Reprinted from Anthropology Newsletter 37(9):7
Unlike many other disciplines, anthropology has traditionally
encompassed
both sides of the nature-nurture debate: Our field is premised on
an understanding of the importance of culture in thought and action,
yet
we also recognize the contribution which our primate heritage makes to
who and what we are. Some anthropologists have been content to
confine
their questions to one side or the other of this divide. However,
such approaches fail to take advantage of the unique potential which
our
discipline holds for producing a sophisticated synthesis of
views.
In particular, psychological anthropology stands out as one area in
which
there is considerable promise for the integration of the two
perspectives.
Portraits of mind increasingly describe innate predispositions and
capacities,
potentials which, though hardwired, are only realized through the
learning
and manipulation of a specific culture. Similarly, recent
accounts
of culture emphasize the 'fit' between this informational system and
the
strengths and weaknesses of human minds, while the differences between
cultures are described as in part the result of differential emphasis
on
and elaboration of particular nascent proclivities.
A
variety
of approaches in psychology have contributed much towards our
understanding
of mind. However, until recently, it has been difficult to
combine
psychological perspectives with anthropological findings concerning
hominid
evolution. If we are to take seriously the proposition, common in
psychological anthropology, that culture and the human mind coevolved,
then our investigations of mind must adopt an evolutionary
perspective.
It is therefore exciting to note the emergence of a new type of
psychology,
one explicitly premised on an evolutionary foundation.
Evolutionary psychology grew out of sociobiology and, like its
predecessor,
is based on the assumption that human behavior has been importantly
shaped
by natural and sexual selection. However, evolutionary psychology
differs from sociobiology in a number of fundamental ways. While
sociobiology is content to treat the mind as a black box, evolutionary
psychology asserts that because behavior is a product of mind, in order
to shape behavior selective forces must have shaped the mind.
Moreover,
because selective forces are highly specific, the mind ought to consist
of multiple independent systems, each a response to a particular
selective
force. Lastly, because foraging in small groups probably
constituted
the principal adaptation throughout most of hominid evolution,
selection
will have operated to maximize fitness within this social and physical
context.
Human
minds are thus seen as a package of proclivities and capacities, each
of
which served a specific function in our foraging past. Hence, in
stark contrast to sociobiology, evolutionary psychology does not assume
that present-day behavior is uniformly aimed at increasing inclusive
fitness.
For example, some sociobiologists compare the number of children
fathered
by high-ranking and low-ranking men, arguing that men seek high rank in
order to increase reproductive success. In contrast, evolutionary
psychologists argue that because high rank correlated positively with
reproductive
success in the ancestral environment, selection favored a strong
sensitivity
to and desire for prestige. It is this feature of the mind,
rather
than a concern with reproductive success, which is largely responsible
for the rank striving which we see today. Furthermore, because
many
extant societies (and cultures) differ markedly from ancestral ones,
today
high rank may be entirely decoupled from reproduction, as in the case
of
"power couples" who forgo having children for the sake of their careers.
Evolutionary psychology presents the anthropologist with a new
opportunity
for productive collaboration. On the one hand, anthropologists
can
work to keep evolutionary psychologists honest. First, we can
test
evolutionary psychologists' claims of universality -- is it true, for
instance,
that men in all societies exhibit a desire for prestige? Second,
we can use anthropological portraits of hominid development to examine
the plausibility of evolutionary psychologists' evolutionary scenarios
-- do findings from biological anthropology and paleoanthropology
support
or contest these reconstructions? On the other hand, evolutionary
psychology can supply anthropology with new avenues for exploring the
relationship
between culture and mind. We can ask, for example, how different
cultures suppress, manage, or enhance the desire for prestige.
Or,
consider gender relations, another area where collaboration may be
productive:
Anthropological accounts of power relations between men and women can
both
test and be enriched by a consideration of evolutionary psychological
theories
concerning the causes of men's proprietary attitudes towards women, and
the role that women's own actions play in perpetuating patriarchy.
Having
touched
on some of the ways in which anthropology and evolutionary psychology
can
benefit one another, I should note that evolutionary psychology is not
a discipline, but merely a paradigm. Current contributors to
evolutionary
psychology can be found in departments of history, biology, law,
economics,
psychology, literature, sociology, and yes, anthropology, to name a
few.
As this diversity demonstrates, there are few topics of interest to
anthropologists
which cannot be addressed from an evolutionary psychological
perspective.
However, if there is one thing which this paradigm generally lacks, it
is a rich understanding of the importance of culture. Hence,
while
anthropology can benefit from many of the insights developed in
evolutionary
psychology, the latter can also be enormously enhanced by
anthropological
contributions. Ultimately, the result may be a fuller
understanding
of the dynamic interplay of nature and nurture, and hence of what it
means
to be human.