Studies in Interactional Sociolinguistics

*Discourse strategies* John J. Gumperz
*Language and social identity* edited by John J. Gumperz
*The social construction of literacy* edited by Jenny Cook-Gumperz
*Politeness: some universals in language usage* Penelope Brown and Stephen C. Levinson
*Discourse markers* Deborah Schiffrin
*Talking voices* Deborah Tannen
*Conducting interaction* Adam Kendon
*Talk at work* edited by Paul Drew and John Heritage
*Grammar in interaction* Cecilia E. Ford
*Crosstalk and culture in Sino-American communication* Linda W. L. Young
*Aids counselling: institutional interaction and clinical practice* Anssi Peräkylä
*Prosody in conversation* edited by Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen and Margaret Selting

Interaction and grammar

*edited by*

ELINOR OCHS
University of California, Los Angeles

EMANUEL A. SCHEGLOFF
University of California, Los Angeles

SANDRA A. THOMPSON
University of California, Santa Barbara
terns of conversational discourse in shaping morphosyntactic regularities. She is the co-author with Charles Li of Mandarin Chinese: A Functional Reference Grammar. She has co-edited Studies in Transitivity with Paul Hopper, and Clause Combining in Grammar and Discourse with John Haiman.

1

Introduction

EMANUEL A. SCHEGLOFF, ELINOR OCHS, AND SANDRA A. THOMPSON

One of sociology’s ancestral figures, Emile Durkheim, with whom DeSaussure is often linked, is known (among many other contributions) for the claim that “the social” is not reducible to the psychological or the biological, or the sum of any individual attributes. It is, he said, an emergent phenomenon, a distinct level of organization; it is, he said, a reality sui generis – unto itself, of its own sort (Durkheim, 1938 [1895], 1951, among others). Some cynical (or astute, depending on one’s point of view) students of intellectual history, of the history of sociology and of the social sciences more generally, and practitioners of the sociology of knowledge have remarked that this claim needs to be understood as part of a struggle to find a place for sociology in the structure of French academic life at the turn of the century. To have as the object of one’s study a domain which was autonomous, which could not be reduced to other people’s work and subject matter, was arguably one prerequisite for establishing one’s own organizational niche, for establishing one’s own standards of quality work, of important problems, of acceptable methods, of distinctive theories, and the like, and the professional license and mandate – the professional autonomy – to administer them.

None of this – even if true – has any bearing, of course, on the theoretical or empirical merit of Durkheim’s claim. To hold otherwise would be to commit the so-called genetic fallacy. Yet it can enrich our understanding to have called to our attention that there can be secular (i.e., material) as well as sacred (i.e., theoretical) grounds for insisting on the total autonomy of one’s subject matter from any apparently overlapping or even contiguous domains of phenomena and inquiry.
Sociology is hardly the only academic discipline to have had to struggle to establish a place for itself within the bureaucratic organization of contemporary academic life. It was not until the 1960s, for example, that Departments of Linguistics began to be established as undertakings with a proper subject matter domain of their own, in which linguists could do “their own thing,” rather than serve as marginal adjuncts to Departments of Language and Literature, such as English, French, German, etc. – caught between language teaching and literary scholarship. It is surely no coincidence that this departmental autonomy within the academy was directly linked to the claims of the then newly ascending other. The key documents in the latter regard were, of course, evidence that this departmental autonomy within the academy was directly linked to the claims of the then newly ascending other. The key documents in the latter regard were, of course, Chomsky’s review (1959) of B. F. Skinner’s *Verbal Behavior* and his attack (1957: 18-25) on information-theoretic models of language use such as Shannon and Weaver’s *Mathematical Theory of Communication* (1949). This disciplinary autonomy was grounded theoretically as well, in the claimed autonomy of syntax as the backbone of the biological faculty called “language.”

There were, then, diverse resonances – the purely theoretical merits aside – for that approach to language (and to syntax in particular) which took it to be a well-formed structure in its own right, built to stand on its own, with its coherence and structure best understood as self-enclosed integrity. Its proper understanding would then be equally internally shaped, and only marginally affected by our understanding of, for example, other “mental capacities,” or the cultures which are irremediably intertwined with the semantics and the lexicon of a language, let alone its pragmatics and the contexts in which language develops and is used.

The contributors to this volume are exploring a different way of approaching and understanding grammar. For them, grammar is part of a broader range of resources – organizations of practices, if you will – which underlie the organization of social life, and in particular the way in which language figures in everyday interaction and cognition. In this view, the involvement of grammar in such other organizations as those of culture, action and interaction has as a consequence that matters of great moment are missed if gram-
these budding common interests has continued to expand. This volume presents a sampling of the state of work at their interfaces.\(^3\)

This undertaking is not yet a well-formed enterprise: the topics taken up here are varied and not systematically related to one another; the ways of working at them are equally diverse, and the authors hold themselves (and are held) responsible to quite different audiences and constituencies in the analytic themes which they sound and in the ways in which they address them.

That is where things stand now; little is to be gained by imposing an artificial order. What may be more helpful is briefly to take stock of the recent trajectories of these "feeder streams," so that readers can have a sense of where the authors are coming from. These accounts must, of necessity, be thumbnail sketches, and they are irremediably perspectival — each written from the perspective of the editor's feeder stream (Ochs for linguistic anthropology, Thompson for functional linguistics, Schegloff for sociology/conversation analysis), and not necessarily seen in the same light by the others (although there is a fair degree of consensus among us).

1.1.1 Linguistic anthropology

In the early decades of this century, Franz Boas formulated his program of cultural anthropology on the assumption that linguistic inquiry is necessary to investigating the mental habits and social life of a people (1911). For Boas and his student Edward Sapir (1927, 1933), grammatical analysis is essential to the enterprise of ethnology in that grammatical categories reflect fundamental, unconscious, cultural patterns of thinking and acting. Grammars are deeply socio-cultural and integral to cross-cultural analysis because they illuminate how humans structure the world.

Sapir's writings in particular promoted a radical view of how grammar and the lexicon relate to social life. He suggested that language does not stand apart from experience as a parallel symbolic structure but rather "completely interpenetrates with it" (1974: 49). Sapir proposed that this interpenetration of language and life is pervasive: "For the normal person every experience, real or potential, is saturated with verbalism" (1974: 49-50). Language is not only a tool for thinking, it is also a tool for acting. Language

Introduction

is not only embedded in social intercourse; it is also itself a form of social intercourse.

Boas and Sapir championed the study of language as both thought and action, articulated human similarities as well as differences, foregrounded individual variation within social groups, and conceptualized the relation of grammar to custom as subtle and indirect. However, their ideas became rigidified in the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis to mean (for many) that the grammar of a language unidirectionally and uniformly molds its speakers into distinct patterns of thinking and behaving (Whorf, 1956). This formulation gave rise to studies relating lexical and grammatical categories within a particular language to distinct conceptual systems of its speakers (Conklin, 1955; Goodenough, 1956; Hoijer, 1951, among others). With some exceptions (e.g. Frake, 1964), linguistic relativists tended to relate linguistic systems to thought without recording and closely examining how such systems actually interpenetrate with activities and become constitutive features of social action. In part because of technological limitations and in part because of a professional disposition to capture underlying cultural patterns, these studies characterized language behavior in social life largely in terms of underlying features, habits, norms, and integrated fashions of speaking, gleaned primarily from participant observations, interviews, and secondary sources.

While a cadre of linguists and anthropologists continued to conduct research on indigenous languages and cultures, urban dialects, and multilingual communities, formal linguistics became increasingly concerned with Universal Grammar rather than grammars as holistic systems and with syntactic structure rather than semantic categories. In the 1960s, Dell Hymes asked, "Is the role of prime collaborator of linguistics among the sciences now to pass to psychology?" (1962/1974: 190). Hymes encouraged linguists to "move outward into the exploration of speech behavior and use" (1962/1974: 193). John Gumperz and Dell Hymes (1964) promoted extending linguistic inquiry to units of analysis such as the speech act, the speech event, the speech situation, and the speech community. They redrew the boundaries of linguistic competence to include communicative competence as well as grammatical competence. But these messages fell on deaf linguistic ears; the enterprises of linguistics and anthropology drew rapidly apart. Grammatical
analysis faded from the syllabi of most anthropology programs; anthropology departments hired fewer and fewer linguists, rendering linguistics the least represented among the the four perspectives (physical, cultural, archeology, linguistics) that comprise the discipline of anthropology in the United States.

As grammar lost its centrality among cultural anthropologists, social action assumed a more important analytic role in the field. This shift paralleled a sea change across disciplines away from an analytic focus on timeless mental competence and atemporal structural analysis towards a focus on unfolding, socially co-ordinated, temporally and spatially situated "interactional rituals" (Goffman, 1964, 1967, 1974), "practices" (Garfinkel, 1967; Bourdieu, 1977, 1990; Schegloff, 1972), "activities" (Vygotsky, 1978; Leontyev, 1981), and "talk-in-interaction" (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson, 1974; Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks, 1977; Schegloff, 1987). In these approaches, people are not visualized as passive bearers of unconscious patterns of language and culture, but rather as active agents whose actions and sensibilities at different moments influence the organization, meaning, and outcome of events. While performance is loosely motivated and organized by conventions, principles, and expectations, it is not predictable from mental scripts of situations. Rather, everyday social life is appropriately characterized by historically positioned, situationally contingent moves and strategies of active participants. Moreover, through these moves and strategies, members actively (re)construct, for themselves and for others, orderly ways of being in and understanding the world. In this sense, competence enters into a dialectical relation with performance in that each impacts the other, each is a resource for the other, each helps to constitute the other.

For linguistic anthropologists, an interest in social interaction is a compatible extension of their concern with speaking as situated action. However, the above mentioned approaches to practices, joint activity, and contingent accomplishments differ from the structuralist zeitgeist that characterized much of linguistic anthropology up through the early days of the Ethnography of Speaking. For example, Hymes called for reconfiguring the competence-performance distinction by encompassing communicative as well as grammatical competence and concomitantly shrinking the bounds of what was considered mere performance. However, this redesign preserved the competence-performance dichotomy and privileged competence over performance as the analytic focus of the discipline. Further, in the early 1960s when Hymes launched the study of "the situations and uses, the patterns and functions, of speaking as an activity in its own right" (Hymes, 1962/1974: 191), he advocated utilizing Roman Jakobson's framework of paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations (Jakobson and Halle, 1956) as well as Jakobson's dimensions of a speech event (1960) to analyze the structures and functions of speaking across communities. This methodology inspired comparative research on communicative events, including studies by one of the editors of this volume (e.g. Keenan, 1973, 1974; Ochs, 1984). These accounts, however, generally objectified the communicative event and de-emphasized the subjective experience of moving through these events and collaboratively building actions and meanings with other persons over interactional and historical time.

A more phenomenological turn emerged later in linguistic anthropology – for example, in interactional accounts of cross-cultural miscommunication (Gumperz, 1982), language socialization (e.g. Goodwin, 1990; Heath, 1983; Kulick, 1992; Ochs, 1992a, 1992b; Schieffelin, 1990), intentionality and authorship (Duranti and Brenneis, 1986; Hill and Irvine, 1992), professional discourse (Cicourel, 1992; Goodwin, 1994), and context more broadly (Duranti and Goodwin, 1992; Hanks, 1990). Although varying in focus, these anthropological accounts articulated how in the course of historically situated social interactions participants formulate and co-ordinate their utterances, gestures, and other actions to co-construct understandings, misunderstandings, social personae, relationships, stances, activities, and/or modes of learning, knowing, and controlling the world. For some researchers, an interaction-centered anthropology of language means relating strategies for engaging in verbal interaction to the socialization, maintenance, and transformation of social realities such as the family, the school, work, or community political structures. Others relate verbal interaction to the socialization, maintenance, and transformation of ideologies, including ideologies of spoken and written language. And others have returned to the question of how grammatical and lexical structure relates to society and culture by articulating ways in which linguistic structures are themselves interactional. In
his study of deixis in a Mayan community, William Hanks distills the essence of this perspective (1990: 4): “This is the real rub: reference is a kind of communicative action which occurs as part of an interactive manifold.” This position is resonant with Sapir’s conviction that language is not a symbolic system that runs parallel to experience but rather interpenetrates experience. An anthropology of language in this sense warrants studying not only how linguistic and socio-cultural histories inform social interaction, but also how interactional processes universally and locally motivate, give meaning to, and otherwise organize language, society and culture.

1.1.2 Functional grammar

The area of research which has come to be known informally during the last two decades or so as “functional grammar” has encompassed a wide variety of endeavors. What all these have in common is an emphasis on “grammar,” taken generally as morphosyntax, and a commitment to examining grammatical data in terms of functional considerations, that is, in terms of the ways in which language functions as a tool of human communication. It has been clear to all involved that this commitment has consistently stood in opposition to a view of language, and more particularly grammar, as an autonomous faculty of human cognition.

Within this broad conception of “functionalism,” a number of important contributions to our understanding of language as it functions in communication have emerged, most densely in four or five roughly demarcated areas of work. One intensively worked area is that of typology and universals (e.g., Comrie, 1989; Givón, 1984, 1990; Greenberg, 1978; Li, 1976; Nichols and Woodbury, 1985; Shopen, 1985, inter alia). A continuing emphasis on cross-linguistic generalizations throughout this period has greatly increased the degree of sophistication with which languages are described with respect to almost every aspect of “grammar.” Comparison across languages has enhanced the capacity to generalize e.g., about how tense-aspect systems get grammaticalized (e.g., Bybee, 1985; Bybee et al., 1994; Cole and Sadock, 1977; Comrie, 1976, 1985; Hopper, 1982 inter alia), what possible types of grammatical relations systems there are (e.g., Comrie, 1978; Croft, 1991; Dixon, 1979; Foley and Van Valin, 1984; Hopper and Thompson, 1980; Mithun, 1991; Shibatani, 1988, inter alia), how classifiers work in languages that have them (e.g., Craig, 1986), how number can be expressed (e.g., Mithun, 1988), what types of clause-combining strategies languages can have (e.g., Austin, 1988; Haiman and Thompson, 1988), what the possible ways of expressing causation are (e.g., Comrie and Polinsky 1993; Shibatani, 1976), and how grammaticalization works by converting lexical resources into grammatical ones (e.g., Bybee, 1985; Bybee et al., 1994; Hopper and Traugott, 1993; Heine, Claudi, and Hünnemeyer, 1991).

During the same period, work in lexical semantics and cognitive models – such as that by Fillmore, Kay and their associates (e.g., inter alia, Fillmore, 1988, 1989; Fillmore, Kay, and O’Connor, 1988), by Lakoff and his associates (e.g., Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987), by Langacker and his associates (e.g., Langacker, 1987, 1991), and by Van Valin and his associates (e.g., Van Valin, 1990, 1993) – has brought to light a number of insights into regularities in word “meanings” and constructions. This work, often associated with the rubrics “construction grammar,” “cognitive grammar,” and “role and reference grammar,” focusses on naming and categorization processes, the nature of grammatical constructions, prototype theory, and the operation and effects of metaphor. A related effort has been mounted under the rubric “functional grammar,” associated with the name of Simon Dik (1981, 1983) and his associates, and a more socially oriented semantically based model of grammatical structure has been the focus of attention for a group centered around M. A. K. Halliday and his associates, known as “systemic functional grammar” (e.g., Halliday, 1985).

Within psycholinguistics since the mid-1970s, several lines of work have most directly been preoccupied with the ways in which language figures in social interaction. In psycholinguistic research on communication per se, the work of H. Clark and his associates (e.g., Clark and Wikes-Gibbs, 1986; Clark and Schaeffer, 1987; Clark and Gerrig, 1989; Clark and Brennan, 1991) is perhaps the most sustained and visible. In the area of child language, functionally oriented work – done as much by psychologists (e.g., Bates et al., 1988; Bloom, 1973; Bruner, 1983; Ervin-Tripp, 1979; Garvey, 1984; Greenfield et al., 1985; MacWhinney, 1987, inter
al) as by linguists (e.g., Clancy, 1986; E. Clark, 1978; Halliday, 1975, inter alia) — has shown how children acquire grammatical constructions and learn to use them in appropriate contexts — constructions such as classifiers, questions, relative clauses, tense-aspect markers and other aspects of verb morphology, etc., and this work has been enhanced by cross-linguistic work by developmental psychologists (see especially the contributions to Slobin, 1985, 1992) and by anthropologists such as Ochs (1988) and Schieffelin (1990).

Arising from, and centered around, a recognition of the importance of approaching grammar in terms of its natural contexts of use, in the late 1970s a new area of functional linguistics began to emerge, which could be called discourse-and-grammar. A central tenet of the researchers defining this area has been that, if we take seriously the claim that the function of language as a tool of human communication is the central motivation for observed grammatical patterns, then the study of grammar entails both taking actual discourse as one's primary data, and explicitly relating the structure of grammar to the structure of discourse (cf., for example, Halliday, 1978, 1985; Quirk, 1960; Quirk et al., 1972). Notable proponents of this view include those outlining the relation between grammar and narrative structure (e.g., Chafe, 1980 inter alia), as well as many pursuing the study of grammatical phenomena in written texts (e.g., Firbas, 1971; Fox, 1987; Halliday, 1985; Thompson, 1983; Thompson and Matthiessen, 1989, inter alia), comparisons between written and spoken texts (such as Biber, 1988; Chafe and Danielewicz, 1987; Firbas, 1992; and the survey in Chafe and Tannen, 1987), and interactions among children and caregivers (cf. selected citations above regarding child language). Additional stimulus was imparted to this theme by the rapid development of computational linguistics (cf., for example, Grosz and Sidner, 1986). Later, inspired in part by the work of Sankoff and Brown, 1976, even more explicit claims began to be made regarding the way in which grammatical structure is deeply related to, and explainable in terms of, discourse structure (e.g., Du Bois, 1985, 1987; Givón, 1984). Hopper, 1988 captured this relationship with the phrase emergent grammar, showing that in fact grammar must be seen as emerging from discourse.

A partially overlapping research tradition with functionalist commitments has been that stream of sociolinguistics associated with the names of Labov (1972a, 1972b), D. Sankoff (1978), G. Sankoff (1980) and their associates. To be sure, the bulk of this work, under the “variationist” rubric, has tried to relate grammar to context in a demographic sense, focussing on communities ranging from New York to Montreal (Laberge and G. Sankoff, 1979; G. Sankoff and Vincent, 1980), from Britain (e.g., Milroy, 1980; Trudgill, 1978) to Papua New Guinea (Sankoff, 1980). On the other hand, another component of sociolinguistic work has had a more situational flavor, examining the linguistic construction of stylistic variation (Labov, 1966), ritual insult exchanges (Labov, 1972c), therapeutic discourse (Labov and Fanshel, 1977), and narratives of personal experience (Labov, 1972d). This work reflects both the interest in working with texts and a concern for how grammar is deployed to achieve particular outcomes.

While precedents existed in psycholinguistic and sociolinguistic studies and in work such as that of Crystal, 1969; Fries, 1952; and Pittenger et al., 1960, only recently has functional linguists’ attention focussed on the close examination of grammatical data from social interactions in real time. One could say that out of the study of discourse-and-grammar, we are now seeing the development of studies of interaction-and-grammar. Intriguingly, for linguists immersed in this endeavor, real-time data have inspired a radical shift in the kind of question being asked. These data are now prompting functional linguists to ask in what ways an understanding of the profoundly interactional nature of spoken language can be brought to bear on our understanding of what we take grammar to be. These scholars are beginning to examine the probability that categories of grammatical description need to be made responsible to the categories appropriate to describing communicative interaction. As Hopper (1988) has suggested, (interactionally) emergent grammar may well not be grammar-as-linguists-know-it. These questions and directions guide several of the contributions in this volume, especially Ford and Thompson, Fox, Hayashi and Jasperson, and Sorjonen.

1.1.3 Conversation analysis

Although informed by input from disciplines ranging from anthropology to classics, communications to philosophy, linguistics to
psychology, conversation analysis emerged within the academic context of American sociology. The place one might expect to find a concern with grammar in sociology would be sociolinguistics. It is symptomatic of the disciplinary remoteness between sociology and matters linguistic, however, both that sociolinguistics has been a relatively minor branch of American sociology, and that grammar has not been near the center of its attention.

Although there has been intermittent work in sociolinguistics for some fifty years, its roots in sociology are not deep, in the sense that it has not been as close to core concerns of the field as language has been in anthropology; it has not commanded a broad interest within the discipline; nor has it preoccupied the central figures in the field, in spite of arguably involvement by such major classical sociologists as Durkheim (in his concern with embodiments of cultural conceptions of space, time and causality, or other aspects of cultural classificatory schemes; Durkheim, 1954 [1915]; Durkheim and Mauss, 1963) and Mannheim, whose sociology-of-knowledge analysis of the elective affinity of conservative thought for the image of society as organism and the consequences of this usage (Mannheim, 1953a, 1953b, 1986) might strike some readers as anticipatory of the kind of metaphor analysis associated at present with the name of George Lakoff (e.g., Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).

For some sociological sociolinguists (e.g., Hughes, 1969, 1970; Lieberson, 1970, 1981; Fishman, 1966, 1972, 1989), a concern with language has been in substantial measure prompted by, and a focus for studying aspects of, ethnicity and nationality; but whether for this or other purposes (e.g., Cicourel, 1974a, 1974b, 1980; Grimshaw, 1981; Mehan, 1979), the language was often more or less invoked tout court, rather than having its forms registered differentially in a technically specified manner, and was explored as either dependent or independent variables (to adopt, for the moment, the kind of methodological paradigm with which the field generally conceived projects), rather than as process or practice.

But sociological sociolinguistics gets only cursory mention here, for that was not really the source of the conversation-analytic impulse in sociology. Sociological sociolinguistics was on the whole a piece with (and at peace with) mainstream sociology both theoretically and methodologically (although not politically, if one locates work on gender within sociolinguistics rather than gender studies, e.g., Thorne and Henley, 1975; Thorne, Kramarae, and Henley, 1983). It sought to extend the reach of sociology to a neglected dimension of social life, and to bring into view the relevance of language as a sometimes defining component of the identity and collective life of sub-groups of a society. By contrast, CA was engendered in important respects by developments in sociology which were substantially at odds with its contemporary tenor.

The two key "forebear" figures here are Erving Goffman and Harold Garfinkel. Although they have on occasion been referred to as sociolinguists, and Goffman on occasion so characterized some of his own writing, their work was of such a different character as to make the appellation virtually misleading. Both were rather preoccupied with the fundamentals of sociality, social interaction and social order, and are now appreciated much more as theorists than as sociolinguists.

Goffman (who had studied, as it happens, with Everett Hughes at the University of Chicago) had launched a distinctive program of studies of the organization of conduct in face-to-face interaction in the early to mid-1950s in a modality which was somehow both anthropological and social psychological. By the mid-1960s this work was converging with anthropological work sufficiently that Goffman was a contributor to the special issue of the American Anthropologist in which the Ethnography of Communication came to substantially greater professional visibility. One key linkage was the very topic of Goffman's contribution to that publication, "The situation" (his paper was entitled, "The neglected situation," 1964).

A critical component of the stance emerging from linguistic anthropology - in dialectic with the preoccupation in "autonomous linguistics" with universal grammar and ideal speaker/hearer - was the contextual specification of linguistic "performance." The social situation - a unit which Goffman was elaborating in a series of publications (1961, 1963, 1971) around that time and subsequently - was admirably suited to serve as the most proximate context for uses of language, however the situation might otherwise be "located" by reference to other, "larger-scaled," social and cultural structures. Although one of Goffman's main points in "The neglected situation" was that the contingencies of
“situations” were not specific to language, and were socio-interactional rather than linguistic in character, the most ready and relevant exploitation of this line of inquiry focussed on the bearing of “the situation” – or particular situations – on the behavior of language deployed in it. But although Goffman was in increasingly dense scholarly contact with both linguists (especially, in the last decade and a half of his career, William Labov and associates) and linguistic anthropologists (such as John Gumperz and Dell Hymes), he was cautious about himself taking up a scholarly stance on the details of linguistic matters. Indeed, the closest he came was in his paper “Felicity’s Condition” (1983), which he withheld from publication even after it was accepted by the journal in which it was eventually published posthumously, for fear that he lacked adequate technical understanding himself, and that he had not been briefed with sufficient critical edge by his linguistic colleagues. The exigencies of language and interaction were thus brought into contiguity, but not to interpenetration.

Garfinkel’s development through the 1950s and 1960s of the program of inquiry he called “ethnomethodology” (Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 1984) was importantly informed by considerations about language, but not about language distinctively, or in the ways then central to linguistic thinking or theorizing. A few key points will have to suffice here.

Garfinkel’s undertaking – although quite distinct from phenomenology per se – took some inspiration from a number of figures writing in the phenomenological idiom (e.g., Husserl, Schütz, Gurwitsch, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger), and shared a focal interest in the practices by which the world is apperceived by the sentient being. This included how signs and sign systems were interpreted and understood, and, consequently, how language – as one important system of signs – was interpreted and understood.

Early in his studies, Garfinkel was at pains to show the inadequacy of a device common in the sociological and anthropological theorizing then current – the notion of a common culture as a guarantor of shared understanding and/or of social order. He showed in various demonstrations that “common” or “shared” could not mean that sets of the same contents, same meanings, same norms or rules, were inscribed in the minds/brains of separate persons, and were independently triggered and brought to bear on the production and decoding of signs, whether linguistic or otherwise. Garfinkel discerned a profound indexicality about all sign systems that made the privileged treatment of proterms and demonstratives in this regard appear shallow and impoverished. He drew attention instead to the practices of common-sense theorizing in particularized local contexts of practical action by which the meaning or import of actions, signs, symbols, and other vehicles of communication, action and appearance were convergently and contingently established.

Although there is much which differentiates CA from many central features of ethnomethodology along these lines, the local determination of action and understanding has ethnomethodology as its most substantial and proximate source. However, although some would disagree with this assessment, the emphasis in ethnomethodology – perhaps as a consequence of the phenomenological idiom in which it was conceived – was on the uptake, interpretation and understanding of apperceiveable elements of the surround, and much less on their production. The resources which it made available for an exploration in depth of the reflexive relationship between situational particulars and “the situated” (including situated language), were thus somewhat asymmetrical resources. The practices it brought to attention (and ethnomethodology was among the first lines of inquiry in American social science to feature the notion of “practice” as a key analytic and interpretive tool) were most likely to be interpretive practices, leaving under-addressed the contingencies by reference to which the conduct to be interpreted had come to have the features and character which it did. This has so far turned out to be an asymmetry difficult to redress within the terms of those forms of ethnomethodology itself.

Conversation analysis is by no means a straightforward product of the combination of ethnomethodology and Goffmanian interaction analysis, however much it has profited from the new directions of inquiry both have opened. (On the relationship between conversation analysis and ethnomethodology, cf., inter alia, Clayman, frth.; Clayman and Maynard, 1995; Goodwin and Heritage, 1990; Heritage, 1984; Maynard and Clayman, 1991.) Its exploitation of recorded episodes of quotidian interaction – both as an object of inquiry supporting its empirical bent, and as a source of disciplined control on analysis – is but one of many contrasts with
these sources, but one which has issued in marked differences in its
directions of inquiry and in the character and "texture" of its pro-
ducts.

While the disciplinary origins of the contributors to this volume,
and the intra-disciplinary variations which inform the intellectual
ferment which fuels it, are diverse, there are commonalities. More
often Wittgensteinian family resemblances than Aristotelian criteria
of category membership, there are common themes,

While the recent development of mechanical devices for the easy recording
of the speech of persons in all types of situations there seems to be little
excuse for the use of linguistic material not taken from actual communicative
practice when one attempts to deal with a living language. Even though
the investigator is himself a native speaker of the language and a sophisti-
cated and trained observer he cannot depend completely on himself as an
informant and use introspection as his sole source of material. He has a
much more satisfactory base from which to proceed with linguistic analysis
if he has a large body of mechanically recorded language which he can hear
repeated over and over, and which he can approach with more objectivity
than he can that which he furnishes from himself as informant.

1.2 Convergences

Perhaps the first thing to be said is that, whatever their disciplinary
starting point, all the papers hold themselves accountable to
recorded data of naturally occurring episodes of interaction of
one sort or another – from literacy lessons in Papua New Guinea
to laboratory meetings of university physicists, from airport ground
operations to Finnish telephone conversations, among others.

This common point of departure is by no means incidental or
arbitrary. It is deeply consequential for how the work of the papers
gets done, for how their analytic and theoretical contribution is to
be extracted and assessed, for how the papers must be read to be
properly understood, and we will turn to those matters below. But
there is another sense in which this starting point is non-arbitrary,
and that is historical.

Although in the most recent period the detailed examination of
recordings of mundane interaction has been most closely associated
with conversation analysis, it is worth recalling (cf. the chapter by
Schegloff below) that over forty years ago, some linguists had
already begun to move in this direction. In his The Structure of
English: An Introduction to the Construction of English
Sentences (1952) Charles Fries proposed to base his account on

Within five years, of course, other "developments" were to super-
sede this one in shaping the course of linguistics, and deflected it
away from taking as its empirical constraint how people actually
talk. Even among those who remained committed to goals other
than those engendered by the generativist transformation of the
discipline, however, few took up Fries' charge. (Notable exceptions
included Charles Hockett, as in Pittenger, Hockett, and Danehy
(1960), and Norman McQuown, as in McQuown, Bateson,
Birdwhistell, Brosin, and Hockett (1971); cf. the accounts in
Kendon, 1990; Leeds-Hurwitz, 1987; and Winkin, 1981.) The
notion that there was promise in doing so has hovered over the
study of language for quite a while, waiting to be allowed to
land. Though there have been some efforts along these lines in
more recent years (e.g., by Labov and his associates), most interest
in actual talk (which is what recorded data are of interest for) has
been consigned to psycholinguistics, where it is largely confined
within the impoverished environment of experiments and testing
sessions (here again with exceptions, as in the work of H. Clark
and his associates).

To be sure, there are important differences between Fries' vision
of the function of recorded data and the ones that inform the papers
in this volume. For example, Fries was little concerned with how the
language he was describing was part and parcel of the interaction in
which he found it, either generically or episodically. There is a
sense, nonetheless, in which the enterprise this volume seeks to
advance is one which had begun to come to maturity some decades ago.

Its historical resonances aside, the naturalistic commitment to address the observable, situated ways in which people actually talk, as preserved for repeated and detailed examination, is one of the distinctive features of the reorientation of inquiry which this book advocates. A common feature of these papers is their intense focus on the data of talk-in-interaction which composes the quotidian experience of the participants in whatever social worlds and settings they inhabit, frequent or construct. Extensive, careful and detailed specimens of such materials in their respective contexts are what we believe students of grammar must most importantly come to terms with, and extensive detailed accounts of this material is a primary product of such coming-to-terms.

For the reader, this means that there will be in these papers long stretches of data, accompanied in some instances by substantial ethnographic background which permits the data extract to be examined intelligently, and analytic explication of those data more detailed – and differently detailed – than will be familiar to many readers. It is key to the serious understanding of the vision informing the volume that readers engage the data citations in detail and with care, and familiarize themselves with the notational conventions made available in the Appendix to make this possible. To understand what the authors' texts are claiming, the reader must stand shoulder to shoulder with them, examine the data with them, understand what they are claiming about it and about the language structuring to be learned from it, and then assess those claims and their grounding in those data. No reading that detours around the data excerpts can properly support a reader's assessment of the result. On the other hand, if readers have taken the data seriously, they have at least partially engaged the project being prosecuted here, even if they find the author's take on it faulted. To find it faulted, the reader should (in principle, at least) undertake to wrest her/his understanding in engagement with the same recalcitrant reality of what is on the tape/transcript as challenged the author.

But this is not a fetishism of tape per se. The materials which furnish the authors their challenges are all records of naturally occurring scenes in the lives of their participants. They are not pretenses or role plays; they are not tests or experiments, in which the actual fabric of the interaction is treated as an invisible and property-less film through which other matters – ones of academic interest to the investigators – may be observed. Three interrelated features of such material (out of a rather larger set) may be mentioned here to alert the reader to their relevance, and to the different terms of inquiry in this arena: temporality, activity-implication, and embodiment.

1.3 Some differences the data make

1.3.1 Temporality

The passage of tape past the heads of the playback machine is both physical and symbolic representation of the temporality of talk-in-interaction – “physical” because the tape reading is also a process in real/reel time, “symbolic” because that process is iconic with that which is recorded on the tape. Temporality figures in talk-in-interaction in multiple ways, among them the sheer distribution of elements of conduct across passing time (including hiatuses in that distribution) and directionality.

The passage of time, and the distribution of that which a grammar organizes in that real time, figures in a number of the papers in this volume. Among the more telling appearances of real time in grammar is the import of “0,” the null or zero value. The idea of no surface realization for some grammatical variable is familiar enough – so-called “zero anaphora” for example. But that zero does not itself have a physical representation; it denotes the absence of an occurrence made potentially relevant by reference to the theory being employed. But no “zero” can be detected in the talk.

On the other hand, in temporal terms, the distribution of elements of an utterance in real time can include moments at which no utterance element is realized – silence. “Zero” here is detectable, and potentially meaningful. Depending on its positioning or sequential context, it can convey uncertainty about what is to follow or reluctance to produce it, or even embody its inaccessibility; it can project what follows as being “dispreferred;” it can begin or collaborate in the constitution of a lapse in the interaction, etc. (In Schegloff’s paper below, the possibility is accordingly entertained
of such silences themselves being “elements” organized by a grammar.) But these “zeros” are discernible, palpable occurrences, time allowed – by all the parties convergently – to elapse with “nothing which counts” occurring in it, and whose actual duration thus matters, and emerges as a necessarily collaborative production. The notion of an utterance as the sole product of a speaker, or of a mind, could hardly have been entertained had real talk-in-interaction been what investigators had to come to terms with.

But what kind of time is this? The time of seconds, and tenths of seconds and milliseconds? Perhaps, but surely not that alone. Those are units of standardized time, or chronometric time, of the time captured by the underlying Greek root, “chronos.” But Greek offered another conception of time, captured by the root “kairos.” This is meaningful, or meaning-implicated time. One prototype of its application is in Christian theology, where historical time is composed not so much of decades and centuries which follow one another evenly, as by anticipatory time leading up to Christ and a very different trajectory thereafter. Kairotic time, then, is directional, and the real time in which talk-in-interaction occurs, in which grammar operates, is kairotic time; kairotic time converges with chronologic time via the relevance of the structures of the occasion, including grammar. Just as (pace Gertrude Stein) a century is not a century is not a century, so are half seconds strikingly contrastive in import depending on where they materialize (so to speak) in the developing structure of the occasion – in the midst of a grammatical construction like a phrase, after a question has come to possible completion, after an answer has, after its acknowledgement has, after the silence following such acknowledgement has already begun, after the second last participant has left the scene (Goffman, 1963).

And so a second relevance of temporality for the sort of grammar which figures in interaction is directionality, for, of course, directionality matters for much besides silence. Much of what is involved here is captured simply by the notion of structuring distributed in a shaped, differentiated manner over time, and this seems deeply implicated both in grammar and in interaction. It is what underlies the projectability which figures in many of the papers here (Ford and Thompson; Fox, Hayashi, and Jasperson; Lerner; Schegloff), but this is not the only way in which temporality enters into these papers (see, for example, the way in which the moment-by-moment structuring of activity figures in the papers of Goodwin; and Ochs, Gonzales, and Jacoby).

1.3.2 Activity-implication

One consequence of drawing empirical materials from the actual life of the society is that the grammar at work in deployments of the language is “at work,” that is, engaged in the activities that compose the quotidian life of the society and the quotidian experience of its members, in all its actual consequentiality. Although it is true that participants in experiments and testing situations, in role plays and academically instigated demonstrations, are also participating in real activities of the society (such as cooperating in the production of “science,” at the very least, as the literature on the demand characteristics of experiments showed long ago, e.g., Orne, 1959, 1962; Rosenthal, 1966), this is so only in a highly skewed and specialized sense, and not one which makes such settings illuminative of how language figures in activities not devoted to securing samples of “language use.”

Once we register that language figures in the actual, practical activities of the lives of people and societies, and that how the language is configured is more than incidentally related to its involvement in those activities, it is readily apparent that, at the very least, attention must be paid to what the relationship is between activity, action and the orderly deployment of language called grammar. For many of the papers in this volume that relationship is utterly central to understanding the grammar itself, the activity itself, or how the grammar interpenetrates with its context of activity (cf. especially the papers by Goodwin; Morgan; Ochs, Gonzales, and Jacoby; Schieffelin; and Sorjonen). Accordingly, it is regularly the case in these papers that what is being said about grammar cannot be divorced – should not be divorced – from what is being said about the interactional dynamics implemented by that grammatical construction, or precipitated by that grammatical usage (cf. chapters by Morgan, Schieffelin).

Here again there are consequences for the reader. Because grammatical accounts are intercalated with accounts of interactional trajectory, of the texture of activity, of the shape of sequences
and the emergent upshot of the interactional episode, materials enter these accounts which may appear extraneous to those readers accustomed to more traditional linguistic texts. Some such readers may find themselves asking what level of "nitty gritty details" are "sufficiently relevant to get such lengthy treatment," "whether," as one reader put it, "they are of sufficient generality."

However, the issue is not the generality of this or that detail, but rather the details of the context of any particular bit of talk bear on its grammatical composition and shape. There is no question but that the materials in this book go far beyond current conceptions of the bearing of "nitty gritty details" of an interactional or ethnographic sort on the understanding of grammar; that is just the point. The challenge to readers who find themselves reluctant or unable to grasp how some detail — or order of detail — is relevant, is to rethink what orders or senses of "relevance" might need to be entertained, which are currently not being entertained.

1.3.3 Embodiment

Just as activities and their implementing utterances are inextricably built for and with one another, so are the products of vocalization and other bodily processes. Here we encounter another inescapable feature of the materials to which the authors hold themselves responsible, and that is the embodied character of most talk-in-interaction.

"Most" because, although talk on the telephone is also embodied (speakers on the telephone continue to gesture, to shift posture, to engage in other simultaneous projects), its non-vocal elements are ordinarily unavailable to interactional co-participants. In that sense they do not enter into the interaction, and are not deployed resources and practices in it, requiring analytic attention from investigators. Those bits of body behavior which do get conveyed on the telephone — one can often hear the breathing, the turning away to address someone in the room, the so-called "smile voice" — testify even in this specialized medium of interaction to the relevance of the embodied character of talk-and-other-conduct-in-interaction. (Of course, as the mention of breathing in the preceding sentence should make clear, vocalization itself is an embodiment of embodiment.)

The bearing of the embodied character of talk on the relationship between grammar and interaction is key to a range of concerns of grammar not so far mentioned here. Most notable here are anaphora, deixis, and indexicality more generally. Perhaps nowhere in grammar is there a more pointed display (so to speak) of the relevance of the embedding context of surrounding discourse and coordinate bodily practice. In a number of the papers in this volume, the very deployment of some vocalized components of the conduct, and their import, is predicated on the coordinate bodily action and is complementary with it (in particular the papers of Goodwin, and of Ochs, Gonzales, and Jacoby).

1.4 On theoreticity

These few observations about some prima facie features of the data to which the authors hold themselves accountable and which constrain the terms of their examination should suggest substantial differences in the disciplined inquiry directed to them. And, indeed, very different sorts of observations, analytic methods, problems, and notions of theoreticity characterize these undertakings than are common in most contemporary linguistic work, and surely than inform inquiry into the grammaticality of abstract sentences.

It is the latter, in particular, which has come to dominate — indeed, to define — what is to be understood as "theoretical" in contemporary inquiry into language. By reference to that default template of theoreticity, the papers included here may be found to be theoretically inexplicit, or even irrelevant. Indeed, one reader of an early version of this collection characterized the manuscript as "having a non-theoretical character," and complained that the papers do not "really go into the issue of how their observations regarding the effect of interaction on features of language could be integrated into linguistic description, or in models of linguistic structure (i.e., in grammar)." But such a view underestimates the scope and degree of reorientation of inquiry which this book is meant to advance. Many of the papers in this volume embody in the conduct of their analyses a theoretical take on the organization of language — and grammar in particular, and not a few of them discuss this explicitly. They do not, it is true, undertake to integrate their observations into "linguistic description" or "models of lin-
guistic structure,” but this is because they do not accept current ideals of linguistic description or models of linguistic structure as a basis into which matters of interaction can be, or should be, “integrated.”

Rather the import of the volume is that the interactional matrix of grammar requires a different understanding of what should enter into a linguistic description and/or a different model of linguistic structure. We do not aim to integrate into them; we aim to transform current understandings of them. And this thrust underlies every contribution to the volume, though it is not shouted from each of their rooftops. Each raises the issue of the bearing of interaction on our understanding of what observable events in the world a grammar operates on and organizes, and how the elements traditionally comprehended in/by a grammar find a place in a re-theorized grammar for interaction.

Note that there are at least two matters being called under review here: the scope and range of elements, practices and organizations properly understood under the rubric of grammar, and the terms in which such components are properly to be understood. The second of these raises the issue as to whether there is a uniquely adequate or uniquely relevant descriptive apparatus for whatever is comprehended by “grammar.” This issue is not wholly new; alternative terminologies, embodying alternative conceptions of what is being named and for what, call to mind reflections on the status of “noun” and “verb” (Hopper and Thompson, 1984), “subject” and “predicate,” “agent” and “action” and “patient,” “adjective” and “modifier,” etc. But once set in an interactional matrix, still other characterizations recommend themselves, more attuned to what an element is being used to do in the utterance than what it does in the sentence. What may be a “modifier” of a “noun” under one dispensation may invite treatment as a “descriptor” for a “referrer” under another. This is part of what we mean by being cautious regarding “integration” into linguistic description, as compared to reorienting it.

1.5 A note on formalism

There is a virtually inescapable tension in inquiry between the formalist impulse in analysis and the substantivist commitment to the particularizing panoply of detail, or, as it used to be called, between the nomothetic and the idiographic (though the former is often interpreted within a positivist framework as aspiring to “generalization” rather than formalism). And that tension is not resolved in the present undertaking.

In invoking the inextricable co-implication of activity and utterance, or of speech and bodily activity, we can hardly be denying in principle the possibility of describing practices of utterance construction abstracted from, or transcending, particular activities, or divorced from temporally coordinate gesticulation. For how, in that case, could one be proposing to speak, for example, of “turn organization” across the universes of possible projects undertaken in turns? No, anti-formalism by itself is not what this is about.

One thing one can question, however, is the adoption of practices of inquiry and analysis which themselves engender a whole genre of results which are then attributed to the natural world, and not to the procedures of inquiry which produced them.

Consider, for example, Levelt’s account of the role of syntax in the ordering of self-initiated repair (Levelt, 1983). This otherwise thoughtful and careful work was done on the speech of subjects in a psycholinguistic experiment, in which there was no active co-participant serving as interlocutor with whom the subject was in real-time interaction. The materials were drawn, then, from a setting in which the operation of interactional organization – and of ordinary interactional activities – had been eliminated by design. In the absence of interactional organization, syntactic organization can be claimed to play a key role. But it is quite another matter to show that syntax plays that role when the full range of naturally occurring features of talk-in-interaction is in effect. This is especially ironic in view of the transparently interactional motivation of the whole organization of repair, even if these particular episodes have been stripped of their interactional context. That is, the resources, practices, and organization of repair are built not only to effect changes in the ongoing talk of a speaker, but to do so in a way accessible to systematically organized parsing and understanding by the recipient(s) in the framework of an ongoing interaction.

But proceeding in this fashion is the product of largely invisible premises underlying much linguistic and psycholinguistic work at present – in which the primary organization of language is situated
at the syntactic, semantic, lexical, and phonological levels, with only the surviving, unordered "details" – the "residual variation" – being referred to pragmatic or sociolinguistic or interactional "factors." But given the thoroughgoing situatedness of language’s observable engagement with the world, and its role as an instrument in the effecting of real worldly projects, does it not make more sense, is it not theoretically more plausible, to suppose that interactional and pragmatic organizations play a primary and formative role, rather than a residual one, in the organization of conduct, including talk, and that grammar and syntax are, if not subordinate, then not more than co-ordinate with them, for example, by being among the available resources and practices informing the interactional and pragmatic organizations?

The critique of much in the contemporary linguistic enterprise implicit in the stance of this volume is aimed not at formalism per se, but at a formalism which has “stacked the deck” by holding itself responsible only (or largely) to data – whether intuitive or experimental – which exclude from the outset those features, forces, and possible organizations which are then claimed to be of lesser importance (or are ignored and omitted altogether) as a matter of empirical and theoretical fact.

Such formalism as is part of the present undertaking is meant to avoid these pitfalls. By working with naturally occurring materials, the authors give themselves – and their readers – a chance to be forced into a confrontation with whatever might have been at play in the production of those materials. With naturally occurring materials, that is a production which invites understanding solely (or almost solely; cf. the following paragraph) by reference to properties of the natural/cultural world we aim to understand, and not by reference to techniques of experimentation, testing, or other investigatory intrusion (including consensually validated judgments of acceptability) which claim to open windows to nature, only to fill them with distorting or filtering glass.

Not that there is no glass in our windows, or that it is entirely devoid of its own refractory effects. The authors are not unaware of the consequentiality of camera angles and microphone placement and sensitivity, and the sensory restriction to sight and sound at the expense of touch and smell (let alone the attenuation of such sight and sound as are made available). They are not unaware of the disparities of knowledge and experience and perceptual reach or access that discriminate the existential position of the researcher (and even more so the reader) from that of the participants in the events being examined. They are not unaware of the frailties of notational convention, of graphic reproduction, etc. which further attenuate the robustness of the data that can be made available to the reader.

But they are under no illusions that all these obstacles – and the many others which come with the complexity of this undertaking – can be somehow magically dispelled by ignoring them in efforts of theoretical imagination and intuition, or by holding them constant in artificially created experimental worlds whose methods of creation add complications rather than simplifications to the analytic task.

1.6 Extending the familiar, anticipating the unknown

Whatever the reservations about simply integrating into past models of linguistic structure, wholesale iconoclasm is not the point, nor is reorienting for the sake of novelty per se. We have a healthy respect for our co-workers, past and present; much of what we inherit will support continued work, either as its basis or as its point of departure. Our reconsiderations are prompted by taking seriously the nature of the material with which we believe grammar must come to terms, and its consequences for inquiry. The papers in this volume (collectively, and in some cases singly) thus proceed on two tracks – one grounded in not unfamiliar understandings of grammar, the other reaching for new conceptions which are at some variance with past work. The shape of the second of these impulses cannot be formulated a priori and is best left to the several contributions. But it may be useful to offer, in advance of the contributions of the volume’s papers, a sample of some interplay between grammar in a not unfamiliar sense and one class of concerns related to interaction.

The essays in this volume (and, in some instances, parts of the essays) vary in the degree to which they explore the mutual bearing of interaction and grammar conceived in some more-or-less familiar form, on the one hand, and, on the other, the ways in which the
intersection of interaction and grammar prompts a rethinking of what sort of thing grammar might be thought to be and how it might be configured. For the time being, both enterprises are worthy of pursuit, even though the latter must remain especially tentative, at the current stage of development. In this Introduction, we can give no more than a premonitory sketch of some lines of inquiry of each sort as a kind of orientation to the more detailed treatments in the papers themselves.

Consider three lines of informed speculation on the potential reflexive relationship between grammar in a relatively traditional sense and the organization of turns and turn-taking. One concerns German, a second Italian, the third Japanese.

Begin with the observation that the account of turn-taking which informs several of the papers in this volume (namely, Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson, 1974 – henceforth SSJ; for a different view of turn-taking cf. Duncan, 1972, 1974; Duncan and Fiske, 1977) was developed in the first instance while working with materials in English. A key element of the turn-taking organization on this view is the projectability of possible turn completion in advance of its actual arrival (an element focussed on in the paper by Ford and Thompson, but figuring as well in those of Lerner and Schegloff). It seems clear that one key contribution to projectability is grammatical structure. It is plausible to entertain the possibility that projectability will vary with different grammatical resources and structures, and with it the contingencies of turn-taking and accordingly of turn construction. It may matter, then, that English grammar gives rather more weight to word order than to morphological inflection, and that it is – within the word-order languages – a so-called SVO language. How might it matter?

Although it is common to assign so-called “given” information to early (“left”) positions in grammatical units and “new” information to late (“right”) ones, by the time ordinary English clauses and sentences approach their ends, their last elements have often been substantially adumbrated, and may appear well nigh fully determined. Their projectability can then be very high. Among the apparent consequences of this is their vulnerability to “anticipatory completion” by a co-participant (cf. Lerner, this volume) or to terminal overlap – the sort of simultaneous talk produced by another in anticipation of the projected imminent completion of current turn, rather than to precipitate it.

Consider, by way of contrast, the grammatical structure of German. Its richer morphological resources aside, its word order structure differs from that of English in a way consequential for the point under discussion: the verbal expression is commonly discontinuous. While an auxiliary or other finite verb form may occur in clause-second position, a non-finite verb form, often expressing the semantic heart of the verbal expression, may occur in final position. In many utterance constructions, therefore, the sense or upshot of what is being said may be substantially under-determined (if not indeterminate) until the verb appears in clause-final or sentence-final position. The structure of projectability would, accordingly, appear to be quite different than it is in English, and with it the placement of possible completions within the structure of the utterance. Although some sorts of anticipatory completions should remain unaffected because they are articulated around phrase or clause boundaries (the ones carried through on “compound turn-constructional units,” Lerner, 1991, this volume), the possibility of terminal overlaps should be attenuated because the “casualties” they would inflict on the ongoing-turn would be more consequential to its understanding, and would not yet have occurred in German, as they would have in English, thus constraining the potential overlapper’s readiness with a response. When this possibility was first discussed with a native speaker of German interested in this area some years ago, his response was to remark that he had in fact been puzzled, in reading SSJ, by the discussion of terminal overlap, which he said he found relatively infrequently in his German conversational materials. We were of a mind that verb-final position was key here.

Examination of such materials, however, quickly revealed that matters were somewhat more complicated. For example, many German verbs are formed by combining a stem with a prefix, and not uncommonly, contrastive pairs of verbs are formed by combining a stem with contrasting prefixes – for example, “an/ab” (toward/away from). A preliminary examination of some interactional materials suggested that regularly only one such verb from a contrastive pair is in use at a time. When combined with the grammatical usage that has the prefix occupy the clause- or sentence-final
position, that final element may be virtually fully determined well in advance of articulation, a result quite the opposite of the previously sketched line of conjecture.

The key substantive analytic work remains to be done to establish empirically the bearing of German grammar on turn-construction and turn-taking practices. German's verb-final character has often been credited (or blamed) for the multiple center-embedding that can make for very long sentences, at least in written uses of the languages. Does that feature have the same consequences in talk-in-interaction? Or are there countervailing practices of talk-in-interaction which limit that outcome? (For one account of the ramifications of such facts for the study of interaction and grammar in German, see Schuette-Coburn, to appear.)

If German raises the possibility of keeping entry by an interlocutor at bay, Italian may raise the possibility – in a confluence of grammar, culture and turn-taking organization – of early entry by interlocutor as a common practice, with a variety of possible attendant problems. Of course it is part of a common stereotype about Italian speakers that they talk simultaneously a great deal. Italian conversation is occasionally offered as grounds for questioning whether conversation's organization is designed for one-speaker-at-a-time in the first instance. But no detailed research of which we are aware documents this supposedly massive overlapping, or specifies what in the organization of Italian conversation allows us to understand it (if it occurs) as an orderly product of Italian conversational practices.

One possibility is suggested by a passing observation in a recent paper on testing the oral proficiency of learners of Italian as a second language (Filipi, 1994). The setting is an oral examination, in which two assessors interact with the examinee. Although the author notes that the assessors “come in” while students are still talking, she also remarks about particular junctures that “the assessor is holding back thereby creating opportunities for the student to continue talking...” She goes on to note that “the assessor ‘created’ a tolerance for redundant talk by withholding a response until the student had a chance to complete his utterance,” and that we have here “a greater tolerance for redundancy of talk,” presumably greater than in natural settings involving native speakers.

Introduction

Trying to think through what systematic practices of talking-in-interaction might underlie such observations (as well as other, more impressionistic claims about Italian conversation), the following conjectures present themselves:

(a) what SSJ treated as a speaker's and hearer's right and obligation – that speaker bring, and be permitted to bring, a so-called turn-constructional unit to possible completion, is here treated as an optional practice by recipient;

(b) “redundancy” here is being used to refer to a speaker saying at the end of a turn-constructional unit what earlier parts of it more or less projected, and this fits with the treatment (by the author, and, if she is right, by speakers and hearers of Italian) of actual completion as merely an option;

(c) if it is an option, where does it set in? At the sorts of points which Lerner (1991, this volume) analyzes as providing an opportunity place within a turn-constructional unit, where for example anticipatory completions are launched? Or does it have a broader provenance than that?

(d) if it is (only) an option for speaker to complete a TCU, how do speaker and recipient coordinate on what is going to be done? If they do not arrive at the same option, is this the source of claimed greater incidence of overlap in Italian, i.e., the speaker chooses to exercise the “option,” while the recipient treats it as dispensable? If so, then it is not just that Italians allow an even earlier early start of next turns than Americans do; it is that they organize the talk differently. That is a difference not in the values of the variables plugged into a working organization, but a difference in the organization itself. But, if that is the claim, we need a characterization of where that differing organization comes into play.

(e) And we need to ask whether it has consequences for how Italian speakers organize the talk in a turn. If projecting aspects of the talk-to-follow makes that talk appear potentially redundant and thereby vulnerable to pre-emptive next turn starts, then does projection get differently implemented in the design of turns and turn-constructional units in Italian?

If German appears initially to offer some protection against “premature” starts by next speakers, the conjecture here is that Italian may institutionalize the possibility by changing some of
the modus operandi of its turn-taking organization in ways which further exploit possibilities made available by the grammar. (On a nice fit between the phonemic inventory of a language and its practices for initiating same-turn repair, cf. Schegloff, 1987.)

Another way of conceiving the relationship between grammar, turn organization and turn-taking organization is prompted by Fox, Hayashi, and Jasperson's treatment of repair in Japanese and English (this volume). Early in their paper they suggest that “differences in repair organization (and...turntaking) arise...from larger differences in syntactic resources”; Although not everyone will wish to subscribe to this apparent claim of linear causality in which syntax seems to determine practices of turn-taking and repair, taken more broadly the line suggests that there can be various ways in which syntax, turn-taking, turn organization and repair practices co-organize the sequential organization of talk-in-interaction. Then features managed by turn-taking organization or turn organization in some settings (e.g., in some languages) are managed by grammar in others, and vice versa. The suggestion in the paper by Fox, Hayashi, and Jasperson relates the often remarked-on practices of aizuchi to features of Japanese grammar. The interpolations which in English conversation ordinarily come at the boundaries of larger chunks of extended turns understood to be not yet complete (Schegloff, 1982) are produced – and solicited – for much smaller chunks of utterance in Japanese, in part to offset otherwise potentially problematic indeterminacies built into Japanese grammar, indeterminacies which are problematic precisely because of the exigencies of recipient parsing in real time.

We have then several variations on a theme that sets grammar (in a rather traditional usage of the term) in a complementary relationship to other organizations of practices in talk-in-interaction, and prompts a search for the details of that complementarity, the trade-offs between various orders and types of organization, and the differential products of such trade-offs – from the lengths of German sentences to the multi-vocality of Italian conversation to the density of understanding and co-construction (aizuchi) tokens in Japanese.

1.7 The papers

As is not uncommon in thematically motivated volumes such as this, the several chapters relate to the theme in three main ways. Some take the volume's theme as their theme, more or less (Schegloff; Ford and Thompson; Lerner). Some address themselves explicitly to the theme intermittently, while otherwise being organized around a more specific project, with more or less transparent bearing on the theme (Fox, Hayashi, and Jasperson; Goodwin; Ochs, Gonzales, and Jacoby). Some have their own project and pursue it, the project in principle having a perspicuous bearing on, or in some fashion embodying in its very constitution, the underlying theme of the volume (Morgan; Schieffelin; Sorjonen). Each of these types invites a somewhat different introductory setting.

But juxtaposing each paper to the title of the volume is only one way of understanding their separate and intersecting contributions. Laced through this introduction have been various other allusions to the way in which various of the papers fit together. In the end, it is the mosaic which each reader fashions from the resources of their own analytic resources and taste which will be most useful. So it is not to pre-empt such individualized integrations that we offer here a preliminary orienting overview of the contributions to this volume, but to offer provisional guidance until the readers come to a view of their own.

The contributors to this volume explore the notion that grammar and social interaction organize one another. Within this overarching endeavor, each of the chapters can be read for promoting (in varying ways and emphases) three arguments: (1) grammar organizes social interaction; (2) social interaction organizes grammar; and (3) grammar is a mode of interaction. These arguments vary in the conceptualization of grammar and its vulnerability to the exigencies, potentialities, and architecture of social interaction.

1.7.1 Grammar organizes social interaction

The first argument – that grammar organizes social interaction – preserves a relatively traditional notion of grammar. Grammars are
abstract mental structures that organize linguistic elements within
utterances that in turn comprise social interaction. All of the con-
tributors to this volume treat grammar as a resource par excel-
lence for doing social interactional work. All examine the interactional
potency of particular linguistic structures that form part of a speaker's grammatical knowledge.

Several contributions examine ways in which grammar organizes
"turn constructional units," i.e. components that compose a turn
(Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson, 1974). Emanuel Schegloff proposes
a key role of grammar to be precisely this – to provide an orderliness
to the shape of interactional turns and to facilitate the calibra-
tion of possible turn endings and turn-taking. Cecilia Ford and
Sandra Thompson find that syntax alone is not an adequate guide
to projecting when a speaker is completing a turn, but rather that
interlocutors rely as well upon intonational and pragmatic struc-
tures in making such projections. Gene Lerner’s chapter observes
that interlocutors who anticipate the remainder of a turn before a
current speaker has completed his utterance characteristically do so
at grammatical boundaries. Clause boundaries, for example, are
routinely a resource for interlocutors to take a turn that anticipa-
torily completes an utterance-in-progress.

In addition to turn construction and speaker transition, grammar
influences the management of "repair" in conversation (Schegloff,
Jefferson, and Sacks, 1977; Schegloff, 1987). As noted earlier, while
repair is a universal means for handling sources of trouble in the
production, hearing, and understanding of utterances, grammars of
languages organize this conversational practice somewhat differently. In this volume, Barbara Fox, Makoto Hayashi, and Robert
Jasperson document how English and Japanese provide different
grammatical resources for accomplishing same turn self-repair.
Among other influences, the grammars of these two languages
differentially impact which linguistic constituents are repaired, which
are recruited as place holders in word searches, and which are
recycled as part of same turn self repair.

Grammatical constructions are also resources that constitute par-
ticular types of activities. For example, Elinor Ochs, Patrick
Gonzales, and Sally Jacoby analyze how working physicists recur-
cently use "indeterminate constructions" in their collaborative
interpretive activity. These constructions, accompanied by gestures,
confirmation. *joo*, on the other hand, is used to frame the repeat as an acknowledgment (a "receipt" of information), in which case *joo* constitutes the current turn construction unit as a re-confirmation or verification. Sorjonen's point is that while the repeats may be intended as confirmations or receipts by their producers, these are possible meanings. When interlocutors respond with *niin* and *joo*, they imbue the repeats with heard meanings. Positioned strategically at the beginnings of turns, *niin* and *joo* are resources for complex renderings of past, current, and future utterances.

Grammatical forms can reach beyond a past conversational turn to reconfigure how members of a community acted and thought in the historical past. Schieffelin documents the historical emergence and interactional deployment of a new evidential particle among Kaluli speakers (Papua New Guinea). Marking information as new, true, and only known from the written word, this particle appears in instructional materials and talk of missionary personnel in the context of teaching Kaluli people about past and current views of religion and health. Instructors and the institutions they represent use this particle along with pictures and photographs to establish factivity of mission beliefs. Schieffelin's study of the import of grammar and visual media to missionizing interactions parallels Goodwin's study of the import of grammar and visual media to establishing factivity and socializing a world view among airport personnel. Both situations involve participants in the activity of "virtual witnessing," wherein linguistic and visual representations simulate for readers/audiences the experience of actually witnessing an event, thereby authenticating information as true (Shapin and Schaffer, 1985).

1.7.2 Social interaction organizes grammar

The second theme of this volume – that *social interaction organizes grammar* – positions grammar as an outcome of lived sociality. In this interpretation, grammar stands in a relatively intimate relation to social interaction. It is designed for interactional ends and as such must reckon with the architecture and dynamics of turns, sequences, activities, participant frameworks, stances, trouble, expectations, contingencies, and other relevant interactional actualities. Grammar is vulnerable to social interaction in that social interaction is the universally commonplace medium for language acquisition, language maintenance, and language change. As Schegloff notes, "It should hardly surprise us if some of the most fundamental features of natural language are shaped in accordance with their home environment in copresent interaction, as adaptations to it, or as part of its very warp and weft."

Schegloff's chapter charts a paradigmatic vision of "syntax-for-conversation," including how grammar is shaped by the position of a turn construction unit within a turn and the position of a turn within a sequence. Grammatical forms such as prospective indexicals in English (Goodwin, this volume) and particles in Finnish (Sorjonen, this volume) may be positioned not only with respect to sentence structure but with respect to turn and sequence structure. Prospective indexicals, for example, are designed to project upcoming turn construction units. And it may be no accident that particles in many languages come at or near the start or possible end of a turn, as many of these particles are responsive to preceding and/or upcoming turn construction units or turns at talk. Indeed Fox, Hayashi, and Jasperson propose that sentence-final particles in Japanese evolved in part to mark possible turn completions. Similarly, forms such as tag questions in English may be designed as turn extensions, units which recreate a possible interactional place for speaker transition (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson, 1974; Schegloff, this volume; Ford and Thompson, this volume).

In addition to the impact of turn organization, special social activities may give rise to linguistic innovations, both novel forms and novel amalgams of existing forms. In Papua New Guinea, missionary practices such as the creation of literacy materials produced new varieties of Kaluli language – amalgams of different dialects, syntactic simplifications, and non-canonical forms. As discussed above, rapid social change engendered by missionization also involved innovation within the evidential system. This form both arises from social change and facilitates that change in marking past practices as unenlightened and present-day, mission-generated practices as what we now know as truth. In a radically different locus, the practices of physicists give rise to novel constructions that amalgamate a personal pronominal subject (e.g. "I"), which generally presupposes animacy and a predicate that presupposes inanimacy.
(e.g. "am breaking up into domains.") These constructions emerge as part of routine interpretive activity involving physicists moving through graphs and symbolically experiencing physical processes. Fox, Hayashi, and Jasperson also speak of grammatical amalgams that arise from conversational repair. Repair across languages allows interlocutors to "splice together" otherwise ungrammatical syntactic units. Such amalgams provide opportunities for interlocutors to convey a complex concatenation of information before a possible point of speaker transition.

1.7.3 Grammar is a mode of social interaction

The third thematic focus addressed in this volume – that grammar is a mode of social interaction – more radically realigns how we think about grammar. Closely associated with conversation analytic research (e.g., Goodwin, 1981; Sacks, 1992; Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson, 1974; Schegloff, 1979), this vision also has anthropological and linguistic roots that go back to Sapir's notion that language interpenetrates experience. Grammar is not only a resource for interaction and not only an outcome of interaction, it is part of the essence of interaction itself. Or, to put it another way, grammar is inherently interactional.

In this perspective, grammar is imbued with subjectivity and sociability: grammar is viewed as lived behavior, whose form and meaning unfold in experienced interactional and historical time. For example, Kaluli evidential particles (Schieffelin, this volume) embody modes of experiencing the world. These and other linguistic forms compose the fabric of missionizing interactions that attempt to socialize Kaluli into new truths. A Kaluli grammar of these evidentials comprehends their existential condition. Similarly the Finnish particles niin and joo (Sorjonen, this volume) are quintessential interactional entities. They constitute interactional configurations that link current to just past and just next conversational moves. Tacit understandings of Finnish particles incorporate just this sort of situatedness. Likewise in the world of working scientists, indeterminate, semantically disjunctive constructions (Ochs, Gonzales, and Jacoby, this volume) form the interactional crucible for linking scientists and the physical constructs they are examining. Part of a physicist's grammar of these constructions is this existential potentiality. Indeed the syntactic conjoining of a personal pronominal subject with an inanimate-presupposing predicate is itself an iconic representation of the experiential conjoining of physicists with the objects of their study. Not only specific constructions, but also codes can be visualized as modes of interaction. For example, code-switching between African American English and American English dialects (Morgan, this volume) itself is an interactional move that may count as a bid to formulate identities of participants and activities such as signifying, reading, or other kinds of assessment. For members of the African American community, a grammar of these varieties encompasses such contrapuntal, interactional work.

An important dimension of linguistic structures is their moment-by-moment, evolving interactional production. Sacks (1974); Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974); Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks (1977); Sacks and Schegloff (1979); and Goodwin (1981) stand out as classic demonstrations that the linguistic shaping of an utterance is intertwined with changing relationships among participants over interactional time. As an utterance proceeds, its lexical and grammatical structuring may open up, narrow down, or otherwise transform the roles of different participants to the interaction. In this volume, several studies articulate how the unfolding structuring of a single utterance shifts the statuses of participants and recipients. Lerner speaks of linguistic structures as temporally unfolding interactional opportunities for reorganizing (indeed for pre-empting) who takes a conversational turn. Schegloff invites us to re-perspectivize approaching a (possible) turn boundary not as an interim between events but rather as a central interactional event that has shape and duration, and implications for subsequent talk and speaker transition. Goodwin illuminates how in the course of a current utterance, a prospective indexical "unleashes[s] . interactive processes" by drawing co-workers together as co-participants in extended problem-solving.

That linguistic forms manifest a progression of interactional arrangements renders them interactional structures par excellence. As interactional structures, linguistic forms can be understood as collaborative achievements of different interlocutors (Duranti and Brenneis, 1986; Goodwin, 1981, 1987, this volume; Keenan and Schieffelin, 1976; Lerner, 1987, 1991, this volume; Ochs,
In some cases, as in anticipatory completions and certain types of repair, different participants produce linguistic forms that comprise a linguistic construction. In other cases, the joint activity generating a construction is discernible only by attending to eye gaze, body orientation, or non-occurrence of verbal uptake at some relevant moment in the course of producing a construction. Interlocutors who do not display recipientship through eye gaze, for example, may lead speakers to redesign their utterances for other recipients (Goodwin, 1981). And, as noted earlier, tag questions may be inspired by the non-occurrence of speaker transition at a point of possible turn completion (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson, 1977; Ford and Thompson, this volume; Schegloff, this volume). In all of these cases, the resulting constructions are co-authored by multiple participants. The meaning of any single grammatical construction is interactionally contingent, built over interactional time in accordance with interactional actualities. Meaning lies not with the speaker nor the addressee nor the utterance alone as many philosophical arguments have considered, but rather with the interactional past, current, and projected next moment. The meaning of an entire utterance is a complex, not well understood, algorithm of these emergent, non-linear, sense-making interactions.

The present volume offers an intellectual springboard for a transformative synthesis — an aufhebung — from a separately conceived interactional grammar and grammar of interaction to an as-yet-only-dimly-perceivable conjunction. In it, grammatical structures are rewritten as interactional structures that have their own interactional morphology and syntax within and across turns (see especially chapters by Schegloff, Goodwin, and Lerner). Strips of talk make sense within a more encompassing orderliness of historically situated, social encounters. Of central import are turn construction units, turns, sequences, collaborative completions, participant frameworks, endogenous activities, the built environment, gestures, visual representations and other interactional resources.

Applying the lens of interaction, the contributors to this volume see grammar as a contingent and concerted accomplishment, symbiotic with the setting of social interaction which is its home base. This vision in turn inspires an analytic lexicon of possibility, pre-emption, non-occurrence, reformulation, and achievement. What it will at some future retrospect turn out to have inspired is itself contingent on what others — what you, the readers — make of the efforts offered here.

Notes

1. This introduction has benefited from the comments and help of Chuck Goodwin, John Heritage, Adam Kendon and Barrie Thorne.
2. Even then, linguistic anthropologists — or anthropological linguists — continued to be housed in Departments of Anthropology, where they were largely answerable to the central thematics of the larger discipline, whether regarding culture, evolution, or other such general disciplinary preoccupations.
3. The proximate sources of this sampling were two mini-conferences on Grammar and Interaction, held at UCLA under the auspices of the Center for Language, Interaction and Culture in the Spring terms of 1992 and 1993, organized by Elinor Ochs with the support of the Division of Humanities of the College of Letters and Sciences. We are indebted to then-Dean Herbert Morris for his support. Earlier versions of the papers by Ford and Thompson; Goodwin; Morgan; Ochs, Gonzales and Jacoby; and Schegloff were presented at one or the other of those conferences, as were parts of the present introduction. Several other of the contributors to this volume (Fox, Sorjonen) participated in the conferences, but not through their contributions to this volume. Other contributors to the volume (Lerner, Schegloff) were present in spirit, if not in body. Others who attended the conferences have contributed to this volume through their participation in the discussions and their comments on the papers, and papers by several of them could not be incorporated in this volume because of constraints on either their time or our space. The point is that this volume indexes a larger community of workers and a more extensive body of work than are overtly presented here in print.
4. To some extent the importance of grammar-in-context had been addressed in those corpus-based linguistic descriptions, from the time of Boas and Sapir, which were based on texts, typically myths and legends.
5. For a suggestion that in a strongly verb-final language, Japanese, anticipatory completions — of the type discussed in Lerner, 1991; Ono and Thompson, forthcoming; and Sacks, 1992 — appear to occur only under very restricted interactional circumstances, see Ono and Yoshida, forthcoming. For a different view, see Lerner and Takagi, forthcoming.
References


Introduction


Introduction


Introduction


