processes of dispute management among urban black children

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Legal anthropologists, adopting what Garbett (1970) has termed an “actor-oriented perspective,” have recently argued that the detailed examination of actual dispute “transactions” (Barth 1966) can provide a way of understanding fundamental social processes. According to Moore (1978:46), “through the observation of transactions many of the detailed operations of regular circulatory and redistributive mechanisms that change the lot of individuals may be understood.” Gulliver (1979:274), adopting a somewhat similar perspective, has argued that the study of “negotiations” within disputes provides a way of analyzing “the dynamics within a social relationship,” processes that are generally left unexamined by traditional studies of social structure.

The present study pursues such a line of thought and proposes that verbal exchanges in disputes constitute elements through which children, in particular preadolescent boys, both achieve and negotiate their standing of the moment vis-à-vis one another. In this paper, structures and procedures of dispute management within a group of urban black working-class children from West Philadelphia, aged 4 through 14, are examined. The “Maple Street group,” as the children will be referred to, constitutes a group in that it includes 44 friends living within a block’s radius of each other who talk together after school, on weekends, and daily when school is not in session. Among members of the Maple Street group, individuals divide themselves into four different subgroups or clusters according to principles of age and sex: younger girls (aged 4 through 9), younger boys (aged 5 through 8), older girls (aged 10 through 13), and older boys (aged 9 through 14). The conversations of this group were recorded for a year and a half as the children conducted their play activities among one another. In all, 175 argumentative sequences from a corpus of over 200 hours of transcribed conversation form the basis for the present study; in this paper, however, only a limited number of illustrative examples will be presented.

In that the cultural concerns in terms of which group members make comparisons of one another influence the ways in which disputes are conducted, the paper begins by identifying these concerns for each cluster. Next, alternative forms of speech actions and their

This paper investigates the forms and functions of alternative dispute procedures as well as distinctive operating cultures that account for them among urban black working-class children. It is found that children strategically manage the social organization of a dispute through the selection of particular argument formats. In conducting argumentative exchanges, children display a range of communicative competencies and collaborate in performing highly orderly negotiations of power. (conversation analysis, child language, social organization, legal anthropology, Black English Vernacular)
sequencing patterns for constructing argumentative talk are discussed. Finally, strategic principles involved in the selection of a particular format for dispute will be considered by examining a more extended conversational fragment of a specific subgroup, preadolescent boys. Through an investigation of the form and sequencing of verbal exchanges in argumentative conversation, I will endeavor to show how, within a particular cluster, the social order of the moment can be formulated, refuted, and reconstituted through talk.

preferred activities and criteria for making comparisons within clusters

Clusters within the Maple Street group engage in different types of play and compare group members with reference to different sorts of criteria. The older boys' group enjoys a range of activities, including sports and competitive games, which differentiates the group from the other three clusters. Older boys enjoy cyles (Sutton-Smith 1953) of games and activities: dead blocks, pitching pennies, half-ball, making and riding homemade go-carts, making and flying model airplanes, shooting marbles, riding bikes, flying kites, conducting buckeys and slingshot fights, throwing snowballs, football, basketball, and playing musical instruments in a small group. Younger boys rarely participate in organized sports and play games such as “dumb school,” “mother may I,” “hot and cold butter beans,” hopscotch, “hide the belt,” and “red light, green light” only on rare occasions, and then with younger girls. Dramatic play such as imitating soldiers, milkmen, doctors, traveling salesmen, monsters, Batman, and cowboys, as well as rough-and-tumble activities such as sliding down steep lawn banks, tag, and climbing trees, are preferred.

Among younger as well as older girls, organized sports or games of any sort are seldom played. Jumping rope, playing house and school, practicing original dance steps, organizing club meetings, making things (such as crocheted and knitted scarfs and hats, and glass rings from bottle rims), and preparing foods (such as cake, pizza, and water ice) are favorite activities of the older girls' group. Younger girls participate in jump rope, school, house, and other activities similar to those of the older girls, as well as, on occasion, traditional games with younger boys.

Parents' occupations or one's achievement in school are relatively unimportant in establishing differentiations among group members, and in general there is no role specialization or fixed hierarchy such as those reported for other peer groups (Whyte 1943; Sherif and Sherif 1953; Keiser 1969). However, among mixed groups of both younger and older children, and also within single-sex groups, comparisons are made in terms of who can “beat” whom, although actual (physical) fights are a rare occurrence.

The specific criteria that are selected for making comparisons do, however, differ among groups. When comparisons are initiated by younger children, these are seldom made with reference to aspects of self that reflect personal achievement. For example, younger children compare one another in terms of new possessions (example 1) or ages of themselves and relatives (example 2).³

example 1 (Stephen is grinning as he is riding his new bike.)

Damey: He just showing off cuz he have new tires.

example 2

Barry: I'll be seven. Then I'll be older than Cameron.
Dishunta: I'll be older than you.
Barry: So?
Dishunta: I'm eight and a half. I'm almost nine.
Barry: So? My brother older than you.
Dishunta: So? Willa older than him.
Barry: And Antony- and Antony.

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Dishunta: Willa older than you.
Barry: How old is Willis,
Dishunta: She twenty one. Na-a-an, she's older than Jean, //And
Barry: My mother twenty two.

In contrast to younger children and older girls, among older boys ranking is discussed with relation to skill displayed in games and contests. Comparisons between group members are made by "bragging," positively assessing one's abilities or initiative with regard to a play activity.

**example 3** Raymond: I could walk on my hands better than anybody out here.

**example 4** ((during a yoyo contest))

**example 5** ((making sling shots))
Huey: The first people who ever knew about this stuff was my brother, me and I around this neighborhood.

In speech actions such as commands, threats, accusations, and insults, boys openly make claims about their positions vis-à-vis one another. Examples of each of these types of speech acts will be presented in turn. As Mitchell-Kernan and Kernan (1977:201) have argued, "directives and reactions to them" can be used "to define, reaffirm, challenge, manipulate, and redefine status and rank." In organizing a task activity, a person assuming the position of leadership in the group uses what Labov and Fanshel (1977:77) have argued is the most straightforward and "aggravated" way to execute a command: the imperative "Do X."

**example 6** Huey: Get off my steps!
**example 7** Raymond: Gimme some nails!
**example 8** Michael: Go upstairs and get the other cutters!

In attempting to step up one's commitment to a command, or in answering a prior argumentative action, threats—"verbal or nonverbal communications by a source or influence indicating that he intends to harm a target" (Tedeschi and Bonoma 1977:215)—may be used.

**example 9** Johnny: Get off or I'll hit you with my thing!
**example 10** Chopper: You call me a faggot and I send ya-throw it to the-transform it throw it down the sewey. Just say it to me. Say it to me.
**example 11** Chopper: You better hop off your high horse.

Accusations—actions which describe the addressee as the agent of an offensive act—are also made in a direct form and with emphatic intonation. Unlike "blaimings" of adults (Pomerantz 1978) boys' accusations make no attempt to mitigate the blame of the addressee.

**example 12** Sheridan: You cheat!
**example 13** Chuckie: You messin up my paper!
**example 14** Raymond: Boy you broke my skate board!
Although boys insulting others make use of ritualized forms of degradation (Abrahams 1970; Labov 1972b), they may also make statements about “the addressee’s deviation from a culturally defined value” (Mitchell-Kernan and Kernan 1975:310) in direct insult forms.

example 15  ((to a boy whose mother helps him with his homework))
Tokay: Least I don’t need nobody to do my homework!

example 16  ((to a boy with a proportionally big head))
Chopper: It’s the person who got the head that don’t fit with their body!

example 17  Robby: Faggot!

Girls have full knowledge of the use of aggravated actions such as those employed by the boys and make explicit the distinctions between aggravated and mitigated forms in their talk.

example 18  Pam: I said “You c’d roll your eyes all you want to. Cuz I’m tellin you. (0.5) Tellin’ I’m not askin you.” (0.4) And I ain’t say no please either.

In interactions with boys of their same age level, while playing house and school, and in talking with their siblings, girls use forms similar to those of boys. However, among members of the same-sex group, aggravated actions are reserved for serious occasions, as when a girl acts conceited or thinks herself superior to others.

Comparisons between girls and boys differ with respect to their content, timing, and framing. Boys evaluate themselves using fairly objective standards, such as ranking in play activity. Girls, however, criticize other girls who are felt to “think they cute” or better than others because, for example, they possess nicer clothes or have skipped a grade in school. Girls, therefore, employ criteria that may exist as much in the mind of the observer as in the actions of the observed. Whereas boys’ critiques of others take place generally in the presence of the person discussed, criticisms of girls who “show off” occur more frequently in the absence of the target of conversation. Subsequently, the activity of talking about someone “behind her back” can itself provide grounds for a confrontation (Goodwin 1980b:681). In he-said-she-said disputes (Goodwin 1980b), accusations are formatted in indirect speech and refer to what is reported to have been said in someone’s absence: “X said you said I said.” Through the selection of this indirect form, the speaker can be seen to be working toward avoiding possible conflict. Girls have access to more direct forms, which are utilized in playing house or school, with siblings and in cross-sex interactions (Goodwin 1980a:170–172); however, among members of the girls’ play group, such actions are often treated seriously. By way of contrast, boys make frequent use of aggravated types of commands, threats, and insults that do not constitute affronts or lead to breaches in social relationships.

an instance of an older boys’ dispute

The following provides an example of a boys’ dispute in which the process of comparison between two parties may be sustained over a series of utterances. In this dispute, ten boys, aged 9 through 14, are making slingshots in Michael and Huey’s back yard. It should be noted that because play is occurring on their property, either Michael (aged 13) or Huey (aged 14), the oldest and biggest boy present and one who generally plays with boys older than himself, could exert considerable power with respect to others present, ordering any-
one—especially an argumentative boy such as Chopper (aged 12)—to leave at any point.

example 19

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(1) Huey:</td>
<td><strong>Gimme the things.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>(2) Chopper:</td>
<td>You shut up you big lips.</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>(3) Huey:</td>
<td><strong>Shut up.</strong></td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>(4) Chopper:</td>
<td>Don’t gimme that. I'm not talkin ta you.</td>
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| 5 | (5) Huey: | I’m talking ta you!
| 6 | (6) Chopper: | Ah you better shut up with your dingy sneaks. |
| 7 | (7) Huey: | I'm a dingy your head. How would you like that. |
| 8 | (8) Chopper: | No you won’t you little- // h **Guess what.** |
| 9 | (9) Jack: | ’y’foul foul thing. |
|   | (0.4) |   |
| 10 | (10) Chopper: | **Lemme-tell-you. Guess what.** (0.8) We was comin home from practice, (0.4) and, three boys came up there and asked us for money and Huey did like this. (0.6) hh [(raising hands up)] “I AIN’ GOT // no(hh)ne.” |
|   | (11) Raymond: | (Who did.) |
|   | (12) Nate: | Ah-hih-ha, hh Hah-hah! |
|   | (13) Tokay: | You di//d, |
|   | (14) Raymond: | Oh, |
|   | (15) Chopper: | hh // Hey Poochie |
|   | (16) Michael: | Ah-ha-aa-aa Ah-ha//ha |
|   | (17) Tokay: | You there Michael, |
|   | (18) Chopper: | hhh He was the(hh)ere. |
|   | (19) Tokay: | What’d he say Chopper. |
|   | (20) Chopper: | Yeah. = |
|   | (21) Huey: | = You was there // Tokay! |
|   | (22) Chopper: | hh hh Lemme-tell ya, An he sai(hh)d, |
|   | (23) Tokay: | When. = |
|   | (24) Chopper: | = “I ain’t got no(h) mo/ney.” |
|   | (25) Huey: | Member // that night when we was goin there, and |
|   | (26) Nate: | Whew::, |
|   | (27) Huey: | them // boys came down the street, I ain’t ras/ed my hands/up. |
|   | (28) Chopper: | Khhh! |
|   | (29) Chopper: | Go ahead. You’re gonna say it- I know:. Didn’t he g’like this? (0.4) “I ai(h)n’t got no(hh)ne.” |
|   | (30) Michael: | Ah-ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-ha |
|   | (31) Chopper: | hh |
|   | (32) Michael: | Ah:: |
|   | (33) Chopper: | hh |
|   | (34) Michael: | ([baby voice]) “I a/in’t got no money.” Ah-//ha-ha. |
|   | (35) Chopper: | Khhh! // hh |
|   | (36) Huey: | If he had money. If // he had money and he said he didn’t |
|   | (37) Chopper: | hhh ‘h |
|   | (38) Huey: | them boys kicked his b’hi(hh)nd. eh heh |
Chopper: I ain't had no mon- I only had a penny they didn't even find it.
Jack: You did.
Chopper: At least I didn't go up there and say, (1.2) I ain't got none."
Huey: Well there'd be some problems if he came found it didn't it.
Chopper: Nope. And I guess what Michael.
Michael: He said said (baby voice) "I ain't got no money."
Chopper: Guess what Michael. = Them boys out there said, 'hh "Your football player can't play," And guess where Huey was. (0.6) All the way around the corner. (0.5) hh Remember that night? Them little boys said "That little punk can't fight?" And Huey started runnin across the street.
Raymond: eh heh heh.
Huey: WHAT?!
Chopper: Where who w' playin basketball at.
Huey: You know, where we were playin basketball? And you wasn't even waitin for us, you was up there runnin, Until you got way around the corner. = Them boys said, those boys kep, those boys kep on I said, "Hey Huey what chu runnin for." He said "I ain't runnin." That boy woulda come next to me, "I woulda kicked they ass. And // Huey was all the way around the corner.
Huey: I don't know what you talkin bout.
Jack: "Talkin // bout bein kicked. That's what it // is.
Huey: I don't remember // what he talkin about.
Nate: That boy down there
Michael: (baby voice) "I ain't got no(hh) mo(hh)ney."
Huey: What he-When is he talkin // about.
Chopper: OH YEAH! "I know you ain't talkin to me!" Down the park! Khh-heh!
Nate: eh heh heh.
Chopper: hh We was down the park, (0.7) and we was- (0.6) and wh- wh- what was he doin,
Huey: You can ask Ralph what happened down the park Michael Johnson cuz this sucker lie too much.
(67) Chopper: **Uh** uh. We was playin- (0.3) we was makin a darn raft, (0.5) and them boys was throwin things at Huey, (0.7) And he said, "Boy!" And everytime he was talkin to that little boy. Th'he said, "Boy you better watch them things!" That big boy said.

(68) Huey: What ones. =

(69) Chopper: = "I know you ain't talkin to me!" I said and he said:"NO, not // you: du(hh)mmy-"

(70) Huey: What things.

(71) Nate: Ah:-heh-heh://heh.

(72) Chopper: "The little bo: (hh)y." Eh-heh-heh. hh

(73) Michael: That-

(74) Chopper: That big boy woulda kicked his butt!

(75) Michael: That lil/little boy.

(76) Huey: That's a lie too Chuckie.

(77) Chopper: Why you talk to that little boy.

(78) Huey: I said what?

(79) Chopper: Got chu got chu got chu! Hey heh hey heh, Hey hey HEY! Heh hey HEY! HEY HEY HEY! "I ain't go(h)t no(h)-" (0.8) Da:g!

Forms of exchanges such as the preceding can be identified as "negotiations" (Gulliver 1979:79), as contrasted with other dispute processes such as "duels," "self-help," "avoidance," "transformations in symbolic and supernatural terms," and "adjudications" (Gulliver 1979:133). Among the children themselves, activity such as the preceding is labeled "arguing."* Within this dispute, both the types of speech actions used to argue and these actions' sequencing forms shift dramatically in example 19.8 as one format for contesting one's relative positioning is replaced by another. That is, paired actions containing commands, threats, and insults, answered by return challenges—an activity that might be identified as similar to "sounding" (Kochman 1970:157–161, 1972:224–228; Abrahams 1970:39–60; Hannerz 1969:129–130; Mitchell-Kernan 1971:89–90)—are replaced by sequences of statements about verifiable events in the world (in this particular case, stories instancing one's opponent's character) responded to with refutations or disagreements. In addition to changing the operative speech action, the form of social organization of the group is also rearranged. A contest primarily between two disagreeing parties becomes a dispute arena for storytelling involving almost the entire playgroup.

Each of the types of verbal contest exemplified here is constructed with reference to alternative and highly structured types of procedures. In the next section of this paper the form and sequencing patterns in these alternative forms will be described. Then, focus will return to example 19 for a close investigation of specific forms of negotiation in this extended dispute, as well as a consideration of the strategic selection of a particular dispute format.

**argumentative responses: disagreements, disclaimers, commentaries, and returns**

One way in which argumentative talk can be constructed is by treating prior talk as statements about events that can be found to be true or false. With reference to this idea the following dispute will be examined.
example 20

(1) Eddie:  ((singing)) You didn’t have to go to school today, did you.
(2) Terry: Yes we did have to go to school today!
(3) Eddie:  ((singing)) No you didn’t have to go to school (1.0) was on strike.
(4) Terry:  We had our school today! The strike is off you dummy.
(6) Terry:  The strike is // off.
(7) Eddie:  The strike came on today.
(8) Terry: I don’t wanna hear it. I don’t wanna hear it.
(9) Eddie: I know. Cuz, I betcha I won’t go to school tomorrow.
(10) Terry: Take a biscuit.

The talk that begins this dispute provides a statement that the other party might be expected to agree with, that is, it provides a description of the addressee in positively valued terms. Terry is identified as someone who didn’t have to go to school. Terry’s response to this statement, however, constructs disagreement. An expression of polarity (Halliday and Hasan 1976:178), “yes,” occurs in the initial position in the turn in example 20.2. Terms such as “yes” and “no,” as well as their equivalents, frequently occur in the beginnings of disagreement turns and unequivocally mark opposition.

example 21  ((during slingshot battle planning))

(1) Raymond: I’m on Michael side.
(2) Michael: No you not.
(3) Raymond: Yes I is.
(4) Chopper: No you ain’t.

In example 20.2, opposition is displayed not only through the expression of polarity at the beginning of the turn, but also through the stress on the auxiliary verb “did,” creating a contrast with the auxiliary verb in the preceding utterance. A general procedure for marking disagreement in conversation is through such contrastive stress on a word being substituted for another in the prior utterance.

example 22  Michael: Me and Huey saw- we saw um: the Witch and the Hangman.
           Huey: The Hangman and the Witch nuckelhead.

example 23  Deniecey:  And that happened last year.
           Terry:  That happened this year.

When disagreement occurs through “substitution” (Halliday and Hasan 1976:88-89), the term replacing another in the prior utterance can be highlighted by making it the principal part of the turn. Frequently, the term is also accompanied by a pejorative person descriptor, as in example 22, or it replicates the prior utterance and makes the substitution the primary part of the prior speaker’s talk that is changed, as in example 23.

Substitution occurs not only in example 20.2, but also in examples 20.3-20.8. In example 20.3, Eddie’s opposition to Terry (example 20.2) is produced in a statement mirroring quite closely the preceding with the exception of the term “didn’t,” which replaces “did.” In the
moves which follow, a similar format for patterning statements of opposition occurs. In examples 20.5 and 20.7, “on” replaces “off” in examples 20.4 and 20.6, respectively. The stress on these replacement terms formulates these parts of the utterances as those parts to be focused upon. The form that argumentation takes thus demonstrates an orientation toward creating contests of verbal contention, a feature of interaction style that Abrahams (1970, 1975, 1976), Abrahams and Bauman (1971), Kochman (1970, 1972), and Reisman (1970, 1974) have argued to be characteristic of Afro-American speech events.9

The turns in example 20 are occupied not only with disagreeing with prior statements, but also with providing accounts for one’s own position, as in example 20.3 (“was on strike”). Although some forms of accounts may lead to closure of the dispute, in the present case disagreement continues. With the account, a new topic for debate is put on the floor as the focus shifts from whether or not Terry has to go to school to whether or not the teachers are on strike.

Accounts such as Eddie’s in example 20 are fitted to the particulars of the assertion at issue. However, there are also some classes of accounts that are used across a range of disputes. One such form of account used to persuade one’s opponent that his own position is the more tenable is the statement that the speaker is willing to “make a bet” on his position. In example 20, Eddie steps up his commitment to his position by using the phrasing “I betcha” (example 20.9). Here Eddie’s step-up effects a closure to the argument and Terry’s next utterance “Take a biscuit” (example 20.10) shifts the topic.

A second strategy through which a disputant may attempt to persuade an opponent that his own position is more valid is by arguing that his point of view is shared by at least one other person. If two people agree on one version of the event at issue, this is felt to constitute a form of “proof” of the speaker’s version of the event.

example 24 Anthony: Okay. I can prove that we went. Randy! Come here. (0.8)

Um, didn’t we go to Moore College of Art, Don’t we go every Wednesday,

In addition to trying to persuade one’s opponent of the validity of one’s own position, a disputing party might also attempt to establish the invalidity of another’s perspective by pointing to two inconsistent positions taken by the other, as Terry does in the following.

example 25 ((children are wearing roller skates))

Terry: Play and you gonna get knock down.

Raymond: Nuh uh,

Terry: Mm hm.

Raymond: Nuh uh y’all. I ain’t playin.

Terry: Yes you are playin. If you- if you put on a skate on you playin.

In the absence of a contradictory set of circumstances, a participant may attempt to set up a situation in which the other’s position may be argued to be logically inconsistent.

example 26 ((Pam has borrowed a rope belonging to a Venezuelan family))

(1) Sharon: Pam those Spanish people gonna tell on y(h)ou(h)!

(2) Pam: They ain’t Spanish. They Portariccan.

(3) Sharon: How ya know they Portariccan.

(0.7)

(4) Pam: They TALK Portariccan.

(5) Sharon: AH: YOU DON’T EVEN KNOW HOW PORTARICCAN people talk. So shut up.
Sharon's question (example 26.3) requests an account from Pam; subsequent to Pam's providing the account in example 26.4, Sharon (example 26.5) produces a move that argues that Pam's competence to have produced her prior statement is undermined. The "how you know" question sets up for a recipient to provide a reason for his position, the questioner may subsequently challenge the grounds for this position.

In the forms of moves we have been examining, second actions to assertions that are being challenged are built upon prior actions in a particular way. Statements about events in the world are treated as issues of fact to be called into question. However, rather than producing a contradiction to a prior statement, a disputant may also provide what Halliday and Hasan (1976:206-217) have termed an "indirect response," a "disclaimer" (an action that denies the relevance of a prior action), or a "commentary" (an action that comments upon what was said in a prior turn). In format, a disclaimer may resemble other disagreement turns. Terms such as "so," "I don't care," and "I know," for example, may be used as disclaimers in turn initial position and can be followed by a reason for the opposition.

**example 27**  
(a seven-year-old boy challenges a five-year-old)

Terry: Why you wanna bother with him. He smaller than you.

Eric: — So; he keep mouthin off with me.

**example 28**

Eddie: ((singsong)) Hannah an em hadda go to school.

Hannah: So, I ain't have to go to school yesterday.

**example 29**

Robby: I'm a tell Mommy.

Terry: — I don't care what you do.

**example 30**

Terry: Johnny gonna be in our club. Johnny and um Chuckie.

Naynay: — I don't care. Never mind. I don't like Chuckie cuz Chuckie say he gonna kiss me.

**example 31**

Nate: Al was fightin him last night. (0.7) Al was fightin him boy,

Michael: — I know it.

**example 32**

((discussing skin color variations in blacks))

Earl: Some people is spot-uh: light freckles.

Rick: — Yeah I know. I know that. I know it.

Disclaimers such as "I don't care" or "so," arguing for the irrelevance of a prior speaker's talk, constitute especially apt moves following statements whose truth values are not an issue, such as warnings (example 29), criticisms (example 27), and attempts to show oneself at an advantage vis-à-vis others (examples 28 and 30). Following moves treated as attempts to show up the other by delivering news (examples 31 and 32), a recipient can argue that he already knows what the prior speaker tells him, and thus can be seen as violating an implicit principle organizing much of conversational interaction (Sacks 1974:341; 1973:139).

A second form of indirect response is the categorization of the prior action in terms of a culturally defined offense. Categorizations such as "basing" (talking loudly about someone in a pejorative manner; example 33), "talking trash" (talking in what the recipient considers an inappropriate manner [example 34], often because the talk has sexual connotations [Abrahams and Bauman 1971]), "acting hard" (putting on a front of being tough), "telling stories" (lying), "showing off," "acting smart," "having smart answers," "bragging," etc., may occur alone or in association with other argumentative actions.

**example 33**  
(Nate has told Earl that his mother has four eyes)

Earl: You must need some glasses.

Nate: — I need some glasses, Well you- you base too much.
Commentaries permit a speaker to produce an action that ties to the past speaker’s action while introducing a new field of dispute, an accusation, to be answered by the prior speaker.

In a third set of argumentative next moves to be considered, responses are constructed neither by contradicting a prior utterance, disclaiming its relevance, nor commenting upon it, but rather through proposing a return action similar in form to the prior speaker’s utterance. Insults, accusations, and commands constitute instances of such actions.

Many insult sequences are composed of units in which a first insult term is responded to by a second insult term, in a format resembling sounding.

In insult returns using embedded structures, the description of a prior utterance remains the same but is cast within a new framing.

In examples 36 and 37, through what Labov (1974:115), describing how excellence is achieved in sounding or ritual insult, has referred to as “striking semantic shifts with minimal changes of form,” the referent of the description becomes the prior speaker and the action is redirected, though the description itself remains unchanged.

Insults such as the above imply a comparison between speaker and hearer, which is made explicit through use of the phrase “better than.”

Second actions do not negate prior ones, but instead state that relative to the prior speaker, the present speaker is superior with regard to the attribute being discussed.

Accusations (examples 40 and 41) and commands (examples 42 and 43), like insults, can also make use of actions that reply to prior talk with an action similar in kind, in sequences that Pomerantz (1975:26) has termed “return and exchange” moves.
example 43  Michael: Man back out. I don’t need y’all in here. I keep tellin’ ya.

Chopper: You better shut up. I’ll tell you that!

Accusation and command sequences such as examples 40–43 are structured according to a procedure similar to that in insult/insult return sequences. A first action is proposed; this is then answered by an action identical to the prior action in surface structure, but which makes the prior speaker rather than the current speaker the agent of the action. In the first utterance of the pair, the activity or negative attribute referred to is the more prominent; return moves, however, emphasize through intonational stress the agent of the action or subject associated with the pejorative attribute. Thus, contrast lies not in the truth or falsehood of the action put on the floor but rather in who should be the appropriate addressee of that action.

The sequencing of moves in disputes constructed through the exchange and return of insults, commands, or accusations can resemble that in which prior statements are answered by “indirect responses” such as disclaimers (see example 2). However, it differs in fundamental ways from the patterning of moves in which statements are treated as propositions to be refuted or proven. Return moves and disclaimers constitute actions for which providing an account for a prior position is an inappropriate next action following a move/countermove pair. Instead, such pairs are answered by a new round of exchanges.

Once disputes are under way, participants face the problem of how they are to be drawn to a close. In many anthropological descriptions of legal dealings, two concepts are taken for granted as parts of the dispute process: mediation and settlement (Collier 1973:19; Nader 1969:85; Gulliver 1969a:19; 1969b:67–68; Cohn 1967:148). Nader and Todd (1978:10) and Gulliver (1979:3) have recently, in their discussions of “negotiations,” provided arguments that mediation is not a necessary feature of all disputes. Most anthropologists, with the exception of Yngvesson (1976), however, have left unchallenged the idea that disputes terminate in settlement.

The disputes of the children of Maple Street differ from disputes reported in the anthropological literature in that they are conducted without mediators and rarely end in compromise or settlement. Children feel that individuals should “take up their own battles” without others “jumping in.” Indeed, requiring the assistance of an adult is considered a form of cowardice and can result in extensive ridicule. Children feel that the intervention of adults is unnecessary.

example 44  (after a skirmish between Poochie and Chuckie)

Vincent: That stupid Mr. Dan gonna come up there and say (0.4) “Y’all better (0.2) come on and shake hands.” Don’t mean nothin’ cuz we be playing together next day anyway.

Aggressive actions among children, in contrast to those among adults, are short lived and are not perceived as leading to the severing of relationships; it is expected that children who argue will play together shortly afterwards.

Disputes may be resolved by logical entrapments or by present participants’ aligning themselves with one party against another (as in example 19), in which case the outcome is clear. The majority of disputes, however, are terminated without any sharp indication that either position has “won” or “lost.” In general, the end of an argument occurs when one of the two disputing parties does not tie his talk to the topic of the prior dispute, but instead produces an action that breaks the argument frame—issuing a command (as in example 20), singing, asking a question, producing a noticing, initiating a greeting, accusing another, greeting someone, initiating a story or joke, or returning to ongoing play activity—and his adversary accepts this shift. Although compromise is seldom reached, nor sought as a goal of the interaction, by shifting to noncompetitive talk (between former disputants), parties
cooperate in bringing about closure to the dispute. Despite the absence of a clear outcome, disputing allows participants the opportunity to construct and display character, a process important in their social organization.

The general procedures available to children for managing arguments have been briefly sketched in this section. I will now return to the more extended example presented earlier (example 19) to investigate how, in a specific case, participants in conversation creatively utilize these resources for strategic advantages.

**Strategy in dispute management: a specific example**

Example 19 begins with a series of challengeable actions and their returns (examples 19.1-19.8). These actions simultaneously have features of commands, insults, and threats. However, at a certain point (during his second utterance in example 19.8) Chopper begins the first of a series of three stories about Huey. A puzzling question that arises is why Chopper attempts to change the conversational event from a sequence of counters in exchange and return format to a story.

As we have seen with the examples in the previous section, argument sequences provide a particular structure of turn taking. Each of two opposing positions is presented consecutively in relatively short, orderly, generally uninterrupted turn exchanges, in accordance with the conversational principle “current speaker selects next speaker” (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974:704). In general, though many people may be present to a dispute built on return and exchange actions, the argument is restricted to parties representing each of two opposing positions. In example 19, eight children are making slingshots. Prior to the dispute, two different groups have been carrying on conversation simultaneously. When the argument begins, however, only two participants, Chopper and Huey, become ratified speakers; the others stop talking.

This argument is constructed in rounds of exchange and return moves. Huey (example 19.1) provokes the argument with his command “**Gimme the things.**” Chopper (example 19.2) responds with an action that is both challengeable, having features of both a command and an insult. This action is answered by Huey (example 19.3) with a command. Chopper’s next action (example 19.4) both gives Huey a return command and categorizes Huey’s action as inappropriately addressed. Huey reciprocal action (example 19.5) preserves the format of Chopper’s utterance but changes the pronoun referent.

In the utterances that follow, another round begins with an action that is both a threat as well as an insult (example 19.6). Huey returns Chopper’s action with a reciprocal threat, using “dingy,” the pejorative attribute referred to in Chopper’s insult, as the verb in his utterance (example 19.7). Chopper begins a new comeback (example 19.8), but before bringing it to completion he initiates a story preface (Sacks 1974:340-342) in his second utterance (examples 19.8, 19.10). What kind of advantage might such a shift in activity serve?

In that actions such as insults, threats, and commands designate a particular party as next speaker, other parties who might be present to the argument are excluded. Stories, by way of contrast, provide for the participation of anyone who is a ratified hearer to them (Sacks 1970, 1974). Listeners to stories are not a passive audience; instead they may participate in the event by selecting themselves as next speakers, providing requests for elaboration and evaluation of the event reported on.

In addition, stories differ from the return and exchange moves of sounding because rather than constituting moves that concern issues of relative power and the enforceability of actions, they deal with propositions about verifiable events in the world that can be buttressed by accounts. The others present may thus enter into the dispute, testifying whose version of the event is the more plausible. In addition, in telling a story a speaker has rights.
to maintain the floor for several turns (Sacks 1970: lecture 5, 1974) and thus to a more extensive development of an idea than is generally permitted participants during other speech events. Usually, when following a turn at talk in a dispute a speaker must relinquish the floor to his opponent, so that the relevant domain of action may shift quite rapidly. By way of contrast, although a story may be interrupted, it remains a point of focus to which the storyteller may return, following the interruption. The actual details of the telling of Chopper's story will illustrate these points.

The first story (example 19.10) provides a description of Huey as someone afraid of confrontation. Chopper receives permission to continue his story through displays of appreciation, requests for elaboration of his story, and through Huey’s objections. Chopper’s within-word laughter in his quote of what Huey said to the boys who approached him for money provides not only what could be analyzed in Goffman’s (1974:516-544) terms as a comment by the animator or storyteller on the actions of the figure being described, but also what Jefferson (1974) has analyzed as an invitation to laugh. Indeed, laughter from listeners to the story follows in examples 19.12 and 19.16. This laughter not only provides a warrant for Chopper to tell a story, but also displays the alignment of the listeners to the narrative with respect to its principal character, Huey, who is ratified as having been afraid. Support for Chopper’s position is thus obtained without overt solicitation of proof.

Requests for elaboration of the story are provided by three of Tokay’s questions (examples 19.13, 19.17, and 19.9). These utterances not only demonstrate a listener’s interest in the story but also provide warrants for Chopper, in responding to them, to continue his story (examples 19.18, 19.20, 19.22). In that Huey is the main character in the event under discussion, he is in a position to counter the description in the story as well as the requests for elaboration that display interest in it. His first counter (example 19.21) disputes the relevance of Tokay’s questions. Tokay’s challenge (example 19.23) “When,” being also a request for information, allows Huey to develop his defense. Huey’s utterances (examples 19.25 and 19.27) provide both a response to Chopper and a counter to Chopper’s description of him.

Within the framework of a story, an event similar to that of a dispute may occur as, in turn, opposing sides present their positions. In the first cycle of the story, Huey’s alternative version of the event at issue is countered by Chopper (example 19.29) in a disclaimer. Further confirmation for his position is obtained from others present with Chopper’s accusatory description of Huey. Michael argues for Chopper’s position through his laughter (example 19.30) and his “baby-voice” mocking or “marking” (Mitchell-Kernan 1972:176) quote of what Huey said (example 19.34).

Huey’s next countermove is to provide an equivalent return pejorative description of Chopper (examples 19.36 and 19.38). He projects what would have happened to Chopper if the boys had found money on Chopper’s person after he had claimed he didn’t have any money. Chopper’s next move countering Huey (example 19.39) locates error in Huey’s hypothetical statement and recycles his pejorative description of him. In responding to this move, Huey, tying to Chopper’s prior denial, initiates a new counter (example 19.40).

A second story about Huey, in which he is again portrayed as cowardly, is then initiated by Chopper (example 19.45). After Huey was insulted, being told he couldn’t play football and was afraid to fight, he ran away. Huey’s objections to the story again permit Chopper to elaborate it. His counters to these charges (examples 19.49 and 19.51), though intended to establish his innocence, are treated by Chopper as requests for information—moves asking him to develop the story further (examples 19.50 and 19.52). At the close of Chopper’s second story, Huey presents further protestations of innocence (examples 19.53 and 19.56). Huey is countered by Jack (example 19.54) and then by Chopper (example 19.58), who recycles a refrain from his first story.
A third chained story is initiated by Tokay's request for a story (example 19.61). In response, Huey provides yet another counter (example 19.62). Chopper, however, recognizes Tokay's line rather than Huey's and provides what Labov (1972:363-364) has analyzed as an "abstract" to his narrative: "I know you ain't talkin' to me!"14 This abstract is Chopper's animation of a line in the story to come; it is the action delivered by a "big boy" that Huey backed down from during a confrontation.

In response to Chopper's portrayal of Huey as a coward, Huey states that Chopper is lying and pleads that Michael consult a disinterested third party (example 19.66). Chopper's answer is to deny the charge of lying and to continue the story (examples 19.67-19.72). Throughout the telling of this third story, Huey counters Chopper's telling of it (examples 19.68, 19.70, and 19.76).

Chopper's next move (example 19.77) points to an inconsistency between Huey's claims about what occurred and his own version of the event. Chopper asks Huey why he talked to the little boy and was afraid to answer the big boy, who had directed a challenge to him. In response, Huey (example 19.78) again attempts to argue his innocence of the event being described. As discussed previously, moves in arguments that point to inconsistencies in one's opponent's version of an event are frequently set-ups for logical entrapments. Following Chopper's challenge to Huey, and Huey's response, Chopper constructs that he has trapped Huey (example 19.79).

Shifting the conversational activity from a contest of challenges to stories about contests of challenges in which counters can occur has several advantages for Chopper. The confrontation takes place on Huey's property. Huey is also older and bigger than Chopper, and thus is in a better position to enforce his threats. By constructing a story, Chopper shifts the activity of argumentation away from the immediate situation, a domain in which Huey has a clear advantage, to the past, a domain where Huey's position relative to others can be called into question. The story format, which invites others to participate, allows Chopper to provide an extended, ratified account, an instancing of his version of Huey's relative status, by discussing Huey's cowardly actions in the past.

The rearrangement of argument mode also calls into play a different configuration for social organization. The event shifts from one designating only two parties to dispute to one inviting the participation of all those present. In that others may become members of the activity, even without being officially summoned as witnesses, they may align themselves to a particular side of the dispute and their participation may display whose version has more support. Chopper's story elicits agreement with his position from others present. The structure of the recounting itself allows for displays of appreciation, both laughter and repetition of lines in Chopper's story, as well as requests for elaboration of the story, which grant Chopper a warrant to develop his line. Even though Chopper's description may be countered, topic shifts or exits from the dispute by one's opponent are precluded in that the narrative format provides a point of focus to which Chopper as storyteller may return.

The type of analysis presented here takes a close look at both the structure and function of particular forms of speech events from a perspective that contrasts with that taken generally by researchers in the tradition of the ethnography of speaking. Most folklorists and anthropologists investigating the performance of verbal forms as an emergent process have directed their attention to the examination of how variables external to talk itself, such as setting, ground rules, and social roles, affect verbal forms (Bauman 1977:38, 37-45; Dégh 1969:83-84; Darnell 1974). Such an approach is consistent with the general programatics of sociolinguistic research outlined by Fishman (1972:450-451), who states that the "constructs" involved in the analysis of talk, "including situations, role relationships and speech events . . . originate in the integrative intuition of the investigator . . . [and] are extrapolated from the data of 'talk' rather than being an actual component of the process of
talk.” In contrast, the present analysis has examined how speech events can themselves provide for social organization, shaping the alignment and social identities (Goodenough 1965) of participants to the present interaction.

The importance of understanding the relationship of both form and function in human activities was stated by Sapir (1963[1927]:547).

We shall not consider any kind of human behavior as understood if we can merely give or think we can give, answer to the question “for what purpose is this being done?” We shall have also to know what is the precise manner and articulation of the doing.

All too frequently, social anthropologists describe the functions of social interactions without providing close documentation of the exact words with which these events are executed. On the other hand, folklorists and sociolinguists who pay close attention to the precise structure of verbal events frequently neglect the study of their social functions. Indeed, while studies of elicited or role-played speech events provide valuable information about the formal properties of such events, they cannot answer questions concerning how it comes to be that these events emerge in talk in the first place.¹⁵

**Conclusion**

I have described general procedures for conducting disputes which are made use of by black working-class children. Children disputing a proposition about a verifiable event in the world utilize various forms of accounts or proofs to argue for their own positions and against those of their opponents. In addition, they have ways of answering argumentative talk by disclaiming the relevance of prior utterances or categorizing them as offensive. Finally, through exchange and return actions, they may respond to prior moves with actions identical to those proposed by their opponent.

All the subgroups have full competence in the use of these various forms. However, members of the older boys’ group make fullest use of actions that promote situations of disagreement¹⁶—for example, exchange and return actions such as insults, threats, accusations, and commands. These types of actions allow boys to negotiate directly the kinds of cultural issues that are of immediate concern to them: for example, their positions of relative power with respect to one another. The present study is thus consistent with research of anthropologists and folklorists investigating male Afro-American speech events (Abrahams 1970, 1975, 1976; Abrahams and Bauman 1971; Kochman 1970; Reisman 1970, 1974).¹⁷

Argumentative talk, especially that of urban black children, is frequently dismissed as being disorderly conversation or a disruptive form of human behavior.¹⁸ The present analysis, however, demonstrates the orderliness with which disputes are conducted, as well as the linguistic and communicative competence black children display in arguments—playing with structures of embedding and ellipsis in return actions, providing disclaimers disarming the illocutionary force (Austin 1962) of a prior speaker’s talk, and formulating logical proofs—all without creating rifts in relationships. Moreover, children’s disputes do not take place following hours of intensive deliberation concerning what to say, but instead are realized in rapid-fire, successive turns at talk.

Through argumentative talk children not only play with rules of logic and forms of deductive reasoning, as Piaget (1926:20) has suggested, but also display and generate character. Indeed, the investigation of the argumentative conversations of preadolescent children, a group virtually unstudied by anthropologists, provides confirmation of Wehr’s (1979:8) statement that “conflict is a natural process . . . with predictable dynamics.” By carefully attending to the exact formulations and sequencing patterns of argumentative actions, we can investigate how social organization is processually realized through talk. We
can also begin to build a framework that will be of value in the cross-cultural study of dispute management.  

notes

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1 The term procedures is used to refer to what Goodenough (1971:21) has described as “an established way of conducting a recurring activity.”

2 Interference with the ongoing talk of members of the group was minimal, as I wanted to observe the children’s interaction without being an addressee of their talk. See Labov (1972a:209) for a discussion of what he terms “the observer’s paradox.”

3 Data are transcribed according to the system developed by Jefferson and described in Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974:731-733). A simplified version of this transcription system appears in Goodwin (1980b:695).

4 Kochman (1979) contrasts black and white notions of bragging and boasting and discusses differing attitudes toward what is the appropriate subject of each of these speech events. Reisman (1974: 117-119) and Abrahams (1976:57) also discuss boasting behavior.

5 Direct commands have been reported to be the most common form of directive in the play of both white middle-class preschoolers (Carvey 1975:61) and black American children aged 7 through 12 (Mitchell-Kernan and Kernan 1977:194). Sex differences in the use of directives of urban black children are discussed in Goodwin (1980a).

6 The term arguing is used by children to refer to disputing activities.

example 45

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chuckie:</th>
<th>((takes Vincent's slingshot board))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vincent:</td>
<td>Uh uh = That's mine! That's why I was late then. I did that this morning. (1.0) In the house.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuckie:</td>
<td>Who said you could have it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vincent:</td>
<td>Who took and said you could have it. Who said you could have my nails. Or who said you could have my rubber bands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuckie:</td>
<td>You did yesterday!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earl:</td>
<td>Stop // arguing!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuckie:</td>
<td>I got em and you ain't take em from me.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the ongoing activity in this interchange is clearly labeled by the children themselves as “arguing,” not all variations of the dispute process that will be examined are distinguished by them with specific terms. Nevertheless, the distinctions I will be making concerning alternative types of dispute-relevant actions are important because the children orient differently to these alternatives. Indeed, Goodenough (1970:112) has noted that “people have concepts that are not represented by the vocabulary of their languages.” A different research strategy, however, underlies much of the work in ethnoscience, the ethnography of speaking and folklore. These disciplines tend to be concerned with “events that are culturally encoded as lexemes of the language” (Agar 1975:43).

7 Abrahams (1976:50-51) specifies distinctions in definitions of sounding and signifying made by Kochman, Mitchell-Kernan, and Rap Brown. Foster (1974:225-227) discusses literature relating sounding to other Afro-American ritual insult forms. Among the children themselves, the term sounding was used only to refer to insults describing pejorative attributes of the target.

8 These stories might be viewed as employing a particular “rhetorical strategy” called signifying (Abrahams 1976:51). According to Kochman (1970:157), “provocation, goading, and taunting” are practiced by the signifier, who “reports or repeats what someone else has said about the listener.” Certainly, the function of the talk analyzed here coincides with Kochman’s (1970:157) description of the expressive functions of signifying: “to arouse feelings of embarrassment, shame, frustration or futility, for the purpose of diminishing someone’s status.” However, it would be difficult to establish that there exists “implicit content or function which is potentially obscured by the surface content or function” (Mitchell-Kernan 1972:166). Despite the fact that stories rather than ritual insults describe Huey’s pejorative traits, the stories are not primarily concerned with reports of a third party about the target; their “meaning” and “goal orientation” (Mitchell-Kernan 1972:166) appear to be direct rather than indirect.

9 That such events are exclusively characteristic of blacks is debated in Foster (1974:225-227) and Brommer (1978). See also Maltz and Borker (1980). A counterargument to such proposals appears in Abrahams (1976:38).
A similar finding concerning the orderliness of turn taking in children's arguments is made by Brenneis and Lein (1977:56) in their study of white middle-class children in the first through fourth grades in Massachusetts.

The distinctions made here correspond roughly to Piaget's (1926:65-72) differentiation of "quarreling" from "genuine argument."

See also Pratt (1977:100-116).

Abrahams (1976:20) discusses such forms of repetition as stylistic features of black speech events. See also Reisman (1974:121-122).

The form of this action resembles that of denials to he-said-she-said accusations by black girls: "I ain't say that!" (Goodwin 1980b:680, 685). It argues that the hearer exempts herself from the accusation in that it is inappropriately targeted.

See, for example, Labov (1972c), Stahl (1975), and Watson (1973) for studies that document the structure of stories but that ignore issues concerning how stories emerge in talk, a topic dealt with in Jefferson (1978). For a critique of sociolinguistic studies using as their corpus role-played data, see Stubbs (1978).

Recent work in sociolinguistics, following Goffman (1967), has proposed that certain universal principles of "face-saving" behavior underlie human communication (Brown and Levinson 1978). The data presented here provide evidence for an orientation toward an alternative conversational mode.

The talk analyzed here does, however, contrast with the talk of black speakers, which has been described as having a "contrapuntal" quality (Reisman 1970, 1974; Abrahams 1975; Abrahams and Bauman 1971). Discussing the features of "contrapuntal conversations," Reisman (1974:115) states that "there is no sense of interruption, or need to fit carefully into an ongoing pattern of conversation, or need to stop if someone else speaks" such that "the impulse to speak is not cued by the external situation but comes from within the speaker." Although it could be said that within the stories presented here "overlap signals a kind of interlock between the participants as active members of the performance" (Abrahams 1975:288), a close analysis of the text in example 19 has demonstrated that speakers are not merely "asserting their sense of presence and their feelings" (Abrahams 1975:288), but carefully tying their talk to that which preceded it. Here, voices do not, as Reisman (1974:111) puts it, "sing independently at the same time."

See, for example, Rosenfeld's (1971:43-61) analysis of Harlem teachers' perceptions of their students' talk.

On the need for such a framework, see Cox (1980).

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