2

Achieving Mutual Orientation at Turn Beginning

The Apparent Disorderliness of Natural Speech

Natural speech is frequently considered a poor source of data for the analysis of linguistic structure (see, for example, Chomsky 1965:3–4). Specifically, sentences produced within it are regularly found to be impaired in a variety of ways.¹ Thus, a sample of natural speech will contain not only well-formed grammatical sentences:

(1) **John:** These egg rolls are very good.
(2) **Curt:** Al’s a pretty damn good driver.
(3) **Marsha:** Christ it was just gorgeous.

but also sentences characterized by phrasal breaks, false starts, long pauses, and isolated ungrammatical fragments:

¹ Thus Chomsky (1965:58) argues that actual speech is of such “degenerate quality” that it is of limited usefulness for the study of linguistic competence. A similar view of speech production has been expressed by some psychologists, for example, Martin and Strange (1968:478), who argue that natural speech is so defective “that it is hazardous to guess at the exact constituent structure of any given utterance.” It is also frequently argued that participants themselves do not perceive the restarts, pauses, and fragments in their talk (see, for example, Lyons 1972:58 and Mahl 1959:114).
THE USE OF RESTARTS TO CONSTRUCT UNBROKEN SENTENCES

In contrast to the grammatically coherent Examples (1)–(3), Examples (4)–(6) manifest the supposed disorder of actual speech. However, note that, although Examples (4)–(6) contain fragments of sentences, they also contain coherent grammatical sentences.

(4) DEBBIE: I went to bed really early.

(5) BARBARA: Brian you’re gonna hav– You kids’ll have to go down closer so you can hear what they’re gonna do.

(6) SUE: I come in t– I no sooner sit down on the couch in the living room, and the doorbell rings.

Furthermore, note that the fragment and the coherent sentence occur in a particular order: first the fragment and then the sentence. A single format is thus found:

[Fragment] + [Coherent Sentence]

This format defines a restart. Though it provides one demonstration of the possible disorder of natural speech, this format is a phenomenon that occurs repeatedly in actual talk and that has a specifiable structure in its own right—which, moreover, includes a coherent grammatical sentence.

This format will be investigated with respect to the possibility that its repeated occurrence is not haphazard but rather a regular product of the procedures constructing actual talk and, more specifically, that the format has the effect of systematically achieving something found within it: the occurrence of a coherent grammatical sentence in natural speech.

In order to investigate this possibility, one other aspect of the behavior of participants in conversation—their gaze—will also be examined.

The ethnographic literature provides some striking exceptions to what will be said about gaze in this chapter. For example, Whiffen (1915:254) reports that “when he speaks, the Indian does not look at the person addressed, any more that the latter watches the speaker. Both look at some outside objects. This is the attitude also of the Indian when addressing more than one listener, so that he appears to be talking to some one not visibly present.” See also LaFrance and Mayo (1976) and Erickson (1979), for differences between the conversational gaze behavior of blacks and whites.

I find many problems with calling what is being talked about here a rule but am unable to locate the phenomenon to be focused on as clearly in any other way. Moreover, though the present wording is adequate as a point of departure for beginning to investigate gaze within the turn, subsequent analysis, both in this chapter and the next, will reveal that, although this feature is an operative feature of one type of turn, it is not found in every turn.

2 The work of Kendon (1967) provides strong empirical support for the argument that gaze is a relevant feature of face-to-face talk as well as detailed investigation of its structure.
In each of these examples, the following may be observed:

1. Although the recipient is not gazing at the speaker at the beginning of his turn, he subsequently redirects his gaze to the speaker.

2. Without bringing his previous sentence to completion, the speaker begins a new sentence at the point at which he gains the gaze of a recipient.

The conjunction between a recognizable event in the utterance of the speaker and the place where the recipient’s gaze reaches the speaker is consistent with the possibility that the gaze of the hearer is relevant to the speaker in the construction of his turn.\footnote{Within psychology and sociology, phrasal breaks in utterances, such as restarts and pauses, have received some attention (see, for example, Allen and Guy 1974; Argyle 1969; Beattie 1978b; Bernstein 1962; Cook 1971; Cook, Smith, and Lalljee 1974; Dittman 1974; Dittman and Llewellyn 1969; Goldman-Eisler 1961, 1972; Henderson 1974; Jones 1974; MacKay and Oggo 1959; Mahn 1959; Martin and Strange 1968; Mishler and Waxler 1970; Sahin et al. 1979; Siegman 1979). In these studies, two assumptions have been consistently made. First, as in contemporary linguistics, phrasal breaks are seen to be manifestations of defective performance. Second, phrasal breaks are assumed to result from processes entirely internal to the speaker, such as anxiety, cognitive difficulty, or problems in encoding the utterance. An alternative possibility is explored here: specifically, that the actions of the hearer as well as the speaker might be relevant to the production of phrasal breaks by the speaker. It certainly cannot be argued that processes internal to the speaker are irrelevant to the production of phrasal breaks or that the hearer is implicated in the production of all phrasal breaks. However, in cases where the speaker’s phrasal break is coordinated with specific actions of the hearer, it would seem inadequate to attempt to specify either the distribution of phrasal breaks within the utterance, or the processes providing for their occurrence, without reference to the actions of the hearer. Though a hearer can signal his attentiveness in a number of different ways (see, for example, Wieman 1971:63), many investigators (for example, Argyle 1969:108–109; 202; Argyle and Cook 1976:212, 184; Goffman 1967:123; Kendon 1967:56; Philips 1974:143–144; Schellenberg 1974:68–69) have noted the special importance of gaze as a display of attentiveness. Argyle (1969:105) notes that in order to display proper attention to a speaker, a hearer may gaze at “some object with which they are both concerned” rather than the speaker. Though the present research will restrict itself to studying the gaze of the hearer toward the speaker, the situation described by Argyle is recognized as valid and not inconsistent with the analysis being developed here. From a physiological rather than a social perspective, Diebold (1968:550–551) notes that facing the speaker optimizes a recipient’s ability to actually hear the talk. Though much of the most important work of Harvey Sacks exists at present only in the form of unpublished lectures, many researchers do have access to these materials. I have therefore chosen to cite them as exactly as possible, giving a specific date and page number where relevant.}

The sequence of actions performed by the speaker produces a restart. The sentence being produced before the gaze of the recipient was obtained is abandoned without being brought to completion. When the speaker has the gaze of his recipient a coherent sentence is produced. To have the gaze of a recipient thus appears to be preferred over not having his gaze and this preference appears to be consequential for the talk the speaker produces in his turn. This is consistent with the possibility that gaze is one means available to recipients for displaying to a speaker whether or not they are acting as hearers to his utterance.\footnote{Within psychology and sociology, phrasal breaks in utterances, such as restarts and pauses, have received some attention (see, for example, Allen and Guy 1974; Argyle 1969; Beattie 1978b; Bernstein 1962; Cook 1971; Cook, Smith, and Lalljee 1974; Dittman 1974; Dittman and Llewellyn 1969; Goldman-Eisler 1961, 1972; Henderson 1974; Jones 1974; MacKay and Oggo 1959; Mahn 1959; Martin and Strange 1968; Mishler and Waxler 1970; Sahin et al. 1979; Siegman 1979). In these studies, two assumptions have been consistently made. First, as in contemporary linguistics, phrasal breaks are seen to be manifestations of defective performance. Second, phrasal breaks are assumed to result from processes entirely internal to the speaker, such as anxiety, cognitive difficulty, or problems in encoding the utterance. An alternative possibility is explored here: specifically, that the actions of the hearer as well as the speaker might be relevant to the production of phrasal breaks by the speaker. It certainly cannot be argued that processes internal to the speaker are irrelevant to the production of phrasal breaks or that the hearer is implicated in the production of all phrasal breaks. However, in cases where the speaker’s phrasal break is coordinated with specific actions of the hearer, it would seem inadequate to attempt to specify either the distribution of phrasal breaks within the utterance, or the processes providing for their occurrence, without reference to the actions of the hearer. Though a hearer can signal his attentiveness in a number of different ways (see, for example, Wieman 1971:63), many investigators (for example, Argyle 1969:108–109; 202; Argyle and Cook 1976:212, 184; Goffman 1967:123; Kendon 1967:56; Philips 1974:143–144; Schellenberg 1974:68–69) have noted the special importance of gaze as a display of attentiveness. Argyle (1969:105) notes that in order to display proper attention to a speaker, a hearer may gaze at “some object with which they are both concerned” rather than the speaker. Though the present research will restrict itself to studying the gaze of the hearer toward the speaker, the situation described by Argyle is recognized as valid and not inconsistent with the analysis being developed here. From a physiological rather than a social perspective, Diebold (1968:550–551) notes that facing the speaker optimizes a recipient’s ability to actually hear the talk. Though much of the most important work of Harvey Sacks exists at present only in the form of unpublished lectures, many researchers do have access to these materials. I have therefore chosen to cite them as exactly as possible, giving a specific date and page number where relevant.}

Sacks (10/26/67, Part II, p. 7)\footnote{Though much of the most important work of Harvey Sacks exists at present only in the form of unpublished lectures, many researchers do have access to these materials. I have therefore chosen to cite them as exactly as possible, giving a specific date and page number where relevant.} has noted that “one wants to make a distinction between ‘having the floor’ in the sense of being a speaker while others are hearers, and ‘having the floor’ in the sense of being a speaker while others are doing whatever they please. One wants not merely to occupy the floor, but to have the floor while others listen.”

In conversation speakers are thus faced not simply with the task of constructing sentences, but with the task of producing sentences for hearers. Suppose that a recipient begins to display proper hearkership well after the speaker has begun to produce a sentence. If the speaker brings that sentence to completion, his utterance will contain a coherent sentence and no sentence fragment. However, when the actions of both speaker and hearer are taken into consideration, that complete sentence may in fact constitute a fragment, since only part of it has been properly attended to by a hearer:

Fragment of sentence during which hearer is gazing at speaker

SENTENCE OF A SPEAKER: $\text{-----------------------------------------------------}$

$\text{X}$

Point at which recipient begins to gaze at speaker

By beginning a new sentence when the gaze of the recipient is obtained, the speaker is able to produce his entire sentence while he is being gazed at by the hearer. In short, rather than providing evidence for the defective performance of speakers in actual conversation, restarts may provide some demonstration of the orientation of speakers to producing sentences that are attended to appropriately by their recipients.
Procedures for Securing the Gaze of a Hearer

THE USE OF RESTARTS TO REQUEST THE GAZE OF A HEARER

Not all restarts exhibit precise coordination with the arrival of a recipient's gaze:

(7) ETHYL: So they st– their classes start around (0.2) in

BARBARA: X

(8) LEE: Can you bring– (0.2) Can you

RAY: ..................

LEE: bring me here that nylon n?

RAY: X ........................

(9) JOE: My mother told me that– We had a col d water flat

PAT: ........................ X

In these examples the recipient's movement begins just after the restart. The argument that the restart and the gaze of the recipient toward the speaker might be performed with reference to each other seems once again tenable.

It has been frequently argued (for example, Allen and Guy 1974:171–172, Dittman 1974:175, Lyons 1972:58, Mahl 1959:114) that participants do not notice the phrasal breaks that occur in natural conversation. Thus Dale (1974:174) states that "subjects perceive the presence of hesitations but not their precise location." However, the close coordination between the actions of the recipient and the phrasal break in Examples (7)–(9) provides evidence that participants attend to the location of phrasal breaks with some precision.

These data also cast doubt on the accuracy of Martin and Strange's statement (1968:474) that "while . . . hesitations mark speaker uncertainty they have little utility for the listener."

The differences in the placement of gaze relative to the restart in the two data sets suggest that the restart may function to coordinate action between speaker and hearer in at least two alternative, but related, ways. First, as demonstrated in Examples (4)–(6), the restart allows a speaker to begin a new sentence at the point where recipient's gaze is obtained. Second, the recipient action just after the restart in Examples (7)–(9) raises the possibility that a restart may also act as a request for the gaze of a hearer. With respect to this possibility, note that the restart, containing as it does a marked phrasal break, is applicable to any sentence whatsoever. That is, because the flow of the utterance is interrupted in a quite noticeable fashion, a hearer can recognize the occurrence of a restart quite independently of the content of the particular utterance in which it occurs. Being widely usable and extremely noticeable, the restart is well suited to serve as a signal."

* Indeed, on some occasions, a restart used to begin a new sentence at the point where a first recipient's gaze reaches the speaker might also have the effect of drawing the gaze
If the restart can in fact act as a request for gaze, the actions of speaker and hearer together would constitute a particular type of summons-answer sequence. Schegloff's (1968) study of the organization of summons-answer sequences provides analytic resources with which this possibility might be investigated further. In order to differentiate phenomena that participants orient to as sequences from events that merely happen to be adjacent to placed, Schegloff (1968:1083) proposes that sequences have a property that he refers to as "conditional relevance." The occurrence of a first item in a sequence, such as a summons, establishes the relevance of a next item to it, with the effect that not only an answer, but also the absence of such an answer, can be treated as a noticeable event by participants. One way in which the absence of an answer to a summons might be noted is by repetition of the summons, though only until an answer to it is obtained, at which point the party making the summons proceeds to further talk.

If the restart-gaze pattern does in fact constitute a type of summons-answer sequence, it may therefore be expected that on some occasions a recipient's failure to gaze after an initial restart will be noted by the production of another restart which will have the effect of repeating the summons. Further, the string of restarts thus produced will

of a second recipient. Note Examples (52) and (16) in the penultimate section of this chapter, p. 90.

With respect to the insistent quality of such repetition, it may be noted that being gazed at by a recipient not only ensures that the channel between speaker and hearer is functioning, but also constitutes a display that the speaker is receiving from the hearer the respect owed him. Lord Chesterfield, writing to his son in 1752 (Letter CCLXXVIII) (1932:231–232) had the following to say about inattention in conversation:

There is nothing so brutally shocking, nor so little forgiven, as a seeming inattention to the person who is speaking to you; and I have known many a man knocked down for (in my opinion) a much slighter provocation than that shocking inattention which I mean. I have seen many people who, while you are speaking to them, instead of looking at, and attending you, fix their eyes upon the ceiling, or some other part of the room, look out the window, play with a dog, twirl their snuff box, or pick their nose. Nothing discovers a little, futile, frivolous mind more than this, and nothing is so offensively ill-bred: it is an explicit declaration on your part that every, the most trivial, object deserves your attention more than all that can be said by the person who is speaking to you. Judge of the sentiments of hatred and resentment which such treatment must excite in every breast where any degree of self-love dwells, and I am sure that I never yet met with that breast where there was not a great deal. I repeat it again and again (for it is highly necessary for you to remember it) that sort of vanity and self-love is inseparable from human nature, whatever may be its rank or condition. Even your footman will sooner forget and forgive a beating than any manifest mark of slight and contempt. Be therefore I beg of you, not only really, but seemingly and manifestly, attentive to whoever speaks to you.

Each of these utterances contains not one but two restarts. (Subsequent analysis will reveal that the restart is not the only phrasal break that can be requested the gaze of a hearer. Analysis of Examples [10]–[12] in terms of such a possibility would reveal that some, such as [11], contain more than two requests for a hearer.) When the gaze of a recipient has been obtained, the speaker stops producing restarts and enters a coherent sentence.

10 This is not of course meant to imply that the sentence begun at this point will inevitably remain free of perturbations and phrasal breaks; these might subsequently arise from other
The data are thus consistent with the possibility that such norms—answer sequences might function, not only to provide coordinated entry into a conversation as a whole (Schegloff 1968; 1989), but also to establish the availability of participants toward each other within the turn itself.

It would thus appear that recipients have the ability to attend to restarts with precision, and that speakers in fact expect recipients to do this and systematically organize their talk with reference to such an ability by, for example, not only repeating the phrasal break, but also treating the recipient's failure to move after the initial phrasal break as the noticeable absence of relevant action.

WAITING FOR RECIPIENT TO RESPOND

The ability to recycle the phrasal break provides for the possibility of cases, such as (13)–(15), in which the beginning of the recipient's movement occurs after a slight delay:

(13) GARY: I know Freddy— (0.2) Freddy used to work over the plant.

MIKE:

[ ]

X

(14) PAM: Why don't you go out— What's that one swing doing up

BRUCE:

[ ]

X

(15) SARA: That's like— She tells me down there at the corner

FLORA:

[ ]

X

Insofar as speakers have the ability to recycle their request for gaze, if a response is not immediately forthcoming they can wait briefly for that response. Further, it is possible that recipient's starting to move into orientation in examples such as these operates retroactively. By starting to attend, one may recognizably display that one has already heard some of the prior talk, and thus that it need not be redone.

Phrased differently, their ability to recycle the request for gaze makes it possible for speakers to treat the place where recipient's response is relevant and possible, not as an instantaneous point, but rather as a period of time with some duration. Thus, although recipients have the ability to attend to restarts with precision (and do in fact move immediately after the restart on many occasions), they are also given some leeway for the placement of their move relative to speaker's action by the larger framework of action within which such moves are given organization and made meaningful.

The processes that have just been examined provide some evidence for the possibility that a state in which a recipient is attending the speaker during the production of a coherent sentence is neither accidental nor automatic, but rather something toward the achievement of which the actions of the participants may be actively directed.

In sum, the restart constitutes one technique available to participants in conversation for coordinating the actions of the speaker and those of the recipient so that the recipient is attending the speaker during the time in which he is producing a coherent sentence.

AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE RESTART: THE PAUSE

In examining the restart as a request for the gaze of a recipient, it was found that the speaker did not require the gaze of his recipient from the absolute beginning of his sentence. Thus, if the speaker had a technique for obtaining the gaze of his recipient near the beginning of his first proposed sentence, he might be able to continue with the sentence without producing a restart.

Coherent Sentence

X

However, consider a situation in which the speaker does not have the gaze of his recipient when he takes the floor, and in which, furthermore, it takes the recipient a considerable amount of time to bring his gaze to the speaker. In such a situation, by the time the recipient moves into orientation, the speaker's sentence would have advanced well toward its completion:

Coherent Sentence

X

The length of time required for the recipient to move into orientation would pose no problem to the speaker if he had a way of holding the sentence at its beginning until he obtained his recipient's gaze. A very simple way the speaker might accomplish this task is by ceasing to speak near the beginning of his sentence, waiting until the gaze of his recipient is secured, and then continuing the sentence:

[Beginning] + [Pause] + [Continuation]
By using a pause to delay the onward development of his sentence in this fashion, the speaker would be able to secure the gaze of his recipient near the beginning of his sentence despite the fact that it takes his recipient some period of time to bring his eyes to the speaker.

The following provide possible examples of such a process. Dashes mark tenths of seconds within a silence, and plus signs mark each second.

(16) MICHAEL: Who knows, 'hh (- ---) numbers and letters (huh),
DON: .......................... X

(17) DIANNE: He put uhm, (- --- - -) Tch! Put crabmeat on
MARSHA: .......................... X

(18) DIANNE: (Ye-nd) uh, (- ---) Muddy Ritz was saying that

In these examples, a pause is employed to hold the speaker’s sentence near its beginning until the gaze of a recipient has been obtained. The use of a pause in this fashion is functionally analogous to the use of a restart to produce a new sentence beginning at the point at which a recipient’s gaze has been secured.

These data also show that, in addition to silence, a speaker might use phenomena such as inbreaths, transcribed as “‘hh’” (see Example [16]), and filled pauses (the “uhm” and “uh” in Examples [17] and [18]) to delay the onward progression of his sentence while recipient’s gaze is moving.

REQUESTING GAZE WITH A PAUSE BEGINNING

Terminating talk in the middle of a turn-constructional unit, as happens when a pause is begun, produces a noticeable perturbation in the stream of speech. Like the restart, this perturbation may be used to signal that the services of a hearer are being requested. In the following examples, nongazing recipients begin to move their gaze toward the speaker shortly after a pause is entered.11

11 These examples raise one other issue. Hearer neither gazes nor even moves toward the speaker before the pause is entered. Yet the portion of the sentence spoken before the pause is not repeated. It thus appears that speakers may treat their hearers as having the ability to recover portions of the talk spoken before hearer showed any attention to the speaker. Chafe (1973:17) has argued that the human mind can retain sound briefly even if the sound was not consciously attended while actually being heard. The following data, brought to my attention by Gail Jefferson, provide some demonstration that participants in conversation are in fact able to recover some piece of talk that they initially indicate has not been heard:

(A) RICK: So how’d you get home.
LINNY: Huh?
LINNY: Ben gave me a ride.

(B) RICK: What do you mean.
(1.0)
LINNY: Huh?
(0.2)
RICK: What do you mean.

(C) RICK: How have you been feeling lately.
LINNY: Huh?
(0.7)
LINNY: How do I feel?

In these examples, by producing a “huh,” a participant indicates that the last item of talk has not been heard in some relevant fashion and requests that it be repeated. However, before the repeat is provided (at least in complete form), the party who requested the repeat produces an utterance showing that the requested item has been recovered.
sound stretches (indicated in the transcript by colons), cut-offs, filled pauses, and marked changes in intonation (for example, the falling intonation indicated by a period following "...kids..." in Example [20]).

Like a restart, the beginning of a pause is able to signal that the services of a hearer are needed. However, with this same pause the speaker is also able to delay further production of his sentence until the gaze of his recipient is secured. In this sense, the pause is a more versatile tool than the restart: It can, if necessary, combine the functions of both classes of restarts, requesting the gaze of a recipient and delaying the production of the speaker's sentence so that the gaze of this same recipient is secured near the beginning of the sentence.

Criteria for Choice between Restarts and Pauses

The analysis so far presented reveals two different techniques available to a speaker for securing near the beginning of his sentence the gaze of his recipient. He can either begin a new sentence by producing a restart when his recipient reaches orientation or he can pause near the beginning of his original sentence and await the gaze of his recipient before developing the sentence further.12 Given the structural and functional sim-

12 Precisely where in his utterance the speaker places such a pause is an issue that is beyond the scope of the present analysis, but relevant for future study. A considerable amount of research has in fact been done on where pauses occur in utterances. First, a distinction is generally made between "juncture pauses" and "hesitation pauses." Juncture pauses occur at the boundaries between major units in the sentence (this argument has been made from the perspective of both structural linguistics [see, for example, Cook et al. 1974:15] and transformational grammar [for example, Lieberman 1967:125]). Juncture pauses are usually considered to be "essentially linguistic" phenomena, serving, for example, to demarcate units in the stream of speech, whereas hesitation pauses "are attributed to nonlinguistic or extra-linguistic factors [Boomer 1965:151, footnote 3]."

Most research has focused on hesitation pauses. As noted by Boomer (1965:148), "the linking hypothesis is that hesitations in spontaneous speech occur at points where decisions and choices are being made." Some early theories (for example, MacKay and Osgood 1959) argued that phrasal breaks occurred between words of high uncertainty. However, Boomer (1965) found that pauses occurred most frequently after the first word of a phonemic clause. He argued (1965:156) that this finding provided evidence that speech was encoded in terms of the phonemic clause rather than the individual word (p. 148). Specifically, he proposed that the pattern he found demonstrated that speech encoding occurred in at least two stages: with hesitations occurring after a structural or grammatical decision had been made but before lexical selection (p. 156). Building on Boomer's work, Dittman (1974:172), see also Dittman and Llewellyn 1969) found that body movements tend to occur "at the beginning of fluent speech, be this when the speaker gets started on a clause or when he gets started after some nonfluency within the clause." The placement of both pauses and some relevant body movements early in the utterance in the present data is roughly consistent with the patterns described by Boomer and Dittman.

ilarities of the two techniques, one question that arises is why a speaker would choose one rather than the other to accomplish this task. Specifically, what criteria guide a speaker's selection between the two?

RELEVANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PROCEDURES

The choice of one procedure over another would be meaningless if the procedures did not differ from each other in some relevant fashion. One place to search for such difference might be in the phenomena constructed by such procedures. Restarts and pauses appear to be clearly distinguishable from each other:

Restart: [Fragment] + [New Beginning]
Pause: [Beginning] + [Pause] + [Continuation]

However, the distinctiveness of such phenomena, as well as their status as alternatives for securing gaze, is called into question by examples such as (8), (11), and the following, Example (23), in each of which the gaze of a recipient is secured through use of both a pause and restart:

(23) BARBARA: I-(---) You know I think that's terrible.

GORDIE: .... X

These examples suggest that if the procedures considered earlier do in fact provide the speaker with a choice between meaningful alternatives, the criteria for that choice are not to be found simply in the difference between a restart and a pause. Because restarts and pauses are complex phenomena constructed through operations on more simple units, the nature of the choice available to the speaker might be obscured if the comparison is made between restarts and pauses as distinct, irreducible entities. Before being able to make the proper comparison, we must, therefore, briefly examine the process through which restarts and pauses are constructed as recognizable phenomena in the first place.

An event that occurs in the construction of both a restart and a pause is the self-interruption13 of a turn-constructional unit after its beginning.

13 In some current work on the organization of conversation (for example, Zimmerman and West 1975), the term "interruption" is used as a technical term to refer to talk intruding into the talk of another. The term is being used here in a rather different way. What is at issue is not the placement of one party's talk relative to another's, but rather the way in which a unit that ceases before a recognizable completion to it has been reached can be seen as noticeably incomplete but still having the potential, though not the certainty, of being returned to and completed at some point in the future. The term is also intended to suggest that such a thing does not just happen, but, rather, is something that is actively being done by someone. Interruption in this sense can be performed by a single party on
but prior to a recognizable completion. The talk that occurs after this interruption may either be a continuation of the unit already in progress or the beginning of a new unit. Only if it is the latter has a restart occurred. Thus, in the following example, whereas the talk after the first phrasal break constructs a restart, the talk after the second does not:

(24)  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First</th>
<th>Second</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phrasal</td>
<td>Phrasal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Break</td>
<td>Break</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

JERE: I have more- u I have- trouble keeping it clean.

After a unit has been interrupted, a period of silence—that is, a pause—may or may not occur before speech production is resumed. The talk after the period of silence may be either the beginning of a new unit, a restart (as in Examples [8], [11], [13], and [23]), or a continuation of the unit already in progress (as in Examples [16]–[22]).

One distinction in this process that may be relevant for the selection of one procedure over the other is whether the talk after the interruption continues the unit already in progress or begins a new unit. Which of these events happens affects not only the talk after the interruption but also the talk that preceded it. If the talk following the interruption does not continue the speaker’s initial unit, then the talk in that unit loses its status as a possible sentence beginning and becomes a sentence fragment. If, however, the talk following the interruption continues the unit that preceded it, then that original talk maintains its status as the beginning unit of the utterance.

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a single unit and indeed is something that might be performed in activities other than talk, as, for example, when a person interrupts a task that is as yet uncompleted to perform another. Other available formulations, such as abandoning the unit in midcourse or delaying its further production, are inadequate in that they specify the outcome of possibilities that still remain open to the participants, who not only do not yet have the future history of the unit available to them, but might be actively using the range of possibilities it still provides as a resource for their current actions.

14 The self-interruption is frequently but not always marked by a glottal stop (indicated in the present transcription system by a dash). The glottal stop results from the sudden closing of the vocal cords when speech production is abruptly terminated. Labov (1975) has argued that in English such a glottal stop constitutes a universal editing signal. For other relevant analysis see the discussion of repair initiators in Schegloff et al. (1977).

15 The ability to recognize, first, that a unit has stopped at some place other than a possible termination for it, or, second, that some subsequent piece of talk is or is not a continuation of some prior unit, requires that the participants be able to determine from the part of the unit already produced what would constitute an appropriate termination or a continuation of it. As was noted in the last chapter, such a property is made explicit in the definition of turn-constructural unit provided by Sacks et al. (1974:702).

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Criteria for Choice between Restarts and Pauses

The basis for choice between the alternatives noted will now be investigated. This investigation will be restricted to criteria relevant to the process of negotiating a state of mutual gaze between speaker and hearer, although it is recognized that there are many other valid reasons for interrupting or abandoning an utterance prior to its completion. One has only to look at the great number of false starts, hesitations, and pauses found in monologues, such as academic lectures, to realize that processes of interaction between speaker and hearer are by no means involved in the occurrence of all speech perturbations.

The analysis until this point has provided some demonstration that obtaining the gaze of a recipient within the turn is in fact relevant to the speaker. However, even casual inspection of a visual record of conversation reveals that the hearer does not gaze continuously toward the speaker. Rather, during the course of a turn, he gazes away from the speaker, as well as toward him. Given the regular presence of both alternatives, the absence of a hearer’s gaze at a certain point cannot be definitively established. Either the speaker or an analyst could look at some specific place in a turn, find that the hearer is not gazing at the speaker, and yet not be able to establish that gaze is noticeably and relevantly absent, since the gaze appropriate to hearership might occur in the unit currently under construction by the speaker. In short, the procedures that have been examined provide a choice between continuing the unit that was in progress prior to the phrasal break and thus treating that initial talk as the beginning of the sentence still in progress, or beginning a new unit of talk and treating the talk originally begun as a fragment.

SPEAKER’S GAZE TOWARD HEARER

The ability to recognize, first, that a unit has stopped at some place other than a possible termination for it, or, second, that some subsequent piece of talk is or is not a continuation of some prior unit, requires that the participants be able to determine from the part of the unit already produced what would constitute an appropriate termination or a continuation of it. As was noted in the last chapter, such a property is made explicit in the definition of turn-constructural unit provided by Sacks et al. (1974:702).

---

16 The work of Sacks and his colleagues on repairs (for example, Jefferson 1972, 1974a; Sacks 1974; Sacks et al. 1974; Schegloff 1972; Schegloff et al. 1977) analyzes many other processes that might lead to the interruption of a turn-constructional unit prior to its projected completion. Ways in which speech errors make visible underlying linguistic structures have been investigated by Fromkin (1971). The work of Goffman (1981) on the different aspects of the self generated through repairs examines yet other aspects of this phenomenon. Further, it cannot be claimed that the interaction of speaker and hearer is relevant to the production of all restarts and pauses. Processes internal to the speaker, such as those examined by Boomer (1965), Dittman (1974), and Mahi (1959), as well as social processes quite different from those being investigated here (see, for example, Beattie 1979-73; Brereton 1979-200), are certainly relevant to the production of many phrasal breaks. Although the present analysis focuses on the social and interactive use of restarts and pauses, it is recognized that such phenomena may reflect actual difficulty the speaker is having in organizing what he is trying to say.
elsewhere in the turn. Nevertheless, the data already examined would indicate that speakers do in fact orient to the noticeable absence of a recipient’s gaze at a specific point (for example, by requesting such gaze).

The issue thus arises as to where in the turn speaker is able to find that hearer’s gaze is relevantly absent. When data are examined it is found that one place at which restarts requesting the gaze of a nongazing hearer systematically occur is just at the point when speaker’s gaze reaches a nongazing recipient. In the following examples, the gaze of the speaker is marked above the utterance.

(25) MARSHA:  

[ X__________]  

’N he c a– he calls me a Vassar snob.

DIANNE:  

[ X__________]

(26) BETH:  

[ X__________________]

Terry– Jerry’s fa scinted with elephants.

ANN:  

[ X__________________]

In many cases, such as in the examples provided, the restart occurs precisely at the point where the speaker’s gaze reaches his recipient. However, in some cases, the restart is not produced until very slightly after the speaker has begun to gaze at his recipient:

(55) MARSHA:  

[ X______]

En a couple of gir ls– One of the girls from there,

DIANNE:  

[ X____________]

(9) JOE:  

[ X____________]

My mother told me that– We had a cold water flat

PAT:  

[ X__________]

Despite the nonsimultaneity of the speaker’s gaze and the restart in these examples, their production seems compatible with a process of the type being described. First, the time between the arrival of the speaker’s gaze and the production of the restart is brief: The phrasal break that begins the restart occurs in the syllable after the speaker’s gaze reaches the recipient. Second, the units produced in this space, “is–” and “that–” are marked by their pronunciation—by the glottal stop that occurs in each case—as defective. The space between where the speaker’s gaze reaches the recipient and where the restart actually begins is retroactively marked as impaired. Thus, though the phrasal break in fact occurs a syllable later, it is displayed as getting started at the point where the speaker’s gaze reaches the hearer:

MARSHA:  

[ X______]

En a couple of gir ls–

JOE:  

[ X______]

My mother told me that–

In these data, when speaker’s eyes reach a recipient who is not gazing at him, he treats the talk in progress as impaired by producing a restart, an action that simultaneously has the effect of acting as a request for the gaze of recipient. This raises the possibility that one basis for choice between the procedures being examined might be found in the relationship between hearer’s gaze and speaker’s. Specifically, it suggests that at least one place within the turn where hearers should be gazing at speakers is when speakers are gazing at them.

One way to explore such a possibility further is to see what happens when speaker’s gaze reaches a gazing recipient. In general, in such a situation, rather than producing a restart, the speaker continues with the talk in progress:

(3) MARSHA:  

[ X______]

Christ it w as just go:orgeous.

DIANNE:  

[ X____________]

(27) ANN:  

[ X__________]

Did you play go if this mor ning?

CHIL:  

[ X____________]

Some quantitative description of this process will be provided in the next section of this chapter.
Thus, talk produced when speaker’s gaze arrives at a nongazing recipient is treated as impaired, whereas talk in progress when speaker finds a gazing hearer is not.

It may be noted that talk without recipient gaze is not treated as impaired until speaker’s gaze reaches the recipient. This has a number of implications.

First, it suggests that there might be a preferred order for the sequencing of the participants’ gaze at turn-beginning. If speaker’s gaze arrives first, he will be looking at a nongazing hearer, a situation that may lead to the talk in progress being treated as impaired. However, if hearer brings his gaze to speaker first, this situation is avoided:

Speaker Finds Gazing Hearer

Speaker:  
Utterance: X  
Recipient:  

Speaker Gazes at Nongazing Hearer

Speaker:  
Utterance:  
Hearer: X  
Place Where Speaker Gazes at Nongazing Hearer

The order of hearer and then speaker is thus preferable to the order of speaker and then hearer. To achieve an appropriate state of mutual gaze, a hearer should move his gaze to the speaker early in the turn so that it arrives before the speaker has begun to gaze at him. On the other hand, in order to provide time for the hearer to make his move, the speaker should avoid gazing at the hearer until the turn is well underway.19

Such an ordering is consistent with the findings of Kendon (1967:33) and Duncan (1974a) that, whereas hearer gazes at speaker at the beginning of his utterance, speaker looks away at that point. These investigators did not account for this pattern in terms of interactive procedures for the systematic achievement of particular, oriented-to states of gaze. Duncan did, however, find that one of the ways in which a participant’s shift from hearer to speaker is marked is by movement of gaze away from his partner, and Duncan and Fiske (1977:215–221) found that presence or absence of such a move differentiated attempts to claim speech from back channel vocalizations within the turn of another. Kendon (1967) accounted for the speaker’s looking away at turn-beginning in terms of speaker being involved in planning what he was about to say. Such a possibility certainly cannot be discounted and, indeed, it rather neatly complements the processes being investigated in the present analysis.

20 Now that the phenomena being pointed to in the rule proposed on p. 57 have been described in a more precise fashion, it can be seen that that initial formulation of these phenomena was indeed too broad.

21 Thus Kendon (1967:27) notes that “mutual gazes tend to be quite short, lasting for little more than a second as a rule.”
2. Achieving Mutual Orientation at Turn Beginning

Fourth, the fact that an impairment is not located until speaker’s gaze arrives raises the possibility that speaker might be able to request the gaze of a recipient who has not started to move without creating a situation where talk must be treated as impaired; that is, while requesting recipient’s gaze, speaker might withhold his own gaze. The phenomena initially examined as pauses provide resources for requesting gaze without locating the talk then in progress as impaired. The present line of reasoning suggests that, when the pause is used, speaker is not yet gazing toward his recipient. This is, in fact, what is typically found:

(17) DIANNE: ................................ X____
\[ He put uh m. (---) Tch! Put cramb eat on \]
MARSHA: ................................ X____________

(20) BARBARA: 
\[ Uh. my kids. (---) had all these blankets, \]
ETHYL: ................................ X____________
BARBARA: ................................ X____
\[ and quilts and s l e e ping bags. \]
ETHYL: ................................

(29) ANN: 
\[ When you had that big \]
JERE: ................................
ANN: 
\[ uhm.; (---) tropical fish tank. \]
JERE: ................................ X____________

To summarize, speakers use a pause to request gaze if they have not yet gazed at their recipient and a restart if they have. Further, no perturbation in the talk occurs when speaker’s gaze arrives at a hearer who is already looking at him. In essence, the present data suggest that when speaker’s gaze reaches a recipient, that recipient should be gazing at the speaker.

Earlier sections of this chapter focused on the gaze of the hearer. In this section, those phenomena have been found to be but an aspect of a larger process through which the gaze of both speaker and hearer, including their avoidance as well as their contact, is organized.

Quantitative Description

One frequent request that has been made by readers of this analysis who are not themselves conversation analysts is for some quantitative measurement of the processes being investigated. I myself consider quantitative methodology not only premature but inappropriate to the type of phenomena here being investigated. However, to deal with questions that readers from other research backgrounds find both troublesome and legitimate, I will here attempt to provide at least some quantitative description.

In order to do this, a single 10-minute two-person conversation was examined in detail. This particular conversation was selected for a number of reasons. First, because of the limited number of participants, their seating configuration, and the outdoor setting which provided a great deal of light, the participants on this tape could be seen with a great deal of clarity.25 Except for one brief sequence, both participants can be observed throughout the tape.26 Second, the conversation was comparatively brief so that exhaustive analysis of it was possible. Third, there was available an audio-transcript of the conversation by Gail Jefferson, which had been checked against the original videotape by her and three other people.

All cases in which a party who was speaking brought her gaze to her coparticipant were noted, and the following frequencies were found:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of Gazing</th>
<th>No restart</th>
<th>Restart</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>97</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quite clearly, restarts occur much more frequently when hearer is not

\[ For a clearer idea of how the participants were positioned, see Figures 3.1–3.5 in the next chapter. These figures are tracings from this conversation.\]

\[ This sequence (47 seconds long), in which someone else walked over and the camera zoomed back but still did not always include all participants, was excluded from analysis.\]
gazing that when she is. 22 When a chi-square is computed, 26 it is found to have a value of 13.888 and to be significant at the .01 level.

In 11 of the cases that were counted, the gaze of one party arrived during simultaneous speech. 23 In such a situation, who is to be treated as speaker and who as hearer may be at issue for the participants themselves. 24 In that this is one of the distinctions being used to organize the present data, these cases should perhaps not be included in the frequency distribution. When they are removed, the contingency table is found to have a chi-square value of 7.242 which is significant at the .01 level.

Our analysis in this chapter has focused specifically on turn-beginning. However, the frequencies just provided were for all cases in which a speaker's gaze reached a hearer. It might be argued that such a tabulation inflates the differences being examined, since it includes as separate events all of the looks a speaker gives her recipient during a long turn such as a story. The following are the frequencies found when analysis is restricted to gaze arriving at turn-beginning. The gazng-no restart cell includes two cases in which recipient's gaze was obtained through use of a pause.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When speaker's gaze arrives hearer is</th>
<th>No restart</th>
<th>Restart</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gazing</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not gazing</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again most restarts occur when a speaker gazes at a nongazing hearer.

22 It should be emphasized that what I am trying to examine here is not every speech perturbation in the data (it is quite definitely not being argued that all speech perturbations are gaze related) but only the use of phrasal breaks in the specific interactive processes I am analyzing.

23 Yates's correction for continuity was included in the computation of all chi-squares reported here.

24 In six of those cases, the other party was gazing toward the party speaking; in five she was not. In no case was a restart produced just at the point of gaze arrival.

25 Thus, in the following, both parties claim speakership when Marsha enters a new turn-constructional unit (note that neither party relinquishes within the overlap):

MARSHA: really a treat. She was ( jing guys to the room
[        ]
O h there are always-- dozens of those. [ ]

DIANNE: , .......... X

For more detailed analysis of overlap, see Jefferson 1973.

When a chi-square is computed it is found to have a value of 5.059 which is significant at the .05 level.

One problem with the way in which statistical methodology is frequently used in the social sciences is that it provides a rationale for not engaging in detailed analysis of particular cases. Exceptions and examples that do not support the point being argued can be disregarded as "noise" if an acceptable level of significance is obtained. Despite the fact that the present frequency distribution supports my analysis, I find that it raises more questions than it answers. For example, though most restarts occur when hearer is not gazing, it is more likely that speaker will not produce a restart in such a situation than that he will. Of all the examples in the data, these 11 cases are the ones that would seem to provide the most interesting test of the analysis as well as the opportunity to learn something new about the phenomena being studied. Instead of treating these cases as statistically unimportant exceptions, one might therefore want to look at them carefully.

When the data are examined, it is found that in two of the cases where hearer is not gazing toward the speaker, she is none the less performing activities relevant to the talk in progress. In both cases, current speaker asks her recipient to remember something. One systematic component of the activity of searching for a word is looking into space rather than toward others present. 29 Indeed, in one of the examples, speaker displays explicit recognition of this activity and organizes her own talk with reference to it:

(30) DIANNE: .......... X
| Wh o was it. = Do you remember?
|

MARSHA:

Here speaker talks about recipient being engaged in the task of remembering. Moreover, she does not even leave a space for her recipient to reply at the end of her first question. She is thus able to recognize in the course of her own talk that, rather than showing inattention, recipient's gaze aversion is involved in a specific activity which is relevant to the talk of the moment.

Quite clearly, recipient's lack of gaze in circumstances such as these is not a display of lack of hearership, and speakers do not treat it that way. Thus examples such as these highlight the fact that gaze toward the speaker is but one way of making visible proper hearership and that

29 The practice of averting gaze while searching for a word has been frequently noted not only by students of gaze (Argyle and Cook 1976:122; Kendon 1967:41), but also by psychologists (Kinsbourne 1972) and ethnologists (Worth and Adair 1970:26).
participants have the competence to recognize that in some circumstances an activity that includes gaze aversion may be the most appropriate way to display involvement in the talk of the moment.

If these examples are removed from the no gaze–no restart cell of the contingency table, a chi-square of 6.104 which is significant at the .02 level is obtained.

When the remaining nine cases are examined, it is found that in four of them, though hearer is not yet gazing when speaker’s gaze arrives, she is in the process of moving toward speaker. For example:

(31) MARSHA: ........................................ X________________________
     [Another interesting group were the ones from]
     DIANNE: ........................................ X________________________

Recipients in these examples are thus visibly involved in activities relevant to hearership. The fact that no restarts occur suggest that speakers treat this activity as adequate to establish that proper hearership is present.

By paying attention to examples such as these we are able to refine our understanding of how the phenomena being examined are organized. Thus, though the sharp contrast between presence and absence of gaze is useful as an analytic point of departure, it appears that the distinctions the participants themselves make about what counts as gaze are somewhat more subtle. If these four examples are removed from the no gaze–no restart cell of the frequency distribution, a contingency table with a chi-square of 9.437 which is significant at the .01 level is obtained (the figure would of course be higher if these examples were counted as instances of hearer gaze).

When the remaining five cases are examined, it is found that in four of them speaker brings her gaze to hearer right at the beginning of the turn and that hearer starts to move her gaze very shortly after that:

(32) DIANNE: ... X________________________ . .
     [ (- -) We use th do some really awful things]
     MARSHA: ........................................ X________________________

(33) MARSHA: X________________________
     [ But, another one that went to school with me was]
     DIANNE: ........................................ X________________________

By moving right at turn-beginning, speaker has not allowed recipient time to make her move first. In view of this, it is possible that recipient’s gaze can not yet be treated as relevantly absent. By moving quickly—in a sense, as soon as can be reasonably expected—recipient shows that she is in fact providing proper coparticipation in the turn.

One way to explore further the possibility that such cases are in fact lawful exceptions would be to see what happens when speaker’s gaze is present early in the turn but hearer’s movement does not begin until the turn is well underway. Such cases would contrast with those we have just discussed in that there would be a space of noticeable duration in which speaker was gazing but recipient was not displaying coparticipation in any way. Under these circumstances, it could not be argued that recipient was moving as soon as reasonably possible. When such examples (which did not occur in the particular tape that is the current focus of analysis) are examined, it is found that recipient’s gaze-arrival is marked with a restart:

(34) DIANNE: ........................................ X________________________
     [ (- -) Tch! We couldn’t stand her. so badly we]
     MARSHA: ........................................ X________________________

(35) DIANNE: ........................................ X________________________
     [Broccoli pie 1 thin k that sounds great.]
     MARSHA: ........................................ X________________________

By moving right at turn-beginning, speaker has not allowed recipient time to make her move first. In view of this, it is possible that recipient’s gaze can not yet be treated as relevantly absent. By moving quickly—in a sense, as soon as can be reasonably expected—recipient shows that she is in fact providing proper coparticipation in the turn.

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(36) TOMMY: ........................................ X________________________
     [You agree with– You agree with your aunt on]
     PUMPKIN: ........................................ X________________________

(37) GARY: ........................................ X________________________
     [He’s a policeman in Bellview and he--; I guess he–]
     MIKE: ........................................ X________________________
The data are consistent with the possibility that speakers do sometimes distinguish hearers who have not been given time to move from those whose coparticipation is visibly late.

It should be noted, however, that this is an area in which speakers do seem to have some range of choice as to how a particular case will be treated. Note, for example, the similarity in the timing of recipient's movement in Example (36), where a restart occurs, and Example (34), where the sentence continues without perturbation.

In some cases, recipient's movement might be treated as not simply late but noticeably absent. In the data just examined, the restart was not produced until recipient's gaze actually arrived; recipient was able to begin her movement without visible prompting from speaker. However in the following, when recipient has not moved by the time that the turn is well underway, speaker interrupts the talk in progress to produce a restart which acts as a request for gaze:

(38) BETTY:

| I had about three different- I hear it <A bout three |
| X |

PAM:

(12) BETTY:

| The first catch <I mean Susie- you know she just |
| X |

PAM:

In general, when gaze is requested with a restart, recipient's gaze arrival is not marked by another phrasal break—as is shown, for example, by (7)-(9). In (38), however, a second restart is produced when recipient's gaze arrives. In (12), the transition movement of the recipient is covered with a "you know" so that the substantive beginning of the sentence does not occur until the recipient's gaze actually reaches the speaker. It would thus appear that recipient's very noticeable delay in these examples is being treated as especially serious, getting both a request for gaze and a new sentence beginning when gaze arrives.

The data that we have been examining suggest that the longer recipient's movement is delayed, the more consequential its absence becomes for the talk in progress. If hearer is gazing when speaker's gaze arrives, no perturbation occurs in the talk. If recipient is moving when speaker's gaze arrives, or if the movement starts shortly after speaker is gazing but still near the beginning of the turn, the talk may proceed without interruption, though restarts might sometimes occur. If recipient's movement does not start until after a visible delay, a restart will be produced when gaze at last arrives. If recipient does not even begin to move within a reasonable period of time, speaker will not only interrupt the talk in progress to make a request, but might also place a second restart at the point of gaze arrival, something not done in other cases where the restart is used as a request. It thus appears that what is at issue is not simply absence of gaze but the timing of that absence relative to other events within the turn. In essence, if recipient's involvement in the turn can be seen as noticeably late or absent, then the talk in progress may be treated as impaired.

It may be noted that three distinct places where a restart might be placed have now been described. Two of these are at points where the gaze of one party reaches the other: First, when speaker's gaze reaches a nongazing recipient:

| SPEAKER: .... X_______ |
| UTTERANCE: uuuuuuuuuu Restart uuuuuu |
| RECIPIENT: ........ X_______ |

and, second, when the late-arriving gaze of a recipient reaches a gazing speaker:

| SPEAKER: uuuuuuuuuu Restart uuuuuu |
| UTTERANCE: x_______ |
| RECIPIENT: |

The third place where a speaker might produce a restart is when recipient's movement is noticeably delayed. The production of the restart in this latter situation is not coordinated with the gaze arrival of either speaker or hearer.

| SPEAKER: uuuuuuuuuu Restart uuuuuuuu |
| UTTERANCE: x_______ |
| RECIPIENT: .... X_______ |

Restarts in the first and third positions act as requests.

38 Indeed, on some occasions, even early movement might lead to a restart (note Example (27)).
39 Syntactically, the words spoken here could be a continuation of the prior talk. However, speaker's intonation makes it clear that a new unit is being begun.
40 "Y'know" in this example may function analogously to the use of potentially deleteable terms in positions of possible overlap as analyzed by Jefferson (1973).
Returning to the tape that has provided the basis for this discussion, there is one turn which has not yet been examined. Line 3 of the following, in which speaker gazed at a nongazing recipient but did not produce a restart.

(39) MARSHA: ______
1. Yeah right.

DIANNE: ______

2. ... in Mount Pleasant.

DIANNE: ______

MARSHA: ______
3. r: Right.

DIANNE: ______

It can be observed that this turn, which is extremely short, does not initiate a new activity or strip of talk, but rather performs a specific, limited operation on the just prior turn— that is, it shows agreement. By virtue of its length, sequential position, and retrospective— rather than prospective— orientation, this turn is quite different from most of the other turns that we have been examining. In many respects it is more like a “back channel” agreement than a substantive turn in its own right.

One other phenomenon, which was often present in both turns where a restart was produced and turns where it was not, was withdrawal of gaze from a nongazing recipient, frequently before that party’s gaze arrived.

(35) DIANNE: ____

Bro:collipieIthin kthat sounds great.

MARSHA: X____

(40) MARSHA:

.... X____

I: said asparagus might sound a little bit better.

DIANNE: X____

(25) MARSHA: 

.... X____

‘N he c a— he calls me a Vassar sno:b.

DIANNE: X____

Such an action both shows an orientation to the dispreferred status of gazing at a nongazing recipient and constitutes a way of minimizing that state of affairs.

The analytic gains that have been made by looking carefully at the cases that did not fit our original analysis would seem to lie less in the increases in statistical significance that have been obtained (indeed, if that were all that were at issue what has been done here would surely be overkill) than in the gains that have been made in our understanding of the detailed organization of the phenomena being investigated. For example, we now have a more precise understanding of what counts as gaze for the participants, when it can be seen as late, and some of the ways in which specific types of gaze aversion (for example that found in [30]) might constitute not signs of inattention, but rather displays of involvement in the talk of the moment.

In that the frequency distribution just examined was organized in terms of speaker’s gaze arrival it did not capture cases where restarts were used to request gaze before speaker brought her gaze to recipient. This happened on seven occasions which seemed to fall into two classes. In one, the restart occurs right at turn-beginning:

(41) MARSHA:

But no; uh— thut— uh the Tex ans were the ones that

DIANNE: X____

(42) MARSHA:

But the— the yea r after we left they

DIANNE: X____

(43) MARSHA:

But—uh, but there— there was the Beth el Park— crew.

DIANNE: X____

These restarts appear to be rather different from the restarts produced when a speaker’s gaze reaches a nongazing hearer. First, they occur so early in the turn that almost no information is available about the substance of the speaker’s initial sentence. The talk in progress is less marked as impaired than not fully begun. Second, the restart frequently occurs within a flurry of other hesitations and phrasal breaks. It would seem that in cases such as these, rather than making visible trouble in the talk so far produced, phrasal breaks are being used to indicate right at turn-beginning that gaze will be relevant to the talk about to be produced.33

33 As was noted earlier (Note 19), turns with such a structure are not inconsistent with the presence of encoding processes that might be in progress when an utterance is begun.
In a second class of restarts without speaker gaze, failure by recipient to coparticipate appropriately in the turn is shown in other ways. In the following example, which will be considered in more detail in the next chapter, speaker leaves a pause after an initial phrasal break but recipient fails to move during the pause:

(44) **MARSHA:**

... X_____

[But I: uh, (0.9) Don uh: .. Don’s family moved,

**DIANNE:**

... X_________________

Here, even though speaker has not yet gazed, lack of appropriate coparticipation by recipient is shown by her failure to answer a request for gaze.

This tape also contains 19 turns in which no gaze between speaker and hearer occurs. As was noted earlier, such turns are not inconsistent with the present line of analysis and will be examined in more detail in the next chapter.

To summarize, detailed analysis of the tape examined here supports the line of argument that has been developed in this chapter and also provides the opportunity to conceptualize the processes involved in a more precise fashion.

**Gaze Withdrawal in Midturn**

For clarity, analysis of the achievement of an appropriate state of mutual gaze has so far focused on the beginning of the turn. However gaze is relevant throughout the turn. The same procedures utilized to establish an initial state of mutual gaze at the beginning of the turn can be employed to renegotiate an appropriate state of gaze between the participants later in the turn. In the following example, a speaker loses the gaze of her recipient in midturn. By producing an “uh” followed by a pause, she constructs a request for a hearer. The further development of her utterance is delayed through use of the pause until the gaze of her recipient is once again secured:

(45) **MARGIE:**

And he put it all the way up my back which was a

**ROSS:**

________________________

[big uh (-----) help on that.

**MARGIE:**

__________ X_____

The following provides another example of such a process:

(46) **TINA:**

You remember that— that white (1.0) that sweater

**MARLENE:**

... X_____

**TINA:**

... X___________

sweater r with the (0.6) it was Earl’s,

**MARLENE:**

... X___________

The speaker thus has the ability to request and obtain the gaze of his recipient not just at turn-beginning, but throughout the turn.

It is, however, possible for gaze-withdrawal in midturn to be found acceptable. Note that such an act is not exactly the same as failing to gaze at turn-beginning. The party withdrawing has already displayed orientation to the speaker and the talk of the moment with the gaze so far provided within the turn. In this sense, subsequent positions within the turn differ from turn-beginning.

In the following, recipient withdraws gaze in midturn, but, while doing so, performs other actions to show speaker that she is still acting as a hearer:

(47) **MARSHA:**

X___________

There was a girl named Candy

**DIANNE:**

Nod Nod

**MARSHA:**

McCready, who lived over, in the e...East

[Mmmh,

**DIANNE:**

Nod NOD NOD

**MARSHA:**

End. It was a very obvious difference.

[Mmm

**DIANNE:**

nod Nod

**--- For more detailed analysis of how gaze withdrawal is performed with reference to the sequential structure of the talk of the moment, and of how both speaker and recipient orient to gaze withdrawal, see Goodwin (forthcoming).---**
As recipient withdraws, she uses both a vocal "Mmmhm" and a very noticeable nod to show that she is still attending the talk in progress. Further, it appears that these actions constitute somewhat special displays of hearership. For example, vocal signs of attention do not occur until recipient withdraws her gaze; nods do occur while recipient is gazing, but the nods produced at the point of withdrawal are visibly accentuated. Thus, as she withdraws her gaze, recipient mitigates the reading of diminished hearership that might be made by performing other actions to show that hearership is still being provided.\(^35\)

After gaze has been withdrawn, recipient sits with her eyes in front of her in a middle-distance look (this is indicated in the transcript with "X").

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**Securing the Gaze of Multiple Recipients**

As an acceptable display of hearership. However, at least in this data, such an action is not a free alternative to gaze toward the speaker, but rather something that has been made visible as a display of hearership for the current talk through the special sequential work done as gaze was withdrawn from speaker.

Participants thus orient to gaze-withdrawal as an act that may be interpreted as a display of diminished hearership. Speaker has the ability to request that gaze be returned by using the same procedures available for securing gaze at turn-beginning. However, recipient may establish that hearership is still being provided by performing other talk-relevant actions, such as nods and vocal displays of hearership, as gaze is withdrawn.

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It can be observed that speaker returns her gaze to recipient while she is seated with this middle-distance look, but does not produce any request for gaze at this point in her talk. The middle-distance look is thus treated

\(^{35}\) The way in which recipient withdraws her gaze here constitutes an instance of activity-occupied withdrawal, a phenomenon that will be examined in more detail in the next chapter.
The procedures examined in this chapter for achieving an appropriate state of mutual gaze between speaker and hearer are thus available throughout the turn and are capable of coordinating the gaze of several recipients with the utterance of the speaker.

Modifying Gaze and Talk to Achieve Appropriate Mutual Gaze

Some basic resources for organizing gaze within the turn at talk have now been examined. On occasion, however, additional processes may be involved. The following provides an example of how a speaker might both modify her own nonvocal action and construct a variety of vocal actions addressed to different recipients in order to negotiate an appropriate state of mutual gaze at turn-beginning. The speaker, beginning to construct an utterance, starts to bring her gaze to its recipient. However, her chosen recipient does not move into orientation toward her. Just as her eyes reach this recipient, she pulls them away from him.

By modifying her emerging gaze movement, speaker manages to avoid gaz ing at a nongazing hearer.

However, the problem of securing the gaze of her recipient remains. In the examples so far considered, a phrasal break has been used to accomplish this task; in the present example, the speaker produces an explicit summons at this point. However, the summons is officially directed to someone other than the recipient she has just turned away from: As she begins to produce this utterance, the speaker is taking a Kleenex from her purse to give to her son who is eating a dripping ice cream bar. When she moves her eyes away from her first proposed recipient, she moves them toward her son and summons his attention with the word "Here!"

You know Don Masters

You know Don Masters = Her e!
Despite the fact that the summons is officially directed to someone other than the speaker's first proposed recipient, as a marked break in the flow of an utterance, it may constitute a general signal that the services of a hearer are required (as has already been noted, several recipients may start to move after a phrasal break). And in fact the summons does secure the gaze of both the speaker's son and the original proposed recipient of her turn.

**KATE:** .................. N, ...... Son

[ ]

You know Don M bers = Her e!

**NED:** ............ X

**SON:** ............ X

In effect, the speaker is able to utilize this summons to secure the gaze of her original recipient while simultaneously arguing that in fact the summons is not directed to him but to someone else. Several purposes are served by such a structure of action. First, no problem in the state of mutual gaze between the speaker and her first proposed recipient is officially recognized. Second, mothers are entitled to perform certain actions to their children that they would not be permitted to perform to other adults. With this summons, the speaker chastises her son for not being attentive to her and taking the Kleenex sooner. She is thus able to complain about a coparticipant’s lack of attentiveness without officially lodging the complaint against the party whose failure to pay attention to her caused her to move to her son in the first place.

The subsequent course of the utterance provides some evidence that the speaker in fact recognizes the possibility that her summons might secure the gaze not only of her son but also of her first proposed recipient. Specifically, immediately after the summons, the speaker returns to the onward development of her original sentence:

**KATE:** .................. N, ...... Son

[ ]

You know Don M bers = Her e! pitch the d. hor:shoe s a

**NED:** ............ X

**SON:** ........................ X

When the speaker's summons obtains the gaze of her original recipient, the possibility emerges that the turn can after all be constructed so that the speaker's gaze reaches her recipient only after her recipient has begun to gaze at her. After her recipient begins to move into orientation toward her, the speaker starts to shift her gaze to him:

**KATE:** .................. N, ...... Son

[ ]

You know Don M bers = Her e! pitch the d.

**NED:** ............ X

**KATE:** ............ Ned

[ ]

hor:shoe s a week er so ago with Chuck?

**NED:**

When the speaker's eyes reach her recipient, she finds that she is already being gazed at by him. However, as we have seen, such a state of affairs is in fact the achieved product of rather careful work on her part: She first avoided looking at a recipient who was not looking at her by transforming the beginning of a look toward him into a look toward her son. She then added an explicit summons to her turn, also apparently addressed to her son. Only after this summons has obtained her original recipient's gaze does she return her gaze to him. The achievement of appropriate mutual gaze in this turn thus involves changes in the emerging structure of both the movement speaker is making and the utterance she is producing.

It may be noted that this example, as well as the other analysis developed in this chapter, strongly challenges recent work (Rutter et al. 1977; Rutter and Stephenson 1979) arguing that eye contact is simply a chance event.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter some procedures available to participants in natural conversation for coordinating the separate actions of speaker and hearer in the construction of the turn at talk have been investigated. It has been found that the gaze of both parties is a relevant feature of many turns in face-to-face conversation and that the participants have access to, and make use of, systematic procedures for achieving appropriate states of mutual gaze. The use of these procedures produces characteristic phe-

* For some analysis of ways in which establishing mutual attention to some common
nominal phenomenon in the speaker's utterance, including restarts, pauses, and hesitations of various types. These phenomena have usually been attributed to processes internal to the speaker and have been treated as performance errors on his part. The present analysis has shown that, though such phenomena can reflect difficulty the speaker is having in producing his utterance, they can also function interactively, and indeed demonstrate the speaker's attention to the construction of coherent sentences for his recipient.

It should also be noted that the structures that have been described here permit there to be variation in the amount of gaze that occurs within a turn (see, for example, p. 75). The systematic presence of such variability has a number of implications. On the one hand it suggests that quantitative measures of overall frequency (the method which has usually been used to study gaze in psychology and sociology) may not be an appropriate way to study the organization of gaze as an activity in its own right. Not only does summing the duration of separate events lump together phenomena that participants treat as quite distinct (for example, lack of gaze may mean quite different things at different places), but the possibility for considerable variation in the frequency of a particular type of event is built into the system itself. It is thus not at all surprising that attempts to use frequency to uncover the organization of phenomena such as eye-contact are able to come to the conclusion that they are just chance events. On the other hand, the possibility for variation provides the resources for gaze during talk to be turned to the service of a variety of other social processes such as establishing intimacy, dominance, or hostility (for a review of much of the research investigating the use of gaze in such processes, see Argyle and Cook 1976).

3

Notes on the Organization of Engagement

The phenomenon dealt with in the last chapter, a state of mutual gaze within a speaker-hearer relationship, is of course but one of many patterns of orientation that participants might assume toward each other during the course of a conversation. The present chapter will investigate some of the ways in which different structures of orientation are organized, how participants move from one of the alternatives open to them to another, and the consequences that such displays have for the organization of their talk. This analysis thus continues a line of investigation begun in the last chapter, but attempts to place within a broader framework the engagement structure that was studied there.

Engagement Displays

The present analysis will restrict itself entirely to events occurring during the time that a state of copresence that has already been established is being sustained.

Within such limitations, the fact that the participants are physically copresent is a constant. However, the form that their presence to each other takes is not. This can be seen most easily by comparing Figures 3.1 and 3.2, which are tracings from a videotape of a single conversation.