinese women to Christianity and American values, the missionaries offered the women and their children educational opportunities while encouraging them to demand women's rights.

Written in 1900, the novel *The Lady of the Lily Feet and Other Stories of Chinatown* reflects the missionaries' view that Christianity was the only solution for the "heathenism" of the Chinese.³⁰ The author, Helen F. Clark, describes a bound footed woman sold against her will to Chinese man. The man abuses the bound footed woman

until Christian missionaries save her. Clark emphasizes the moral principles of Christian men who she claims would never abuse women.³¹ This assertion exemplified the Protestants' conviction in their moral superiority.

While the Christian schools provided an education for Chinese women and children, the underlying goal of the missionaries was proselytization. If they could make the Chinese abandon their traditional values and assimilate into American culture by giving them a Christian education, then they could save the country from the Chinese and their vices. To the missionaries, convincing Chinese women to relinquish their bound feet would have symbolized a conversion to Christianity and Americanism.

The End of Footbinding

In the early 1900s, Chinese women began to unbind their feet and discontinued binding the feet of their daughters to declare their emancipation from their social constraints. But their primary motivation was not Christianity, it was the concurrent revolution in China. European imperialism caused China's political and cultural decline at the end of the 19th century, but bound feet bore the blame. Kang Youwei, a Chinese intellectual, stated that "foreigners laugh at us...and criticize us for being barbarians. There is nothing which makes us objects of ridicule so much as footbinding."³² Previously a symbol of a proud Chinese culture, bound feet became the symbol of defeat. Youwei also stated that Western nations were powerful because the women did not bind their feet, enabling them to have healthier, stronger children.³³ Revolutionaries began an anti-foot-binding movement as part of a larger endeavor to modernize and reform the country.³⁴ Chinese women unbound their feet out of patriotism, not for their own individual freedom. Chinese women in America followed, indicating the continued interest in affairs in China and the preservation of their Chinese nationalism.

The first Chinese woman to publicly address footbinding in America was Sieh King King, a student from China. In 1902, King, the daughter of liberal parents who allowed her an education, delivered a speech to the Chinese women of San Francisco and their husbands.³⁵ She did not oppose fashion, as her stylish Chinese clothing indicated, but she "raged at the horrors of foot-binding."³⁶ She insisted that gender equality and women's education were necessary to restore strength to China. The audience "listened like zealots" as she solicited their participation in the nationalist campaign.³⁷

When the de facto Chinese Empress Dowager CiXi issued an edict against footbinding in 1903, the news stirred discussion amongst the Chinese women in San Francisco. They said they would stop binding their feet, stating, "'Chinatown' is a tributary province of China, and the edicts should be respected."³⁸ Protestant missionaries, however, refused to believe that the empress would affect the Chinese women in America, as if the Chinese people could not progress without their help. Assistance from the missionaries, particularly schooling, was crucial in influencing women to unbind their feet, but that alone did not inspire them to do so as the missionaries made it seem. It became clear that the Chinese remained loyal to the Chinese customs despite the missionaries' efforts to erase them.

Chinese newspapers in America also supported women's rights for Chinese nationalism. In 1908, the San Francisco Chinese newspaper *Chung Sai Yat Po* published a poem denouncing footbinding:

A life in the inner chamber, a living hell
In solitary confinement
Beneath her hemline, bound into a tight bundle
Layers upon layers of restriction...³⁹

This stanza expresses the physical and social destruction bound feet caused. The poem also declares, "You were dig-

ging your own graves at an early age" and "Factories for women workers; schools for young girls," supporting women's liberation through health, employment, and education.⁴⁰ It closed by advising readers to heed the message and push for urgent reforms.

Realizing the incompatibilities of footbinding and the modern world, the Chinese government officially prohibited the practice in China when Sun Yat Sen established the Chinese Republic in 1911. It was only after reformers politicized bound feet by holding it responsible for China's failures that Chinese women gained rights. For the women in America, the fashion was so intimately tied with the old Chinese tradition that to renounce the lifestyle, they needed to renounce the fashion. If bound feet perpetuated a backwards culture, then unbinding the feet would foster cultural advancement.

Conclusion

Bound feet profoundly affected the social, political, and cultural facets of Chinese women's immigration experience in America. The fashion ensured that Chinese women's lives in America would parallel the lives they had in China, but the way Americans treated them because of their bound feet complicated their experiences further. To the Chinese, it symbolized a woman's gentility, sexuality, and status, but to Americans, it suggested a Chinese woman's subservience, sexual deviance, and barbarity. As the Progressive Era emerged, bound feet lost their grasp on Chinese women as missionaries and Chinese nationalism encouraged them to take control of their bodies and lives. Bound feet reflected Chinese immigrant women's lives in the changing social climates in America as much as it had reflected the distinctive culture in China for many centuries.

¹Dorothy Ko, *Every Step a Lotus: Shoes for Bound Feet* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 21.

²Judy Yung, *Unbound Voices: A Documentary History of Chinese*

Women in San Francisco (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 110.

³Lu Lihua, quoted in Wang Zheng, *Women in the Chinese Enlightenment: Oral and Textual Histories* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 146.

⁴May Paomay Tung, *Chinese Americans and Their Immigrant Parents: Conflict, Identity, and Values* (New York: The Haworth Press, Inc., 2000), 16.

⁵Betty Chen, quoted in Jeff Kisseloff, *You Must Remember This: An Oral History of Manhattan from the 1890's to World War II* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1989), 22.

⁶Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899; Reprint, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 121.

⁷Justice Doolittle, *Social Life of the Chinese: With Some Account of their Religious, Governmental, Educational, and Business Customs and Opinions* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishing, 1865), 7.

⁸Rolander Guy McClellan, *The Golden State: A History of the Region West of the Rocky Mountains; Embracing California, Oregon, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, Idaho, Washington Territory, British Columbia, and Alaska* (Philadelphia: William Flint and Co., 1872), 438.

⁹Judy Yung, *Unbound Feet: A Social History of Chinese Women in San Francisco* (Berkeley: University of California Press: 1995), 44; a prostitute quoted in Yung, *Unbound Voices*, 131.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 23.

¹¹Sui Sin Far, quoted in *Unbound Voices: A Documentary History of Chinese Women in San Francisco* (Berkeley: University of California Press: 1999), 160.

¹²Mary Coolidge, *Chinese Immigration* (New York: H. Holt and Co., 1909), 19.

¹³Louise Leung Larson, *Sweet Bamboo: A Memoir of a Chinese American Family* (1989; Reprint, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 32.

¹⁴Alice Sue Fun, quoted in Yung, *Unbound Feet*, 100.

¹⁵Pearl Kwok, quoted in Beverly Jackson, *Splendid Slippers: A Thousand Years of an Erotic Tradition* (Berkeley: Ten Speed Press, 2000), 168.

¹⁶Mrs. Sang, quoted in Louise A. Littleton, "Worse than Slaves: Servitude of All Chinese Wives; Small-Foot Women Kept as Prisoners; Widows Must Serve No. 1-A White Woman's Hard Lesson in Eastern Ways," *San Francisco Chronicle*, October 1, 1893, 2.

¹⁷*Ibid.*

- ¹⁸Mrs. Sang, quoted in Littleton, "Worse than Slaves," 2; Alice Sue Fun, quoted in Yung, *Unbound Feet*, 100.
- ¹⁹"Small Feet of the Chinese Females: Remarks on the Origin of the Custom of Compressing the Feet; The Extent and Effects of the Practice; with an Anatomical Description of a Small Foot," *Chinese Repository*, vol. 3 (1835): 537;
- ²⁰*The New American Cyclopaedia: A Popular Dictionary of General Knowledge*, vol. 7, s.v. "Formosa," (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1858), 697.
- ²¹Edward Said, *Orientalism*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 42.
- ²²Girlfriend of John A. Clark, quoted in Curt Gentry, *The Madams of San Francisco: An Irreverent History of the City by the Golden Gate* (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1964), 57.
- ²³Gentry, *The Madams of San Francisco*, 54.
- ²⁴California Senate Address quoted in Coolidge, *Chinese Immigration*, 87.
- ²⁵United States Senate, *Report of the Joint Special Committee to Investigate Chinese Immigration*, 44th Cong., 2nd Sess., Report No. 689 (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1877), 124.
- ²⁶Quoted in Yung, *Unbound Feet*, 24.
- ²⁷Jackson, *Splendid Slippers*, 164.
- ²⁸Peggy Pascoe, *Relations of Rescue: The Search for Female Moral Authority in the American West, 1874-1939* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), xxi; Linda Scott, *Fresh Lipstick Redressing Fashion and Feminism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 5.
- ²⁹Littleton, "Worse than Slaves," 2.
- ³⁰Helen F. Clark, *The Lady of the Lily Feet and Other Stories of Chinatown* (Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1900), 5.
- ³¹*Ibid*, 19.
- ³²Kang Youwei, quoted in Howard S. Levy, *Chinese Footbinding: The History of a Curious Erotic Custom* (New York: W. Rawls, 1966), 72.
- ³³*Ibid*, 72.
- ³⁴Wang Ping. *Aching for Beauty: Footbinding in China* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 36.
- ³⁵"Leads Her Sisters Out of Bondage: Chinese Woman Begins a Crusade Against Social Conditions in Her Country," *San Francisco Chronicle*, November 3, 1902, 7.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸J.M. Scanland, "Foot-Binding in Chinatown: Late Edict of the Empress Dowager Will Have No Effect," *San Francisco Chronicle*, April 19, 1903, 5.

³⁹Chung Sai Yat Po, September 15-16, 1908 quoted in Yung, *Unbound Voices*, 197.

⁴⁰Ibid.

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Matthew Erickson is a senior History major and will graduate summa cum laude this June. Matthew's area of focus has become the history of medicine and he is currently conducting a research paper on feral children which will compare the cases of Victor the Wild Boy Aveyron and Genie. In addition to serving as a copy editor for *Quaestio*, Matthew holds a position on the editorial board for *Aleph*. Following graduation from UCLA, Matthew plans to attend law school.

**Review of Edward Grant's *The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages: Their Religious, Institutional and Intellectual Contexts*
By Matthew Erickson**

Grant, Edward. *The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages: Their Religious, Institutional and Intellectual Contexts*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. 263. \$24.00).

"A distinguished medievalist", Edward Grant has authored numerous texts on medieval history including *A Source Book in Medieval Science*, articles for *Isis*, *History of Science*, and *The New Catholic Encyclopedia*.¹ Grant began his teaching career at Indiana University in 1959 following his brief tenure at both Harvard and the University of Wisconsin. Upon his retirement from Indiana University some thirty years later, Grant held the distinguished titles of Professor Emeritus of History and Professor Emeritus of History of Philosophy of Science..

In this text Grant masterfully weaves imagery depicting the roots of both higher education and the modern sciences by delving into the contributions and influences exerted by the accomplishments of the Greek, Islamic and (emerging) Latin civilizations. In his 1971 work, *Physical Science in the Middle Ages*, Grant contended that there was no correlation between medieval thought and modern science. Conversely, in *The Foundations of Modern Science in*

the Middle Ages, written twenty-five years later, Grant presents a cogent and interesting argument supporting the connection between the medieval and modern epochs and works to dispel the hypothesis he conjectured in 1971.

Years of research and wisdom are evidenced in Grant's revisionist and sweeping presentation. Grant contends that if pivotal advances had not occurred in Western European thought during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, it is plausible that the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century might never have taken place. Grant posits that "four essential factors enabled medieval Europe to prepare the way for modern science,"² namely: the translation of Greco-Islamic texts into Latin, the establishment of universities with curricula largely constituted by these translations, the sanction given by Christian religious authority in allowance of secular learning, and the transformational effects of Aristotelian logic and natural philosophy on medieval thought processes. Grant supports his change in position through an extensive analysis and explanation of the above mentioned four factors, focusing heavily on the impact and contribution made by the translation of Aristotle's works into Latin during the High Middle Ages.

Grant's initial support for his revision begins with an explanation of how the process of translation of Greco-Islamic texts into Latin proceeded. Translation commenced at monasteries and cathedral schools, demonstrating how instrumental religious influences were in the facilitation of translation.³ Stemming from the Latin translation and subsequent dominance of Aristotelian works and commentaries, an inquisitive approach known as the *questio* or question-based approach propelled its incorporation into Western European thought.⁴ The *questio* approach combined with the utilization of logic to provide Western Europeans with the tools necessary for the critical analysis of issues. This combination led to widespread stimulation of intellectual discourse. Medieval inquisitive processes based on Aristotelian "logic and natural philosophy became the cen-

terpieces of new learning in the newly emerging universities”⁵ thereby setting the stage for the Scientific Revolution to occur.

One drawback to the text’s style and format is that, as noted by another reviewer,⁶ many philosophical terms are used without definition. Individual chapters could suffice to provide background on selected topics such as the process of translation from Greco-Arabic texts, the emergence of universities, or an introduction to Aristotelian thought and natural philosophy. Grant cites numerous primary and secondary sources and presents a detailed and thorough analysis.

¹Ghetu, Magia. “Guide to the Edward Grant Papers: 1950-2001.” Indiana University Archives. (2001): 6 pars. 28 Feb 2006.

²Grant, Edward. *The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages: Their Religious, Institutional, and Intellectual Contexts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Rear of cover.

³*Ibid.* p. 23.

⁴*Ibid.* p. 27.

⁵*Ibid.* p. 29.

⁶Anonymous. “Review of *The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages: Their Religious, Institutional, and Intellectual Contexts*.” 5 pars. 25 Feb 2006.

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