Surveying the scholarly oeuvre of Yosef Yerushalmi, one is struck by a command of Jewish history reminiscent of his great teacher Salo Baron—a command that allows him to visit many past eras with the intimate familiarity of a specialist. Yerushalmi’s broad knowledge of European history—Iberian, Italian, French, German, and Russian among others—affords him a rich understanding of the various contexts in which European Jews have lived and created. This catholicity of knowledge is matched by an unerring instinct to identify historical links not always visible to the eye. Indeed, those who have studied with him will not easily forget Professor Yerushalmi’s frequent invocation of the historian’s olfactory sense; it is incumbent upon a good scholar, he insists, to sniff out connections hidden beneath the surface or between the lines of historical documents. Yerushalmi’s own labors as historical detective, ranging from the account of Isaac Cardoso’s transformation in From Spanish Court to Italian Ghetto to the probing of Sigmund Freud’s Jewishness in Freud’s Moses, have produced exemplary achievements in European and European-Jewish history.

While few historians can lay claim to such a level of scholarly distinction, even fewer can lay claim to the skills of a novelist or the lyricism of a poet. And yet many of Yosef Yerushalmi’s essays and monographs are works of fine literature, sculpted with precision and beauty, and capable of eliciting deep passion from the reader. Within the annals of twentieth-century Jewish historiography, Yerushalmi’s graceful descriptive powers recall the eloquence of the Englishmen Israel Abrahams and Cecil Roth. At the same time, his powers of analysis and command of sources do not fall below the standards of two predecessors whom he held in the highest esteem—his fellow traveler in Iberian Jewish history, Yitzhak Baer, and the great scholar of mysticism, Gershom Scholem.

Yerushalmi’s talents converge most seamlessly in his book Zakhor, which deserves recognition as one of the most important works of Jewish history and thought in the post-Holocaust age. Initially published in 1982, this small volume of four lectures explores with erudition and elegance the relationship between historical knowledge and Jewish collective memory from antiquity to the modern age. Its widespread success—frequent and enthusiastic praise from a wide
range of critics, reissue in paperback form, and translation into six languages—cannot merely be attributed to its appearance at the "proverbial right time," as Professor Yerushalmi modestly claims. It is indeed true that Zakhor was written in the same period as works such as Pierre Nora's collaborative project, Les lieux de mémoire, that sought to clarify the relationship between history and memory. However, Zakhor echoed with such clarity and poignant force that it initiated an important and ongoing debate among students of historiography, scholars of Jewish history, and a wide array of intellectuals. Like earlier works, Zakhor offered no bold programmatic declarations nor prescriptions for a fixed methodological regimen. But the absence of ideological or methodological dogmatism, not to mention polemical rancor, did not preclude a deeply engaged and engaging historical study. On the contrary, Yerushalmi succeeded in raising a question of great contemporary relevance: can Jewish identity survive the modern secular age, the historicist age, with its impulse to dissect and atomize the past?

Although distinctive in many respects, Zakhor is part of a larger body of work whose main thematic concerns are the problems and permutations of Jewish identity created by modernity's ruptures. The prototypical modern Jewish identity for Yerushalmi is that of the Marranos, to whom he devoted his first scholarly monograph. Marranos, Yerushalmi once asserted to an interviewer, "were perhaps the first Jews to live in two radically different universes, with all the internal tensions and conflicts that resulted from this." It is not a dissimilar quality that intrigues him in two of his modern Jewish heroes, Kafka and Freud, the latter of whom was the subject of his latest English book. Nor does the Marranos' "duality," as Yerushalmi put it, seem far removed from the modern Jewish historian's predicament in Zakhor. And yet, notwithstanding the thematic thread running throughout his writings, it is Yerushalmi's attention to the fissures marking the landscape of modern Jewish history that prevents us from arriving at a monodimensional picture of his work. The challenge of the present essay, then, is to comprehend Yerushalmi's historiographical labors, taking note of the common features while also recognizing important shifts in geographic and conceptual focus.

**Entering the Spanish Court**

Professor Yerushalmi recalls that he first encountered Marranos at the ripe age of ten. It was then that he received a gift from his parents, a children's biography in Yiddish of the great Spanish scholar and community leader, Don Isaac Abravanel. That he would receive such a gift sheds light on some of the unique qualities of the Jewish milieu in which Yerushalmi was raised. His home in New York was presided over by immigrant parents, each of whom spoke to his son in a different Jewish language—Yiddish and Hebrew. They sought to nurture a lively interest in Jewish history and culture to complement the yeshiva education their son would receive. In this regard, his parents, with their mix of tradition and cultural innovation, represented an interesting generational moment; they (particularly the father) were among the last maskilim, Diaspora Hebraists in America, struggling to impart a distinct sense of Jewish cultural identity in a new and often alien world and hence bearing with them a vestige of the duality that their son would explore in his Marranos research.

Despite this formative influence and Yosef Yerushalmi's early encounter with Isaac Abravanel, it was hardly predestined that he would become a historian of the Marranos. In fact, he initially planned to study law, before having a change of heart and deciding, after graduating from Yeshiva College in 1953, to enter the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. There he met an extraordinary group of scholars who exerted a deep influence on his thinking, including Zvi Ankori, H. L. Ginsberg, Saul Lieberman, and Shalom Spiegel. Yerushalmi's years at JTS made it clear to him that his true passion was not the rabbinic but rather the study of history. Thus, after receiving rabbinic ordination in 1957 (and commencing a brief career as a pulpit rabbi), he entered the graduate program in history at Columbia University, working with a number of distinguished medieval and Renaissance scholars. Among them was his teacher and mentor, Salo Wittmayer Baron, then in the midst of the early volumes of the second edition of his monumental *Social and Religious History of the Jews*.

Under Baron's guidance, Yerushalmi began to study Jewish history in earnest. His initial scholarly forays did not lead to the Iberian Peninsula. Rather, Baron encouraged him to focus on the relationship between the Albigensian heresy and the rise of Kabbalah in southern France in the thirteenth century. Yerushalmi never actually conducted serious research on this intriguing subject, but he did develop an interest in the phenomenon of Jewish "heresy" in medieval France. Indeed, his first published article, a dense sixty-page study, "The Inquisition and the Jews of France in the time of Bernard Gui," was written in 1964 while Yerushalmi was still at work on his dissertation. Although its geographic focus was France, this article manifested a number of tendencies that would surface in later work. Most obviously, the institution and functioning of the Inquisitorial mechanism were scrutinized carefully. More particularly, Yerushalmi was interested in the perceptions of Judaizing activity and of anti-Christian blasphemy held by officials of the newly established Inquisition in fourteenth-century France. To address this subject, he studied the Inquisition's claims about Jewish practices and books found among converted Jews. Even at this point, his essay demonstrated the kind of textual mastery that would characterize his later monographic work. So too it revealed his early interest in crypto-Jews, known in this context as *relapsi*, whose predicament adumbrates that of Isaac Cardoso and other Spanish Marranos in Yerushalmi's first book, *From Spanish Court to Italian Ghetto*. The connection is patent enough, Yerushalmi himself acknowledges in this article that "[t]here is surprisingly little in the theoretical, procedural, and even the practical approach of the Spanish Inquisition to Jewish affairs for which one cannot find the archetype in the earlier Inquisition."
What links the French and Spanish contexts is not merely the Inquisition nor the phenomenon of crypto-Judaism but the interplay between Jewish attitudes and knowledge and Christian assumptions about Jewish attitudes and knowledge. Yosef Yerushalmi's decades-long attempt to understand this process rests on the foundation of his award-winning doctoral dissertation from Columbia, published in 1970 as From Spanish Court to Italian Ghetto. This study traces the fascinating career of Isaac (né Fernando) Cardoso, born a New Christian in Portugal in the first years of the seventeenth century, later a prominent intellectual and royal physician in Madrid, who, at the pinnacle of his professional life, decided to abandon his charmed Spanish existence and "return" to Judaism in Italy. At the outset, Yerushalmi was drawn to the Cardoso name because of Isaac's brother Abraham, who was a major theologian of the Sabbatian movement. His curiosity was piqued further when he came across a copy of Isaac Cardoso's apologetic treatise on behalf of the Jews, Las excelencias de los hebreos, written after Cardoso's removal to Italy. The juxtaposition of the two Cardoso brothers—one a Marrano turned Sabbatic, the other a Marrano returnee to Judaism—exposed to Yerushalmi the radically divergent paths on which crypto-Jews embarked when beyond the reach of the Inquisition. Moreover, the figure of Isaac Cardoso provided him with the opportunity to describe an extraordinary physical and psychological journey, one that struck him as paradigmatic of the modern Jew's quest for a stable source of identity. The story Yerushalmi tells is a gripping one, novelistic in its rendering of Isaac Cardoso's dramatic flight. But it is unmistakably a work of history, a point affirmed by the meticulous analysis of sources, including a large trove of archival material as well as biblical and postbiblical Jewish literature, medieval and early modern apologetics, and modern historiography. In analyzing these sources, Yerushalmi respectfully acknowledges methods and conceptual approaches used by predecessors but then sets out to propose new ways of looking at old questions. Thus, he seeks to overcome what he regards as unproductive oppositions in previous Iberian and Iberian Jewish historiography—for instance, between social and literary history, between Jewish and Christian sources, or between Iberian Jewish and Sephardic diaspora experiences. The eclectic mix of social, cultural, and intellectual history in From Spanish Court yields fascinating excursuses on a wide range of subjects, ranging from New Christian life in the Portuguese province of Beira Alta to the shared messianic fervor of Sabbatianism and Sebastianism. Moreover, it yields a rich and complex historical picture, noteworthy for its resistance to essentializing clichés about the plight of the crypto-Jew.

Not only is Yerushalmi sensitive to the shifting faces of human nature; he brings to his subject psychological insight and empathy. Indeed, one of the distinctive features of his work is his ability to avoid harsh judgments of the protagonists in his story. Yerushalmi's great precursor in Spanish Jewish history, Yitzhak Baer, was both a master of archival sources and an author possessed of tremendous passion. And yet, Baer could not restrain his contempt either for assimilated Spanish Jews or for their spiritual heirs, the conversos. By contrast, Yerushalmi writes of Marrano life in Spain with no less passion and a good deal more empathy than did Baer; his description of Isaac Cardoso's entry "to the most fashionable" in Madrid is presented without a trace of condescension. At the same time, Yerushalmi does not romanticize the difficult. While Marranos in Spain lived a life of constant threat of discovery, they also enjoyed a spiritual space in which submission to clerical authority was deferred. Consequently, the "return" to Judaism, as the famous case of Uriel da Costa tragically reveals, was fraught with its own dangers. In From Spanish Court and at length that returning Jews had in embracing rabbinic authority and rites after leaving Spain experienced such difficulties. He readily "embraced the whole of traditional Judaism down to its most minute details, and without reservation." Curiously, Isaac Cardoso was not among those who returned down to its most minute details, and without reservation. And yet the Jewish world he was entering was a world in crisis, riven by the cataclysm of expulsion and the resulting religious and social disruption. In concluding the tale of Cardoso's journey, Yerushalmi avers that the former New Christian "came, in a sense, to a mansion whose halls enchanted him, but whose foundations, unknown even to most of its own inhabitants, were already seriously weakened."

The paradox of Cardoso's return—the flight from an outwardly stable and inwardly fractured life in Spain to a state of inner tranquility and communal instability in post-Expulsion Italy—clearly excites Yerushalmi's historical imagination. At the heart of this paradox lies the persistent "duality" that marked the Marrano's life both in Spain and beyond. Indeed, return to a Jewish community meant often did not expunge the Marrano's ambivalence toward normative religious authority. Nor, for that matter, did this ambivalence necessarily lead to paroxysms of self-negation. It actually opened up the possibility for new sources of group identity (e.g., "ethnic 'national' sources) that recur frequently in the modern age. Yerushalmi is intrigued by the dialectical workings of history, in which the disparate mantling of one source of authority eventuates another—or more likely, a set of others. In the case of Jewish identity, he is well aware that this process unfolds.

Of particular importance to the emergence of new forms of Jewish identity is the emergence of new forms of anti-Jewish expression. In a pair of lectures published in the early 1980s, Yerushalmi investigated this interdependence within the context of Marrano history. His 1982 Leo Baeck Memorial Lecture, Assimilation and Racial Anti-Semitism, was an interesting attempt to compare the historical experience of fifteenth-century Spanish Jews and modern German Jews. The focus of his analysis was not only the common motif of acculturation but the emergence in both instances of a racial conception of the Jew. In particular, Yerushalmi pointed to the novelty of the limpieza de sangre (purity of blood) statutes enacted against Spanish New Christians in the mid-fifteenth century. He noted the ironic effect of such statutes in revealing the Jewish origins of those conversos with only the slimmest knowledge of their roots. At the same time, he
Yerushalmi analyzed a related theme in a lecture to the Israel Academy of Sciences delivered in 1977 but published in 1983. Here his subject was that notorious son of Portuguese Marranos and bête noire of Amsterdam Jewry, Baruch Spinoza. In this engaging essay, as yet available only in Hebrew, Yerushalmi sought to explain Spinoza’s idiosyncratic understanding of Jewish history and particularly of the survival of the Jews through recourse to his Marrano heritage. He did so with a characteristically varied amalgam of approaches, combining his knowledge of Marrano history with careful scrutiny of Spinoza’s library holdings on Spanish subjects and a close reading of the Theologico-Political Treatise. On the basis of this mix, Yerushalmi offered a nuanced reconstruction of Spinoza’s argument that it was adherence to a lapsed set of legal norms that explained the historic segregation of Jews. This segregation led, in turn, to Gentile hatred, which itself provided a new and important rationale for Jewish identity. For Yerushalmi, Spinoza’s assertion of a close link between Gentile hatred and Jewish identity represented a genuinely innovative insight—indeed, a prescient understanding of the negative criterion that undergirds Jewish identity in the modern age.

In addition to their shared concern for anti-Jewish expression in its incipient modern form, the Spinoza and Leo Baeck lectures exhibited Yosef Yerushalmi’s skill in considering old historical sources or issues from novel perspectives. This quality is already present in From Spanish Court, where Yerushalmi builds on the work of previous historians to open new gateways of understanding into the Marrano personality. And it is present in his second scholarly monograph dealing with Iberian Jewish history, The Lisbon Massacre of 1506 and the Royal Image in Shebet Yehudah (Cincinnati, 1976). At the heart of this study is Yerushalmi’s analysis of a contemporaneous German account describing the mob violence against Portuguese New Christians in April 1506 that culminated in more than one thousand deaths. His close reading of this and other sources provides the most in-depth treatment of the Lisbon massacre produced to date. Typically, though, Yerushalmi’s interests are not confined to the unfortunate events in Lisbon. He is fascinated by a recurrent pattern according to which Jews, or New Christians, forged bonds of loyalty with royal authority. It is not merely the model of contractual arrangements regulating Jewish residence in European realms (e.g., charters and privilegea) that intrigues him. Rather, it is the profound internalization and concomitant glorification of the myth of the royal alliance. In the specific case of early-sixteenth-century Portugal, Yerushalmi seeks to understand why Portuguese New Christians, forcibly converted en masse by King Manuel in 1497, would still feel deep allegiance to the Portuguese monarchy during and after the massacre in Lisbon. In fact, Yerushalmi demonstrates that this allegiance survived not only the mob violence but the dilatory attitude of King Manuel toward the outbreaks.

Yerushalmi’s efforts to make sense of this phenomenon bear the traces of his teacher, Salo Baron. One of the most important insights stemming from Baron’s celebrated opposition to the “lachrymose conception” of Jewish history was that medieval and early modern Jews often developed closer and more dependent relationships with political sovereigns than did other groups in European society. Yerushalmi continued Baron’s work on medieval Jewish political allegiances in his study of the Lisbon massacre. At the same time, he integrated into his work the penetrating criticisms of Jewish political behavior offered by Hannah Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism. Yerushalmi was particularly interested in two features of Arendt’s work: first, her analysis of the Jews’ “uncritical faith in the capacity and willingness of the state to protect them”; and second, her understanding of the vulnerability in which such uncritical faith placed Jews vis-à-vis groups “radically disaffected with the state itself.” These two concerns helped shape his own treatment of the events of 1506. The dissonance between actual historical events and New Christian perceptions of them was a function of a deeply rooted article of faith; indeed, even before the Expulsion, “the royal alliance flowered beyond its obvious mundane realities into a guiding myth which gripped many of the Hispano-Jewish elite.”

This guiding “myth of the royal alliance” withstood the disruption of Expulsion. As hinted above, it continued to inform those Jews who fled Spain and were converted against their will by King Manuel in Portugal in 1497. Yerushalmi probes this bewildering persistence in a Hebrew text that has engaged his attention for many years, Solomon ibn Verga’s Shewet Yehudah. In this exemplary work of sixteenth-century Jewish historiography, ibn Verga makes reference to the Lisbon massacre, noting that King Manuel was a “gracious king” who “wept and cried out against the evil event.” How, Yerushalmi asks, could such generous praise be showered on the man responsible for the mass conversion of 1497? It was impossible that ibn Verga did not know of 1497. “Undeterred by facts of which... he was surely cognizant,” ibn Verga can only be understood against the backdrop of the myth of the royal alliance. That is, his distorted, at times “blasphemously fictional” depiction of royal behavior in Shewet Yehudah, in which Manuel was not only exonerated but celebrated, reflected the very “uncritical faith” that Jews had repeatedly invested in political rulers. For Yerushalmi, ibn Verga was a link in a chain of Jewish political tradition extending from antiquity to the modern age.

Apart from the lingering question of Jewish political behavior, Yerushalmi is chiefly concerned in The Lisbon Massacre with the manner in which Jews, as exemplified by ibn Verga, refashioned their past to suit contemporary sensibilities. Not without warrant, Harold Bloom has suggested that this study may signal Yerushalmi’s first grappling with the problematic that would later animate Zkor—namely, “how Jewish memory and Jewish history fail to inform each other.” One sees further evidence of the tension-filled relationship between history and memory in Yerushalmi’s Spinoza lecture. There Yerushalmi analyzes a curious historical inversion made by Spinoza in the third chapter of the Theologico-Political Treatise: it was in Portugal, Spinoza insists, that converses...
encountered widespread social opposition that eventually took the form of proto-racial discrimination (through purity of blood statutes). In fact, Yerushalmi clarifies, Portuguese New Christians gained access to the highest strata of Portuguese society for nearly a half-century after their conversion. Moreover, it was in Spain, not Portugal, that blood standards were first introduced to segregate New from Old Christians.

Yerushalmi speculates that Spinoza may have been influenced in his historical thesis by a Portuguese Jesuit, Antonio Vieira, whose mission was to eradicate discrimination against conversos so as to realize the larger goal of eradicating Judaism.32 Proceeding on this assumption, Yerushalmi wondered whether Spinoza might have derived his views on Jewish survival from Vieira's claim that it was discrimination that invigorated the Jewish identity of New Christians. Without conclusively proving the Vieira connection, Yerushalmi was certain that Spinoza deliberately manipulated the history of Iberian New Christians in order to advance his central point. The articulation of that point—that it was antisemitism, not Divine Providence, that sustained Jewish identity—heralded a momentous shift in Jewish consciousness. Indeed, this idea constituted, according to Yerushalmi, "an important station on the path to the secularization of Jewish history, as well as to the historicization of Judaism."33

Between History and Memory

One of the main threads running through Yerushalmi's historical work is his stubborn resistance to unbending scholarly conventions and methods; in fact, this resistance to methodological orthodoxy is as dogmatic as Yerushalmi ever becomes. It is also noteworthy that, in striking out on his own path, Yerushalmi rarely directs a harsh word at his predecessor. Rather, Yerushalmi prefers to recognize with appreciation the work of such diverse nineteenth- and twentieth-century figures as Alexandre Herculano, Meyer Kayserling, Henry Charles Lea, Carl Gebhardt, Cecil Roth, Américo Castro, Albert Sicoff, I. S. Révah, and of course Yitzhak Baer. His own research, meanwhile, has served as a model for new work in Sephardic history or thought, including that undertaken by the noted Israeli scholars Yosef Kaplan and Yirmiyahu Yovel, as well as that of his students Elsheva Carlebach, Benjamin Gampel, and Aron Rodrigue.

And yet, just as Yerushalmi has resisted conventional assumptions in his scholarly studies, so too his restless intellect defies facile depiction. In the midst of his explorations of the plight of the Marrano, Yerushalmi was planting the seeds for a major shift in scholarly focus—from the Iberian Peninsula and Sephardic diaspora to the dispersed precincts of Jewish collective memory. The first hints of this new direction appear in Haggadah and History, published a year before The Lisbon Massacre, in 1975.34 This book contains facsimile plates of nearly two hundred printed Passover Haggadahs from the late fifteenth century to the late twentieth. The panoramic sweep of texts presented here, ranging from the Soncino Haggadah of 1486 to the Moscow Communist Haggadah of 1927, reveals the remarkable interplay between liturgical norms, on the one hand, and stylistic and ideological innovations, on the other. In his introduction, Yerushalmi surveys with a keen eye for artistic detail the many versions and languages in which the Passover Haggadah has appeared; notwithstanding the diversity reflected in these versions, it is in the Haggadah that "the memory of the nation is annually revived and replenished, and the collective hope sustained." Moreover, Yerushalmi describes the Haggadah as the literary foundation for "the great historical festival of the Jewish people."35

Yerushalmi's explicit interest in the transmission of Jewish memory is informed by the intuitive appreciation that collective memory is neither an undifferentiated monolith nor the product of an ahistorical vacuum. The broad sample of printed material in Haggadah and History suggests that collective memory assumes literary form within specific and distinct contexts. The sample also reveals that stylistic and substantive diversity in Haggadot becomes more pronounced with the passage of time. Indeed, the modern (e.g., the Communist, kibbutz, or Holocaust-era) texts offer more radical deviations than do early modern texts, suggesting that the forces of secularization were at work reshaping, even undermining, traditional forms of memory.

Yerushalmi continues his inquiry into the history of Jewish collective memory in "Clio and the Jews: Reflections on Jewish Historiography in the Sixteenth Century."36 This 1980 essay constituted, by Yerushalmi's own admission, an important stage in the crystallization of Zakhor. And indeed, it anticipates many of the important themes of the later book. In the first instance, it reflects Yerushalmi's desire to overcome the "reticence on the part of Judaic scholars to examine and articulate the latent assumptions of the enterprise in which they are engaged." Yerushalmi's desire for a new introspection emerges out of the "ongoing crisis of the historicist view of the world."37 He does not fully pursue the contemporary Jewish incarnation of this crisis in "Clio and the Jews," preferring to leave that task for Zakhor. Rather, "Clio and the Jews" is an examination of Jewish historical thinking and writing between antiquity and the modern age—that is, in the long Jewish Middle Ages running from the destruction of the Second Temple to the late eighteenth century.

Curiously, Yerushalmi's remarks concerning the term historiography are more explicit and edifying here than in Zakhor. His efforts at terminological clarity prompt him to mediate between two extreme positions: on the one hand, there was no Jewish historiography until modern times; and on the other, that "any text that has an historical dimension, or that exhibits any interest whatever in history," is historiographical.38 Between those poles lies a limited corpus of medieval Jewish works that move beyond general ideas about Jewish history to "a recital of concrete events that possess a temporal specificity."39 Among them are the Liggeret Rab Sherira, the Sefer Yosippon, the Hebrew Crusades Chronicles, and the shalshelet ha-kabbalah (chain of tradition) literature. Yerushalmi tends to see these works as largely unrelated to one another and as atypical of medieval
Jewish writing in general. It was not "out of lack of talent, nor even for lack of knowledge" that medieval Jews neglected to write history "but primarily because they felt no need to do so." Indeed, the medievalist concern was not the random event but the enduring moment, the religious "longue durée." According to Yerushalmi, rituals and liturgy proved to be far more suitable agents of preservation than historiography.

An apparent break in this tradition was the proliferation of Jewish historiography that occurred in the sixteenth century. Yerushalmi identifies this body of literature "as one among a gamut of Jewish responses to the trauma of the Expulsion from Spain." Although some scholars have challenged the catalyzing effect of the Expulsion on this historiographical activity, that issue need not detain us here. It is rather the novel properties of this literature—the new attention to postbiblical Jewish history and to non-Jewish history—that merit scrutiny. Yerushalmi's teacher, Baron, suggested in 1928 that it was in the sixteenth century that the "foundations for a major evolution of Jewish historic criticism" were laid. Within the general field of European historiography, scholars have debated for decades whether a new historicist spirit was born in the Renaissance. Yerushalmi is cognizant of these currents but sets out on his own course. His close analysis of the works of Solomon ibn Verga, Yosef Ha-Kohen, Samuel Usque, and others reveals not only new elements, but also "conceptions and modes of thought that had been deeply rooted among Jews for many ages."

Perhaps the most intriguing among this generation of scholars was the Italian Azariah de' Rossi, whose evaluation of amadic sources marked, for Yerushalmi, a genuine advance in critical historical method. But, Yerushalmi averns, "(t)here were no heirs to his method." De' Rossi's major work, Me'or'enayim, with its innovative reading of traditional legends, met a hostile reception among many Italian Jews, reflecting the considerable gap in historical understanding between author and audience. Yerushalmi concludes from this experience that neither Azariah de' Rossi nor his contemporaries can be seen as the progenitors of modern Jewish historiography. To the extent that they bore protohistoricist impulses, they did so in a relative vacuum. Thus, at the end of "Clio and the Jews," Yerushalmi suggests that the true progenitors of modern Jewish historiography were not Jews at all but rather the founding figures of modern German historiography, such as Niebuhr and Ranke, who introduced a new ethos of critical dispassion and distance into nineteenth-century scholarship.

The assertion that a vast sea separates medieval from modern Jewish historical writing receives even more powerful expression in Zakhor. The skeletal outline for this book was traced in 1977 when Yerushalmi gave the lecture that eventually became "Clio and the Jews." In the spring of 1980, Yerushalmi was invited to the University of Washington to deliver the annual Stroum Lectures. These four lectures in Seattle fleshed out the argument of "Clio and the Jews" while adding a soulful note to the analysis. Indeed, in Zakhor, Yerushalmi seems discomfited by the idea that modern Jewish historiography is not only different in kind from earlier modes of historical writing but that it is severed from the vital sources of Jewish collective memory. Rather than succumb to paralysis, however, Yerushalmi overcame the long-held inhibitions of Jewish historians and directly confronted the limits of modern historiographical practice.

To be sure, Yerushalmi's concerns about this practice were embedded in a much broader historical framework, namely, the relationship between historical knowledge and collective memory throughout Jewish history. Each of the chapters in Zakhor focuses on this relationship in a distinct time period, though each stands on its own as a model of scholarly and stylistic grace. In the first chapter, Yerushalmi roams through the thicket of biblical and rabbinic literature in an attempt to explain how ancient Jews used and understood history. Eschewing standard contrasts drawn between Greek and Hebrew notions of history and time, Yerushalmi posited that it was "ancient Israel that first assigned a decisive significance to history." In Israeli thought, there was no longer a struggle between pagan gods and "the forces of chaos" in a mythic void, but rather between "the divine will of an omnipotent Creator and the free will of his creature, man, in the course of history." Biblical historiography reflected this historical struggle, which is why the Israelites were repeatedly enjoined—on one hundred and six-nine occasions in the Bible, Yerushalmi informs us—to "remember." The imperative of zakhor was not rooted in curiosity about the past for its own sake. It reflected the ancient Jewish belief that past deeds revealed the presence of the Divine Hand and hence were replete with meaning. In fact, the act of remembering, centering on "the great and critical moments of Israel's history," was constitutive of the very collective identity of the Jews. On the basis of this proposition, Yerushalmi offers the following refinement of standard views of ancient historical thought: "If Herodotus was the father of history, the fathers of meaning in history were the Jews." It is not the contention of Zakhor that Jews subsequently abandoned their quest for meaning in history. Rather, it is that they no longer saw fit to write narrative accounts of past events. Unlike the rich descriptions of political and military exploits in the Bible (e.g., Samuel, Kings, and Chronicles) or by Josephus in the first century C.E., Jews in the post–Second Temple age showed little interest in the "concrete particulars" of the past. To a certain extent, the loss of political sovereignty deepened the sensitivity of Jews to such particulars. But the lack of historical writing was also "due in good measure to their (i.e., the Jews') total and unqualified absorption of the biblical interpretation of history." Indeed, the Bible provided late ancient and medieval Jews with "all the history they required"—with exemplary events by which to comprehend their own passage through history. Recollection of the past became highly ritualized in the form of prayers (selihot and kinnot), practices (fast days and second Purims), and new literary genres ("chains of tradition" and Memorbuch). These media came to serve as the "vessels and vehicles of Jewish memory" in the Middle Ages. Drawing extensively on "Clio and the Jews," Yerushalmi analyzes these vessels of memory in the second and third chapters of Zakhor. It is here that Yerushalmi seeks to demonstrate, with a sure command of medieval Hebrew literature, that
neither Jewish memory nor the impulse to derive meaning from history necessitated historiography. The former were very much alive in the Jewish Middle Ages, while the latter was largely absent.

The final chapter of Zakhor, to which much scholarly and popular attention has been devoted, examines the converse phenomenon. The modern age is the historicist age par excellence, in which all human knowledge is refracted through historical lenses. Research that emanates from this new perspective may provide us with a more textured understanding of where we come from. But it exacts, in Yerushalmi’s view, a heavy toll. The subtitle of this chapter, “Historiography and Its Discontents,” laden with its ominous Freudian allusion, hints not so subtly at the troubling consequences of a historicist perspective: all events of the past are to be treated with equal and critical rigor; none is privileged with the claim of divine inspiration. The new secularized attitude to the past levels the landscape of Jewish collective memory, reducing the monumental to the merely historical. The result is a stunning conceptual inversion: “it is not history that must prove its utility to Judaism, but Judaism that must prove its validity to history.”

Yerushalmi’s tone turns plaintive as he analyzes this transformation. The force of his argument is enhanced by the recognition that he is not merely a diagnostician of the historicist condition but also a product of it. Yerushalmi is aware that as a Jew and historian, he cannot escape this condition; it is, perhaps the, defining feature of modern life. His uncompromising reflexivity, as he holds a mirror up to himself, lends Zakhor the quality of a cri de coeur.

Echoes of Friedrich Nietzsche’s antihistoricism reverberate throughout the final chapter. Nietzsche, as is well known, had once been a promising classical philologist, dedicated to the historical excavation of past languages and cultures. By 1874, however, he had arrived at a sharply critical posture—we might even say an attitude of revulsion—toward his earlier pursuits. Historical-mindedness had not only become the dominant mode of cognition in his day; in its most exaggerated form, it had became a hindrance to life, to the conduct of a vital and vibrant existence. Indeed, hyperhistoricism disrupted the continuous flow of human activity by freezing each past moment in its own context. In doing so, it prevented access to the sources of mythic inspiration that were necessary to replenish human energies.

Although Yerushalmi does not consciously embrace Nietzsche, he clearly shares Nietzsche’s concern over the excesses of history. Nietzsche might well have concurred with Yerushalmi that Irene Funes, protagonist of a Jorge Luis Borges short story, was representative of a most dangerous malady of our time—the surfeit of history. As the result of an accident, Funes was rendered incapable of forgetting. Not only did he remember everything, but his mind ground every chunk of memory down to infinitesimal detail. In Yerushalmi’s reading, Funes symbolizes a larger plight, a “demonic parable for a potential dénouement to modern historiography as a whole.” Mindful of this potential, Yerushalmi himself wonders what the use of studying the past is.

At the end of the day, Yerushalmi assumes the existentialist position that he, as a historian, has no choice but to continue even as he confronts this foreboding question. And yet, with an apparent glance at both Nietzsche and Gershom Scholem, he declares himself open to “a new, metaphistorical myth” that might transport the Jew beyond the historical realm. Yerushalmi mentions neither Nietzsche nor Scholem in the context of this statement. In fact, he professes in Zakhor that his ruminations about the nature of Jewish history and memory and his own stake in them took place in isolation, cut off from the work of historians with whose ideas he later became intimately familiar.

In retrospect, Yerushalmi acknowledges the existence of “a cultural climate that was ripe for such efforts” as Zakhor or Pierre Nora’s Les lieux de mémoire, both of which explore the relationship between history and memory. From a broad perspective, this climate has resulted from the ever-expanding technologizing of modern society. The quickened pace of social existence, perhaps best symbolized by the dizzying tempo of information transmission, has led to what Nora calls the “acceleration of history”—a process in which atoms of history careen around in seeming disarray. For many observers, this rapid pace has dispossessed once tightly knit communities of a somewhat timeless sense of group memory. It is at this point that the owl of Minerva, in the form of historians, arrives to pass judgment on the past.

To the extent that Yerushalmi is part of or in the vanguard of this cohort of scholars, he seems also to be the product of a post-Holocaust world. His introspection, one might say, was, over the fate of the present historicist age, and surely of the traditional world of old, hints of the abrupt moral and epistemological rupture created by the Shoah. After all, the living centers of Jewish collective memory in Europe were largely destroyed. Moreover, it is Auschwitz, according to Jean-François Lyotard, that “marks the confines where historical knowledge sees its boundaries impugned.” Yerushalmi notes that the Holocaust “has already engendered more historical research than any single event in Jewish history,” and yet this massive body of scholarship neither answers the question of how the Final Solution occurred nor offers an enduring image to sustain contemporary Jewish identity. Is it not from the depths of this historical void, in which the utility and integrity of history are questioned, that Yerushalmi’s meditations issue?

Undoubtedly, there is a particular poignancy to critical reflections on the enterprise of history in the wake of the Holocaust. However, as Nietzsche’s case clearly reveals, discontent with the enterprise of critical history long preceded the Second World War. Indeed, the malaise of history was but a reflection of the broader malaise of modernity that has plagued European cultural life for well over a century. Taking stock of the fragile state of affairs at the fin de siècle, Ernst Troeltsch once proclaimed to a group of fellow scholars of theology: “Gentlemen, everything is tottering.” Symptomatic of the new intellectual instability was historicism whose relativizing instincts threatened existing foundations of belief and identity. Among the important twentieth-century thinkers who feared these instincts was the idiosyncratic Jewish philosopher Leo Strauss, who expressed concern in the 1930s about the hubristic claims made by modern
suffered in their efforts to clarify the past. Writing on the eve of the Nazi terror, Strauss is an oddly appropriate companion to Yerushalmi, who writes in its aftermath. Both manifest an intense appreciation for what they respectively understood as tradition. Both apprehend the defects of modern scholarly practice, particularly historiographical. And both opt to forge on in the midst of their fears. Consequently, the two scholars are among the most intellectually compelling critics of Jewish historicism in our century.

It is perhaps the quality of profound existential deliberation that explains the widespread acclaim for *Zakhor*. A long list of commentators has praised the book in newspapers and academic journals, drawn not only by its learning but by its "sad and strict reflections" on the Jewish condition. Some have pointed to weaknesses in one or another of the chapters. Inevitably, in a book of small size and considerable breadth, questions will remain unaddressed. For instance, there is relatively little attention paid to the question of whether historicism was itself a causal agent or merely symptomatic of the rupture of modernity. This question is related to a larger question repeatedly raised in discussions of *Zakhor*: did Yerushalmi overstate the gulf between history and memory in his analysis? Perhaps the most significant critique of the book, the late Amos Funkenstein's "Collective Memory and Historical Consciousness" in the first number of the journal *History and Memory*, engages this very issue. In this essay, Funkenstein proposes a third category, historical consciousness, to temper Yerushalmi's opposition between historiography and collective memory.

This is not the appropriate place to reprise Funkenstein's argument. But it is important to note that his engagement—that of a great scholar whose intellectual breadth matches Yerushalmi's—symbolizes what might be *Zakhor*'s most enduring achievement: its role in inaugurating a major scholarly debate over the relationship between history and memory. Within the field of Jewish history, this debate has resulted in a new reflexivity on the part of scholars and, concomitantly, in a new spate of works dealing with Jewish historical consciousness and historiography. Even though it was published some fifteen years ago, *Zakhor* remains the touchstone for this new literature and sensibility. A further sign of its distinction is that the book's influence has not been felt only in the United States, where Yerushalmi has spent almost his entire academic career. It has also received widespread exposure in Israel and in Europe, especially France, where Yerushalmi regularly traveled in the 1980s and early 1990s to teach and converse with leading French intellectuals.

**Beyond the Rupture: Freud and the Jewish Question**

It has been a hallmark of Yosef Yerushalmi's historical research to draw out the universal and the profound from the arcane, to render visible that which previously lay concealed from view. Moreover, he has repeatedly challenged conventional scholarly assumptions without bitter polemic, all the while pushing toward new paths of inquiry. The former ability was clearly present in his early work on Iberian Marranos. The latter typified his book on Jewish history and memory in *Zakhor*.

An impressive marriage of these abilities can be found in *Freud's Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable*. It is in this book that Yerushalmi's shift in scholarly focus reaches its culmination. The transition from Iberian to modern Central European Jewish history, with the intervening foray into Jewish history and memory, was hardly coincidental. Indeed, the motif of a latent or cryptic Jewish identity that animated his earlier work on Marranos lay at the core of the Freud book. Yerushalmi approaches Freud through the portal of Jewish history, bringing to his reading insights that other scholars had not generated or could not generate (because of linguistic or contextual ignorance). He does so without reclaiming Freud for the Jews in a simple-minded and self-serving fashion. Yet there can be no doubts about Yerushalmi's deep sense of identification with Freud and his Jewish predicament, never more evident than in the daring "Monologue with Freud" with which Yerushalmi concludes his narrative.

*Freud's Moses* assumed form in a fashion similar to much of Yerushalmi's work in the 1980s—as a series of lectures. The very nature of oral presentation demands attention to and interaction with an audience in a way that a purely written text does not. Yerushalmi quite consciously maintains this dialogic quality, opening his book with a "Prelude for the Listener" rather than the usual preface for the reader. The effort to preserve "some echo of the spoken word" lends an air of intimacy to *Freud's Moses*. And this intimacy fuels Yerushalmi's empathetic powers, which are much needed for the central task at hand: to understand anew Freud's controversial analysis in *Moses and Monotheism*. Published in 1939 in the midst of the Nazi campaign against the Jews, this enigmatic book makes a number of astonishing claims about ancient Judaism, beginning with the proposition that monotheism was not a Jewish invention. Rather, it was the discovery of the Egyptian pharaoh Amenhotep IV, whose new "heresy" did not gain wide favor among the Egyptian masses. In order to invigorate this new monotheistic creed, an Egyptian nobleman named Moses sought to transplant the faith to "an oppressed Semitic tribe then living in Egypt," the Hebrews. However, the new practices imposed by Moses proved too onerous for the tribe, which rose up in revolt and killed Moses. Subsequently, the memory of Moses' murder was repressed, even as his monotheistic idea was incorporated into the new religious system of Judaism.

As Yerushalmi notes, Freud's analysis of Moses and the origins of monotheism struck some contemporaries as the epitome of Jewish self-negation. How could a proud and self-confident Jew deny to his people the source of its greatest contribution to civilization or its most outstanding and inspirational leader—especially in a period when the clouds over European Jewry were darkening?

Yerushalmi's response to these questions is a nuanced reading of new and old sources that yields a far more complicated picture of Freud than had emerged from previous scholarship.
Yerushalmi's Freud was not intent on disavowing his Jewish bonds of affiliation in *Moses and Monotheism*. On the contrary, he was intent on examining the source of ancient Judaism precisely in order to clarify what gave Jews their distinctive character. His aim, thus, was historical, an approach that Yerushalmi finds thoroughly unsurprising. After all, "[h]istoricism of one kind or another has been a dominant characteristic of modern Jewish thought since the early nineteenth century, while the 'historical' bent of psychoanalysis itself is, theoretically and therapeutically, part of its very essence."

In assessing Freud's journey into the ancient Jewish past, Yerushalmi argues that the great master possessed a far deeper and more varied knowledge of Jewish history and culture than he let on. This knowledge sensitized him to the importance of tradition and the problem of its transmission, issues that occupied him in *Moses and Monotheism*. Yerushalmi does not conclude from his close scrutiny that Freud secretly believed in an unbroken chain of Jewish religious tradition. He does, however, maintain that Freud believed in a process of identity transmission whose early stages were emphatically religious and whose later stages were of an entirely different character. Indeed, Yerushalmi identifies in Freud a Lamarckian instinct, a belief that Jewish group traits were passed on from generation to generation even as those traits were outwardly modified in response to shifting circumstances. In particular, Yerushalmi suggests that Freud held to a "psycho-Lamarckism" in which the group transmits collective memories "phylogenetically through the unconscious."

Freud's "neo-Lamarckism" was not, according to Yerushalmi, a mere analytic schema. It was both an explanation and rationale for his own Jewishness. And indeed, it was *Jewishness*, not Judaism, that served as the basis of Freud's own identity. The former, for Freud, "is inerminable even if the latter be terminated." Yerushalmi's Freud exemplified this interminability in the peculiarly modern form of the Psychological Jew. While outwardly assimilated, Psychological Jews lay claim to a number of shared qualities: "[i]ntellectual and independence of mind, the highest ethical and moral standards, concern for social justice, tenacity in the face of persecution," and a deep sensitivity to antisemitism. Yerushalmi insists that far from submitting to Jewish self-denial in the face of social pressure, Freud was a conscious and proud Jew of the psychological variety, "an exemplary specimen of the genus *Judaes Psychologicus.*"

What is of particular interest to Yerushalmi is that the Psychological Jew is both a product of and response to the forces of modernity that wreaked such havoc on Jewish community and collective memory. And what is interesting to us is that, at the point of rupture, Yerushalmi sees glimmers of hope. He conveys this sense when he relates that, for him, "the abiding significance of *Moses and Monotheism*" was to discover "the fiercely 'godless Jew' who emerges and persists out of what seems to be a final and irreparable rupture in the tradition." In fact, Yerushalmi assures Freud in the "Monologue" that "hardly you alone" struggle to overcome this rupture.

There is something noble in Yerushalmi's Freud, a desperate desire to retain a link to an elusive and malleable ideal. That Yerushalmi identifies with this attempt is manifest on every page of *Freud's Moses*. Contrary to popular opinion, he reads *Moses and Monotheism* as a profoundly Jewish and modern book, as an elucidation of the sources of Jewish identity through historical inquiry. Indeed, he admits that his "preoccupation" with Freud's book "arises out of a profound interest in the various modalities of modern Jewish historicism, of that quest for the meaning of Judaism and Jewish identity through an unprecedented reexamination of the Jewish past which is itself the consequence of a radical break with that past."

Unlikely as it may seem, Freud serves as a model for a Jewish historian seeking to heal the rift in Jewish collective memory. In this respect, *Freud's Moses* offers, in its own way, an important reply to *Zakh#. The sense of despair over the utility of the modern historical enterprise gives way to a more sanguine, though tempered, sentiment. Yerushalmi had already sought to mitigate the sense of despair prior to *Freud's Moses*, most notably in a 1987 address entitled "Reflections on Forgetting."

"And yet it is in *Freud's Moses* that we witness the clearest articulation of modern historiography's potential, albeit limited, to find meaning in the wake of the "radical break with the past." And it is here, especially in the "Monologue with Freud," that we are most exposed to Yerushalmi's own existential concerns as a Jew.

As a whole, Yosef Yerushalmi's work illuminates the richly complex and tension-filled condition of the modern Jewish historian. In search of both historical truth and spiritual meaning, the Jewish historian attempts to cross, with alternating bouts of hubris and self-doubt, the bridge spanning the traditional and the modern. Rather than fall victim to the abyss of despair, the great historian skillfully negotiates this bridge, always possessed of perspective and empathy. In his profound meditations on Marranos and memory, ranging from Cardoso to Freud, from Isaac Luria the kabbalist to Alexandr Luria the psychologist, Yosef Yerushalmi integrates the historical and the spiritual with intellectual creativity and audacity. He defines the condition of the modern Jewish historian by simultaneously analyzing and embodying the animating features of that condition.

And yet Yosef Yerushalmi has never limited his concerns exclusively to Jewish history, nor has he imagined that the implications of his work redound only to Jews. His work transcends, quite deliberately, rigid lines of group identity or scholarly method. In fact, it is perhaps the ultimate tribute to ascribe to him the ability to merge the particular and the general, the work of the archival historian and the profound thinker, the mind-set of the Jew and the human. In this regard, Yerushalmi achieved or worked through that which (he lamented) Freud could not: the possibility to "lay to rest the false and insidious dichotomy between the 'parochial' and the 'universal,'" that canard of the Enlightenment which became and remains a major neurosis of modern Jewish intellectuals. Challenging this "false and insidious dichotomy" may well be the signal achievement to date in the brilliant and accomplished career of Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi.
Notes


2. Harold Bloom notes that Zakhor is "pragmatically agonistic though almost never agonistic in tone," Zakhor, xxv.


4. Ibid.


6. Zakhor (French), 151.

7. Professor Yerushalmi related Baron’s desire to me in a conversation in New York on April 9, 1995.

8. Though written in 1964, this article was not published until 1970. Yerushalmi, "The Inquisition and the Jews of France in the time of Bernard Gui," Harvard Theological Review 63 (July 1970): 317-76. Referring to his earlier interest, Yerushalmi declares in this article that there is no evidence to support a link between Albigensian heretics and French crypto-Jews (pp. 341-42).

9. Ibid., 318.

10. Yerushalmi observes that “[i]n all the welter of competing ideas the Marrano emigrants stand out as perhaps the first modern Jews.” From Spanish Court, 44.

11. Ibid., xiv.


13. From Spanish Court, 95.


15. Yerushalmi, From Spanish Court, 370.

16. In the spirit of Gershom Scholem, Yerushalmi argues that the Expulsion from Spain "raised the perennial problem of Jewish exile and suffering to a new level of urgency." From Spanish Court, 43.

17. Ibid., 477.

18. Ibid., 21.


20. Ibid., 12-22.


22. Yerushalmi acknowledges and then builds upon the work of such Spinoza scholars as Carl Gebhardt and I. S. Revah. "Divre Spinoza," 172-73.

23. Ibid., 176-79.


25. See, for example, Baron’s seminal article, "Ghetto and Emancipation," The Menorah Journal (June 1928), 515-26. In a series of articles, Baron argued further that medieval Jews were often accorded the status of servants of the chamber (servi cameræ) by political sovereigns in order to merit protection. See Baron’s studies, "Plenitude of
55. Only in the penultimate endnote to Zakhor, and as an afterthought, does Yerushalmi recognize the parallel to Nietzsche. Zakhor, 145, n. 33.
56. Zakhor, 102. A stark literary foil to Funes is Yudka, the hero of Haim Hazaz’s story “Ha-derashah,” who announces to his colleagues in a kibbutz meeting that he is “opposed to Jewish history” and advocates its eradication from Jewish consciousness (p. 97).
57. Ibid., 98.
58. Interestingly, in a later essay entitled “Reflections on Forgetting,” Yerushalmi declares “essentially banal” Nietzsche’s view that “the unhistorical and the historical are equally necessary to the health of an individual, a community, and a system of culture.” See the “Postscript” to the second edition of Zakhor, p. 107.
59. Scholem himself raised the possibility that what appeared to nineteenth-century historians “to be an impotent hallucination will be revealed as great and vibrant.” See his article, “Mi-tokh hirhurim al Hokhmat Yisra’el,” reprinted in Paul Mendes-Flohr, Hokhmat Yisra‘el: hebetim historiyum u-filosofiyim (Jerusalem, 1979), 165.
60. See Yerushalmi’s preface to the second edition of Zakhor, p. xxvi.
63. Zakhor, 98.
64. Yerushalmi himself acknowledges that “the crisis of historicism is but a reflection of the crisis of our culture, of our spiritual life.” See his “Reflections on Forgetting,” Zakhor, 115.
68. Funkenstein, “Collective Memory and Historical Consciousness,” History and Memory 1 (spring/summer 1989); 5–26.
70. Among the scholars whose attention has focused on Jewish historiography in recent years are Jacob Barnai, Israel Bartal, David Biale, Robert Bonfil, Robert Chazan, Shmuel Feiner, Amos Funkenstein, Ivan Marcus, Michael Meyer, Reuven Michael, Amon Raz-Krakotzkin, David Myers, Arielle Reim, Isamar Schorsch, and Perrine Simon-Nahum.
71. Yerushalmi asserts the shift was first signalled in his 1982 Leo Baeck lecture on “Assimilation and Racial Anti-Semitism.” Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, Freud’s Moses: Judaism Terminate and Interminate (New Haven, 1991), xvi.
72. Freud’s Moses, xv.
73. See the précis in Freud’s Moses, 5–6.
74. Freud’s Moses, 113, n. 5.
75. Freud himself poses this question in the opening paragraph of the book. See Moses and Monotheism (New York, 1939; 1955), 3.
76. Freud’s Moses, 19.
77. See Yerushalmi’s insightful analysis of Freud’s Jewish background, including a new reading of the Hebrew inscription by Freud’s father to him on his thirty-fifth birthday. Freud’s Moses, 37–79.
78. Ibid., 30.
79. Ibid., 90.
80. Ibid., 10.
81. Ibid., 2.
83. Freud’s Moses, 98.