St. Louis County, ss.: Virginia L. Minor and Francis Minor, her husband,

Plaintiffs, vs. Reese Happersett, Defendant.

The plaintiff, Virginia L. Minor (with whom is joined her husband, -Francis Minor, as required by the law of Missouri), states, that under the Constitution and law of Missouri, all persons wishing to vote at any election, must previously have been registered in the manner pointed out by law, this being a condition precedent to the exercise of the elective franchise.

That on the fifteenth day of October, 1872 (one of the days fixed by law for the registration of voters), and long prior thereto, she was a native-born, free white citizen of the United States, and of the State of Missouri, and on the day last mentioned she was over the age of twenty-one years.

That on said day, the plaintiff was a resident of the thirteenth election district of the city and county of St. Louis, in the State of Missouri, and had been so residing in said county and election district, for the entire period of twelve months and more, immediately preceding said fifteenth day of October, 1872, and for more than twenty years had been and is a tax-paying, lawabiding citizen of the county and State aforesaid.

That on said last mentioned day, the defendant,  having been duly and legally appointed Registrar for said election district, and having accepted the said office of Registrar and entered upon the discharge of the duties thereof at the office of registration, to wit: No. 2004 Market Street, in said city and county of St. Louis, it became and was then and there his duty to register all citizens, resident in said district as aforesaid, entitled to the elective franchise, who might apply to him for that purpose.

The plaintiff further states, that wishing to exercise her privilege as a citizen of the United States, and vote for Electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, and for a Representative in Congress, and for other officers, at the General Election held in November, 1872: While said defendant was so acting as Registrar, on said 15th day of October, 1872, she appeared before him, at his office aforesaid, and then and there offered to take and subscribe the oath to support the Constitution of the Unites States and the State of Missouri as required by the registration law of said State, approved March 10, 1871, and respectfully applied to him to be registered as a lawful voter, which said defendant then and there refused to do.

The plaintiff further states, that the defendant, well knowing that she, as a citizen of the United States and of the State of Missouri, resident as aforesaid, was then and there entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizenship chief among which is the elective franchise, and as such, was entitled to be registered, in order to exercise said privilege: yet, unlawfully intending, contriving, and designing to deprive the plaintiff of said franchise or privilege, then and there knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and corruptly refused to place her name upon the list of registered voters, whereby she was deprived of her right to vote.

Defendant stated to plaintiff, that she was not entitled to be registered, or to vote, because she was not a "male" citizen, but a woman! That by the Constitution of Missouri, Art. H., Sec. 18, and by the aforesaid registration law of said State, approved March 10, 1871, it is provided and declared, that only "male citizens" of the United States, etc., are entitled or permitted to vote.

But the plaintiff protests against such decision, and she declares and maintains that said provisions of the Constitution and registration law of Missouri Art. II., Sec. 18, aforesaid, are in conflict with, and repugnant to the Constitution of the Uni-ted States, which is paramount to State authority ; and that they are espe-cially in conflict with the following articles and clauses of said Constitution
of the United States, to wit:

ART. I. See. 9-Which declares that no Bill of Attainder shall be passed.

Art. I. Sec. 10. -- No State shall pass any Bill of Attainder, or grant any title of nobility.

ART. IV. Sec. 2-The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and im-munities of citizens in the several States.

Art. IV. Sec. 4 --The United  States shall guarantee to every State a republican form of government

Art. VI. --This Constitution and the laws of the United States which be made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, anything in the Constitutions or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

AMENDMENTS.

ART. V.-NO person shall be . . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
 

ART. IX.--The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

ART. XIV. See. 1-All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they  reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-munities of  State deprive -any person of life, liberty, or property, without due -process of law ; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction, the equal protection of the laws.

The plaintiff states, that by reason of the wrongful act of the defendant as aforesaid, she has been damaged in the sum of ten thousand dollars, for which she prays judgment.

JOHN M. KRUAI,
FRANCIS MINOR, Atts for Plfs.
JOHN B. HENDFRSON, I

Demurrer. In the Circuit Court of St. Louis County Virginia L. Minor and Francis Minor, her husband, Plaintiffs, vs. Reese Happersett.

The defendant, Reese Happersett, demurs to the petition of plaintiffs, and for cause of demurrer defendant states that said petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, for the following reasons

1. Because said Virginia L. Minor, plaintiff, had no right to vote at the general election held in November, 1872, in said petition referred to.

2. Because said Virginia L. Minor had no right to be registered for voting by said defendant at the time and in the manner in said petition alleged.

3. Because it was the duty of the defendant to refuse to place said Virginia L. Minor's name upon the list of registered voters in said petition referred to.

All of which appears by said petition.
SMITH P. GALT, Atty for Deft.

The first amendment to the Constitution declares that Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or of the press, thus incorporating into the organic law of this country absolute freedom of thought or opinion. We presume it will not be doubted that the States are equally bound with Congress by this prohibition, not only because, as Chief-justice Taney says, 11 the Constitution of the United States, and every article and clause in it, is a part of the law of every State in the Union, and is the paramount law " (Prigg vs. The Comm., 16 Peters R., 628), but because, in the very nature of things, freedom of speech or of thought can not be divided. It is a personal attribute, and once secured is forever secured. To vote is but one form or method of expressing this freedom of speech. Speech is a declaration of thought. vote is the expression of the will, preference, or choice. Suffrage is one definition of the word, while the verb is defined, to choose by suffrage, to elect, to express or signify the mind, will, or preference, either viva voce, or by ballot. We claim then that the right to vote, or express one's wish at the polls, is embraced in the spirit, if not in the letter, of the First Amendment, and every citizen is entitled to the protection it affords.  It is the merest mockery to say to this plaintiff, you may write, print, publish, or, speak your thoughts upon every occasion, except at the polls. There your lips shall be sealed. It is impossible that this can be American law!

 Again, it is the opinion of some that suffrage is somehow lodged in the government, whence it is dispensed, or conferred upon the citizen, thus completely reversing the actual tact.  Suffrage is never conferred by government upon the citizen. He holds it by a higher title.   In this country government is the source of power, not the rights. These are vested in the  individual--are personal and inalienable Society can only acquire the authority to regulate these rights, or declare them forfeited, for cause. The time, place, and manner of their exercise are under governmental control, but their origin and source are in the individual himself.

I shall, therefore, says a writer on government, assume It as an incontrovertible posttiou, as a first principle, that the right of private opinion, which is, in fact, no other than the right of private judgment upon any subject presented to the mind, is a sacred right, with which society can, on no pretense, authoritatively interfere, without a violation of the first principles of the law of nature. (Chipman on Government, chap. 5.)

Other liberties, says Erskine, are held under governments, but the liberty of opinion keeps governments themselves in due subjection to their duties. (Speech in defense of Thomas Paine.)

But this clause of the Missouri law further violates the XIII. Amendment, which declares that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist in the United States, except for crime, etc. This Amendment is a copy of the 6th clause of the famous Ordinance of 1787, which secured freedom for the Northwest Territory, and has now become the organic law for the entire Union. This Ordinance was drawn by the Hon. Nathan Dane, of Massachusetts.*

We say that his Missouri law violates this amendment inasmuch as it places the plaintiff in a disenfranchised condition, which is none other than a condition of servitude-of "involuntarily servitude," because, although a
citizen in the fullest acceptation of the term--a member of this body politic--one of the " people "-she has never consented to this law ; has never been permitted to express either consent or dissent, nor given any oppor-tunity to express her opinion thereon, in the manner pointed out by law, while at the same time she is taxed, and her property taken to pay the very men who sat in judgment upon and condemned her !

Finally-Such is the nature of this privilege-so individual-so purely personal is its character, that its indefinite extension detracts not in the slightest degree from those who already enjoy it, and by an affirmation of the plaintiff's claim all womanhood would be elevated into that condition of self-respect that perfect freedom alone can give.

RESUME--(Minor vs. Happersett, 21 Wallace Rep., p. 164.)

1st. As a citizen of the United States, the plaintiff is entitled to any and all the "privileges and immunities" that belong to such position however defined, and as are held, exercised, and enjoyed by other citizens of the
United States.

2d. The elective franchise is a " privilege " of citizenship, in the highest sense of the word, It is the privilege preservative of all rights and privileges; and especially of the right of the citizen to participate in his or her government.

3d. The denial or abridgment of this privilege, if it exist at all, must be sought only in the fundamental charter of government-the Constitution of the United States. If not found there, no inferior power or jurisdiction can legally claim the right to exercise it.

4th. But the Constitution of the United States, so far from recognizing or permitting any denial or abridgment of the privileges of its citizens, expressly declares that " no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."

5th. It follows that the provisions of the Missouri Constitution and registry law before recited, are in conflict with and must yield to the paramount authority of the Constitution of the United States.

 A few words more and we have done. The plaintiff has sought, by this action, for the establishment of a great principle of fundamental right, appli-cable not only to herself, but to the class to which she belongs; for the principles here laid down (as in the Dred Scott case) extend far beyond the limits of the particular suit, and embrace the rights of millions of others, who are thus represented through her. She has a right, therefore, to be heard for her cause; and in making this plea, she seeks only to give expres-sion to those principles upon which, as upon a rock, our Government is founded.   It is impossible-that that can be a Republican government in which one half the citizens thereof are forever disfranchised. A citizen disfranchised is a citizen attainted; and this, too, in face of the fact, that you look in vain in the great charter of government, the Constitution of the United States, for any warrant or authority for such discrimination. To that instrument she appeals for protection.
 

*More recent investigation shows that this clause was originated by Mr. Jefferson in 1784. See The .11ation for May 4, 1S82. and authorities mere referred to. See "Bancroft's "History of the United States." Vol. H., P. 115.