Power in Non-negotiated Exchange Networks
Phillip Bonacich
Bonacich@soc.ucla.edu
Research on how power develops within exchange networks
is a lively and exciting topic within sociological social psychology.
Almost all the work has involved the power imbalances that develop when actors
are in unequal bargaining positions within networks of bargaining opportunities.
Models (one of which is mine) have been developed to predict exactly which
positions will have power. Only one researcher, Linda Molm, has experimented
with networks in which actors do not negotiate over the distribution of rewards
from transactions but instead have opportunities to distribute rewards to
each other. In game-theoretic language, she?s initiated the study of
non-cooperative games within networks while previous research used cooperative
games. Molm has experimentally examined only two networks, and as yet
no one has developed a general theory predicting the location of powerful
positions in any network.
Computer simulations, using Mathematica, suggest that
the distribution of power among positions will be different in negotiated
(cooperative) and non-negotiated (non-cooperative) networks. In the
simulation actors are programmed to reciprocate with a probability proportional
to the value of the gifts they have received.
The simulations also suggest that whether or not the actors
have complete information about the network and the pattern of giving should
also affect the distribution of power. The outcomes that result when
actors have just local knowledge about what they have received and simply
reciprocate do not form a Nash equilibrium. Knowledgeable actors can
learn that they are better off giving less frequently to actors who are dependent
on them for rewards and more frequently to actors who are less dependent.