

**INTENTIONS, SELF, AND LOCAL THEORIES OF MEANING:  
WORDS AND SOCIAL ACTION IN A SAMOAN CONTEXT**

**Alessandro Duranti**

**Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition**

**University of California at San Diego**

**and**

**University of Rome**

**Copyright © 1984 Alessandro Duranti**

**Center for Human Information Processing**

**University of California, San Diego**

**La Jolla, California 92093**

Author's current address:

— Dept. of Anthropology —

U.C.L.A.

— [REDACTED] —  
Los Angeles, Ca 90024

A slightly revised version of this article appeared in the Journal of Pragmatics 12, pp. 13-33 (1988).

## 1. Introduction

In discussing human communication, contemporary speech act theorists, linguists and psychologists tend to concentrate on the recognition of the speaker's intentions as a crucial aspect of interpretation.

Grice's (1957) notion of "meaning-*nn*" (with "*nn*" standing for "non-natural") is one of the clearest examples of "intentional meaning."<sup>1</sup> Originally concerned with a number of issues such as the difference between "literal meaning" and "conveyed meaning" and the need to distinguish between intended and unintended inferences, Grice proposed that for speaker A to mean something by the utterance *x*,

"A must intend to induce by *x* a belief in an audience, and he must also intend his utterance to be recognized as so intended." (Grice, 1957/1971, p. 441)

In this view, as pointed out by Levinson,

"Communication consists of the 'sender' intending to cause the 'receiver' to think or do something, just by getting the 'receiver' to recognize that the 'sender' is trying to cause that thought or action. So *communication is a complex kind of intention that is achieved or satisfied just by being recognized.*" (Levinson, 1983, p. 16 -- emphasis added)

An important question for a theory of pragmatics or, more generally, for a theory of communication, is the extent to which "intentional communication" is common across socio-cultural contexts; or, in different terms, the extent to which intentional communication is a useful concept in dealing with language as a social tool. As already discussed by Austin (1962), there are many cases in the use of language in which words achieve certain ends because of their conventional force in a particular context and quite independently from the speaker's subjective stand or intentions. Thus, as we know, only certain individuals in certain circumstances can successfully threaten, or promise, or punish, or forgive (just to mention a few commonly mentioned speech acts). Whereas Austin emphasized the ritual nature of verbal communication (cf. Griffin and Mehan, 1981), many contemporary speech act theorists originally inspired by Austin's work are interested in conventions only as a route to reading speaking intentions. Many studies of verbal communication focus upon the speaker, leaving out the hearer and, more generally, the work that the audience and other aspects of the speech event play in shaping messages and meanings:

"Despite the importance of hearer uptake, the subject of speech act theory is the speaker's intentions." (Clark and Carlson, 1982, p. 54)

In this allegedly rationalistic tradition, it is often implied that meaning is already fully defined in the speaker's mind BEFORE the act of speaking. The addressee is little more than a passive recipient who can either guess it right or wrong. The role of context is that of a mere adjunct that may help the hearer if conflicting interpretations seem possible.

This view, in addition to being at odds with any kind of interactively oriented approach to the study of language and social interaction (cf. Gumperz, 1982; McDermott and Tylbor, in press; Mehan, 1981; Psathas, 1979; Schenkein, 1978), also appears too limited or overtly

ethnocentric to many anthropologists, some of whom have stressed the culture-specificity of such a theory of interpretation (cf. Kochman, 1983; Ochs, 1982; Ochs and Schieffelin, 1982; Paine, 1981; Rosaldo, 1982; Silverstein, 1977, 1979). The work of these researchers suggests that the role assigned to the speaker's intentions in the interpretation of speech may vary across societies and social contexts. On many occasions, participants seem more interested in coordinating social action for particular ends than in reading other people's minds.

In this paper, I will question the role of intentions in interpreting speech on the basis of data collected during my field work in a Western Samoan village (June 1978 - July 1979 and March - May 1981). By discussing several examples from transcripts of audio-recordings of politico-judiciary meetings, I will argue that the Samoan ideology and practice of doing things with words cannot be explained on the basis of the notion of "intentional meaning." The Samoan local theory of interpretation mirrors the Samoan theory of task as a cooperative, albeit hierarchically structured, enterprise. Rather than taking words as representations of privately owned meanings, Samoans practice interpretation as a way of publically controlling social relationships rather than as a way of figuring out what a given person "meant to say." Once uttered in a given context, words are interpreted with respect to some new reality they help to fashion rather than with respect to the supposedly intended subjective content. This is related to the fact that the consequences of a given act are often more important to Samoans than its original circumstances. Furthermore, in many social contexts, it is not the individual actor but his dramatic persona to be considered as the reference point. As a whole, the Samoan theory of how to do things with words is much more dialogical than usually accepted by contemporary speech act theorists. As to be expected, the Samoan theory of meaning and interpretation is grounded in local theories of knowledge, self and task which are different from commonly assumed western epistemologies and social action. At the end of the paper, I will suggest that the Samoan and the 'western' theory represented by the notion of intentional meaning can perhaps be reconciled within the larger theoretical context of a socio-historically oriented approaches to cognitive processes and within dialogically oriented approaches to meaning.

To illustrate these points, I have chosen to discuss the ways in which the speaker's identity and accountability are contextually and cooperatively defined in politico-judiciary meetings in a traditional Samoan village. Although my analysis is based on one particular type of event, as shown below, the Samoan theory of meaning presented here is consistent with other accounts of Samoan society and culture. In particular, my description and understanding of Samoan interpretive procedures is consistent with Shore's (1982) ethnography -- despite my slightly different interpretation of his *aamio/aga* dichotomy -- and with the work on Samoan language acquisition and socialization carried out by Ochs (1982; 1983).

The analysis presented here assumes Geertz's (1973) idea of *culture as a semiotic system*, that is, a system of symbols that communicates (to its own members) a theory of reality and, at the same time, provides the intellectual tools for dealing with social life.

## 2. The Fono

All the examples of oratory in this paper are taken from transcripts of a particular kind of social event called *fono* (cf. Duranti, 1981a, 1981b). There are many different kinds of fono or meetings in Samoan society (cf. Larkin, 1972). The kind I will be discussing in this paper is the special convocation of a deliberative assembly or title holders of *matai* -- chiefs and orators -- which, as typical of similar events in other "traditional" societies (cf. Comaroff and Roberts,

1981), acts both as a high court -- which deals only with crimes involving *matai*-laws -- and as a context for local politics.

Although the particular discourse organization typical of a fono discussion is, in many ways, unique (cf. Duranti, 1981a, 1981b, 1983), the speech genres used, the social relations among participants, the modes of strategic interaction found in a fono are also found in other speech events that characterize the daily life of a traditional Samoan village. In fact, given the emphasis on the political over other realms or modes of interaction in Samoan communities, the fono is emblematic of much of Samoan adult life.

Although participation in it is restricted to matai, a fono is a rather "public" context in the sense that people can be held accountable for their words and political stands at some later time. A fono is always embedded in a larger "social drama" -- in the specific sense given to this term by Turner (1974). A fono is a highly antagonistic arena in which different powerful groups and individuals try to control one another's political actions. It is thus hard for participants to predict what the final outcome of a meeting will be. In such a context, it may be convenient to be cautious, humble and vague. At the same time, there might also be reasons for a speaker to be forceful and direct, as when his role in the proceedings prescribes that he be the one to make certain announcements or accusations, or when he might want to try to gain in prestige or material goods.

### 3. The Role of Intentions in the Assessment of Responsibility

A Samoan orator can gain prestige and material gratification in speaking for a powerful and wealthy party or in his support, but he may also get in trouble and risk retaliation if something "goes wrong" in the transaction. Thus, an orator can be held responsible for having announced something on behalf of a higher ranking matai. Retaliation may take place against him if people cannot have direct access to the original "addressor" of the message. In such cases, the grounds on which an accusation can be made are the relationship between the orator and the party he is seen as representing as well as the practical consequences of his words. The orator's own understanding of the events or his personal motivations may well be irrelevant. Generally, Samoans do not evoke "good will." They accept instead the consequences of having partaken in a particular social act which was not fulfilled, e.g., a public commitment to doing something, or which had an unfortunate outcome, e.g., a political defeat or a loss of face. This attention for the consequences of actions is repeatedly stressed in Shore's ethnography of Samoa:

"...when I questioned informants about the relative seriousness of different misdeeds, their tendency was to base their evaluations on the results for the actor of the action rather than on an intrinsic quality of the act." (Shore, 1982, p. 182)

This means that in Samoa a speaker must usually directly deal with the circumstances created by his words and cannot hide behind his alleged original intentions. In Samoan, one cannot say "I didn't mean it." The need to deal with the reality created by speech sometimes means that the distinction between the sender and the addressor is not as sharp as in our (western) culture, where a "messenger" should not be held responsible for what he says.

An example of the way in which Samoans operate is provided below, in an excerpt from a meeting in which one of the two highest ranking orators, Iuli, proposes to fine the orator Loa for having announced, a few weeks earlier, that the newly re-elected district M.P., Fa'amatuaainu

(shortened to "Inu" in example [3] below), was going to present some goods to the village assembly. Since the M.P. did not come to share food and goods with the village, Loa should be considered responsible and heavily fined, perhaps even expelled from the village.

(1) (Fono April 7, 1979, III, p. 81)<sup>2</sup>

Iuli: 'O le makaa'upu gei e uiga iaa Loa. ...  
'This topic is about Loa. ...'

Kusa 'o le aso ga-pokopoko ai lo kaakou gu'u  
'About the day our village got together'

e fa'akali le faipule. ...  
'to wait for the M.P. ...'

'o mea fa'apea 'o se luma o se gu'u.  
'Things like that are a humiliation for a village.'

Loa: Maalie!  
'Well said!'

Iuli: Ma e:- 'ua ka'uvalea lo kaakou gu'u. ...  
'And our village is ridiculed. ...'

'Ua fiu le kaakou gu'u e kakali. ...  
'Our village was tired of waiting. ...'

Le ai se faipule e sau. ...  
'the M.P. did not come. ...'

'Ae se'i gofogofa Loa alu amai se mea e kaumafa  
'But Loa just sits there (instead of) bringing  
some food'

ma le gu'u.  
'for the village.'

Loa: Maalie!  
'Well said!'

Iuli: 'O lo'u lea kalikoguga ...  
'This is what I believe ...'

(ka)kau ga sala Loa.  
'Loa should be fined.'

[...]

'Ae kakau oga fai maukigoa  
'(He) should have made sure'

auaa e 'aaiga Loa ma- ma Igu.  
 'Because Loa and- and Inu(= the M.P.) are related.'

((Talking to Loa)) 'Afai 'ua fai age ia,  
 'If he said that to you,'

Ia. 'Sa kaakau oga makuaa ma'oki. ...  
 'Well, one must be very clear about it. ...'

gi mea e fa'akaumafa ai le gu'u ga- ga amai la 'ea,  
 'bring something for the village to eat then (Loa)'

pe 'aa lee sau le faipule. ...  
 'if the M.P. doesn't come. ...'

[...]

Mea lea 'ua fai e Loa. ...  
 'This is what Loa did. ...'

'A le povi, iaa Loa ma le selau kalaa.  
 'Perhaps a cow, from Loa and 100 dollars.' ((A heavy fine))

alu 'ese ma le gu'u!  
 'get out of the village!'

Loa: Maalie!  
 'Well said!'

Iuli's arguments for holding Loa responsible are the following: he created a situation that ridiculed the village matai; he is related to the M.P.; when he saw that the M.P. was not coming, he should have done something to remedy the village loss of face.

The orator Fa'aonu'u, who was not present when the events recounted by Iuli took place, asks for more information about the case. Is Iuli saying that Loa lied to the village? Or what else did Loa do? Iuli then reconstructs the events:

(2) (Fono April 7, 1979, III, p. 85)

Iuli: [...] 'o Loa 'ua sau kala'i le kaakou gu'u  
 '[...] Loa came (to) summon our village'

e fogo- ma pokopoko. La'a sau le faipule.  
 'to have a meeting and gather together. The M.P. was going to come.'

e amai loga momoli ...  
 'to bring his contribution ...'

Ia. Oga pokopokó lea 'o le kaakou falefiku.  
'So our seven subvillages get together.'

Leai se isi e o'o iaa Fagaloa ma Falevao.  
'Nobody stays behind from Fagaloa and Falevao.'

ma kagaka uma o le kaakou gofoaala ...  
'and all the people from our subvillages ...'

pokopoko. 'Ua fiu 'ua alu legaa aso 'o kakali  
'get together. (We are) tired of waiting the whole day'

leai se faipule 'o sau ma se mea ...  
'the M.P. does not come (and) nothing (is given to us) ...'

After this clarification, Fa'aonu'u speaks again asking Iuli to forgive Loa. In his words, Loa's behavior is *'ese*, that is, 'unusual, strange, wrong' (cf. Milner, 1966) given that he and the M.P. are relatives. In this case, as in other ones that I witnessed, the relationship between social actors is seen as crucial for evaluating responsibilities.

The discussion of the case is eventually suspended by the chairman Moe'ono. The reasons adduced for (temporarily) suspending the case, however, are procedural (viz., the case had not been properly announced at the beginning of the meeting) and pragmatic (the village is about to meet with the M.P. and this matter may be then solved along with other problems). No one challenges Iuli's accusation by introducing the issue of Loa's motivations or his possible intentions. The consequences of the orator's words are instead discussed, more specifically the fact that his words are seen as having caused the inconvenience of important people and contributed to their public loss of face. Furthermore, Loa is said to be responsible because of his family relationship with the M.P. Loa's conventional agreements *maalie!* 'well said' throughout Iuli's speech are not ironic. They rhythmically exemplify Loa's preoccupation for the seriousness of the accusation.

#### 4. Getting Reprimanded For Being Too Direct

Orators can also get reprimanded for being too direct or for expressing an opinion that can be defined as "wrong" or "inappropriate" in the light of later developments.

In one of the fono I recorded, for instance, there was some discussion about whether the young chief Savea should or should not pursue his court case against the district M.P. Inu. Most members of the village council felt that to confront the M.P. directly in the central court would have seriously damaged the already precarious relationship with the nearby village of Lufilufi where the M.P. lived. However, the orator Fa'aonu'u, the highest ranking orator from Savea's subvillage, spoke in favor of Savea's decision. Here is the crucial passage from his speech:

(3) (Fono April 7, book III, p. 21)

Fa'aonu'u: [...] 'o lea laa 'ou ke fa'amaluuluu aku ai

'Now I would like to excuse myself for this'

i lau koofaa le makua Moe'ogo ...  
'with your Highness the senior orator Moe'ono ...'

Ia e fa'apea fo'i 'Aaiga gei ma kagaka o le Kuisaakua,  
'as well as with the chiefs and the orators,'

... ka'akia ia le makaa'upu a Savea ma- ...  
'drop this issue of Savea and- ...'

le koofaa iaa Igu.  
'His Highness Inu.' (=the M.P.)

Laa ke oo i le Maaloo ...  
'Let them go to court ...'

Later on in the meeting, however, the chief Savea, under pressure from some important members of the council, agrees to reconsider his decision to go to court. In his concluding speech, at the end of the meeting, the senior orator Moe'ono, who had been the primary advocate of a "traditional" (i.e., out of court) settlement, takes the opportunity to scold Fa'aonu'u for not having shown moderation and for having hastily expressed an opinion which was eventually contradicted by the chief's later decision.

(4) (Fono April 7, 1979, book III, p. 90)

Moe'ono: [...] 'ou ke kaukala aku fo'i Fa'aogu'u iaa ke 'oe, ...  
'I am also talking to you Fa'aonu'u, ...'

mea lea e leaga ai le- le alualu i galuega sau fo'i  
'this thing is bad of going away to work and then coming  
back' ((you do not fully participate in village affairs))

ua- ... pei 'o agaleilaa  
'... as for before'

'o le- 'o le makaa'upu 'ua fikoikogu i lou kou falekua  
'the- the topic that concerns your subvillage,' ((the  
chief Savea's courtcase against the M.P. from Lufilufi))

kaofiofi le i'u maea ...  
'moderate yourself ...'

'ae 'aue le luaiga laalaa mai fa'amaka o Avi'i lou ka-  
'and don't show off your op(inion) like the crab that has  
eyes sticking out'

A'o lea 'ua aliali gei  
'Now it seems (that)



[...]

'ua fausia e Savea le- le figagalo  
'Savea has agreed' ((i.e., he has changed his mind))

e fai aku iai iga ia kaakou feloa'i ma Lufilufi. ...  
'to say that we should meet with Lufilufi ((Where the  
M.P. lives). ...'

Ko'a le fa'aukaga. ...  
'Hold the advice. ...'

Ko'a le fa'aukaga. ...  
'Hold the advice. ...'

E leai fo'i se isi Fa'aonu'u  
'There is no other Fa'aonu'u'

'o 'oe ga'o 'oe aa 'o Fa'aonu'u.  
'You only you are the Fa'aonu'u.'

The orator is here reprimanded for having said something that was *at a later point* contradicted by the chief Savea.

This incident also suggests that one of the reasons for having orators speak first or on behalf of a chief, a fairly common practice in Polynesia (cf. Firth, 1975), is that of allowing the chief to change his opinion without loss of face. The chiefs' "wrongs" are assumed, in the public arena, by the orators who spoke on their behalf. The source of authority and wisdom represented by the chief is thus protected by having the lower ranking orator to expose himself to potential retaliation and loss of face. The complementary relationship between chiefs and orators (cf. Shore, 1982), however, allows the orator to "get back" at his chief in a more private context, given that it is the chief who is responsible for materially supporting his orators and any payment or retaliation suffered by the orators will call for the chief's contribution.

##### **5. Announcing the Agenda of the Meeting: Sharing Responsibility for Changing the World with Words**

The kind of interaction discussed above implies a strong belief in the power of words. Words do not simply describe the world or someone's (good or bad) intentions. Words bring about changes in people's lives and actions. They can make enemies and friends, they can give or take away prestige and material wealth. There are several verbal strategies adopted by Samoan orators for dealing with the potentially dangerous power of words.

One way of protecting oneself against retaliation, punishment or blame is that of avoiding public commitment to a given cause. The simplest strategy is, of course, silence. An orator may simply avoid talking in any detail about what he considers a dangerous topic or a delicate issue. In some cases, however, the speaker may be forced to speak because of his role in the proceedings or his positional identity in the village. An example of this sort is discussed below.

At the beginning of a fono, after the opening kava ceremony, an orator from a particular section of the village delivers a formal speech, called *laauga* (cf. Duranti, 1983). In this speech, there is a part, toward the end, dedicated to the announcement of the agenda of the meeting (*mataa'upu o le fono*). The same orator who might "show off" his knowledge of oratorical formulas and ancient metaphors in other parts of his speech tends to be very succinct and vague in the announcement of the agenda. In some cases, the first orator might even leave out one (or all) of the topics of the day, in which case the chairman of the meeting might remind him, as shown below:

(5) (Fono April 7, 1979, book II, p. 11) (Context: The first orator has just concluded the introductory speech leaving out the mention of the agenda)

First

Orator: ((Ending his speech)) *Maguia le aofia ma le fogo!*  
'Good luck to the assembly and the fono!'

?: ( )kai // fekalai.  
'thank you // (for your honorable) speech.'

Chairman: 'O aa makaa'upu o le fogo?  
'What are the topics of the fono?'

*Fai mai makaa'upu // o le fogo.*  
'Tell us the topics // of the fono.'

First

Orator: 'O le makaa'upu  
'The topic'

*o le aofia ma le fogo, ... Ia e fa'akakau kogu lava*  
'of the assembly and the fono ... really centers around'

*i lo kaakou Falelua ... oga pau ga 'o makaa'upu.*  
'the two subvillages<sup>3</sup> ... That's it for the topics.'

Chairman: Oi! [Conversational marker of repair initiation]  
'Oh!'

First

Orator: ((Softly)) *E aa?*  
'What?'

Chairman: ((Softly)) 'O le isi makaa'upu o Savea.  
'The other topic about Savea.'

First

Orator: Ia. 'o le isi fo'i makaa'upu e uiga i le- ...  
'Right. 'There is also another topic about ...'

*le Afioga iaa Savea 'ogo 'o - 'o le laa:- ...*

'His Highness Savea 'cause- the:-'

mea fo'i ma Fa'amakuaaigu.  
'thing there with Fa'amatuaainu.'

Go 'ua kukulu Savea i- ... i le Maaloo ...  
'Cause Savea has complained ... to the Government ...'

Ia (iga) 'ua ka'ua gi fa'akosiga  
'Given that some (illegal) campaigning has been said (to occur)

(a) Fa'amakuaa'igu i le paloka, ...  
'of Fa'amatuaa'inu for the elections ...'

iai fo'i gisi makaa'upu o lo'o lee maua ...  
'(if) there are some other topics (I) didn't get ...'

Ia. La'a maua i luma.  
'Well, they will be brought to the floor.'

?: Maaloo!  
'Well done!'

Chairman: Ia. Fa'afekai aku [NAME] ... 'ua 'ee fa'amaga le fono  
'So. Thank you [NAME] ... for starting the fono'

[...]

The fact that a simple reminder such as "the other topic about Savea" is sufficient for the first orator to remember Savea's case suggests that he might have known but did not want to be the one to initiate the announcement.<sup>4</sup> His reluctance can be better understood once we interpret the announcement of the agenda not simply as a statement DESCRIBING A FACT about the world, but also, in Austin's (1962) terms, a PERFORMATIVE, that is, a *conventional verbal act through which the world is changed*. The new reality is defined as one in which the ideal social harmony or "mutual love" (*fealofani*) of the village is in danger or already disrupted. The announcement of the agenda puts the orator in the difficult position of having to define the actions of a higher ranking chief as causing such a state of affairs. The orator's way of handling this difficult task is to involve someone more powerful, the chairman of the meeting, in jointly performing the act.

## 6. Group Identity, Individuals and Dramatis Personae

In a fono, opinions are often framed as delivered on behalf of a group. We thus often find speakers shifting between the first person singular 'I' ('ou or a'u) and the first person plural exclusive 'we' *maakou*. The use of *maakou* defines the speaker as the representative of a contextually defined group, e.g., his subvillage, his family, the orators (as opposed to the chiefs). Here are a few examples:



'I know what I did ...'

'O lea 'ou ke kalosaga aku ai ma le agaga vaivai,  
'I hereby implore (you) with a humble spirit,'

e mamaa Vave e le ai saga 'upu fai fa'apegaa  
'vave is clean. There are no words of that sort that he said'

pei oga silafia. ...  
'as it is known (to you).'

The line before the last provides an example of a third person referent used for referring to oneself. This is not uncommon in the fono speeches, but not found in ordinary conversation. Another example of this is provided in (9) below:

(9) (January 25, I, p. 28. In explaining his role in the present crisis, the senior orator Moe'ono tries to convince the rest of the assembly of his trustworthiness)

Moe'ono: 'Auaa 'o 'upu a Moe'ogo e lee alo,  
'Because Moe'ono's words do not dodge.'

Given that all speakers in a fono are matai, the name they use coincides with their matai title. The speaker's reference to himself through his own title frames his words as originating from his positional role. Given that a title can be held by more than one person at the same time and is defined as deriving from a mythico-historical figure and his descendants, the use of the title in talking about oneself can be seen as a strategy to recreate a relationship, a groupness when the circumstances would seem to call for an individual commitment. In fact, the tendency to obscure the individual in favor of the public and positional role a person is embodying is quite common in Samoa across all kinds of situations. As noted by Mead:

"This separation between the individual and his role is exceedingly important in the understanding of Samoan society. The whole conception is of a group plan which has come down from ancestral times, a ground plan which is explicit in titles and remembered phrases, and which has a firm base in the land of the villages and districts. The individual is important only in terms of the position which he occupies in this universal scheme - of himself he is nothing. Their eyes are always on the play, never on the players, while each individual's task is to fit his role." (Mead, 1937, p. 286).

Such a separation between the individual and his dramatis persona is of course not restricted to Samoa. Thus, for instance, in discussing the notion of self in Bali, Geertz (1983, p. 62) writes:

"...there is in Bali a persistent and systematic attempt to stylize all aspects of personal expression to the point where anything idiosyncratic, anything characteristic of the individual merely because he is who he is physically, psychologically, or biographically, is muted in favor of his assigned place in the continuing and, so it is thought, never-changing pageant that is Balinese life. It is dramatis personae, not actors, that endure; indeed, it is dramatis

personae, not actors that in the proper sense really exist."

In the Samoan case, one way of explicitly evoking the contextually appropriate dramatis persona is to use one's title in talking about oneself.

## 7. Intentions, Self and Meaning

Contemporary cultural anthropologists have often suggested that local theories of meaning should be described and analyzed in the context of local theories of self and social action (cf. Geertz, 1983; Myers and Brenneis, 1984; Rosaldo, 1982; Shore, 1982). Thus, the distinction we often draw between sender and addressor might be related to the belief that people should be held responsible only for those acts (and words) that can be clearly seen as reflecting their own intentions. The latter perspective is explicitly adopted by those speech act theorists who, as pointed out by Rosaldo (1982, p. 204), "think of 'doing things with words' as the achievement of autonomous selves, whose deeds are not significantly constrained by the relationships and expectations that define their local world" (Rosaldo, 1982, p. 204). This view corresponds to what Holquist (1983) calls the "personalist" theory of meaning:

"This view holds that 'I own meaning.' A close bond is felt between the sense I have of myself as a unique being and the being of my language.

Such a view, with its heavy investment in the personhood of individuals, is deeply implicated in the Western Humanist tradition." (Holquist, 1983, p. 2)

This "heavy investment in the personhood of individuals," however, is not shared by Polynesian cultures. Thus, for instance, in discussing the Hawaiian concept of self, Ito (in press) writes:

"The Hawaiian concept of self is grounded in affective social relations. [...] This conceptualization of self is a highly interpersonal one. It is based on the reflexive relationship of Self and Other and on the dynamic bonds of emotional exchange and reciprocity. For Hawaiian, Self and Other, person and group, people and environment, are inseparable. They all interactively create, affect and even destroy each other."

Shore (1982) describes the Samoan theory of person in a similar fashion:

"Not only are there in Samoan no terms corresponding to the English 'personality,' 'self,' or 'character,' but there is also an absence of the corresponding assumptions about the relation of person to social action. A clue to the Samoan notion of person is found in the popular Samoan saying *teu le vaa* (take care of the relationship). Contrasted with the Greek dicta 'know thyself' or 'To thine own self be true,' this saying suggests something of the difference between Occidental and Samoan orientations. Lacking any epistemological bias that would lead them to focus on 'things in themselves' or the essential quality of experience, Samoans instead focus on things in their relationships, and the contextual grounding of experience.

[...] When speaking of themselves or others, Samoans often characterize people in terms of specific 'sides' (*ituu*) or 'parts' (*pito*) [...] . By parts or sides, Samoans usually mean specific connections that people bear to villages, descent groups, or titles." (Shore, 1982, p. 136-7)

Given such a contextual and relational theory of person and social action, it should not be surprising that in Samoa meaning is NOT conceived of as owned by the individual; rather, it is closer to what Holquist (1983) characterizes, following Bakhtin (cf. Voloshinov, 1973), as a "we relationship," that is, as a cooperative achievement. For Samoans, *meaning is seen as the product of an interaction (words included) and not necessarily as something that is contained in someone's mind*. In engaging in interpretation, Samoans are not so much concerned with knowing someone else's intentions, as much as with the implications of the speaker's actions/words for the web of relationships in which his life is woven.

Samoans thus do not share what Michael Silverstein (1979) typifies as the "reflectionist point of view," that is, the idea that language is mostly used for classifying and describing some reality or universe "out there" (or, we might add, "inside of someone's head"). What I have discussed in the earlier sections of this paper indicates that Samoans tend to think of words more as social deeds than as abstract representations. It may not be accidental, then, that the Samoan word *fai* means both 'say, tell' and 'do, make,' and that the word *uiga* means 'meaning' and 'behavior' (cf. Milner, 1966, p. 297). Words are indeed actions. But not necessarily the actions of a single actor. Meaning is a mosaic that no one can compose by himself.

In this sociocultural context, the distinction between the illocutionary and the perlocutionary force may be problematic at times, if not irrelevant. Such a distinction implies several beliefs about human nature and social action which are not shared by Samoans. In particular, the idea that one can always distinguish between the intended meaning and the effect of someone's words implies that the speaker/actor has control over his actions/words independently of other people's recognition of these actions/words as having a particular, conventionally defined goal. After offending someone, an American can thus say "I didn't mean it." This cannot be done by Samoans, given that part of what one meant IS what the other person understands as meant. In Samoan, one does not say "you mean x?" but "is the meaning of your words x?" The latter phrase de-emphasizes the view of meaning as defined by the speaker's intentions and accentuates instead a view of meaning as a conventional load carried by words in a given context.

Correspondingly, from the point of view of Samoan ethics, people cannot really know whether they have done wrong until someone else tells them – viz., the Samoan saying *e lee iloa se tagata lona sese* 'a person does not know his own error' (cf. Shore, 1982, p. 176). It is the community, others recognized and organized as institutions (viz., particular kinship relationships, committees, local courts, ceremonial settings) that provide social control, not the individual. More generally, this view of ethics relates to the Samoan notion of task. Samoans do not see task accomplishment as an individual achievement; instead, they see it as a joint, collective product. This point can be illustrated by the important Samoan notion of *taapua* 'i 'supporter, sympathizer.' As discussed in Duranti and Ochs (to appear), Samoans always see people as needing someone else to sympathize with them, to give them some support or feedback on their accomplishment. The role of the supporter is in fact institutionalized and routinely symbolized by what we call the "maaloo exchange." When someone does something, his supporter recognizes that doing as an accomplishment by saying *maaloo*. The person who performed the action or accomplished the task, answers back with another *maaloo*. The relationship between the actor and the supporter must thus be understood as reciprocal rather than unidirectional. The

first *maaloo* acknowledges the doing and the second *maaloo* acknowledge the acknowledgment.

"More generally, something is an accomplishment because of and through the recognition that others are willing to give it. Any accomplishment can then be seen as a joint product of both the actors and the supporters. In the Samoan view, if a performance went well it is to the supporters' merit as much as the performers'. This is so true that if the performer receives a prize or some previously established compensation, he will have to share it with his supporters." (Duranti and Ochs, in press)

All of these facts imply a belief in interpretation as a practical activity to be prototypically performed in the public rather than in the private sphere of self-evident rational thought. Such a belief comprehends the cognitive, the social, as well as the moral realm. "Knowledge of one's actions must be public to some extent for one to be responsible" (Shore, 1982). Thus, for instance, in Samoan there is no special term for "promise." Milner, in his thorough Samoan dictionary, translates the English *promise* with the Samoan *foolafola* (1966, p. 416). When we look at the English translation of *foolafola*, we find that it means: (1) announce (publically); (2) acknowledge (a gift) by public announcement; (3) promise (Milner, 1966, p. 68). The act of promising is a public commitment. The speaker's commitment to some future act is constituted in and by the presence of others, presumably in a ceremonial setting, and not simply by the speaker's intentions and his uttered words.

## 8. Rethinking Shore's Distinction Between AAMIO and AGA

Once we understand the Samoan notion of interpretation as a cooperative enterprise and of meaning as pertaining to the public rather than to the private sphere, we can perhaps try to reconsider a classic issue in Samoan ethnography, namely, the apparent contradiction of most Samoan moral judgments. Shore (1982) has devoted a great deal of his discussion of Samoan ethos and worldview to the resolution and explanation of this "paradox." He explains it by introducing a dichotomy between the term *aga* and *aamio* (see below) and by stressing the highly context-sensitive nature of Samoan evaluations and interpretations:

"...the moral evaluation of most acts is for Samoans highly sensitive to the settings in which they are performed. 'Ai *savali* (eating while you are walking) is condemned by most Samoans when it is done on the main *rad* or on the *malae* [i.e., village ceremonial ground, A.D.] and also when it is done in the daylight. It is, however, no longer a bad act when these conditions do not prevail. Implicit in the prescription or proscription is the social context in which the act is carried out. Theft is somewhat anomalous in this respect. To some informants, the prohibition of theft was a basic moral proscription, and was seen as inherently bad, independent of context. For other informants, however, theft (*gaaioi*) was indeed context-bound in its moral aspect in the same way as was 'ai *savali*. One informant [...] told me that he felt that it was bad (*leaga*) to steal in the daytime, but added: 'It's good at night, because no one can see you. And for some people it's good to steal in the daytime from the plantation when no one else is about.'" (Shore, 1982, p. 181)

For Shore, the word *leaga* 'bad' should be interpreted as meaning "without *aga*," that is, without 'proper public conduct.' Behavior away from public sight would be better characterized, according to Shore, by the term *aamio*, which "represents the socially unconditioned aspects of behavior that point away from social norms, toward personal drives or desires as the conditioning factors" (Shore, p. 154). The apparent contradictory statements about whether a



given act is 'good' or 'bad' are thus resolved by referring to two different realms of judgment: in one realm, in the day time and when people can see you, one should act according to *aga*, in the other case, at night, or away from the eyes of others, one acts according to *aamio*. Although this dichotomy is, in many respects, convincing, it runs into problems if we stick closely to the Samoan terms and the way they are used in various syntagmatic combinations. Particularly problematic, in this respect, is the fact that *aamio* is not always associated with negative judgments, but instead, as Shore himself noted, can also be associated with 'good' or 'appropriate' acts. Thus, for instance, the term *aamiotonu* -- *tonu* meaning 'true, appropriate' -- was used by some Samoan orators in describing to me the proper way of conducting public meetings. In other words, if we stick to the Samoan terms and the way they are used in a variety of contexts, we are likely to encounter counterexamples to Shore's absolute distinction between *aamio* and *aga* contexts (cf. Love, 1983). To save Shore's analytical dichotomy, we would have to see it as a purely theoretical, analytical distinction which need not to perfectly match the use of the two terms by Samoans. At that point, some might argue, what's the point of using the Samoan terms?

I think there is an alternative solution, one which is consistent with what is discussed in this paper and with Shore's analysis -- independently from his use of the *aga/aamio* dichotomy. I would like to suggest that certain acts that are judged as 'bad' in some contexts, e.g., theft, rape, do not actually BECOME 'good' in other contexts; they simply lose their ability of being morally evaluated. In other words, in some contexts, THEY HAVE NO MEANING. *Lelei* in such contexts does not mean 'good' (in a moral sense), but possible or acceptable. Stealing at night is not really "good," but something about which little can be said because it cannot, out of a public context, receive an interpretation. In this view, certain actions are not simply bad in the day and good at night; rather, they are seen as having no meaning if performed in the dark, when others cannot see them. This interpretation is supported by the interplay between knowledge and vision typical of metaphors and everyday expressions in Samoa (and elsewhere -- are we facing a cultural universal, e.g., you see?) Thus, the word for "understanding" is *maalamalama* which also means "light." One can understand when one can see, discern, distinguish parts and assign responsibilities according to publically prescribed norms.

## 9. Conclusions

One obvious issue at this point is the extent to which what I have discussed about Samoan verbal interaction is restricted to political arenas or instead pervasive across social situations. This is an important question because recent work on political contexts has stressed the constitutive or context-creating nature of political language (cf. Myers and Brenneis, 1984; Paine, 1981). What I discussed in this paper might then be a potentially universal yet context-specific type of relationship between words and deeds rather than a more general range of phenomena indexing the need to see speech as a fundamentally social tool and interpretation as an inherently intersubjective activity.

The local theory of meaning I have presented on the basis of political speech seems consistent with other accounts of Samoan society and culture. In particular, as demonstrated by my extensive quotes from Shore (1982), my description and understanding of Samoan interpretive procedures is consistent with Shore's ethnography, as represented by his "thick description" of a Samoan murder case. Furthermore, my statements are also consistent with the work on language acquisition and socialization carried out by Ochs (1982, 1983). Thus, for instance, Ochs (1982) has shown that Samoan caregivers do not engage in the kinds of interaction

typically observed in White Middle Class Anglo households. Samoan caregivers do not assign intentions to the infants' acts or vocalizations, which are instead "treated more as natural reflexes or physiological states (e.g., hunger, discomfort, pleasure)." Furthermore, more generally, Ochs (1983) argues that across a variety of social situations, Samoans display a dispreference for explicit guessing. At the same time, the highly stratified nature of Samoan social life forces lower ranking individuals to be more careful about correctly interpreting higher ranking individuals' directives. More generally, in Samoa, the higher their rank the more individualistic people are allowed to be. This suggests that in a similar fashion in which a high chief can literally "own" certain clothes or commodities, he can also "own" the meaning of his words. On the other hand, most people have no exclusive access to any of the goods available within the extended family (or larger social units). Similarly, lower ranking individuals have more limited control over the interpretation of their utterances.

My main point in this paper is not to argue that for Samoans the recognition of the speaker's intentions is not a legitimate route to understanding. I imagine that it could be demonstrated that there are contexts in which it is. My point is that it is not the only route and that participants seem more eager to act upon conventions, consequences, actions, public image, rather than upon individual intentions. Given that human action, and speech as one aspect of it, is goal-oriented, Samoans, like any other people in the world, must interpret each other's doings as having certain ends with respect to which those doings should be evaluated and dealt with. The problem -- for us, and, I would like to suggest, for them as well -- lies in the extent to which in interpreting each other's behavior, Samoans display a concern for the actors' alleged subjective reality. The fact that a society can carry on a great deal of complex social interaction without much apparent concern with people's subjective states, and with a much more obvious concern for the public, displayed, performative aspect of language is, in my opinion, an important fact which any theoretical framework concerned with the process of interpretation should take into account.

The almost exclusive concern for a subjectively defined meaning typical of some speech act theorists and the Samoan emphasis on an intersubjective and context-minded notion of verbal communication can be reconciled only in a theoretical framework in which both the subjective and the intersubjective, the cognitive and the social aspects of communication and interpretation of reality are acknowledged, represented and integrated. In particular, we need a theory of pragmatics that would recognize not only the speaker's knowledge, needs, and wants but also the praxis-producing cooperative work between speaker and hearer in making utterances relevant and meaningful. Some encouraging signs of this kind of orientation can be found in some recent work by Sperber and Wilson, who write:

"Most pragmatic accounts assume that the context for the comprehension of a given utterance is fixed in advance, and undergoes no more than minor adjustments during the comprehension process: for example, by the addition of Gricean conversational implications [...] We want to argue, on the contrary, that the search for the interpretation on which an utterance will be most relevant involves a search for the context which will make this interpretation possible. In other words, determination of the context is not a prerequisite to the comprehension process, but a part of it." (Sperber and Wilson, 1982, p. 76)

One could go one step further and suggest that interpretation not only involves finding the most relevant context but also creating it, making it possible.

Such a perspective calls for a theory of mind that systematically links intrapsychological processes to interpsychological ones; a theory in which language is seen as both representing and changing reality; a theory in which the individual and the social context can be seen as two sides of the same coin. The socio-historical approach to cognition, as originally developed by the Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky and his colleagues Luria and Leont'ev, seems to be a good candidate for such an enterprise. One of the basic tenets of this approach is that higher psychological processes in the individual have their origin in social interaction (cf. Vygotsky, 1962; 1978; LCHC, 1979, 1981; Wertsch, in press). Also relevant, from the point of view of our discussion, is Vygotsky's definition of language as a psychological tool, that is, an object that mediates either interpsychologically (between actors) or intrapsychologically (within the same person). A sign, e.g., a word, a sentence, etc., is used by people to affect behavior (cf. Vygotsky, 1978, p. 54). "...speech not only accompanies practical activity but also plays a specific role in carrying it out" (1978, p. 25).

In this approach, speech is seen as a mediating activity that organizes experience (cf. Vygotsky, 1962, p. 125) rather than as a symbol of an already constituted world (whether out there or in the speakers' minds). This idea is consistent with (and probably inspired by) Marx and Engels' definition of language and consciousness as arising "from the need, the necessity, of interaction with other men" (The German Ideology [1845-6], 1978, p. 158).

Within philosophy, the Samoan theory and practice of communication has striking similarities with what is known as "hermeneutic philosophy," that is, with the view that any form of understanding is an activity which cannot simply consist in the reconstruction of the sender's original intentions and his cultural milieu, but also in a constant negotiation between past and present, sender and receiver, history and consciousness (cf. Gadamer, 1975). Indeed, I can't think of anything more appropriate for characterizing the Samoan view of words and social action than Gadamer's statement that "understanding is an adventure and, like any adventure, is dangerous" (1981, pp. 109-110). If you have doubts, just ask a Samoan orator, next time you meet one.

## NOTES

**Acknowledgements:** This research is based on field work conducted between June 1978 and June 1979 and between March and May 1981 in the village of Falefa (Upolu), Western Samoa. Without the kindness and cooperation of the people in Falefaa, my research on Samoan language and culture would have been impossible. Special thanks go to Rev. Fa'atau'olua Mau-ala and his wife Sau'iluma for having accepted our research group as part of their extended family and to the many people who worked with us transcribing and interpreting all kinds of potentially unintelligible utterances. From them I learned that interpretation is a joint adventure and one always goes home with more than imaginable beforehand. With Elinor Ochs and Martha Platt I shared, in the field and after, funny combinations of Samoan, Italian and American cuisine and long hours of discussion about many of the ideas I presented in this paper.

I would like to thank the following agencies and institutions for supporting my work on Samoan language and culture: the Australian National University (Research School of Pacific Studies, Department of Anthropology), the National Science Foundation (Grant No. 534-482-2480 - Elinor Ochs, principal investigator), the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (Rome, Italy), the University of Southern California (Department of Linguistics). While writing this paper I was supported by a postdoctoral fellowship from the Center for Human Information Processing, at the University of California, San Diego (PHS-MH 14268-08-Mandler) as well as funds from The Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition (Carnegie-Cole-DC 15 Dept. 06/84-Cole, and Ford Foundation 780-0639A-Cole).

Finally, I am grateful to Don Brenneis, Michael Cole, and Peg Griffin for their suggestive comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

<sup>1</sup>I am using "intentional" in the loose, vaguely psychological sense usually adopted in contemporary philosophy of language and pragmatics and not in the more abstract sense found in Brentano's and Husserl's discussion of intentionality.

<sup>2</sup>Transcription conventions: I have used traditional Samoan orthography with the exception of long vowels which I have transcribed phonemically as two identical vowels. The letter 'g' stands for a velar nasal and corresponds to what in other Polynesian languages is transcribed as 'ng.' The apostrophe (') stands for a glottal stop. Three dots ... indicate untimed pause, three dots between brackets indicate that some material was left out, and material between parentheses should be taken as additional information provided to ease interpretation of the text. Double parentheses typically frame my own personal comment or hints. In examples (5) and (6) I have used the following abbreviations: TA = tense/aspect marker; ART = article; DX = deictic particle; EXCL = exclusive.

In writing and in literacy-related activities, Samoan exhibit a contrast between /t/ and /k/ and between /n/ and /g/ (velar nasal). In the great majority of traditional activities, however the opposition is neutralized and words which have /t/ (e.g., *matai*) or /n/ (e.g., *fono*) in the written form are pronounced with /k/ (e.g., *makai*) and /g/ (e.g., *fogo*) respectively. In this paper, I have used the convention of citing words out of context in their written form, while at the same time leaving the original pronunciation in the transcripts.

<sup>3</sup>The phrase "the two subvillages" refers to two nearby villages, whose matai are being accused of not having maintained their original commitment to one of the candidate in the political

elections.

<sup>4</sup>Further, more systematic evidence is provided in other transcripts where subsequent speakers all avoid repeating the agenda of the meeting in the introductory speeches.

## REFERENCES

- Austin, J. L. (1962). *How to do things with words*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Burke, K. (1969). *A rhetoric of motives. A grammar of motives*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Clark, H. H., & Carlson, T. B. (1982). Critics' belief about hearers' belief: A rejoinder to Johnson-Laird, Sperber and Wilson. In N. S. Smith (Ed.), *Mutual knowledge*. London: Academic Press.
- Comaroff, J. L., & Roberts, S. (1981). *Rules and processes: The cultural logic of dispute in an African context*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Duranti, A. (1981a). The Samoan fono: A sociolinguistic study. *Pacific Linguistics* (Series B, Vol. 80). Canberra: The Australian National University, Department of Linguistics, Research School of Pacific Studies.
- Duranti, A. (1981b). Speechmaking and the organization of discourse in a Samoan fono. *Journal of the Polynesian Society*, 90, 357-400.
- Duranti, A. (1983). Samoan speechmaking across social events: One genre in and out of a fono. *Language in Society*, 12, 1-22.
- Duranti, A., Ochs, E. (In press). Literacy instruction in a Samoan village. To appear in B. B. Schieffelin (Ed.), *Acquisition of literacy: Ethnographic perspectives*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
- Firth, R. (1975). Speech making and authority in Tikopia. In M. Bloch (Ed.), *Political language and oratory in traditional society*. London: Academic Press.
- Gadamer, H. G. (1976). *Philosophical hermeneutics* (translated and edited by D. E. Linge). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Gadamer, H. G. (1981). *Reason in the age of science* (translated by G. Lawrence). Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press.
- Geertz, C. (1973). *The interpretation of cultures*. New York: Basic Books.
- Geertz, C. (1983). *Local knowledge: Further essays in interpretive anthropology*. New York: Basic Books.
- Grice, H. P. (1957). Meaning. *The Philosophical Review*, 64, 377-88. (Reprinted in J. F. Rosenberg & C. Travis (Eds.), in *Readings in the philosophy of language*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971.)
- Griffin, P., & Mehan, H. (1981). Sense and ritual in classroom discourse. In F. Coulmas (Ed.), *Conversational routine: Explorations in standardized communication situations and prepatterned speech*. The Hague: Mouton.
- Gumperz, J. (1983). *Discourse strategies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Holquist, M. (1983). The politics of representation. *The Quarterly Newsletter of the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition* 5(1), 2-9.
- Ito, K. L. (In press). Affective bonds: Hawaiian interrelationships of self. To appear in G. White & J. Kirkpatrick (Eds.), *In person, self, and experience: Explaining Pacific ethnopsychologies*.
- Kochman, T. (1983). The boundary between play and nonplay in Black verbal dueling. *Language in Society*, 12, 329-337.
- Larkin, F. (1971). Review of the second edition of M. Mead's "The social organization of Manu'a." *Journal of the Polynesian Society*, 6 219-22.
- Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition. (1982). Culture and cognitive development. In W. Kessen (Ed.), *Manual of child psychology: History, theories and methods*. New York: J. Wiley.

- Levinson, S. (1983). *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Love, J. (1983). Review of B. Shore's *Sala'ilua: A Samoan history*. *Pacific Studies*.
- McDermott, R. P., & Tylbor, H. (In press). *On the necessity of collusion in conversation*. To appear in *Text*.
- Marx, K., & Engels, F. [1845-6] (1978). The German ideology. In R. C. Tucker (Ed.), *The Marx-Engels Reader* (2nd ed.). New York: W. W. Norton.
- Mead, M. (1937). The Samoans. In M. Mead (Ed.), *Cooperation and competition among primitive people*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Mehan, H. (1981). Social constructivism in psychology and sociology. *The Quarterly Newsletter of the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition*, 3(4), 71-7.
- Milner, G. B. (1966). *Samoa dictionary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Myers, F., & Brenneis, D. (1984). Introduction. *Dangerous words: Language and politics in the Pacific*. New York: New York University Press.
- Ochs, E. (1982). Talking to children in Western Samoa. *Language in Society*, 11, 77-104.
- Ochs, E. (1983). *The epistemological foundations of caregiver speech*. Paper presented at the 1983 American Anthropological Association Meetings, Chicago.
- Ochs, E., & Schieffelin, B. (1982). Language acquisition and socialization: Three developmental stories. In R. Bauman & J. Sherzer (Eds.), *Working papers in sociolinguistics*. Austin, TX: Southwest Educational Laboratory.
- Paine, R. (Ed.). (1981). *Politically speaking: Cross cultural studies of rhetoric*. Philadelphia, PA: ISHI.
- Psathas, G. (Ed.). (1979). *Everyday language: Studies in ethnomethodology*. New York: Irvington.
- Rosaldo, M. (1982). The things we do with words: Ilongot speech acts and speech act theory in philosophy. *Language in Society*, 11, 203-237.
- Sahlins, M. (1958) *Social stratification in Polynesia*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Schenkein, J. (Ed.). (1978). *Studies in the organization of conversational interaction*. New York: Academic Press.
- Shore, B. (1982). *Sala'ilua: A Samoan mystery*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Silverstein, M. (1977). Cultural prerequisites to grammatical analysis. In M. Saville-Troike (Ed.), *Linguistics and anthropology*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Silverstein, M. (1979). Language structure and linguistic ideology. In P. R. Clyne, W. F. Hanks & C. L. Hofbauer (Eds.), *The elements: A parasesion on linguistic units and levels*. Chicago: The Chicago Linguistic Society.
- Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1982). Mutual knowledge and relevance in theories of comprehension. In N. S. Smith (Ed.), *Mutual knowledge*. London: Academic Press.
- Turner, V. (1974). *Dramas, fields, and metaphors: Symbolic action in human society*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Voloshinov, V. N. (1973). *Marxism and the philosophy of language*. New York: Seminar Press.
- Vygotsky, L. (1962). *Thought and language*. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press.
- Vygotsky, L. (1978). *Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes* (edited by M. Cole, V. John-Steiner, S. Scribner, & E. Souberman). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Wertsch, J. (In press). *Cognitive developmental theory: A Vygotskian perspective*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

### CHIP Technical Report List

1. David M. Green and William J. McGill. *On the equivalence of detection probabilities and well known statistical quantities*. October 1969.
2. Donald A. Norman. *Comments on the information structure of memory*. October 1969.
3. Norman H. Anderson. *Functional measurement and psychophysical judgment*. October 1969.
4. James C. Shanteau. *An additive decision-making model for sequential estimation and interference judgments*. October 1969.
5. Norman H. Anderson. *Averaging model applied to the size-weight illusion*. October 1969.
6. Norman H. Anderson and James C. Shanteau. *Information integration in risky decision making*. November 1969.
7. George Mandler, Richard H. Meltzer, and Zena Pearlstone. *The structure of recognition. Effects of list tags and of acoustic and semantic confusion*. November 1969.
8. Dominic Massaro. *Perceptual processes and forgetting in memory tasks*. January 1970.
9. Daniel Graboi. *Searching for targets: The effects of specific practice*. February 1970.
10. James H. Patterson and David M. Green. *Discrimination of transient signals having identical energy spectra*. February 1970.
11. Donald A. Norman. *Remembrance of things past*. June 1970.
12. Norman H. Anderson. *Integration theory and attitude change*. August 1970.
13. A.D. Baddeley and J.R. Ecob. *Reaction time and short-term memory: A trace strength alternative to the high-speed exhaustive scanning hypothesis*. November 1970.
14. A.D. Baddeley. *Retrieval rules and semantic coding in short-term memory*. December 1970.
15. Roy D. Patterson. *Residue pitch as a function of the number and relative phase of the component sinusoids*. March 1971.
16. George Mandler and Marilyn A. Borges. *Effects of list differentiation, category membership and prior recall on recognition*. May 1971.
17. David E. Rumelhart, Peter H. Lindsay, and Donald A. Norman. *A process model for long-term memory*. May 1971.
18. David E. Rumelhart and Adele A. Abrahamsen. *Toward a theory of analogical reasoning*. July 1971.
19. Martin F. Kaplan. *How response dispositions integrate with stimulus information*. August 1971.
20. Martin F. Kaplan and Norman H. Anderson. *Comparison of information integration and reinforcement models for interpersonal attraction*. August 1971.
21. David M. Green and R. Duncan Luce. *Speed-accuracy tradeoff in auditory detection*. September 1971.
22. David E. Rumelhart. *A multicomponent theory of confusion among briefly exposed alphabetic characters*. November 1971.
23. Norman H. Anderson and Arthur J. Farkas. *New light on order effects in attitude change*. March 1972.
24. Norman H. Anderson. *Information integration theory: A brief survey*. April 1972.
25. Donald A. Norman. *Memory, knowledge, and the answering of questions*. May 1972.
26. David J. Weiss. *Averaging: An empirical validity criterion for magnitude estimation*. Norman H. Anderson. *Cross-task validation of functional measurement*. June 1972.
27. David E. Rumelhart and Patricia Siple. *The process of recognizing tachistoscopically presented words*. August 1972.
28. Ebbe B. Ebbesen and Richard Bowers. *The effects of proportion of risky to conservative arguments in a group discussion on risky shift*. September 1972.
29. Ebbe B. Ebbesen and Michael Haney. *Flirting with death: Variables affecting risk taking on our nation's highways*. September 1972.
30. Norman H. Anderson. *Algebraic models in perception*. November 1972.
31. Norman H. Anderson. *Cognitive algebra: Information integration applied to social attribution*. December 1972.
32. Jean M. Mandler and Nancy L. Stein. *Recall recognition of pictures by children as a function of organization and of distractor similarity*. January 1973.



33. David E. Rumelhart and Donald A. Norman. *Active semantic networks as a model of human memory*. Marc Eisenstadt and Yaakov Kareev. *Towards a model of human game playing*. June 1973.
34. George Mandler. *Memory storage and retrieval: Some limits on the reach of attention and consciousness*. July 1973.
35. Kent L. Norman. *A method of maximum likelihood estimation for stimulus integration theory*. August 1973.
36. Yaakov Kareev. *A model of human game playing*. August 1973.
37. Donald A. Norman. *Cognitive organization and learning*. August 1973.
38. The Center for Human Information Processing: *A Five Year Report - 1968-73*.
39. Larry D. Rosen and J. Edward Russo. *Binary processing in multi-alternative choice*. October 1973.
40. Samuel Himmelfarb and Norman H. Anderson. *Integration theory analysis of opinion attribution*. December 1973.
41. George Mandler. *Consciousness: Respectable, useful, and probably necessary*. March 1974.
42. Norman H. Anderson. *The problem of change-of-meaning*. June 1974.
43. Norman H. Anderson. *Methods for studying information integration*. June 1974.
44. Norman H. Anderson. *Basic experiments in person perception*. June 1974.
45. Norman H. Anderson. *Algebraic models for information integration*. June 1974.
46. Ebbe B. Ebbesen and Vladimir J. Konecni. *Cognitive algebra in legal decision making*. September 1974.
47. Norman H. Anderson. *Equity judgments as information integration*. Arthur J. Farkas and Norman H. Anderson. *Input summation and equity summation in multi-cue equity judgments*. December 1974.
48. George Mandler and Arthur Graesser II. *Dimensional analysis and the locus of organization*. January 1975.
49. James L. McClelland. *Preliminary letter identification in the perception of words and nonwords*. April 1975.
50. Donald A. Norman and Daniel G. Bobrow. *On the role of active memory processes in perception and cognition*. May 1973.
51. J. Edward Russo. *The value of unit price information. An information processing analysis of point-of-purchase decisions*. June 1975.
52. Elissa L. Newport. *Motherese: The speech of mothers to young children*. August 1975.
53. Norman H. Anderson and Cheryl C. Graesser. *An information integration analysis of attitude change in group discussion*. September 1975.
54. Lynn A. Cooper. *Demonstration of a mental analog of an external rotation*. Lynn A. Cooper and Peter Podgorny. *Mental transformations and visual comparison processes: Effects of complexity and similarity*. October 1975.
55. David E. Rumelhart and Andrew Ortony. *The representation of knowledge in memory*. January 1976.
56. David E. Rumelhart. *Toward an interactive model of reading*. March 1976.
57. Jean M. Mandler, Nancy S. Johnson, and Marsha DeForest. *A structural analysis of stories and their recall: From "Once upon a time" to "Happily ever after"*. March 1976.
58. David E. Rumelhart. *Understanding and summarizing brief stories*. April 1976.
59. Lynn A. Cooper and Roger N. Shepard. *Transformations on representations of objects in space*. April 1976.
60. George Mandler. *Some attempts to study the rotation and reversal of integrated motor patterns*. May 1976.
61. Norman H. Anderson. *Problems in using analysis of variance in balance theory*. June 1976.
62. Norman H. Anderson. *Social perception and cognition*. July 1976.
63. David E. Rumelhart and Donald A. Norman. *Accretion, tuning and restructuring: Three modes of learning*. August 1976.
64. George Mandler. *Memory research reconsidered: A critical view of traditional methods and distinction*. September 1976.
65. Norman H. Anderson and Michael D. Klitzner. *Measurement of motivation*. Michael D. Klitzner and Norman H. Anderson. *Motivation x expectancy x value: A functional measurement approach*. November 1976.
66. Vladimir J. Konecni. *Some social, emotional, and cognitive determinants of aesthetic preference for melodies in complexity*. December 1976.

67. Hugh Mehan, Courtney B. Cazden, LaDonna Coles, Sue Fisher, Nick Maroules. *The social organization of classroom lessons*. December 1976.
- 67a. Hugh Mehan, Courtney B. Cazden, LaDonna Coles, Sue Fisher, Nick Maroules. *Appendices to the social organization of classroom lessons*. December 1976.
68. Norman H. Anderson. *Integration theory applied to cognitive responses and attitudes*. December 1976.
69. Norman H. Anderson and Diane O. Cuneo. *The height + width rule in children's judgments of quantity*. Norman H. Anderson and Clifford H. Butzin. *Children's judgments of equity*. June 1977.
70. Donald R. Gentner and Donald A. Norman. *The FLOW tutor: Schemas for tutoring*. June 1977.
71. George Mandler. *Organization and repetition: An extension of organizational principles with special reference to rote learning*. May 1977.
72. Manuel Leon. *Coordination of intent and consequence information in children's moral judgments*. August 1977.
73. Ted Supalla and Elissa L. Newport. *How many seats in a chair? The derivation of nouns and verbs in American Sign Language*. November 1977.
74. Donald A. Norman and Daniel G. Bobrow. *Descriptions: A basis for memory acquisition and retrieval*. November 1977.
75. Michael D. Williams. *The process of retrieval from very long term memory*. September 1978.
76. Jean M. Mandler. *Categorical and schematic organization in memory*. October 1978.
77. James L. McClelland. *On time relations of mental processes: A framework for analyzing processes in cascade*. October 1978.
78. Jean M. Mandler, Sylvia Scribner, Michael Cole, and Marsha DeForest. *Cross-cultural invariance in story recall*. Jean M. Mandler and Marsha DeForest. *Developmental invariance in story recall*. November 1978.
79. David E. Rumelhart. *Schemata: The building blocks of cognition*. December 1978.
80. Nancy S. Johnson and Jean M. Mandler. *A tale of two structures: Underlying and surface forms in stories*. January 1979.
81. David E. Rumelhart. *Analogical processes and procedural representations*. February 1979.
82. Ross A. Bott. *A study of complex learning: Theory and methodologies*. March 1979.
83. Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition. *Toward a unified approach to problems of culture and cognition*. May 1979.
84. George Mandler and Lawrence W. Barsalou. *Steady state memory: What does the one-shot experiment assess?* May 1979.
85. Norman H. Anderson. *Introduction to cognitive algebra*. June 1979.
86. Michael Cole, Edwin Hutchins, James Levin, and Naomi Miyake, Editors. *Naturalistic problem solving and microcomputers. Report of a Conference*. June 1979.
87. Donald A. Norman. *Twelve issues for cognitive science*. October 1979.
88. Donald A. Norman. *Slips of the mind and an outline for a theory of action*. November 1979.
89. The Center for Human Information Processing: *A Description and a Five-Year Report (1974-79)*. November 1979.
90. Michael Cole and Peg Griffin. *Cultural amplifiers reconsidered*. December 1979.
91. James L. McClelland and David E. Rumelhart. *An interactive activation model of the effect of context in perception. Part I*. April 1980.
92. James L. McClelland and J.K. O'Regan. *The role of expectations in the use of peripheral visual information in reading*. February 1980.
93. Edwin Hutchins. *Conceptual structures of Caroline Island navigation*. May 1980.
94. Friedrich Wilkening and Norman H. Anderson. *Comparison of two rule assessment methodologies for studying cognitive development*. June 1980.
95. David E. Rumelhart and James L. McClelland. *An interactive activation model of the effect of context in perception. Part II*. August 1980.
96. Jean M. Mandler. *Structural invariants in development*. September 1980.
97. David E. Rumelhart and Donald A. Norman. *Analogical processes in learning*. October 1980.
98. James A. Levin and Yaakov Kareev. *Personal computers and education: The challenge to schools*. November 1980.

99. Donald A. Norman and Tim Shallice. *Attention to action: Willed and automatic control of behavior*. December 1980.
100. David E. Rumelhart. *Understanding understanding*. January 1981.
101. George Mandler. *The structure of value: Accounting for taste*. May 1981.
102. David E. Rumelhart and Donald A. Norman. *Simulating a skilled typist: A study of skilled cognitive-motor performance*. May 1981.
103. Jean M. Mandler. *Representation*. June 1981.
104. Donald R. Gentner. *Skilled finger movements in typing*. July 1981.
105. Edwin L. Hutchins and James A. Levin. *Points of view in problem solving*. August 1981.
106. Michael Cole. *Society, mind and development*.  
Michael Cole. *The zone of proximal development: Where culture and cognition create each other*. September 1981.
107. Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition. *Culture and cognitive development*. November 1981.
108. Donald R. Gentner. *Evidence against a central control model of timing in typing*. December 1981.
109. Robert M. Boynton and Allen L. Nagy. *The La Jolla analytic colorimeter: Optics, calibrations, procedures and control experiments*. December 1981.
110. Jonathan T. Grudin and Serge Larochelle. *Digraph frequency effects in skilled typing*. February 1982.
111. Donald R. Gentner, Jonathan T. Grudin, Serge Larochelle, Donald A. Norman, David E. Rumelhart. *Studies of typing from the LNR Research Group*. September 1982.
112. Donald A. Norman. *Five papers on human-machine interaction*. May 1982.
113. Naomi Miyake. *Constructive interaction*. June 1982.
114. Donald R. Gentner. *The development of typewriting skill*. September 1982.
115. Margaret M. Riel. *Investigating the system of development: The skills and abilities of dysphasic children*. February 1983.
116. David E. Rumelhart and Donald A. Norman. *Representation in memory*. June 1983.
117. George Mandler. *Consciousness: Its function and construction*. June 1983.
118. Norman H. Anderson. *Schemas in person cognition*. September 1983.
119. Norman H. Anderson. *A theory of stereotypes*. December 1983.
120. Norman H. Anderson. *Psychodynamics of everyday life: Blaming and avoiding blame*. December 1983.
121. Donald R. Gentner. *Expertise in typewriting*. May 1984.
122. Alessandro Duranti. *Intentions, self, and local theories of meaning: Words and social action in a Samoan context*. June 1984.