Foundations of "New" Social Science: Institutational
Legitimacy from Philosophy, Complexity Science, Postmodernism, and Agent-Based
Modeling
Bill McKelvey
mckelvey@anderson.ucla.edu
Since the death of positivism in the 1970s, philosophers
have turned their attention to scientific realism, evolutionary epistemology,
and the Semantic Conception of Theories. Building on these trends,
Campbellian Realism allows social scientists to accept real-world phenomena
as criterion variables against which theories may be tested without denying
the reality of individual interpretation and social
construction. The Semantic Conception reduces the importance of axioms, but
reaffirms the role of models and experiments. In addition, philosophers now
see models as "autonomous agents" that exert
independent influence on the development of a science, in addition to theory
and data. The inappropriate molding effects of mathematical models on social
behavior modeling are noted. Complexity science offers
a "new" normal science epistemology focusing on order-creation by self-organizing
heterogeneous agents-and featuring agent-based models. The more responsible
core of postmodernism builds on the idea that agents operate in a constantly
changing web of interconnections among other agents. The connectionist agent-based
models of complexity science draw on the same conception of social ontology
as do postmodernists. The recent trends in philosophy of science, the notion
of models as autonomous agents, the new normal science epistemology from
complexity science, connectionist postmodernist ontology, and use of agent-based
in place of mathematical models combine to provide foundations for a "new"
social science centered on formal modeling not requiring the mathematical
assumptions of agent homogeneity and equilibrium conditions. Together these
foundations give "new" social science a level of institutional legitimacy
in scientific circles that current social science approaches lack.