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Commentary on Fiske’s Models of Social Relations

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ABSTRACT

In a wide-ranging argument, Alan Fiske (1991) proposes that almost all social action is explicable in terms of one or another of four models of social logic, which describe endogenous, discrete motivational bases for participation in social affairs. He calls the models “Communal Sharing,” “Authority Ranking,” “Equality Matching,” and “Market Pricing.” Fiske argues his case persuasively, and his formulation may be an important contribution to social science. But he says little of significance about psychoanalysis. This article introduces Fiske’s scheme and analyzes parts of it from psychoanalytic and phenomenological perspectives. Both analyses reveal certain points of convergence between his scheme and the psychoanalytic view of psychosocial phenomena. If Fiske is on to something, the points of convergence lend support to the pertinent aspects of psychoanalytic theory (the phenomenological support should not be overlooked in this regard). By the same

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token, because Fiske eschews or rejects psychoanalysis in building his argument, the convergence shows psychoanalysis corroborating relevant parts of his formulation. Outside the convergence, however, psychoanalysis can suggest certain refinements of the models. Some of the proposed changes are defended theoretically and empirically, and other areas in which psychoanalysis could elaborate and refine the scheme are indicated.

INTRODUCTION

In a recent book, Alan Page Fiske (1991) has proposed that four models of interaction describe almost all social action in almost all cultures. His claim is, essentially, that at any moment in social interaction the persons involved are very likely to be guiding their behavior with one or another of these models (Fiske, 1991, p. 167; 1992, p. 710). This is a striking claim, and it makes one pause to wonder if things really can be that simple. But Fiske’s wealth of empirical illustrations of, and support for, this scheme—and his extensive elaboration of the theoretical structure underlying the models—also make one pause. If his claims are even approximately valid, his formulation is an important advance in behavioral science. For instance, his scheme addresses the following major questions—and either suggests cogent answers to them or furnishes a conceptual structure allowing coherent investigation of them: How does enculturation or socialization occur? How might innate psychological tendencies resist or strengthen social and cultural constraints? How do we account for the degree of integration or lack of integration between the individual and society? Why does a society change most rapidly in certain ways? And, in a feature critical for the scientific study of human life, his formulation provides a consistent, empirically grounded way to compare the various forms of social order we find in societies.

The four principal models are called Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, Equality Matching, and Market Pricing. (In the following discussion I will refer to these as “CS,” “AR,” “EM,” and “MP,” respectively.) It should be noted at the outset that Fiske (1991) does not think that any one of these models can characterize an entire society (p. 167). Rather, his chief concern is with social matters at a lower level of analysis. That is to say, he would have us aim at deciding which models operate in which settings within a society; the society is seen as emerging from the way the models interrelate within and among these various settings (p. 228).

As elegant and neat as this formulation may be, it does not ignore the “fuzziness” of many social activities. For instance, ambiguity is seen to exist in disagreement over which model is operating, or over which model should be operating. Additionally, as one model’s influence wanes and another’s increases, there is an inherent lack of clarity regarding when the transition is complete. Nonetheless, Fiske (1992) tells us that “there is typically a high degree of consensus among interactants about what model is, and should be, operative” (p. 712).

But the following discussion is not meant to defend or only to describe Fiske’s formulation. As I analyze parts of it, I will indicate some points of convergence between psychoanalysis and his scheme, and inferences will be drawn from these points. Some of these inferences will suggest that his tetrad be refined in certain ways. My major proposal is that CS and AR may be the basic orientations of social life (in suggesting this, special attention will be paid to the place of AR in human life). But before beginning the analysis, let me sketch each of the models and then give a brief overview of Fiske’s formulation. (The sketches of the models will be presented in the order Fiske claims they instinctively appear in individual development.)

SKETCH OF THE MODELS

Features important for the following discussion are in boldface.
CS: COMMUNAL SHARING

1. People treat all members of a category as equivalent.
2. Expressed as feelings of **being the “same”** as certain
   others, wanting to be physically close to them, and so
   forth.
3. First appears at about **five months** of age.
4. “Marked” as operating in social affairs with bodily activ-
   ities, symbols and signs, such as commensalism, physi-
   cal **pollution**.
5. **Cardinal sins** have to do with bodily pleasure: usually
   sexual (incest) and/or oral (often dietary taboos).

AR: AUTHORITY RANKING

1. People attend to their position in a linear ordering that
   is based on authority, prestige, power, and the like.
2. Expressed as who controls resources; information and
   resources go “up,” and orders come “down.”
3. First appears at about **three years** of age.
4. Marked as operating in social affairs with iconic, visual
   symbols, such as position in line or size of dwelling.
5. **Cardinal sin** is harming a superior (parent or leader).

EM: EQUALITY MATCHING

1. People notice the inequalities among them and strive
   for balance on the basis of each person getting the
   **same** thing.
2. Expressed in spouse exchange, trading hospitality, and
   so forth.
3. First appears at about **four years** of age.
4. Marked as operating in social affairs with manipulable
   “tokens,” so as to achieve matching or arithmetic corre-
   spondence (e.g., one person—one vote; tit-for-tat re-
   prisals).

5. **Cardinal sin** is not known, but has to do with defection,
   jealousy, and the like.

MP: MARKET PRICING

1. People orient to ratio values; concrete equality is not
   the issue, but negotiable “compensation” is.
2. Expressed in prices, exchange rates, wages, or the equivalent.
3. First appears at about **nine years** of age.
4. Marked as operating in social affairs with money, ab-
   stract **symbols**, proportionality, and so forth.
5. **Cardinal sin** is theft. **Minor sins** are price-gouging,
   breach of contract, misrepresentation of value, and the like.

OVERVIEW

Fiske makes a narrow claim about the models: that they
constitute four discrete universal **logical forms** of social interac-
tion. To be more precise, they are seen as principles identifying
four distinct, incommensurable, systematic ways people look at
the social world, behave toward each other, and respond to
each other. His arguments are quite effective at substantiating
this particular claim.

But he makes much broader claims as well. For instance,
the apparent universality of the models allows him to propose
that humans are naturally, fundamentally, social. He builds
upon this claim of instinctiveness by saying that people expect
others to understand the nature of the model operating in
social interaction and that they expect others to behave in ac-
cordance with that model. This creates two additional (minor)
models that account for behavior that does not fit any of the
others. One is the “null” model, in which people simply ignore
each other. The other one is the “asocial” model, in which a
person uses others’ behavior within a model strictly for selfish
ends. Both of these models lack the element of reciprocity, even at the level of expectations.

The instinctiveness of the models, which Fiske usually calls their “endogenous” nature, also allows him to propose that they are in the mind, and he is quite explicit about their psychological nature. For instance, he says that the models are moral and motivational ends in themselves (Fiske, 1992, p. 716), and that “[p]eople create most of their social world using [these] four elementary psychological models” (p. 710; see also pp. 222–223). It is in this regard that his formulation is the most promising. It is a major expedition into the theoretical terra incognita between Durkheim, Weber, and Piaget. But, to my eye, there also seems to be some theoretical and empirical slippage in his delineation of the psychological state of the models. Perhaps there is room here for clarification and refinement, and psychoanalysis can be a valuable tool in this attempt because its view of the mind is different from that presented by Fiske’s models. Hence, it can ask novel questions of his scheme and perhaps thereby propose changes in it. Part of this article will do just this, especially with regard to theoretical relationships between the models. But these relationships will also be discussed from a nonpsychoanalytic perspective (chiefly to support the psychoanalytic argument). In view of this, let me paraphrase how Fiske delineates relations between the models.

Relations between the Models

Fiske (1991) expends considerable effort showing how, at the level of social logic, the models cannot be reduced to each other. He says that each is axiomatic; thus, none can be subordinated to another or derived from another, nor can any be secondary to another (pp. 226–228). The question of whether or not this kind of autonomy also exists on the psychological

level is one that should be asked. Fiske answers it in the affirmative, not only implicitly (as an entailment of his view that the models are psychological), but explicitly when he compares the psychological and social aspects of the models. For instance, he says, “The sociological, cultural, and psychological features that characterize the fundamental models turn out to be homologous” (p. 185), and “The hypothesized properties and operations are axioms about social psychology. . . . They are only correct if they capture the psychological facts about social relations” (p. 222; see also pp. 206, 207).

Before beginning a critique of this dimension of Fiske’s scheme, some words that will be used should be clarified. First, human life—as it is lived—will be held to be inseparable from the mental experience, or phenomenology, of living it. This experience includes the conscious, preconscious, and unconscious thought processes and affect associated with whatever is being attended to (e.g., it includes the mentation of semiotics, of sensation, and of imagination, as well as that of logic, grammar, etc.). Second, the phenomenology or experience of interacting socially will be called the psychosocial aspect of that behavior.

General Refinement of the Models

Let me now take up Fiske’s (1991) contention that each model is independent, and none are consistently (his moderate case) subordinated to any of the others (p. 370). We begin by noting that when we step away from a molecular social focus, we are struck by the pervasive appearance of AR in most human groups: in tribe, chiefdom, and state; in family, in the division

1 He even speculates that they may be encoded (in “empty,” “generic” form) on the DNA molecule (Fiske, 1991, p. 199).

2 See also Whitehead, 1993, p. 927.

3 In entertaining the notion of these different forms of mentation, one might muse on the experience of enjoying a warm spring day, with life quickening all around—without regard for whether the day falls between March 21 and June 21, or for whether or not a certain American groundhog saw its shadow in February.
of labor, in the precarious hold “democracy” (EM; p. 22) has on political life, in the disastrous experience known as state socialism, and so on. Inequality, dominance/subordination, extraordinariness, or whatever—perceived or actual—is virtually everywhere. Even in the band, better arrow-makers, say, are often recognized as having more mastery and control over this craft than others, even if this is not publically recognized—or causes consternation when it is remarked (cf., e.g., Howell, 1984, p. 37). Further, in a band that prescribes equality, when AR (i.e., someone getting what they “shouldn’t” get) threatens the conspicuously egalitarian social order, a common coping mechanism is avoidance behavior: the dissolution of relevant parts of the social order. The fact that the competitors cannot reach a modus vivendi through one of the other models, but choose to dissolve their social relationship, speaks to the strength of AR even in quite egalitarian and generous (Fiske, 1991, p. 164) societies. AR is, so to speak, the last to go. One could also ask whether or not something as fundamental as mate choice in the band is a case of all being equal in the eyes of all. There is evidence that the mate preferences of band members are probably influenced by unequally distributed features, such as hunting prowess (Kaplan and Hill, 1985; also cf. Buss, 1992).

THE SCALES

But there are other methods by which we can critique the posited relations between the models. For instance, Fiske shows how each model is identified with a certain mathematical scale: CS with a nominal scale, AR with an ordinal one, EM with an interval one, and MP with a ratio scale. He then describes differences between the scales to show how the models differ. This strategy also lends itself to my purpose, but I will examine the scales to suggest modifications of Fiske’s scheme.

The first issue is the nature of the relationship between CS and AR. They are fundamentally different, even incommensurable; they are alike only in that neither quantifies the discriminations it makes. But CS also diverges profoundly from the other models, because it declares the identity of things. It marks only the absolute sameness of things, and—ipso facto—their absolute dissimilarity. There is no sense of degree in CS. For this reason, it is somewhat arresting to find CS associated with a “scale,” that is, with a means by which a relationship in the real world can be represented numerically or in terms of gradation (Wallace, 1971, p. 71; Kaplan, 1964, p. 189). In fact, it seems questionable whether a nominal scale is a true scale; for how can the raw distinction “either/or” (which is the essential nominal distinction) tell us “more or less” (which is the sine qua non of numeralization)? Logically, it cannot do so, and if it does, then it is more than a nominal scale: It is an ordinal (AR), or interval (EM), or ratio (MP) scale.

Perhaps the status of a nominal scale qua-scale can be clarified by recognizing a possible, partial solution to Russel’s Paradox suggested by Hempel (1952, p. 54) and applicable to set theory in social science. Hempel distinguishes between “classificatory,” “comparative,” and “quantitative” concepts. By Hempel’s argument, nominal scales—in identifying similarity (as CS does)—serve a classificatory conceptual function, and do not, in themselves, establish gradations. That is to say: To claim

\[\text{Whitehead (1993, p. 325) rightly stresses that these scaling and other mathematical arguments are critical to Fiske’s case.}\]

\[\text{True enough, the latter concern may be experientially involved in the process leading to a judgment of identity (e.g., Rosch, Mervin, Johnson, and Boyes-Braem, 1976). But logically and phenomenologically it is of another order than the attribution of identity: It is the old problem of measuring the “chairness” of a chair.}\]
there are differences between things is one kind of logical maneuver; to attribute some kind of graded ordering to these differences (or things) is another logical matter entirely. Fiske's (1991) use of "categorical" instead of "nominal" (p. 209) is apposite here. A categorical "scale" allows us to signify (in Russell's sense) a set, while operations permitting gradation (the application of scales) are done on items within sets. Hence, categorical scales—and, by extension, CS—are preconditions for grading or scaling. That is to say, in the models' case, "You need a self to rank yourself.

**Phenomenology of the Models**

If the "argument from scales" holds, then we may call CS a unique cognitive development. This throws Fiske's (1991) claim that the entire tetrad forms a Guttman series⁷ (pp. 210, 224) into doubt—at least on the experiential level. I think relations among the last three models do compose such an experiential series, but even if AR relations require identification of units that are to be judged as being greater or lesser, CS should not be included in a phenomenological Guttman series. To be specific, claiming, as Fiske (1991, p. 213) does, that the "antisymmetry" feature of AR allows the "incorporation and preservation" of the prior CS feature of equivalence is, to me, stretching the nature of CS conditions a bit. One can, I submit, plausibly argue that identity and equivalence are not, experientially, the same kinds of things—the former condition being conceptualized as fundamentally monistic, the latter as essentially componential. If this is so, then CS identities are not equivalencies. Thus, the proviso that in AR the equivalence (of

CS) has acquired a different "social" sense (Fiske, 1991, p. 213) is unconvincing because one can question whether equivalence obtained in the first place.⁸

Even if we grant that equivalence is identicalness, it is thereby coextensive with all members of a set because it is that condition upon which the existence of any set is predicated. Thus (if you will forgive some algebra-speak), anything that is perceived as different from, say, X (at that level of equivalence-cum-identicalness) is essentially not comparable with X (recall the homely saw about apples and oranges not being comparable). Or, if you wish, it is "comparable" to X only in being absolutely not X. The point being that comparability requires some element of sameness in the things being compared. The diacritically exclusive nature of the "self versus other" distinction in CS relations illustrates this felicitously: Essentially, you are either in or out of the group.⁹

In an AR relationship, however, the "other" (the different thing) is comparable by virtue of the graded series upon which things can be placed. The overarching hierarchy provides the elemental third aspect¹⁰ of the relationship that creates the

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⁷In such a series subsequent operations (read: "models") incorporate previous ones into novel configurations that "transcend" the previous ones. Whether or not the mind transcends things is in some doubt (e.g., Gay, 1992, p. 99), and the qualitative differences between CS and AR, which I have just described, would also make transcendence of the former by the latter questionable—a point I am about to explain further.

⁸Fiske (1991, pp. 219–220) discusses this problem directly. But I find his defense fully acceptable only as it bears on the nature of the models as social logics. For instance, in the following statement he gives an incisive description of the object of analysis in the "social logic" approach to the models: "In general, in any kind of social relationship it is not the total person or associated objects per se that are structured according to these relational properties, only certain socially constituted, marked attributes of them" (p. 220). Herein lies what I see as the componentiality of equivalence and what Fiske sees as the equivalence aspect of identity. However, taking a phenomenological approach to the models (which is kosher, given their inescapable psychological nature) knocks the "per se" out of this quote. The experience of being in a group, or of being subordinated to someone, is especially susceptible to notions and feelings of wholeness and holism (e.g., Weber, 1922, pp. 358–373, 386–392; Isacks, 1989). I will return to this topic in the conclusion of the article.

⁹Being out of the group means only that. Technically, the distinction does not create different kinds of outsiders.

¹⁰In the rest of this article the term "third" will be used as a shorthand way of referring to the sense of an independent, but related, something beyond the self and immediate other (cf. Abelin, 1980). In a way, society or culture is a third in this sense: It is that phenomenological other that makes us do what we would not do if it were truly only you and I.
"sameness" necessary for comparability. So, if there actually are these fundamental differences between AR and CS judgments (a trichotomized vs. a bifurcated universe; the comparability vs. noncomparability of things) then CS concerns are orthogonal to AR ones. This warrants acknowledging that, cognitively, the appearance of AR is as remarkable a feat as the establishment of CS.

What, then, of the status of EM and MP relative to AR and CS? Again, we turn to the associated mathematical/scalar analogs to tease out the nature of these relationships. EM and MP are fundamentally similar to AR because all three grade relations between items in a set (this provides preconditions for their comprising a Guttman series). However, the features by which the gradation is conceptualized, at the phenomenological level, are not common to all three. At the most primitive (childish) level, the features establishing rank in AR relationships are body-centered (e.g., size and age).\(^{11}\) In the adult AR calculus they are less body-centered but are still closely attached to the "person" (e.g., charisma, authority, and the wisdom of agedness), and they are not readily transferred in an ad hoc fashion (e.g., when interacting with a person who recently stopped being your boss, it is often difficult to refrain from being subordinate in some fashion).

Turning to EM: It is—in both its archaic and advanced forms—a move toward "depersonalization" by manipulating physical things (the "third") to create a sense of relational balance (one-to-one division or sharing of objects, turn-taking, etc.). But on the phenomenological level it is still a physicalized, concrete operation, which is rooted in the extrapsychic world of brute facts and things. EM is thus like AR not only because its calculations too rely on a "third," but because like AR, this third element is also seen as existing in the extrapsychic

world (in EM it exists in, say, each person's allotment of cookies; in AR, it exists in social sanctions). These shared aspects of AR and EM show that EM is not as novel a cognitive creation as AR or CS. Yet, in being the first means of establishing a sense of equality out of inequality, and in doing this by manipulating the things of the world, it is still a major developmental accomplishment.

The next stage, MP, is not, I suggest, as dramatically significant an achievement as EM. Like EM and AR, its operation is based on a perception of a graded series. In this sense, both EM and MP are elaborations of AR conditions, just as interval and ratio scales are quantifications of imprecise ordinal arrangements. But it is worth noting that EM and MP are more than simply descriptive or declarative—as CS and AR are. That is to say, CS and AR simply declare identity and/or superiority. They set distinctions which are "qualitative" (which is an empirically suspect word because it denotes nongradability). By contrast, EM and MP measure "how much" is necessary to achieve equality.

In this respect, EM and MP are primarily instrumental rather than descriptive, because they equip the innate motivational cast of the mind with a practical means to address certain problems in the world. In fact, as I will try to explain in the next section, it may well be that their primary function at the phenomenological level is to permit the elimination of inequality (stemming from some AR situation) by quantifying it. Thus they allow manipulation of perceived\(^{12}\) present conditions (inequality) in order to establish (or prevent) a certain future condition (some form of balance/fairness), whereas CS and AR are more bound to the present because they do not "enable" change in certain aspects of the status quo. They only assert the nature of those aspects—which are changeable by reference

\(^{11}\) I will expand upon the "physicalness" of the models in the section describing a psychoanalytic approach to the models, and will therein touch on the bodiness of these models, important elements of which lie beyond the reach of a social logic analysis (cf. Fiske, 1991, p. 219).

\(^{12}\) The perception may be implicit. Note how quickly the MP proposition "honest wages for honest work" can be related to issues of worker "oppression," and how high interest on loans is readily seen as an abuse of banks' power over the public.
to EM or MP. In short, EM and MP make the changes not only conceivable, but practicable. This practical time-displacement feature of EM and MP separates them from CS and AR, and helps explain why Fiske can characterize EM and MP as the only models that are uniquely human.\textsuperscript{13}

As for the distinctive ways EM and MP achieve their ends, I am not sure that the experiences of equality matching and proportionate loading (cf. Fiske, 1991, p. 226) are all that different. If what was said above holds, then, at important levels of the mind, both are essentially means to quantify inequality in order to eliminate it—the decisive concern being the outcome, not the means. (The close relationship between EM and MP in this regard is evident in the way an [MP] Archimedean ordered field emerges from an [EM] Abelian group simply by the latter being modulated distributively [Fiske, 1991, pp. 217–218]). Nonetheless, in dealing with the concrete reality of AR conditions, MP is far more intrapsychically constructed than is EM. This is because its medium of compensation is much more the mind’s construction of the things of the world; that is to say, it relies on the valorization of mediators. Thus, MP is most readily represented in abstract symbolic form. In this way, the mind reclaims some of the “potency” lost to concrete extrasomatic factors in AR and EM relations. Nonetheless, however much of an advance this signals, it seems to me that there is little novelty introduced—at the experiential level—in the shift to the MP mode when it is compared with the shift to AR and EM arrangements.

If this discussion of differences and similarities among the models is sound, we can summarize some plausible modifications of the tetrad as a set of phenomenological or logical entities. First, CS produces a profoundly different way to sort the world than do the other three models; nevertheless, all depend on its functioning. Also, it seems that MP is a refinement of EM, and both are derivatives—and reactive/secondary ones at that—of AR conditions. Hence, the models exist in orthogonal relations (CS vs. AR/EM/MP), and in relations of priority (AR over EM and MP). Finally, by inference from these two sets of relations, and because the mind directs these models, we suggest that CS and AR are the dominant orientations of the tetrad. Now, it may be that these conclusions are “wrong-headed”; but the psychoanalytic perspective to be applied next makes basically the same assertions, and expands and clarifies them.

**Psychoanalytic Approach to the Models**

Psychoanalysis is deeply concerned with the instinctive dimension of human life. So it can be expected to yield some insight into the instinctive (i.e., endogenous) sequential appearance of the models. Unfortunately, psychoanalysis does not fare well in Fiske’s (1991) study. He ignores it (e.g., p. 137), scants it (e.g., p. 416, n. 10), or seems to misunderstand or oversimplify it (e.g., pp. 385, 399). But Fiske’s oversights in this regard are unfortunate in substance, as well as in principle, because points of convergence between psychoanalysis and the first models to appear developmentally—CS, AR and EM—reveal much that is valuable to psychosocial theory (MP will be discussed later). Let me briefly describe two of these points of convergence (there are others).\textsuperscript{14} To repeat, they are, first, the

\textsuperscript{13}Given that “fully elaborated” (Fiske, 1991, p. 198) EM and MP are distinctive of our species, rudimentary forms of EM may exist among our closest relatives. I speak here of male common chimpanzees mounting a female early in her estrus with little regard for their dominance hierarchy (Goodall, 1986, pp. 450–452) and ask: Might this not be “turn-taking”? And their piece-by-piece relinquishing of meat—with its pacifying effect on the begging recipient—could also be incipient EM behavior (Goodall, 1986, p. 373). The fact that adumbrations of advanced human relations occur in sexual and oral activities among our closest primate relatives is not surprising. These two activities are the most complex (i.e., “overdetermined”) means by which individuals in our line organize ideas, emotions, and feelings about the world and their relations with it. In our evolution, such polysemic activities were likely to be rich sources of variety leading to major adaptive changes (e.g., they are integral to pair-bonding, to the prolonged dependency of offspring, and so on).

\textsuperscript{14}For example, other points of convergence can be found by examining the coding of the models in social signs (Fiske, 1991, pp. 203–206) and by examining the motivational complexes underlying the models (Fiske, 1991, p. 106).
endogenous nature of the models and their order of appearance in development and, second, the nature of the quintessential violations of the models (their ‘sins’). Fiske (1991) uses his discussion of these two matters (sans psychoanalysis) to show the independence and irreducibility of the forms. But when we see these matters in light of psychoanalytic principles, we expand our understanding of the forms’ phenomenology and of their social logic (cf. p. 23), and we find reason to dispute their autonomy at the experiential level. Let me explain.

**Endogeny and Sequence**

Psychoanalysis would readily assent to the instinctive nature of the first three models to appear developmentally and to the sequence of their ordering, because each can be seen as a social ‘logic’ expressing the focus of the unconscious mentation typical of the stage in which it originates. Although the following analysis is conjectural, it reveals a fit between mentation and the origins of the first three models that seems too tight to be coincidental. If the convergence is empirically sound, it provides insight into the basic motivations operating at the root of the models. And, after all, we cannot forget that engaging in them is always intentional.

Let us begin with CS, which is perhaps the easiest model to ‘illuminate’ with psychoanalytic principles. It appears at least by five months of age. This is explicable from a psychoanalytic perspective because it is the social logic of the ‘problem of the mother,’ that is, of the basic self–other boundary being established by virtue of relations with the mother. The sense of ‘selfness’ and ‘otherness’—of us/them—generic to the CS formulation is readily traced back to this earliest and dyadic experience. Its development is manifested in the child groping its way to object permanence, in the appearance of stranger anxiety, and so on.

The later oedipal situation, however, is more complicated, both in its experience and with respect to the model, AR, which appears in its early stages. This is because the Oedipus complex is triadic in its agents (self, desired parent, and rival) and in its double outcome: first, in the ability to relate socially to an other beyond the mother and, second, in its consolidation of the third major axis of mental functioning—namely, the conscience. I think it plausible that this triadic condition is responsible for the first ‘sensing’ of AR—which would be why AR originates at about three years of age—when the oedipal crisis is beginning to develop (Fiske, 1991; Chodorow, 1978, p. 94; Smith, 1988, p. 104; Sluckin and Smith, 1977). Initially, the child (girl or boy) has no organized psychosocial response to its subordination to the father (in access to the mother). But as its powerlessness in this triad persists, it struggles to understand the frustrating arrangement. Its developing mind, working with its social milieu,\(^{15}\) arrives at a conceptualization of a stable rank ‘system.’ This both efficiently represents what is happening and also permits replacement of the rival—which is what the early oedipal child especially yearns to do (Greenspan, 1989, p. 104).

AR permits this by providing a standard, the overarching hierarchy, that is perceived by the child as independent of the members in it.\(^{16}\) This cognitive development is not as accessible through relations with the mother because of the fundamental preexisting identity in the child’s mind between itself and its mother (Machtlinger, 1981, p. 125). Because of this overlap, the child is always tempted to merge with, rather than replace, the mother (Chodorow, 1978, pp. 79–80, 97, 195). The father’s importance in the cognitive ‘invention’\(^{17}\) of AR is due to his

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\(^{15}\)This process is similar to the one that occurred when CS emerged from the mother–infant dyad.

\(^{16}\)See Smith (1988, p. 103) on preschool children’s perceptions of peer hierarchies and on their repeated overrating of their own position. These hierarchies are elaborations of the earlier lessons drawn from parent–child interaction (Omark and Edelman, 1975; Smith, 1988, pp. 96, 98).

\(^{17}\)It is not possible to discuss here how the neurological architecture required for AR-type conceptualizations might be aligned by the encounter with
creating a sustained series of salient opportunities for the child to supplant, rather than merge with, an emotionally preeminent other. And it is his role as a deeply different, powerful, and separate competitor that is decisive in this.\textsuperscript{18}

As can be seen, then, the core of this model's logic is its instantiation of a "third"—a feature, I suggest, that is first and most emotionally understood by the child as a stable feature of the world because of child's enduring rivalry with the father.\textsuperscript{19} This having been said, however, the reflective reader might wonder if there is a difference, as things proceed, between the girl's and boy's experience of the third. With regard to the boy, there is wide agreement that the description given above—minus the pointed AR considerations—captures the relevant aspects of his oedipal experience. On the other hand, there are at least three major, differing accounts of the girl's experience. But they all can be seen to portray the father as a third whose features can, arguably, produce AR. In the first account, the girl's ties to the mother throughout early childhood are seen as being very similar to those of the boy's (Chodorow, 1978, pp. 96, 207). In this case, the above description would hold, unchanged, for the girl as well as for the boy. In the second (the classic) account, the girl comes to see the mother as rival for the father. But, for reasons stated above, the father. This is the issue of the social facilitation of cognitive architecture for which there may be a predisposed neurological substratum. After all, is there a fit—however loose—between Winnicott's (1965) observation that there is no such thing as an infant but only "[f]ather, mother and infant, all three living together" (p. 43) and Lumsden and Wilson (1982) saying that "[F]or humans, genes and cultures are partners of necessity" (p. 7)? Mutatis mutandis, one can ask the same question of at least CS/dyadic relations.

\textsuperscript{19}The father as nurturer, not competitor, is not a true third, but is another type of "mother/other." His thirdness resides in his strength (he is not a peer), in his corporeal distinctiveness, and in his physicalized rivalry. I mean by the last two features that he is not the mother (the first other), he is a different sex than the mother, and he is a competitor for her sensual and sensuous attention.

\textsuperscript{18}Abelin (1980, p. 133) points out perhaps the earliest glimmers of this thirdness as a means by which the sense of self develops. However, even then, the third as rival is critical. But Abelin's argument has serious problems (Machtlinger, 1981, pp. 128–131), and we are here concerned with how the third mounts into an AR scheme.

the mother cannot be a true third because of the basic identity the child senses with her. So, in this case also, the father is the third, even as the object of desire, and he represents AR in being seen as more powerful than the mother—in sociological terms (as the ideological or actual authority in the family) or, more importantly, as the possessor of a penis (physicalized power or metaphor for power [Chodorow, 1978, p. 123]).

But this classic account has serious problems, as Chodorow (1978, p. 95ff.) makes clear in her masterful treatment of the subject.\textsuperscript{20} She presents an explanation that is meant to correct the classic one—without, however, denying the first account just mentioned or the power attributed to the penis by the girl child (pp. 96, 122–123). In her supplementary version, the father is a critical means by which the girl achieves not only heterosexuality, but (parallel to Mahler's theory) also independence from the mother. In terms of the argument being made here, he would help her achieve this by being a third who is associated with precedence in a dominance hierarchy—and in Chodorow's work we find grounds to advance this argument. For instance, she says that the father occupies "a position of distance and ideological authority in the family"\textsuperscript{21} (p. 195), a position reflected in the fact that girls are more likely to obey their fathers than their mothers (p. 80), and he "represents culture and society to the child" (p. 81; see also Lamb, 1981, p. 17). Moreover, even if all of these factors are not objective features of the girl's milieu, her desire to gain autonomy from the "omnipotent mother" will cause her to "idealize" her father in ways such as these in order to "get away from her mother" (Chodorow, 1978, p. 121; see also pp. 80, 195–199). Thus, no matter which of the accounts we ply, the role of father

\textsuperscript{20}The major weakness in her compelling explanation of the girl's situation is its lack of appreciation for the evolutionary basis of oedipal dynamics (see Rancour-Laferriere, 1985, pp. 266–267).

\textsuperscript{21}Even if Chodorow's study does reflect a focus on Western conditions, there is persuasive evidence that men possess, overall, significantly more authority than women in the preponderance of societies; this holds in the domestic as well as public spheres (Whyte, 1978, e.g., pp. 81, 84).
as third, who "brings" along with him the AR model, holds for girls as well as for boys. Even in the girl's case most different from the boy's, the dominance relationship is chiefly conceptualized as the mother being subordinate to the outsider father (e.g., Machltinger, 1981, p. 147), as compared with the boy seeing himself as subordinate to the outsider father. The father is decisive in both cases.

The next model to appear developmentally is the EM model, which first appears when the child is about four years old (Machltinger, 1981). The genesis of this model at this particular age is also understandable as a product of the oedipal dynamics peculiar to the period. At about four years old the child is beginning to deal with full-blown oedipal dynamics. In this ordeal, the most important feature is the child's sure knowledge that the threatening parent (whether mother or father) is going to win many times. In Fiske's terms: The child knows that AR works in the opponent's favor, and the child often despairs of replacing the rival. I suggest that the emergence of EM is, in important ways, a result of the child's struggle to deal with the successful threatening other in a fashion as "social" as AR is: to wit, by imposing a triadic social solution (allowed by the nonrelative compensatory standard—by the EM token) on a triadic problem (I, her, him—and the rival is winning!). This model allows the child to turn away from the futile goal of boldly replacing the rival in the world of social action, to aspiring to be the rival's equal in that world—equal by means of EM (the implications of this for identification, as opposed to internalization and incorporation, should not be lost on psychoanalysis). The passion, even desperation, of the child in this regard is evident in the ardent demands for "fairness" at this age (e.g., see Fiske's [1991, p. 403] remarks on the child's "shock" when someone "pulls rank").

Hence, we have, in the emergence of these three models, neat points of convergence between psychoanalysis and Fiske's scheme. Now, what about the sins of each model?

VIOLATION OF THE MODELS

In this regard, we will examine the typical quintessential form of violating each of the three models (Fiske, 1991, pp. 122–123, 191). In each case the transgression is what we would expect, given a psychoanalytic predictor. For CS, the violation has to do with bodily pleasure: genital and/or oral, and in the latter case it is often identified with dietary concerns. In the next step, AR, the essential kind of violation is physical assault—against parents and/or leaders. When it comes to EM, however, Fiske (p. 123) has trouble identifying its cardinal sin (this is a bit of slack we will try to take up in a moment). But he gives definite leads, which we will accept as sound: He says that EM is "uniquely" susceptible to being weakened by defecation, jealousy, and envy (p. 123). When considering the sins in light of what psychoanalysis knows about the stage in which each model emerges, we discover yet another source of compatibility between psychoanalysis and Fiske's scheme.

As we can see, cardinal CS sins are linked to bodily concerns identified with the child's primitive orientation to its mother during the preoedipal stage, concerns that are elaborated upon in the oedipal period. 22 In short, the typical archetypical CS violations are rooted in relations with the mother. Thus, violations of the first model to appear resonate with relations with the first other. The chief AR sins are readily seen as refractions, or direct reflections, of parricidal impulses stemming from rivalry with the intruding parent, and they are salient concerns of the child when the AR model emerges. Finally, essential infractions of the third model, EM, are linked to the inevitable outcome, for the child, of its futile competition

22The incest in CS violations may seem incongruent. The CS period is involved with self issues, not sexual issues. But the effect of the oedipal experience is to impose its own cast on preoedipal dynamics—which means lending a sexual dimension to self processes and relations with others. Psychoanalysis says it is only natural for the child to seek genital pleasure from the person who has been the chief source of so much general body-pleasure.
with the interloping parent. That is to say, they are associated with loss of some kind.

One could go on indicating the points of convergence between psychoanalysis and Fiske’s theory (see n. 14). But the ones I have outlined are major ones, having to do with the origins, basic orientations, and essential violations of the first three models. The lessons derived from them are four in number. First, if Fiske is on to something, then the convergence lends support to the reality of the psychoanalytic description of how the mind develops in childhood (and of course, the corroboration of theoretical constructs flows both ways). Further, the convergence sheds light on how these models first appear in the mind without being imposed by culture or being produced by pristine mentation. Instead, they stem unavoidably from the interplay of genetic predispositions and panhuman early experiences. Moreover, the convergence shows how these models come into being to serve identifiable motives. Finally, the first three models do contain universal content; specifically, the experience of these models everywhere will be infused with symbolic representations of significant others and of the body (e.g., Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Anzieu, 1989). The last two lessons are specific refinements of Fiske’s scheme proposed from a psychoanalytic viewpoint. Let me make a few more proposals along this line.

PSYCHOANALYTIC REFINEMENT OF THE MODELS

The nonpsychoanalytic analysis presented earlier indicated that CS and AR are more powerful than the other models. Given that CS and AR express the most primitive relations with parental figures, psychoanalysts would not be surprised at their

potency. Psychoanalytic anthropology would also, I expect, concur. For example, Freud’s musings on the primal crime (Freud, 1913), La Barre’s discussion of the family (La Barre, 1970, p. 100), and Paul’s unpacking of the “precultural atom” (Paul, 1976) provide arguments for the contention that CS and AR are the foundations of human life. Fiske (1992) alludes to this possibility a number of times (pp. 709, 719, 715, 716, n. 24), but he does not expand on these asides. However, there is his claim (already mentioned) that the models form a Guttman series (see n. 7), which would preclude the consistent predominance of any model. If this series does typify important aspects of the models, it does so, to repeat my earlier suggestion, only with regard to their social logic.

But this time my suggestion stems from the difference between mentation as Fiske sees it, and mentation as many psychoanalysts understand it. For these psychoanalysts only a small part of the mind is normally organized into rigid or mechanical processes, some of which can be construed logically or mathematically. Instead, and drawing on Freud’s great semiological writings, they believe the main computational style of the mind to be semiotic, fluid, prototypical, “dramatic,” and so on (e.g., Edelson, 1988, pp. 188–191; cf. Greenspan, 1989, p. 76; Deri, 1990). In this view, consciousness and attention float on the fluidity of unconscious and preconscious thought. Studies in cognitive psychology provide evidence to support this contention (see, e.g., Goleman, 1985; Mandler, 1988; Edelman, 1992, pp. 236–252 passim). Fiske’s approach, however, relies on mathematical analogs of the mind, like the Guttman series (Fiske, 1991, p. 207ff.; see also Whitehead, 1993, p. 325), and on an atomistic, Cartesian notion of consciousness (e.g., Fiske, 1991, p. 710). Psychoanalysis would propose, therefore, that if such “rigid” attributes are in fact features of the models, then these features are mainly appropriate to the models as social logics, not as phenomenological states.

29Examples of genetic predispositions are the instinctive urge to engage in relationships (Stern, 1985), and the neurological architecture for the creation of a sense of self (Eccles, 1991).
30Examples of panhuman early experiences are early absolute dependence on caretakers and unavoidable frustration of wishes and needs.

29See Whitehead’s (1993) comment on the possible but tentative links between Fiske’s formulation and modular concepts of mind (p. 329).
The claim being lodged here echoes statements in the introduction, namely, that an experience is not only its "social" and/or nonsocial logic. It is also composed of the affect and nonlogical ideation associated with the logic. This is because consciousness is always being influenced by the unconscious and preconscious conditions of which it is a product. We should remember that recognition of, say, physical objects or of a leader's orders cannot occur until the visual or auditory information has been processed unconsciously and preconsciously. And these preconscious and unconscious precursors are part of the experience of those things or orders. Given the disparity in the views of the mind presented by Fiske and by psychoanalysis, what kind of revisions might psychoanalysis propose for Fiske's formulation?

Let me offer concrete psychoanalytic reinterpretations of a couple of matters, a theoretical one and a brief applied one, for which Fiske has provided a social logic account, and let the psychoanalytic contribution speak for itself.

**THE LINKS BETWEEN EM AND MP**

The first problem we can look at is the relationship between MP and EM. But little has been said of MP. What of MP from a psychoanalytic perspective?

MP arises at about nine years old, which is in the postocipital period, so psychoanalysis would hold that it is not as salient an experiential force as the other three models. Yet it frequently serves as a model for human affairs. Again, we look to the concerns of the developmental period when it emerges, namely, when the child is elaborating his or her social-emotional anchoring beyond the family. In this realm, the fairly straightforward balancing act of EM can be difficult to sustain as a feasible social logic. This is because, on the one hand, the mind has by then become capable of quite sophisticated discriminations, and, on the other hand, because relations outside the family are dramatically different from those inside it.

The nonfamily relations are far more public and perishable and are governed more by relatively impartial rules. Hence, these relations are more autonomous than those within the family. I suggest that under these constraints, EM solutions prove inadequate because they are felt to be too cumbersome and/or crude. So, in order not to break faith with the equalizing impulse of EM, due proportion established by some publically acceptable mediating "currency" creates the MP form of balance. In short, people feel a need for "just" compensation, which, I suggest, is founded in their felt sense of "fairness" (an EM dynamic). Thus (the instinctiveness of MP notwithstanding), at the phenomenological level, MP is anticipated in, depends upon, and is a peculiar elaboration of the underlying EM oedipal concerns, the argument being that these concerns are important generative forces at work.

If this proposal is acceptable, one thing we would expect is the peripheral aspects of MP and EM to be highly similar. "Peripheral" aspects are the more concrete reasons, emotions, and acts produced by the models. For instance, the crimes that undermine a model are peripheral. Let me return to these, but this time only with respect to EM and MP, in order to see if the expected similarity in EM and MP peripheral matters exists. If so, then we have some substantiation of the hypothesized relationship between EM and MP.

Fiske (1991) tells us that the cardinal sin of MP is "theft" (p. 123) and that its minor sins are such things as price gouging, misrepresentation, bargaining in bad faith, and breach of contract (p. 123). But, as I noted before, when it comes to EM, Fiske cannot specify these two kinds of peripheral matters. Why this difficulty?—especially since Fiske is ingenious, and repeatedly so, at applying and elaborating his models.

Perhaps, I suggest, the murkiness at this point is a consequence of theft being, experientially, the cardinal sin within

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2We should not confuse the evolutionary/ultimate nature of something (reflected in its instinctiveness) with its ontogenetic/personal nature (as it comes to be expressed on the individual level) even though the two axes are deeply intertwined (Tooby and Cosmides, 1990).
the EM framework, not within the MP one. This is because the brute expropriation of a thing by robbery or burglary is a dramatically *physicalized* denial of, or challenge to, what psychoanalysis calls body-involvements. This physicality indicates affinity with EM. Fiske prefers to see theft in a more abstract light, as a crime against property "rights." But, given belief in personal (not even private) property, the bald-faced taking of a personal thing without permission is far more intimate an insult to extensions of body-image than is the theft's infringement upon some "right," natural or legislated. If we use reports from cultures where personal property is a salient feature of life, witness the accounts of those who have been burglarized or robbed. Their stories frequently reflect the feeling that they were physically violated by the act.

On the other hand, the MP world is based in *negotiations* over abstract matters (like money or the results of "paperwork"), wherein appearance and substance are not self-evidently connected. The connection is constructed by the negotiation. So deceit, misrepresentation, and the like strike at the central premise of the MP compact. This central premise is, it seems to me, that there is no fraud, no misrepresentation—else the purpose of negotiating is defeated from the beginning. Hence, along with the transfer of theft into the EM account, I suggest that fraud become the cardinal sin in the MP model.

If the "physicality" (i.e., EMness) of theft and the deceit (i.e., "MPness") of fraud are accurate attributions, and if they are viewed in light of the reason for the appearance of MP (so as not to "break faith" with EM) then we have reason to suspect an MP transaction of being a sophisticated form of EM thinking. The close intertwining of these peripheral matters—even to the point of misleading the usually astute Fiske—is what psychoanalysis would predict, given the generative nature of EM (an oedipal issue). And if, as proposed above, EM is—in its experiential roots—a response to AR, then we find primitive oedipal concerns being primary motives underlying these three models, which is what psychoanalysis would claim.

With this claim in mind, let us now examine Fiske's (1991) discussion of various forms of conflict and aggression (pp. 130–133). I will try to show, briefly, how the persons involved in each of three instances are primarily struggling, in a fundamental psychosocial way, to achieve dominance (an AR issue) rather than working, as Fiske claims, within a CS or EM, or MP model. If what I argue is true, then the claim that any of these other three models is exclusively, or primarily, at work in these instances may not be the most productive approach to them.

The first case, that of MP, can be handled quickly. Many of Fiske's (1991, p. 133) examples of conflict in the MP mode ring again and again in the *psychosocial* AR register. For instance, he cites imperialism, colonialism, slavery, and labor relations as containing conflict typical of MP arrangements. But none of these conditions would be possible (nor, I submit, could they be "righted") were it not for both a felt (psychological) and an actual AR situation in which one party imposes its will on another.

In addressing the second case, that of EM, I will examine Fiske's (1991) example of the Kaluli (p. 132). As I read Schieffelin (1976), what Fiske takes to be evenly matched reciprocation for violence-done can be seen as mainly an expression of AR concerns. For instance, in the Kaluli myth of the origin of retaliatory murder, the mythical homicide is brought about by the legitimate refusal of a marriage request. This is an AR cause (Schieffelin, 1976, pp. 154–155, 157), and I suggest that the meaning of this mythical retaliatory murder is "Deny me and I will kill." That is, it is an attempt by the denied person to gain dominance in the relationship. Moreover, the Kaluli reaction to
outlawing the retaliatory murder of witches also shows the AR nature of what Fiske, presumably, would see as an EM act. Let me quote Schieffelin (1976):

From the Kaluli perspective, death, inevitably caused by a sei, was as good as murder—it was the attack of one person on another. To not retaliate . . . was to accept one’s loss lying down. Moreover, Wanalugo pointed out, without fear of retaliation, seus would not be afraid to go out and take people whenever they liked [p. 156; emphasis added].

In the italicized words we can see how these retaliatory murders are perhaps primarily motivated by the desire to impose a dominance hierarchy in which seus are the underlings.

Finally, let us look at a CS situation cited by Fiske. The case is the murder in a Mediterranean culture of a rape victim by her own group, because her rape brought “dishonor” upon the group (Fiske, 1991, pp. 124, 131). He takes this case from articles edited by Peristiany (1966). It appears to me that Fiske does not take into account what are, according to Peristiany and others, the supremely AR aspects of honor in Mediterranean cultures. Let me offer a couple of quotes that make this point. Pitt-Rivers (1966), for instance, says that “the conceptual systems which relate to honor provide . . . a mechanism which . . . determines who shall fill the roles of command” (p. 73). Taking a group Fiske names—the Bedouins—we find several things of interest: namely, that honor plays a vital role in social control, that it is directly related to issues of perceived humiliation at the hands of another, and that in most cases where it is at issue, it is likely to affect political relations between the units involved (Abou-Zeid, 1966, p. 259). So, I ask, how can issues of honor and shame in this context not introduce overwhelming AR dynamics into the tragic death of the woman? Why is her death not chiefly the result of her being the personification—the embodiment—of the group’s submission to the rapist’s group?

Thus, in each case proposed as CS, EM, or MP, the relations can be seen—at the psychosocial level—to be mainly AR in nature. That is to say, in each case, the motivation for, and personal meaning of, the action is best understood as reflecting AR concerns, with the other models being subordinate factors. For example, in Fiske’s EM example above, the Kaluli who murders a sei is not trying to balance things, but to absolutely dominate the sei. It is not really about equality, it is about execution, with the equalizing factor being a spin-off, a derivative concern. However autonomous EM may be as a “social logic,” it is, in this case, phenomenologically secondary. These examples, plus the claims above about the “pervasive” appearance of AR in most human groups (see also n. 4)—if they are true—indicate the power of the dominance hierarchy in human life, whether it be more or less formalized in Authority Ranking, or the pressure, from the phenomenological world, to establish such a ranking.

The situation in which I am most unsure of my claim is that of the CS versus AR relationship.29 But that is because these two may well be the basic experiential orientations of human life, with the others being derivative. Why do the murderers kill the raped woman? What is the experience to them? Do they do this terrible thing because they think and feel that she has been indelibly dirtied, or that she has become their submissiveness? Or both? It is not clear which, but I suggest that the AR dynamics are extremely powerful—her “taint” (the CS concern) is the other group. Now, perhaps we might think it is not so much that she represents the murderers’ submissiveness as that she symbolizes the rapist: She is killed because she is “his.” But then we ask: What is so bad about being “his” if not for the

29The phenomenology of human experience seems to be constituted as much by placing oneself—or by trying to change one’s place—in a hierarchy of others, as in maintaining a self to be placed therein. This is to say that CS dynamics are always fundamentally twisted by AR dynamics. For example, the narcissism of CS dependency is, in the world of social relations, often expressed as an implicit, if not explicit, assertion of dominance: that I should get what I want, that my commands should be obeyed—both are ways of serving me.
AR concern, and, even more telling, what is so bad about being “them,” if not for the AR concern?\textsuperscript{30}

Let me leave these explorations now, and remark upon the room for reconciliation between Fiske’s scheme and the points I have raised. In his openness to critical scrutiny, he recognizes, for instance, that little is known about such things as the transformations from one model to another (Fiske, 1992, p. 712), their rules of implementation (Fiske, 1991, p. 137); the rationales for particular exchange equivalencies in EM and MP (1991, p. 227), or about how the models are “combined” (1992, p. 712). Given the importance and persuasiveness of much of Fiske’s formulation, these matters warrant investigation. Psychoanalysis is one way, I suggest, we can conduct the inquiry. However, there is a major objection to this suggestion, and in closing I would like to address it.

THE EXPERIENCE OF SOCIAL LIFE

It might be said that as sound as the preceding claims may be, they hold only for the phenomenological level of analysis, which is different from that of the social logic of human affairs. Hence, any psychoanalytic modifications of Fiske’s scheme are restricted in their applicability: They only amount to “alternative descriptions at another analytical level” (cf. Fiske, 1991, p. 185). This reaction touches on the problem of identifying the object of analysis in psychosocial inquiry. Consequently, it raises questions about how we shall gain the deepest, richest understanding of human life, not just in a humanistic sense, but also in a theoretical, that is, scientific, sense. The idea is that some of us can do psychological stuff, while others do their social or cultural stuff and the two need not meet. Of course, some of us have serious reservations about practicing such a “strategic” parallelism. From the above, it is evident that the psychoanalytic approach incorporates the social and cultural. It is basically an examination of the interplay between family and social and cultural dynamics, as they are mediated by the minds of the individuals involved.

In Fiske’s case, I suggest that adducing this parallelism does not counter a psychoanalytic critique of the models. First of all, there is Fiske’s identification of the psychological nature of the models. Moreover, he continually returns to the endogenous original appearance of the models (e.g., Fiske, 1991, pp. 401, 405); ipso facto, he allows for the causative nature of psychological factors. To field assertions like these two, yet hold that psychoanalytic modifications have relevance only to a psychoanalytic inquiry is, to me, questionable because such a position manifests the “Durkheimian” foible. This brand of analysis would hold, for instance, that Troy was really brought down by a shrewd manipulation of the social obligations of gift-giving (i.e., by deceitful “prestation”) and not also by the murderous humans who were within, and used, the “gift.” This strategy may be advisable in some instances because certain data are epistemologically sui generis.\textsuperscript{31} But the problem with this approach is that the social order is maintained by individuals who are usually—to some extent and in some ways—cheats, malingerers, and opportunists as well as artists, loyal friends, and true believers. The point is that the natural sociability of humans is as subject to the particularities of family and extrafamilial constraints as is the natural selfishness of humans. This condition is a dimension of social life identified with what occurs—in interaction and in the mind—before and after, and underneath, the operations skimmed from human life by a strictly social (or social logic) analysis. This condition is, in the final reckoning, why “[s]ociability has no unique ultimate source or essence” (Fiske, 1991, p. 167).

\textsuperscript{30}Recall Freud’s (1915) discussion of original aggression, where he describes the intimate relations among good self, bad self, and the nonself that imposes noxious stimuli (pp. 135–136).

\textsuperscript{31}Even methodological individualism does not require the psychobiographical investigation of informants.
Moreover, within this generic claim about the undersocialization of humans, it is the particular psychoanalytic contention that variations among models—which are “logically free of content” (Fiske, 1991, p. 150)—occur because important parts of their “premises” stem from the childhood experiences of the individuals involved.39 If this condition obtains, then culture and history are not “by far” the major determinants of which models are in play or how they are embodied (cf. p. 137). Instead, each person involved has an ontogenetically determined stake in the salience of a certain model, instantiated in a certain way, at certain times. Much of this often irrational and emotional interest escapes, or is shortchanged by, analyses that focus only on cultural or historical data—perhaps because the stake (or obtaining it) violates or is orthogonal to cultural stipulations, or perhaps because the interest is not recognized even by the persons themselves. Additionally, ignoring these highly personal stakes misses the latent and expressive features of the moment, which both induce and resist change in human affairs. Further, it flies in the face of the endogenous nature of the models (not just the actualized one), for surely if they can originate contrary to sociocultural constraints (pp. 401, 405), they remain refractory to these restraints.

Finally, ignoring these private urges misses the fact that when any model is actualized, it emerges because the individuals enacting it want it to be actualized or let it emerge. And their will in this regard arises out of the modulation of instinctive and developmentally determined urges as the individuals interpret and use the cultural and social material to which they attribute relevance.35 This is why Fiske (1991) is right when he says that the models “are products of something that transcends and encompasses all social processes, something that gives order—the same order—to all of them: the human mind” (p. 136). In this article I have tried to describe a way that this claim can be taken seriously—namely, by applying psychoanalysis to the scheme—and to point out some of the consequences of doing so.

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