Language as Culture in U.S. Anthropology

Three Paradigms

by Alessandro Duranti

The study of language as culture in U.S. anthropology is a set of distinct and often not fully compatible practices that can be made sense of through the identification of three historically related paradigms. Whereas the first paradigm, initiated by Boas, was mostly devoted to documentation, grammatical description, and classification (especially of North American indigenous languages) and focused on linguistic relativity, the second paradigm, developed in the 1960s, took advantage of new recording technology and new theoretical insights to examine language use in context, introducing new units of analysis such as the speech event. Although it was meant to be part of anthropology at large, it marked an intellectual separation from the rest of anthropology.

The third paradigm, with its focus on identity formation, narrativity, and ideology, constitutes a new attempt to connect with the rest of anthropology by extending linguistic methods to the study of issues previously identified in other subfields. Although each new paradigm has reduced the influence and appeal of the preceding one, all three paradigms persist today, and confrontation of their differences is in the best interest of the discipline.

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1. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the University of California at Berkeley, Emory University, and the Università di Padova. I thank the participants in those events for their comments and suggestions. I also benefited from detailed comments on an earlier draft by Niko Besnier, Dell Hymes, Adrienne Lo, Sarah Meacham, Elinor Ochs, and four anonymous referees for CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY. Any remaining errors, misinterpretations, or omissions are, of course, solely mine.

2. Because of space limitations, I will not review other traditions, for example, British and French anthropology (on the role of linguistic analysis in British anthropology, see Henson 1974; Hymes 1970:253).
with different beliefs can coordinate their respective efforts and exchange goods [e.g., information]. For physics, Galison gives the example of laboratories. In the study of language use, laboratories [e.g., the Language Behavior Research Laboratory at the University of California at Berkeley] professional organizations [e.g., the Society for Linguistic Anthropology (SLA) and the Society for the Study of the Indigenous Languages of the Americas (SSILA)], and journals have made it possible for scholars to come together around shared interests [e.g., a particular topic, a language, or a linguistic area] and exchange useful information despite differences in theoretical assumptions and methods.

Furthermore, although individual researchers are very important in establishing a new paradigm or undermining the credibility of an established one, a paradigm as I define it here does not necessarily coincide with an individual scholar's research program. It is possible for one or more individuals to be "ahead" of a paradigm or to switch back and forth between different paradigms. When we examine the history of the study of language as culture in the United States, we realize that the relationship between paradigms on the one hand and individual researchers and research groups on the other is complex and problematic, with individuals or groups not always in control of their own assumptions and the theoretical and methodological implications of their work or not always willing to fully commit to one paradigm over another. Hence the need for historical understanding of our present situation.

For the purpose of this discussion I will provide the following working definition of "paradigm": a research enterprise with a set of recognizable and often explicitly stated [a] general goals, [b] view of the key concept [e.g., language], [c] preferred units of analysis, [d] theoretical issues, and [e] preferred methods for data collection. This definition identifies paradigms as clusters of properties established on the basis of explicit statements and interpretive practices in the study of language. In what follows, I will identify the period and intellectual climate that favored the emergence of different paradigms and briefly describe the work of the scholars who were responsible for establishing them. What follows is not meant to be a comprehensive review of the literature in linguistic anthropology and related fields in the past century. I have chosen instead a relatively small number of writers and trends as exemplary of the paradigm shifts I am positing.

I hope to show that this risk is warranted by the gain of a few insights into a field of inquiry that is neither unified nor chaotic in its approaches and contributions.

The First Paradigm

The first paradigm was established toward the end of the 19th century as part of the Boasian conception of a four-field anthropology in which the study of language was as important as the study of culture, the archaeological record, and human remains. It is impossible to understand the establishment of this paradigm without an appreciation of the role played by the Bureau of Ethnology—later renamed the Bureau of American Ethnology (BAE)—and its first director, John Wesley Powell [1834-1902]. It was Powell who supported the young Boas's study of Chinook and other American Indian languages and commissioned what then became the Handbook of American Indian Languages [Boas 1911a; see Darnell 1998a; Hyman 1970:249-51; Stocking 1974; Voegegin 1952].

Powell supported linguistic fieldwork in the belief that by collecting vocabularies and texts from American Indian languages it would be possible to reconstruct their genetic relations and thus help in the classification of American Indian tribes, something that was of great interest to the Bureau of American Ethnology as a U.S. government institution [Darnell 1998a]. Although Boas became skeptical of the possibility of a direct correlation between language and culture [and certainly rejected any correlation between language and race], he documented Native American languages and cultural traditions that seemed on the verge of disappearing because of European colonization [a practice that later became known as "salvage anthropology"]. Through his writing and teaching, he broadened the scope and raised the standards of linguistic fieldwork, which before him had consisted of the compilation of vocabulary lists and the occasional collection of myths and legends. He also transmitted to some of his students—Edward Sapir and Alfred Kroeber in particular—a passion for the details of linguistic description and the conviction that languages were an important tool not only for fieldwork but also for the study of culture, especially because the categories and rules of language were largely unconscious and thus not subject to secondary rationalizations [Boas 1911b]. It is, then, from Boasian theory and practice that the view of linguistics as a tool for cultural (or historical) analysis developed. This principle was meant to sanction the central role played not only by language but also by language experts in anthropology. However, by the third generation after Boas this principle had been transformed into a "service mentality" whereby the linguists' justification for working in an anthropology department was to help cultural and social anthropologists to do their jobs. Not everyone accepted this second-class status, and some scholars either migrated to linguistics departments or encouraged their students to do so. [Sapir, for example, apparently advised his students to get their Ph.D.'s in

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3. My interest in paradigm shift here is related to but different in focus from Stephen O. Murray's (1993, 1998) study of the importance of intellectual and organizational leadership for the development of a number of disciplines including sociolinguistics, ethnoscience, and anthropological linguistics. In contrast to Murray, who focuses on a sociological account of leadership, group formation, and marginalization, I have concentrated here on general theoretical and methodological trends.
linguistics [Darnell 1998b:362.] In my view, this was possible because with the first paradigm the linguists in anthropology departments and those in other departments shared a great deal in terms of theory and methods. Thus, Sapir made important contributions to historical and typological linguistics and to phonological theory, for example, with his argument in favor of the psychological reality of the phoneme [Sapir 1933, 1949]. It is significant in this connection that Leonard Bloomfield—the most influential American linguist of the first part of the 20th century—and Sapir had a cordial, albeit competitive, relationship [Darnell 1990]: they shared a passion, grammatical patterns. Although a scholar like Sapir transcended his grammatical interest to venture into the study of culture [Sapir 1949a, 1994; Silverstein 1986], the prevalent professional identity of those working under his mentorship was expert on the grammar of particular languages. Despite their wider anthropological training, these linguists conceived of language as an autonomous entity whose logic was sui generis and therefore required special tools. Consequently, training in phonetics and morphology was stressed above everything else. This was the "cultural capital" [Bourdieu 1985] of linguists working within the first paradigm. By the 1950s, however, this expertise was no longer easy to sell to anthropologists, and we find the heirs of Boas and Sapir bending over backward trying to justify having at least one of their own in an anthropology department [Voegelin and Harris 1952:326]:

In most universities—those in which no separate linguistic department exists—the anthropology faculty should include a scholar whose competence includes the modern technical developments in linguistics. Where separate linguistic departments already exist, the anthropology department would still have to include instruction in anthropological linguistics given by a scholar who could enjoy the position of a liaison officer between anthropology and linguistics.

In the same article, Charles [Carl] Voegelin and Zellig Harris [both of whom were part of Sapir's group at Yale [Darnell 1998b:362]] seem torn between pride in their "technical" knowledge [i.e., their ability to provide descriptively adequate grammatical accounts of any language] and a desire to avoid scaring off cultural anthropology students with subject matter that might seem too difficult to master in the short time allocated to it in anthropology departments [p. 326, my emphasis]:

The importance of relating anthropological training to technical linguistics is that the latter brings to the former a few necessary but not too difficult techniques for exploring culture. Cultural studies without linguistic consideration tend to be narrowly sociological rather than broadly anthropological. On the other hand, ethnonomological studies essayed by anthropologists innocent of technical linguistic training tend to be amateurish.

The exclusive preoccupation with grammatical structures is also evident in a text entitled Anthropological Linguistics: An Introduction, written by Joseph Greenberg and published in 1968 in a series edited by Harris and Voegelin. A cursory view of its table of contents reveals a subject matter dramatically different from that found in contemporary textbooks (e.g., Duranti 1997, Foley 1997) and readers (e.g., Blount 1995, Brenneis and Macaulay 1995, Duranti 2001b):

I. The Nature and Definition of Language
II. Linguistics as a Science
III. Descriptive Linguistics
IV. Grammatical Theory
V. Phonology
VI. Linguistic Change
VII. Types of Language Classification
VIII. Synchronic Universals
IX. Diachronic Generalization
X. Higher-level Explanations

To see Greenberg's book as an introduction to the study of language from an anthropological perspective means to accept at least the following two assumptions: (a) language is culture (and therefore one can claim to be doing something anthropological by analyzing grammar) and (b) descriptive (including typological, historical) linguistics is the guiding discipline for linguists in anthropology departments and elsewhere, determining both the units and the methods of analysis. The latter assumption is implicit in the choice of the term "anthropological linguistics," which became popular in the 1950s and can be read as an indication that its practitioners identified primarily with linguistics and only secondarily with anthropology. [David Sapir [1985:291] made this claim unequivocally regarding his father's intellectual interests.] If we take the description and classification of languages based on their lexicons and grammatical structures to be the major goal of this paradigm, the series editors' choice of Greenberg to produce an introductory text in the 1960s makes sense given his important contributions to historical [1963a] and typological [1963b, 1966] linguistics. These are areas that continue to be of great interest to anthropologists in

4. "The work of Chomsky now seems to me the ultimate development, the 'perfection,' as it were, of the dominant trend of linguistics in this century. It is the trend that motivated much of Sapir's work, and that informed the recurrent efforts under his influence to relate language to culture. Briefly put, the trend is that toward the isolation of language as an autonomous object of study. And it has been around that separation that modern linguistics has developed as a profession. The degree of separation, and the basis for it, however, have varied" [Hymes 1983:339].

5. "If a school has budgeted only one semester for linguistics, about the best the instructor can do is to give a general course containing about three lectures on consonants, three on vowels, one on tone, three on phonemics, three on morphology, two on syntax, and one on general background" [Pike 1963:321].

6. As Voegelin [1961] later suggested, the term "ethnonomological" is here used pejoratively and in contrast to "anthropological linguistics." It must be understood as referring to cross-linguistic comparisons done by cultural anthropologists.
other subfields, given that linguistic reconstruction can provide evidence [sometimes before the archaeological record is available] for migration and contact (e.g., Kirch 1984).

Furthermore, Greenberg's work was seen by some anthropological linguists, among them Sapir's student Mary Haas (1978:121–22), as providing an alternative to the new paradigm in formal linguistics, Chomsky's (transformational-) generative grammar. Contrary to Chomsky, who was at the time concentrating mostly on English and advocating the need for students to work only on their native languages (in order to be able to rely on their own native intuitions), Greenberg promoted the study of as many languages as possible and was therefore viewed as an ally by descriptive and field linguists. But the exclusive concentration on grammar, together with the rapid growth of independent linguistics programs and departments in the United States, had a negative impact on those who identified themselves as anthropological linguists. Nonlinguists in anthropology departments started to question the need to have their own linguists in light of the existence of another department on the same campus devoted to the study of language. At the same time, the focus on grammatical description and the commitment to the grammatical and textual documentation of languages that were on the verge of becoming extinct (Moore 1999) encouraged the identification of the field of anthropological linguistics with largely theoretical descriptions of non-Indo-European, previously unwritten languages. Before becoming a negative stereotype among those outside the subfield, this narrow view of anthropological linguistics was explicitly articulated by some of its leading scholars. For example, Harry Hoijer (1961:10) defined anthropological linguistics as "an area of research which is devoted in the main to studies, synchronic and diachronic, of the languages of the people who have no writing," and Carl Voegelin (1961:68) stated that anthropological linguistics was meant to reveal the subject matter of previously unknown languages and was in general more descriptive than other linguistic fields (pp. 673–74).

It was this fascination with adequate description of the grammatical patterns of non-Indo-European languages, especially those spoken by North American Indians, that produced the most lasting theoretical issue of this paradigm: linguistic relativity, also known as the "Sapir-Whorf hypothesis" (Hill and Mannheim 1992). The hypothesis was that languages provide their native speakers with a set of hard-to-question dispositions (e.g., to hear only certain sound distinctions, to favor certain classifications, to make certain metaphorical extensions) that have an impact on their interpretation of reality and, consequently, on their behavior (as in Whorf's [1941] example of the empty gasoline drums falsely judged to be less dangerous than full ones). The linguistic-relativity issue generated a considerable amount of discussion, which has continued over the years (Koerner 1992), but until the 1980s it remained closely identified with this paradigm and as such of little interest for those who embraced the second.

The general features of the first paradigm can be summarized as follows:

**Goals:** the documentation, description, and classification of indigenous languages, especially those of North America (originally part of "salvage anthropology").

**View of language:** as lexicon and grammar, that is, rule-governed structures, which represent unconscious and arbitrary relations between language as an arbitrary symbolic system and reality.

**Preferred units of analysis:** sentence, word, morpheme, and, from the 1920s, phoneme; also texts (e.g., myths, traditional tales).

**Theoretical issues:** appropriate units of analysis for comparative studies (e.g., to document genetic classification or diffusion), linguistic relativity.

**Preferred methods for data collection:** elicitation of word lists, grammatical patterns, and traditional texts from native speakers.

### The Second Paradigm

The second paradigm is more closely identified with the names "linguistic anthropology" and "sociolinguistics." As often happens in science, it developed out of a series of fortuitous circumstances that included, in addition to the already mentioned growth of linguistics departments on U.S. campuses, the simultaneous appointment of two young and energetic professors at the University of California at Berkeley and the birth of quantitatively oriented urban sociolinguistics.

Whether or not Chomsky's program for linguistics was, as claimed by Newmeyer [1986], a "revolution," there is no question that the rapid growth of linguistics departments in the United States in the 1960s coincided with the enthusiasm for Chomsky's new approach, which seemed to combine the rigor of the hard sciences [by building quasi-mathematical models] with an unprecedented openness toward the content of mental phenomena—a type of data previously excluded by behaviorists (see D'Andrade 1992:8–15). But Chomsky's preference for models based on native speakers' intuitions and descriptions of what people know about language [competence] over what they do with it [performance] also implied the exclusion of a wide range of potentially interesting phenomena from the field of linguistics. A few young scholars seized this opportunity to provide alternative views of language and new methods for studying it.

The early 1960s saw the emergence of sociolinguistics and an approach called "the ethnography of communication" (initially "the ethnography of speaking"). Both of these perspectives emerged or at least first found fertile ground in Northern California. In 1956 John Gumperz was hired to teach Hindi at the University of California at Berkeley after returning from fieldwork in India [Murray 1998:98], where he had studied language contact and multilingualism using ethnographic methods such as participant observation in addition to more traditional survey techniques (e.g., questionnaires). The new ap-
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pointment gave him an opportunity to collaborate with Charles Ferguson at Stanford—the two had first met in India [Murray 1998:97]—and organize a session at the annual meetings of the American Anthropological Association the contributions to which were published as Linguistic Diversity in South Asia: Studies in Regional, Social, and Functional Variation [Ferguson and Gumperz 1966]. Ferguson and Gumperz’s introduction to the collection revisited earlier concepts in dialectology and diachronic linguistics and introduced the notion of “variety” [replacing the older term “idiolocality”), thereby establishing the foundations of what was later called “sociolinguistics” [Labov 1966:21; Murray 1998:111].

When Dell Hymes arrived at Berkeley [from Harvard] in 1960, he began a collaboration with Gumperz that linked his interest in speaking as a cultural activity with Gumperz’s interests in social dialects and linguistic variation. Hymes’s original call for an “ethnography of speaking” (1962) was thus extended to what was presented as a more general field, the “ethnography of communication,” in two collections: a special publication of the American Anthropological Association called The Ethnography of Communication [Gumperz and Hymes 1964] and a collection entitled Directions in Sociolinguistics: The Ethnography of Communication [Gumperz and Hymes 1972]. Few if any of the contributors to these publications would have called themselves “ethnographers,” and even fewer could have qualified as “ethnographers of communication” in a strict sense of the term, but the collections worked as manifestos for a way of studying language that was in many ways radically different both from earlier versions of anthropological linguistics, dialectology, and historical linguistics and from Chomsky’s increasingly popular transformational-generative linguistics. In Hymes’s introduction to the 1964 collection we find a clear statement of some fundamental features of the new paradigm; it is argued that [1] language must be studied in “contexts of situation” [a term borrowed from Malinowski 1923], (2) study must move beyond grammatical and ethnographic description to look for patterns in “speech activity,” and (3) the speech community (as opposed to grammar or the ideal speaker-hearer) must be taken as a point of departure. Whereas the reference to the speech community was an obvious connection to Gumperz’s research interests and methods, the other two features were at the core of Hymes’s own vision of an ambitious comparative program for the study of speech activities or communicative events, later renamed “speech events” [see Hymes 1972a]. These features were the foundations for the establishment of the new paradigm. They gave those who adhered to it an identity of their own, separate from linguistics [they were not competing for the same territory, grammar] but also, in part, less dependent on the approval of the rest of anthropology.

At around the same time, Hymes edited a monumental collection of essays and extracts entitled Language in Culture and Society: A Reader in Linguistic Anthropology [1964a], in which he gathered a wide range of materials on cultural and social aspects of language use and language structure. In this effort he was not only trying to define how language should be studied but also promoting what became a new perspective represented by his preference for the term “linguistic anthropology” over “anthropological linguistics” (Hymes 1963a, b, 1964b). Reacting to the identification that earlier scholars had felt with linguistics, Hymes argued for a distinctively anthropological perspective to be realized within rather than outside of anthropology departments. He wrote that “departments of anthropology must themselves exercise responsibility for some of the linguistic knowledge their students need” by accepting a division of intellectual labor with respect to that knowledge (1964b:xxiii):

(1) It is the task of linguistics to coordinate knowledge about language from the viewpoint of language.
(2) It is anthropology’s task to coordinate knowledge about language from the viewpoint of man. Put in terms of history and practice, the thesis is that there is a distinctive field, linguistic anthropology, conditioned, like other subfields of linguistics and anthropology, by certain bodies of data, national background, leading figures, and favorite problems. In one sense, it is a characteristic activity, the activity of those whose questions about language are shaped by anthropology. Its scope is not defined by logic or nature, but by the range of active anthropological interest in linguistic phenomena. Its scope may include problems that fall outside the active concern of linguistics, and always it uniquely includes the problem of integration with the rest of anthropology. In sum, linguistic anthropology can be defined as the study of language within the context of anthropology.

With its emphasis on the need to study language within anthropology, this was one of the clearest statements of what I am calling the second paradigm. In this paradigm, to study language from an anthropological perspective meant either to (1) concentrate on those features of language that needed reference to culture in order to be understood and therefore had to be studied with the help of ethnographic methods (e.g., participant observation) or to (2) study linguistic forms as part of cultural activities or as themselves constituting an activity, as in Hymes’s [1972a] notion of the “speech event,” to be understood as an event defined by language use (e.g., a debate, a court case, an interview). This paradigm broke with the narrow definition of language found in most departments of linguistics (where “language” was understood as “grammar”) and at the same

7. Originally the collection, to be coedited with Harry Hoijer, was meant to be about research on language and culture in American Indian communities, but when Hoijer withdrew from the project Hymes decided to expand it to language and culture more generally [Hymes, personal communication, December 4, 2000].

8. The term “linguistic anthropology” is probably older than “anthropological linguistics,” given that it was used in the late 19th century by Otis T. Mason [see Darnell 1998a] and Horatio Hale [see Hymes 1970:349]
time identified new ways of thinking about language as culture. Whereas sociocultural anthropologists tended to see language as a tool for describing or enacting culture, adherents of the second paradigm were trained to see the very organization of language use as "cultural" and thus in need of linguistic and ethnographic description.

But the implicit promise of a paradigm in which the questions were defined by anthropology was not entirely fulfilled. Hymes's program had an ambiguous relationship with cultural anthropology as it moved into the latter's territory (e.g., with the ethnography of ritual events) without managing to produce a volume of empirical research that could either compete with or more fully complement sociocultural anthropologists' steady stream of monograph-length ethnographies. Joel Sherzer's [1983] *Kuna Ways of Speaking: An Ethnographic Perspective* was the exception rather than the norm. The program also lacked obvious connections with biological and archaeological anthropology, especially because of its exclusion of evolution. Although Hymes himself had discussed the evolution of language earlier in his career (Hymes 1961), none of his students did so. This separated adherents of the second paradigm from anthropologists who were pursuing a universal and evolutionary explanation of certain domains of human languages, especially in the lexicon (e.g., Berlin 1975, Berlin and Kay 1969, Witkowski and Brown 1978). Despite the explicit adoption of an evolutionary agenda and an antirelativistic stance (contrary to the Boasian legacy), contributions such as Berlin and Kay's [1969] comparative survey of color terminology shared more features with the first paradigm than with the second. At the methodological level, Berlin and Kay continued to rely, as did Sapir and the scholars who called themselves "anthropological linguists," on informant work to elicit linguistic forms (i.e., lexical items) instead of documenting the use of such forms in specific speech events. At the theoretical level, they continued to interpret linguistic relativity as pertaining to linguistic classification (first paradigm) rather than extending it to the realm of linguistic activities as suggested by Hymes [1966] (second paradigm). Finally, the absence from their work of contextual variation is incompatible with the second paradigm, which is built around the notion of variation (Ferguson and Gumperz 1960) and communicative (as opposed to strictly linguistic) competence (Hymes 1972b). Berlin and Kay's basic theoretical assumptions and methods have remained unchanged (see Kay and Maffi 2000), and they coexist with a radically different tradition for the study of categorization (e.g., Goodwin 1997) that they do not engage.

For similar reasons, the second paradigm shares very little with the "new ethnography" or ethnoscience of the 1960s, later known as "cognitive anthropology" (D'Andrae 1995). Despite the inclusion of Gumperz's

9. "Languages which possess few color terms ... are invariably spoken by peoples which exhibit relatively primitive levels of economic and technological development. On the other hand, languages possessing rather full color lexicons are characteristically spoken by the more civilized nations of the world" (Berlin 1970: 14).

article on multilingual communities in Tyler's *Cognitive Anthropology* [1969] and Frake's work on types of litigation in Gumperz and Hymes [1972], for the most part the second paradigm breaks with the Boasian tradition of conceiving culture as a mental phenomenon, tending to neglect issues of "knowledge" in favor of "performance" [Bauman 1975, Hymes 1975] and solidifying a lasting connection with folklore (e.g., Bauman 1992). It was Gumperz who in the mid-1970s returned to a more cognitive view of culture, exploring the implications of the philosopher Paul Grice's [1957, 1975] work on meaning and implicature for a theory of code switching and cross-cultural [mis]communication (Gumperz 1977, 1982). However, given his focus on interaction and the emergent qualities of interpretation, his approach was also oriented toward performance.

A reading of the literature produced in the 1960s and 1970s by Gumperz, Hymes, and their respective students and associates shows that in those years the intellectual connections for adherents of the second paradigm were not with anthropology but with a number of alternative, nonmainstream research programs in other subfields, including Erving Goffman's study of face-to-face encounters, Harold Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, and William Labov's urban sociolinguistics. In the late 1960s the convergence of Goffman, Labov, and Hymes at the University of Pennsylvania helped create an intellectual climate in which the study of language as used in social life gained momentum. A similar impetus was experienced on the West Coast, where William Bright, a former student of M. B. Emeneau and Mary Haas at the University of California at Berkeley, in 1964 organized a conference at the University of California at Los Angeles on "sociolinguistics" that included students of language change, language planning, language contact, and social stratification in language use [Bright 1966].

For about a decade there was a strong identification between the ethnography of communication and the new field of sociolinguistics. This identification is seen in a number of initiatives, among them (1) the inclusion of William Labov's work in Gumperz and Hymes's collections, (2) the adoption of "sociolinguistics" as a term including the ethnography of communication (see *Directions in Sociolinguistics: The Ethnography of Communication* [Gumperz and Hymes 1972] and *Foundations in Sociolinguistics: An Ethnographic Approach* [Hymes 1974]), (3) the inauguration of the journal *Language in Society*, and (4) Hymes's choice of Labov and Allen Grimshaw [a sociologist] as his associate editors for that journal, suggesting that, having shifted to the university's School of Education, he was no less relying exclusively on anthropology for institutional or intellectual support.

10. It is no surprise that Frake is included in Gumperz and Hymes's [1972] collection. His articles on how to ask for a drink in Subanun and how to enter a Yakas house [Frake 1972, 1975] show an approach to reading the human mind that focuses on enacted classification and as such is more concerned with social action and context than that of any of the other contributors to Tyler's [1969] collection.
Looking at the books and articles that established the second paradigm, one cannot but be struck by the absence of linguistic relativity as a topic or issue. More generally, between the early 1960s and the late 1970s the issue of the relationship between language and mind dropped out of the research agenda of adherents of the second paradigm. The few who continued to be preoccupied with linguistic relativity were Whorf’s critics, for example, Berlin and Kay, who were operating with theoretical presuppositions (innatism, universality) and a methodology (elicitation with no recording of spontaneous speech) alien to adherents of the second paradigm. As Kay became more interested in syntax and prototype semantics—and moved out of the anthropology department at the University of California at Berkeley to join the department of linguistics on the same campus—and Berlin continued his own work on ethnobotanical classifications and sound symbolism (e.g., Berlin 1992), interest in relativity continued to decline in the 1970s and 1980s [to resurface in the 1990s: e.g., Gumperz and Levinson 1996, Lucy 1992]. This decline was linked to another important change: language was no longer a window on the human mind as it had been for Boas and his students. Rather, it was primarily a social phenomenon, to be studied not in the isolation of one-on-one informant sessions but in the midst of speech events or speech activities [see, e.g., Basso 1979, Bauman and Sherzer 1974, Gumperz 1982, Sherzer 1983]. Even when semi-experimental techniques (e.g., interviews, questionnaires), were used, the goal was to document and make sense of linguistic variation across speakers and events (e.g., Gal 1979) rather than of worldview or perception of reality.

Starting in the mid-1960s, linguistic anthropologists and sociolinguists were united not only in their attention to language use but in their lack of interest in the psychology of language. The second paradigm established, in other words, a study of language divorced from psychology and, for many, antipsychological at a time when Chomsky was claiming closer ties between linguistics and psychology [e.g., in his early argument that linguistics should be thought of as part of psychology] and “cognition” as opposed to “behavior” was becoming the key word in U.S.-made psychology. This distance from the “cognitive revolution” had at least two effects. One was that adherents of the second paradigm stopped looking outside of linguistic anthropology narrowly defined (and, especially, stopped deferring to linguistics) for questions to ask and issues to address. Instead, this was a period of self-assertion in which linguistic anthropologists worked hard at establishing their own agenda and reinforcing a positive group identity. The other was that the lack of interest in “cognition” per se separated adherents of the second paradigm from the cognitive anthropologists of the 1960s who were looking at language as a taxonomic system and at linguistic analysis as a guiding methodology for the study of culture-in-the-mind. This intellectual separation represented exactly the opposite of Hymes’s original goal, the integration of linguistic anthropology with the rest of anthropology. In the 1970s, sociocultural anthropologists discovered “discourse,” but the idea of culture as text—as in Geertz’s [1973] influential essay “Thick Description”—tended to be credited to European philosophers (e.g., Derrida, Gadamer, Ricoeur) rather than to linguistic anthropologists.

At the theoretical level, with a few exceptions, the second paradigm was characterized by a general reluctance to challenge either the rest of anthropology or linguistics. Beyond Hymes’s writings about communicative competence, with their explicit criticism of Chomsky’s notion of competence [Hymes 1972b], most researchers were busy identifying ways in which language use was culturally organized across social situations. When theories were discussed, it was usually to show that they were too Western-oriented to account for the ways in which language was conceived and used elsewhere, for example, in the case of Elinor Ochs’ Keenan’s [1977] Malagasy counterexamples to Grice’s maxim “be informative” and Michelle Rosaldo’s [1982] attack on the epistemological foundations of speech-act theory based on her fieldwork among the Ifongon. In the second paradigm, generalizations were rare; scholars did very little comparison, and even when comparisons were made [e.g., in Judith Irvine’s [1979] essay on formal events] it was to show that a commonly accepted analytical concept (e.g., formality) was problematic across speech communities and contexts.

A notable exception to this general trend was Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson’s [1978] study of linguistic politeness, which presented a well-articulated, empirically verifiable theory based on Goffman’s [1967] notion of “face” and on Grice’s theory of meaning as based on the recognition of the speaker’s intentions [1957] and his cooperative principle [1975]. Brown and Levinson supported their rational-choice model with a wide spectrum of examples collected in India among Tamil-speakers (Levinson 1977) and in Mexico among Tzeltal-speakers (Brown 1979) and assembled from the literature on English and other languages (Malagasy and Japanese in particular). Despite the fact that they shared credentials with adherents of the second paradigm (they had been trained in anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley, studying with John Gumperz and a number of others), their theory did not generate much interest among anthropologists. It was much more popular among discourse analysts and pragmaticians working outside of anthropology. The absence of attempts by anthropologists to test their theory or even comment on it [Hymes’s [1986] critical remarks were an exception] suggests a general avoidance of open criticism from within the field and/or a lack of interest in universalizing models.

The features of the second paradigm may be summarized as follows:

Goals: the study of language use across speakers and activities.

View of language: as a culturally organized and culturally organizing domain.

Preferred units of analysis: speech community, com-
Consolidation of the Second Paradigm and Further Developments

In the 1980s, the second paradigm was strengthened by a considerable output of publications and projects. Several of Hymes's and Gumperz's former students had by then secured jobs at various universities and started to train their own students. Those who had positions in anthropology departments with graduate programs were, at least in principle, in a better position to solidify the second paradigm than those who were in exclusively undergraduate programs or in linguistics departments.

When, in 1983, as a consequence of the reorganization of the American Anthropological Association (to avoid increased federal taxation) into separate sections, the Society for Linguistic Anthropology (SLA) was founded, it not only sanctioned the importance of the study of language within American anthropology but also constituted an implicit recognition of Hymes's vision of the subfield—as shown by the preference for “linguistic anthropology” over “anthropological linguistics.” (Hymes was AAA president that year and lobbied for the establishment of the section, although he was not present at its first business meeting.) The identification with linguistics which had characterized adherents of the first paradigm continued to be strong among a number of SLA members, especially among the students of American Indian languages who in 1981 had formed their own association, the Society for the Study of the Indigenous Languages of the Americas (SSILA).

In the 1980s there were also new intellectual developments. Some of these were expansions and refinements of established directions, but others were ideas and projects that took inspiration from theoretical and methodological perspectives outside of the second paradigm. I will here briefly review four main foci of interest: (1) performance, (2) primary and secondary language socialization, (3) indexicality, and (4) participation. Whereas 1 and 2 were more closely tied to Hymes's writings and compatible with his original program, 3 and to some extent 4 were inspired by other work, often outside of anthropology and linguistics.

1. Performance. Starting in the mid-1970s, the notion of performance was extended from language use (e.g., Chomsky 1965) and language as action (e.g., Austin 1962) to the form of speech itself and the implications of speaking as a product that often required special skills and was routinely subject to evaluation for its aesthetic, expressive, or stylistic dimensions (Hymes 1972b, Tedlock 1983). This perspective had some of its roots in folklore and the study of verbal art (Bauman 1975, 1977; Hymes 1975; Paredes and Bauman 1972). The term “creativity,” used by Chomsky to refer to the native speaker's ability to generate a potentially infinite number of sentences out of a finite set of elements, was thus redefined and extended to other realms on the assumption that speaking was an essential element of social life. The simultaneous discovery by some social anthropologists (e.g., Bloch 1975) of the potential role of speaking in status negotiation and conflict management established political rhetoric as a rare trading zone in which linguistic and sociocultural anthropologists could meet to solve common problems (e.g., Brenneis and Myers 1984, Watson-Giego and White 1990). In the 1990s this work expanded and became linked with the work on performance in connection with the definition and negotiation of gender identity (Hall 2001).

2. Primary and secondary language socialization. The acquisition of language became a major subject of investigation in the 1960s and 1970s—the Journal of Child Language was started in 1974 to join journals in psycholinguistics and developmental psychology that focused mainly on adult language (Crystal 1974). Simultaneously, the acquisition of communicative competence was identified by Hymes and his students (e.g., Sherzer and Darnell 1972) as an important part of the ethnographic study of language use. Little empirical work was, however, being done on the basic issues of the second paradigm. Despite the efforts of interdisciplinary groups such as the one organized by Dan Slobin at the University of California at Berkeley in the mid-1960s, the early attempts to produce ethnographically informed acquisition studies were not very successful (Duranti 2001, 203–24). The situation radically changed in the 1980s when, in an article in a major collection in cultural anthropology, Elinor Ochs and Bambi Schieffelin (1984) identified language socialization as a bridge between anthropology and language development, viewing it as both socialization to language (the missing part in linguistics and psycholinguistics) and socialization through language (the taken-for-granted part in cultural anthropology). On the basis of their work among Samoans (Ochs) and the Kaluli of Papua New Guinea (Schieffelin), they described current research on language acquisition as informed by “local theories” of mind and society and sketched out a program of study integrating methods developed in developmental psychology (longitudinal studies) with methods developed in cultural anthropology (ethnography). Their claim that “baby talk” (a feature of “Motherese”) was not a universal was only the tip of the iceberg for a model of socialization to be documented by fieldworkers around the world (see also Ochs and Schieffelin 1995). One of the most promising outcomes of this line of research has been the adoption, extension, and refinement of Ochs and Schieffelin’s insights to language contact situations (e.g., Duranti and Ochs 1997, Garrett 1999, Kulick 1992, Rampton 1995, Schieffelin 1994, Zentella 1997).

Language socialization is a lifelong process, and for this reason a distinction is sometimes made between
primary and secondary socialization. Among secondary socialization processes, the one that has attracted the most interest has been literacy. In this area, Shirley Brice Heath’s [1983] pioneering research in three communities in the piedmont Carolinas was exemplary for its critical view of the literacy-orality dichotomy (see also Rumsey 2001) and its focus on literacy events. Her main point was that socialization to reading and writing was not isolated from other types of socialization, including socialization to perform verbally and participate in events in which narratives are produced. Heath’s work complemented earlier accounts of the skills required in mainstream schools (Cazden, John, and Hymes 1972) and was followed by other research projects on literacy and schooling from an ethnographically based cross-cultural perspective (see Besnier 1995, Collins 1995, Schieffelin and Gilmore 1986, Street 1984).

3. Indexicality. Philosophers including Immanuel Kant, Charles S. Peirce, and Edmund Husserl have long recognized that there are different types of signs, some of which do not “stand for” something else (e.g., an idea) but acquire meaning on the basis of some spatio-temporal or memory connection with another phenomenon or entity. The meanings of such sign expressions can be arrived at only by taking into consideration the circumstances under which they are used. Typical examples include so-called deictic terms such as the English demonstratives this and that and personal pronouns such as I and you. For example, the (first person singular) pronoun I changes meaning according to who is speaking or, rather, according to the character that the speaker is impersonating at any given time (Goffman 1981 [1979]). Using Peirce’s terminology, we can say that the English I is an index. An anthropological study of language cannot but be interested in such expressions, given the power that they have in defining what are ultimately socially constructed cultural categories, for example, speaker/sender/author versus listener/addressee/audience. Earlier studies of indexical expressions were based on linguistic forms in idealized situations, but as fieldworkers started to examine language use in culture-specific contexts they realized that every expression is indexical—that is, needs reference to a context to be given a culturally adequate interpretation (see also Garfinkel 1967).

Starting in the mid-1970s, expanding on Peirce’s and Roman Jakobson’s work, Michael Silverstein began developing a program that made indexicality the cornerstone for the study of language as culture. In an article published in 1976 entitled “Shifters, Linguistic Categories, and Cultural Description,” he outlined a distinction between presupposing indexes (this in this table is too long) and entailing or creative indexes (e.g., personal pronouns such as I and you) to be understood as occupying a continuum from context-dependent to context-constituting. Silverstein also used the notion of indexicality as a way of rethinking linguistic relativity—in this sense, a good portion of his writings can be seen as a bridge between the first and the second paradigm. His concern with relativity became more apparent in a number of subsequent publications in which he criticized speech-act theorists for focusing only on the creative uses of language that correspond to lexical categories (e.g., verbs of saying, doing, etc., that is, performative verbs in J. L. Austin’s terminology) (e.g., 1977) and identified the limits of metalinguistic awareness (a term that evokes Jacobson’s [1960] “metalinguistic function”) (2001 [1981])—an important question for anthropology because it determines the extent to which ethnographers can rely on native accounts. Over the years, Silverstein has expanded his framework to include what he now calls “metapragmatic functions” of linguistic expressions (1993), that is, the range of expressions that refer to what language does (i.e., its pragmatic force). Silverstein’s work on indexicality has been adopted, extended, and modified to some extent by a number of his former students (e.g., Agha 1998, Hanks 1990).

4. Participation. Although one of the components of Hymes’s [1972a] speech-event model was “participants,” including speaker or sender, addressee, bearer or receiver or audience, and addressee, these categories were fully analyzed only in the late 1970s. An important contribution in this area was the above-mentioned article by Goffman on “footing” (1981 [1979]), which incorporated or at least evoked the notion of indexicality and Bakhtin’s work on reported speech as first made known through the translation of V. N. Voloshinov’s writings (1971). Goffman introduced the notion of the participation framework as the combined configuration of participation statuses (author, animator, principal, hearer, overhearer, bystander) activated by the use of a particular linguistic form. Some of his students applied or extended this analysis. Susan Philips [1972] used the notion of participation in her work on classroom interaction to understand the scholastic performance of Warm Springs Indian children. Marjorie Goodwin (1990) elaborated on the participation framework with her notion of the “participant framework,” which includes an understanding of speakers’ and hearers’ respective monitoring as illuminated by conversation analysis (e.g., Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974). Related to this line of research is the study of the role of the audience in determining the shape and meaning of utterances (e.g., Bauman 1986; Duranti 1988, 1993; Duranti and Breen 1986, C. Goodwin 1981).

The 1980s were years of intense rethinking and paradigm shifting within anthropology at large. The new critical anthropology epitomized by Clifford and Marcus’s [1986] Writing Culture questioned some of the epistemological and political foundations of the discipline, anthropologists’ rights to acquire knowledge in certain socio-historical conditions, and the ability of the discipline to survive on the same assumptions that had supported the Boasian project. The postmodern shift highlighted alternative voices and points of view, bringing identity or, rather, its postmodern crisis to center stage. As the very notion of “culture” came under attack for exoticizing the Other, many anthropologists found themselves searching for new ways to represent their ethnographic experience. In this intellectual climate, lin-
guistic anthropology, with its long tradition of collecting and analyzing texts, was suddenly seen as a possible ally in thinking about the politics of representation. It was around this time that the job market started to open up again for linguistic anthropologists. Some anthropology departments felt the need to rethink language in a broader perspective and realized that linguistic anthropology could be part of a new dialogue.

At the same time, perhaps because formal linguistics and quantitative sociolinguistics seemed untouched by the identity crisis that was sweeping the social sciences, students of linguistics interested in the social context of speech became sensitive to the role of language in establishing gender, ethnic, and class identities. These students could look to linguistic anthropology for inspiration and a community with similar concerns, and some of them became part of the cohort that made possible another paradigm shift.

The Third Paradigm

In the late 1980s and the 1990s there was a revival of social constructivism that went beyond the second paradigm's interest in variation and the role of language in constituting social encounters. Interactional and audience-oriented approaches supported the idea that many, if not all, utterances are produced by speaker-audience fine-tuning within genres or types of interaction (e.g., Ochs, Schegloff, and Thompson 1996, Silverstein and Urban 1996) and that language is only one of the semiotic resources for the production of both propositional content and indexical values (e.g., Farnell 1995; C. Goodwin 1994; Hanks 1990; Haviland 1993; Streeck 1993, 1994).

A number of gender theorists adopted the term "performativity" (Butler 1990) to highlight the creative and socially binding potential of any utterance in the cultural and interactional construction of identities (e.g., Livia and Hall 1997, Hall 2001). Gender and other identities have thus been described as invented, improvised, and at the same time located within culture-specific activities that give them meaning (e.g., Bucholtz, Liang, and Sutton 1999). The focus of research has recently moved away from language forms or activities per se toward symbolic domination (Gal 2001[1995]:424).

Although not always explicitly recognized or theorized, temporality has come to play an important part in these studies, whether in the form of the moment-by-moment constitution of conversational exchanges or of the historically situated understanding of particular linguistic practices (e.g., Hanks 1987). There has been an effort to develop analytical constructs and methods of data collection that can capture language as it moves through time and space. Improvisation has thus become a legitimate focus of research (Sawyer 1997). The study of narratives, at first confined to interview situations (e.g., Labov and Waletzky 1966), has entered the more spontaneous domains of speakers' lives, providing researchers with the opportunity to see beyond structural organization (Bamberg 1997, Ochs and Capps 1996) and propose a model based on a few key dimensions of narrative as a cooperative activity (Ochs and Capps 2001).

The relation between language and space has become a focus of attention not only in terms of the indexical properties of speech but also in terms of the spatial prerequisites for verbal interaction and the linguistic recognition of the way in which human bodies are used in the establishment of hierarchical or oppositional identities (e.g., Duranti 1992a, M. H. Goodwin 1999, Keating 1998, Meacham 2001, Sidnell 1997).

Whereas the first paradigm was characterized by a conceptualization of language as grammar and took linguistics as its point of reference and the second paradigm established an independent research agenda with a focus on variation and speaking as organizing culture and society, contemporary developments seem to move in a new direction. Many scholars of the current generation, including some of Gumperz's and Hymes's students and their students' students, often adopt theoretical perspectives developed outside of anthropology or linguistics, such as Giddens's structuration theory, Bourdieu's practice theory, Bakhtin and Vološinov's dialogism, and Foucault's insights on knowledge and power. A good example of this trend is the recent literature on language ideology (Woolard and Schieffelin 1994; Schieffelin, Woolard, and Kroskrity 1998, 2000). In the work of a number of established scholars previously immersed in the second paradigm, language ideology is more a perspective than a topic and as such invites the study of unexplored phenomena while reorganizing previously collected and analyzed data (e.g., Irvine 1998, Kroskrity 1998, Philips 1998).

Those currently working on language identity, interaction, narrative, and ideology share a strong desire to use language studies to reach out to other disciplines. Whereas the second paradigm saw the development of a research agenda related to but independent of those of linguistics and anthropology, the third paradigm, dealing with theoretical concerns that came from elsewhere, has a better chance of reconnecting with the rest of anthropology as Hymes proposed in the 1960s. The interest in capturing the elusive connection between larger institutional structures and processes and the "textual" details of everyday encounters (the so-called macro-micro connection) has produced a new wave of projects that start from a concern for situating one's work in the context of larger theoretical issues and an abandonment of the assumption that language should be one's only or main preoccupation. In contrast to earlier generations of students who started from a fascination with linguistic forms and languages (in the first paradigm) or from their use in concrete and culturally significant social encounters (in the second), students today typically ask questions such as "What can the study of language contribute to the understanding of this particular social/cultural phenomenon (e.g., identity formation, globalization, nationalism)?" The formulation of this type of question conceives of language no longer as the primary object of inquiry but as an instrument for gaining access to complex social processes (Morgan 2002). Whereas Hymes ex-
pected ethnographers of communication to concentrate on what was not being studied by ethnographers and grammarians (language use in social events often constituting the bulk of what one might call "the social"), for many young scholars today linguistic anthropology is a tool for studying what is already being studied by scholars in other fields, for instance, race and racism (e.g., Trechter and Bucholtz 2001). More influenced by and attuned to what happens in the rest of anthropology, adherents of the third paradigm aim at fulfilling the goal of a linguistic anthropology as part of anthropology at large while claiming special access to language as the indispensable medium for the transmission and reproduction of culture and society. The features of the third paradigm may be summarized as follows:

Goals: the use of linguistic practices to document and analyze the reproduction and transformation of persons, institutions, and communities across space and time.

View of language: as an interactional achievement filled with indexical values [including ideological ones].

Preferred units of analysis: language practice, participation framework, self/person/identity.

Theoretical issues: micro-macro links, heteroglossia, integration of different semiotic resources, entextualization, embodiment, formation and negotiation of identity/self, narrativity, language ideology.

Preferred methods of data collection: socio-historical analysis, audiovisual documentation of temporally unfolding human encounters, with special attention to the inherently fluid and moment-by-moment negotiated nature of identities, institutions, and communities.

The Persistence of Earlier Paradigms

At least in the traditions I have been discussing here, paradigms do not die. As new ones are born, the old ones can survive and even prosper. Throughout the 1990s, the first paradigm continued to be visible in a number of publications, including the journal *Anthropological Linguistics* and William Bright's *Oxford Studies in Anthropological Linguistics*. Bright's series featured two books that fit squarely within the first paradigm: Cecil H. Brown's (1990) comparative study of loanwords in Native American languages and Richard Feinberg's *Oral Traditions of Anuta, a Polynesian Outlier in the Solomon Islands* (1998), which consists of 15 pages of introduction and 233 pages of Anutan texts with English translation. There are several features that qualify Feinberg's book as a good example of the kind of "salvage anthropology" practiced by Boas and some of his collaborators (e.g., George Hunt) at the beginning of the 20th century. The texts are monologic and elicited precisely for the purpose of transforming oral history, perceived as on its way to extinction, into a written record. As we find out from Feinberg's candid description of the methods he used (1998:7), the stories collected in the early 1970s were transcribed with techniques that closely resemble those used by the anthropologists hired by the Bureau of American Ethnology before the invention of the portable tape recorder.

Conclusions

While linguists in the first half of the 20th century could already claim to have established the legitimacy of the scientific study of language as an independent and sui generis system, linguistic anthropologists working in the second half of the century could just as easily claim to have brought language back where it belonged, namely, among human beings concerned with their daily affairs. Next to the earlier view of language as a rule-governed system in which everything fits together (à la Saussure) and could be represented via formal and explicit rules, in the 1960s language came to be viewed not as a window on the human mind but as a social process whose study belonged to anthropology as much as to linguistics. Rather than working with native speakers to elicit linguistic forms (whether in the form of isolated words or as coherent narratives), those committed to or trained within the second paradigm became interested in documenting and analyzing actual language usage. Through their studies of performance, primary and secondary language socialization, indexicality, and participation, researchers acquired a more sophisticated understanding of the dynamic relationship between language and context (Goodwin and Duranti 1992), and a new generation of scholars took as a point of departure not linguistic forms but the social constructs (e.g., hierarchy, prestige, taste) and social processes (e.g., formation of self, speech community, or even nationhood) that they helped constitute.

As the object of inquiry increased in scope and complexity (e.g., from grammar to language in context), the area of expertise of each researcher did not necessarily increase proportionally. Researchers adopting or socialized to a new paradigm did not necessarily know more than their intellectual ancestors, nor did they control an area that encompassed earlier approaches. Instead, they were more likely to have expertise in new areas and methods or interests in phenomena that had not been part of earlier research agendas. For example, whereas in the first paradigm training in grammatical analysis (e.g., phonology, morphology, syntax) and historical reconstruction was a requisite, with the advent of the second paradigm this training became less common, and it was left to the individual researcher to decide whether to acquire it. Thus, although the development of each new paradigm has helped to expand the study of language as culture, some areas of research interest and expertise have been abandoned. It is more and more difficult to find "linguists" coming out of anthropology departments who have a good background in phonology, morphology, syntax, and semantics, as well as in diachronic linguistics and elicitation techniques (i.e., working with native speakers to write grammars). The diversity of background and expertise has thus created a wider gap between linguists in linguistics departments and those in
anthropology departments. At the same time, the widening of the concept of language and the adoption of analytical concepts used by sociocultural anthropologists and scholars in other disciplines has made linguistic anthropology in principle, and often in practice, more appealing to a broader audience within anthropology. There has been an increase in the number of linguistic positions in anthropology departments in the United States, and there has been a new flow into the field of students with no formal training in linguistics but a commitment to language, discourse, or, more broadly, communication as a central locus of social life. These are the individuals who not only support a better dialogue between linguistic anthropologists and sociocultural anthropologists but can also be spokespersons for the importance of "language experts" within anthropology departments. This new "linguistic turn" in anthropology is reflected in the latest reorganization of the AAA, whose by-laws now call for a "linguistic" seat on its executive board and all its major elected committees. It seems telling that, in this new climate, two linguistic anthropologists have been elected president of the AAA: Jane Hill (1997–99) and Donald Brenneis (2001–03). Gone are the days when the practice of linguistics within anthropology seemed a relic of the Boasian tradition doomed to extinction. Most anthropologists (with the exception, perhaps, of those attracted by Chomsky's metaphor of language as an organ) now seem convinced that they have little to learn from the type of linguistic analysis conducted in most linguistics departments and that it is wise for anthropology departments to have language experts of their own.

I suggest that this revival has been possible partly because of linguistic anthropologists' ability to project an image of themselves as empirically oriented fieldworkers who have more important things to do than argue with one another (or with those in other subfields). Furthermore, researchers have had no difficulty moving back and forth from one paradigm to another without confronting [or being confronted by others regarding] their own epistemological, ontological, and methodological wavering. In addition to the differences already outlined, I will here briefly mention some other areas of incompatibility or lack of agreement across paradigms.

1. With a few exceptions [e.g., Ochs 1985], grammatical descriptions continue to be written (sometimes even by researchers otherwise working within the second or the third paradigm) as if the criteria for descriptive adequacy assumed by Boas and Sapir (first paradigm) had never been challenged. This means that grammars and grammatical sketches of all kinds of languages, including those in contact situations, are being presented primarily to satisfy the needs of typological linguistics, as if no claims had been made in the past 50 years about the importance of contextual variation and about language as an activity [second paradigm] or there had been no breakthrough in the study of the interplay between grammar and interaction and grammar and narrative activity or the ideological underpinning of grammatical description.

2. Languages are still sometimes being identified with their grammars, even though those working within the second and the third paradigm have worked hard at showing that "a language" is much more than that.

3. Data collection is rarely discussed and even less often contested. Researchers continue to rely on the methods of earlier paradigms, using, for example, recollection or handwritten notes on verbal exchanges witnessed by the researcher despite the evidence that we cannot rely verbatim on participants' accounts of what was said or done on a given occasion without an audio or video recording of the interaction. Considering that researchers in other subfields, especially sociocultural anthropologists, continue to use naked observation and handwritten notes as their main methods for data collection, a thorough discussion of methods for data collection would put linguistic anthropologists in the uncomfortable position of having to challenge the adequacy of a great deal of anthropological research.

4. Criteria for transcription are rarely mentioned, despite the fact that there are differences across [and sometimes within] paradigms not only in transcription conventions but also in the accuracy with which speech is transformed into a visual record. The phonetic transcriptions of adherents of the first [and sometimes the second] paradigm, for example, do not typically include pauses or the interruptions and back-channel cues produced by the interviewer/researcher. Despite the work done in the second and third paradigms on talk as an interactional achievement, transcripts are often still "cleaned" (i.e., edited) to provide clear linguistic examples. At the same time, the use of standard orthography by adherents of the second and third paradigms has its own problems. The fact that those working in the three paradigms do not share a standard for transcription makes the use of data collected by others problematic.

5. The rational model of communication implicit in the work of philosophers such as Paul Grice and John Searle has been repeatedly criticized and challenged by researchers [myself included] who find some common assumptions on the notion of the person and the role of individual intentionality problematic. However, with a few exceptions [e.g., Stroud 1992], not much has been said about the fact that such a model underlies a good deal of the work done by some of our own colleagues [e.g., the notion of "intent" is very important in Gumperz's work on miscommunication and seems implicit in much of the research on code switching], and no alternative models have been clearly outlined beyond the specifics of the reconstructed local views on self and responsibility [e.g., Rosaldo 1982].

6. The experimental and quantitative method sometimes used for cross-cultural comparison [e.g., on color terminology or the linguistic encoding of space] is at odds with the [more common] use of a few [relatively con-
sexualized examples to make general claims about local or universal discursive strategies.

The avoidance of public debates in which to confront these and related issues in the study of linguistic practices has prevented potentially difficult exchanges among colleagues, but it has had its price. It has kept us from developing general models of language as culture that might be adopted, rejected, challenged, criticized, modified, or built upon. For this to be possible we would have to come to terms with our differences not just so as to eliminate them or to proclaim a winner among the possible alternative paradigms but so as to reach a level of clarity that would invite more researchers, from anthropology and elsewhere, to enter into a dialogue with us as partners.

Comments

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"Language as Culture in U.S. Anthropology: Three Paradigms" is an extremely timely piece. Linguistic anthropology in the United States, having undergone some major shifts in recent years, is ripe for an assessment such as Duranti's. Although some scholars might take exception to Duranti's periodization or characterization of the three paradigms, such debate has the potential to be quite productive. As Duranti notes, there has been a remarkable lack of internal debate among linguistic anthropologists conducting very different kinds of research, and this has been both a blessing and a curse. A respectful yet vigorous discussion of the theoretical and methodological foundations of linguistic anthropology would be healthy both for the subfield and for the discipline of anthropology as a whole. The six "areas of incompatibility or lack of agreement across paradigms" identified by Duranti provide an excellent starting point for such a discussion.

As I read Duranti's article, I found myself wondering whether "paradigm" was the best term to use for these trends in the intellectual history of linguistic anthropology. Certainly it serves the purpose of getting the conversation started, but it is also interesting to consider how the use of other terms might enable us to think differently about the same trends. How would it change our understanding [if at all] if Duranti had used the term "school" instead? Alternatively, what would it do to the article if the three paradigms were instead labeled "thesis," "antithesis," and "synthesis"? While any of these labels would stimulate debate in interesting ways, I am partial to thinking about them in terms of Raymond Williams's "dominant," "residual," and "emergent" forms of culture. If we used these terms, we could situate our analysis of the cultural and intellectual history of our subdiscipline in the context of theories of social change more broadly. It would also then be clear why elements of Duranti's three different paradigms can often be present at the same historical moment.

In terms of the most recent developments this article describes, whether because of modesty or disingenuousness Duranti underemphasizes the important role he himself has played in consolidating the field's "third paradigm." He has been steadily redefining linguistic anthropology for some time now through his various publications, including most notably the excellent textbook Linguistic Anthropology (1997) and the readers Linguistic Anthropology: A Reader (2001b) and Key Terms in Language and Culture (2001c). As part of the debate that this article will inevitably trigger, we might consider what is at stake (politically, intellectually, personally) in this redefinition of one of anthropology's four subfields. As someone very much in favor of many of the trends Duranti notes in the "third paradigm," I would nevertheless like to see at least some attention given to how and by whom linguistic anthropology is redefined and/or consolidated and how and by whom a new "canon" is constructed, if indeed that is what is happening.

Finally, I would like to underline what I consider to be two of Duranti's most useful points. First, it does seem to be true that linguistic anthropology is increasingly viewed as indispensable to sociocultural anthropology because more and more linguistic anthropologists are investigating questions of concern to that subfield. Yet I would not like to see linguistic anthropology devolve into a mere tool or sub-subfield of sociocultural anthropology, for, as Duranti has demonstrated in this article and elsewhere, it has a unique intellectual history, one that is well suited to a discipline that can stand on its own even as it contributes significantly to other subfields of anthropology, linguistics, and other disciplines.

Second, in support of this latter view of linguistic anthropology, I believe that it is essential to provide linguistic anthropology graduate students with a good background in formal linguistics. As Duranti notes, it is becoming more and more difficult to find Ph.D.'s coming out of anthropology departments who have expertise in phonology, morphology, syntax, and semantics. While acquiring such skills will be challenging, especially now that linguistic anthropologists are also expected to demonstrate thorough knowledge of the most recent debates in social theory, I would argue that graduate students in linguistic anthropology should be urged to acquire at least a basic grounding in typology and formal grammatical analysis. Such familiarity will only enrich this increasingly vibrant field.

In conclusion, Duranti has written an important, thought-provoking article that deserves to be vigorously debated.
In this ambitious critical review of linguistic anthropology Duranti is breaking new ground in tackling a field that until the past decade had shown little inclination to reflect on its own basic premises. Social anthropology, its sister discipline, has a long tradition of critical self-reflection and public debate [Leach 1966 [1961], Clifford and Marcus 1986, Geertz 1988]. Although their field was recognized by Boas around the turn of the century as a distinct constituent of what we now call four-field anthropology, linguistic anthropologists have always been few, and until the past decade or so few have participated in anthropology’s public debates [Lucy 1993, Silverstein and Urban 1996]. By providing a framework for the long trajectory of historical reassessment, Duranti both reminds the discipline of its beginnings and raises some important issues of current and future directions.

Duranti uses Kuhn’s notion of “paradigm” as an organizing concept to highlight the complexes of ideas that distinguish what he sees as three paradigms of research. These three, he argues, have dominated the entire century, so that as a new set of concerns emerges and becomes established, earlier practices are replaced. The first paradigm was dominated by a concern with historical origins that saw grammatical description and linguistic reconstruction as tools in the recovery of a nation’s past. Language and culture were seen as interdependent since they served similar ends. The second paradigm stepped aside from these concerns to focus on the study of language and context as structurally independent but related entities. This approach gave rise to a new interest in detailed studies of language practices and the cultural variability of activities of speaking. Both of these paradigms are by now seen as part of history, the first of general anthropology and the second as foundational for the then new subfield of sociolinguistics. However, as Duranti’s discussion shows, this paradigmatic exclusivity has been only partial. Many important research issues, such as Berlin and Kay’s work on color and its offshoots in ethnoscence, bridge the two paradigms.

The third paradigm, while it deepens and widens the range of cultural and social events under investigation, at times risks abandoning detailed linguistic analysis in favor of discourse and rhetorical study as sufficient to uncover the politics of language use. In this way, it seems, each new paradigm rejects the previous one in order to highlight its new ideas. We would argue that, while the notion of “paradigm” is useful in revealing historical continuities and discontinuities, Kuhn’s approach gives a sense of structural containment to the flow of ideas that to those living with them appear much more fluid and overlapping. As a consequence, it is easier to see the existence of paradigms in past work, from the position of an heir to and archivist of a tradition, than in the process of creation of new work. Duranti himself points out, sometimes with apparent surprise, that much of the work that he considers important overlaps the paradigms, especially the second and third. He is aware that in the third it is precisely the carryover of the detailed work on language in use that is becoming deepened by the new work on the relationships of language and institutional structuring, with the study of linguistic ideologies and language socialization.

Therefore, rather than think of these three research traditions as paradigms in the Kuhnian sense, we suggest another way of thinking about rapidly changing scientific fields. The historian of science Gerald Holton [1973] uses the idea of “thematic imagination” to reconcile what others see as a deep division between classical and quantum-theory approaches to physics. He particularly looks at how ideas can coexist and strengthen each other as part of a broader conceptual universe. One such overarching theme that runs through all of linguistic anthropology from early Boasian work on myth through the study of speech events to the more recent Bakhtinian dialogism has been the study of narratives and narrativity as cultural text and cultural performances. This theme connects the whole century, albeit, as Duranti points out, with changing technical and technological emphases. The focus on themes enables us to capture such similarities and theoretical relationships and encourages us to look at what, over time, keeps us together.

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Duranti identifies three paradigms for the study of language in relation to culture as consecutive but coexisting within contemporary American anthropology, although his preference for the 1990s paradigm shift to social constructionism is never in doubt. My own experience confirms the existence of these paradigms, but I assess their consequences somewhat differently. As a graduate student in the late 1960s I suffered considerable guilt over my lack of interest in the descriptive-linguistics agenda, embracing a more theoretical model of language as symbolic form instantiated in social action. I agree with Duranti that the ethnography of communication of my professional generation sought autonomy from both anthropology and linguistics, but for me the line between his second and third paradigms remains blurred. From the beginning, I assumed that our attention to language would produce better sociocultural research and theory. As a teacher of anthropology and the sole linguist in my department, I opted for language and culture rather than descriptive linguistics in the single required semester course. My students assumed that all languages were written down and that someone would speak English anywhere they might carry out fieldwork. Language as handmaiden to ethnology had to earn its keep as a way of getting at the nature of social order rather than as a tool for dealing with linguistic diversity in the field.

I have no regrets. In retrospect, however, this approach
allowed sociocultural anthropologists to dismiss linguistic anthropology as merely method, to adopt piecemeal many of its insights without necessarily identifying them as linguistic. I believe that the relative eclipse of linguistics or linguistic anthropology in many departments is due primarily to the success of this strategy of Duranti’s third paradigm. This most endangered quadrant of our traditional Americanist four-square discipline may have ceded its claim to autonomy too quickly.

In my role as historian of Americanist anthropology, I have long mused over the disproportionate influence of a small number of linguistic anthropologists over the discipline as a whole. Duranti cites two recent American Anthropological Association presidents who are linguistic anthropologists: I note that Jane Hill crosses into cultural as well as biological anthropology and Don Brenneis is difficult to identify solely as linguistic or cultural anthropologist. My own explanation tends toward the rhetoric of continuity within the three variants of linguistic anthropology. Because we are not contentious among ourselves, moving comfortably across both the subdisciplines of anthropology and the disciplines of the social sciences and humanities, linguistic anthropologists are often identified as effective mediators and synthesizers. The seminal role of Edward Sapir in the Rockefeller-sponsored interdisciplinary social science of the interwar years provides an early exemplar; Sapir persuaded his colleagues that Chicago sociology and psychology/psychoanalysis were not in conflict but explored different sides of a single coin [his metaphor]. He had moved beyond descriptive and historical linguistics as handmaidens to ethnology into the psychological reality of the phoneme and the theory of culture.

Duranti argues that the theoretical insights of linguistic anthropology under the third paradigm can be realized only if practitioners acknowledge the gulf between the paradigms and criticize, at least by implication, the assumptions of the descriptive-linguistic and ethnography-of-communication paradigms. The recent decision of the descriptive linguists (SSILA) to meet solely with the Linguistic Society of America, although it has pragmatic motivations, also ensures that the first paradigm will be increasingly separate from the other two, as well as from anthropology. I regret the absence of SSILA colleagues from the AAA’s Society for Linguistic Anthropology and deplore the consequences for the study of language within anthropology. Without reciprocal cross-over to linguistic training and primary professional identity, linguistic anthropology may lose the advantage Duranti sees for the study of language/discourse/performance. I am reminded of the uniqueness of our subdiscipline every time I hear the term “discourse” casually bandied about by sociocultural anthropologists who cannot imagine doing a microanalysis of particular discourses, not to mention by Foucault and other theorists for whom the term provides an analytic abstraction characterizing whole eras across time and space. An increasing job market does not necessarily preserve this historical legacy in American anthropology [although I share Duranti’s delight that it is occurring]. Duranti’s examples, moreover, persuade me that the Boasian critique of premature generalization through ethnographic counterexamples has continued to characterize the second and third paradigms. The ethnography part of the equation remains, to my mind, the key to studying both language and culture, albeit with arguably new conceptual tools such as ideology, narrative, and identity.

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Duranti has taken the lead in developing linguistic anthropology both as part of the AAA and as a field with a named journal. His picture of it in this article as a set of distinct practices, of overlapping paradigms, makes a great deal of sense. I should like to add some bits of information and raise a few questions.

The first descriptive paradigm had a broadening of work of its own. George Trager, H. L. Smith, and others added dimensions: paralinguistics, kinesics [Ray Birdwhistell], psychiatric interviews [Hockett]. The concept of “communication” was sometimes invoked.

After World War II, influence identified with Bloomfield appeared dominant, associated with minimal interest in meaning. Some, like Hoijer, identified also with Sapir. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis was part of an argument in linguistics itself about attention to meaning.

In the late 1950s ethnoscience, connecting linguistics and anthropology, was prominent at Yale (Lounsbury, Conklin, Frake) and at Harvard [Frake, Romney]. Frake and Romney were subsequently at Stanford (also D’Andrade) and I at Berkeley, but the “ethnography of speaking” grew out of a paper on cross-cultural aspects of personality that I was invited to write while still at Harvard. To be sure, there was a link to having been at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford in 1957–58. In sum, the East played some part. And for some time Chicago has.

The second “paradigm” involved interest among the social sciences in structural linguistics and language. “Sociolinguistics” became a central term. Charles Ferguson, a student of child language, national language planning, and much else, persuaded the Social Science Research Committee to establish a Committee on Sociolinguistics with anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists as members. I recall being invited by political scientists at Minnesota in this period to talk and contribute to a book. A few years earlier Bert Kaplan had invited me to contribute a paper on linguistic aspects of studying personality cross-culturally.

Such conjunction was active at Berkeley in the 1960s, with Susan Ervin-Tripp [psychologists], John Searle [philosopher], John Gumperz [at first in South Asian languages], Erving Goffman [sociologist], myself...
[anthropologist], and others. Gumperz took much of the lead. Ethnomethodology was an element (Goffman had me serve on Harvey Sacks's dissertation commit-
tee, and I knew Harold Garfinkel from having been a graduate student at UCLA [1954–55]). At Penn a little later Goffman was instrumental in the formation of a Center for Urban Ethnography, which helped bring Bill Labov. Folklore, anthropology, and linguistics were involved.

Duranti is quite right that paradigms can coexist and may not coincide with individual programs. One dimension of this has to do with a sense of obligation to those with whom one has studied. Efforts to sustain and renew Native American languages are an example. Those who have knowledge of a language or language family may be among the few who do. Work of the sort in the first paradigm may be a moral obligation, whatever else one's interests.

As for the ethnography of speaking's "ambiguous relationship with cultural anthropology," I never thought of it as separate. The use of language is a necessary part of cultural anthropology. Are we to think of cultural anthropol-

ogy as ignoring speech? It is hard to see the speech event as really a new unit. Is it not a way of focusing attention on the verbal aspect of things already studied—rituals, family meals, etc.? There has been some connection with archaeology, for example, my paper "Linguistic Problems in Defining the Concept of "Tribe" "[1968] is used by some.

Preference for "linguistic anthropology" hit me at Berkeley. David Mandelbaum asked me to write on "anthropological linguistics" for the book he coedited, The Teaching of Anthropology (Hymes 1963b). I suddenly thought, "If 'linguistics' is the head word, some will mar-
ginalize it as part of linguistics." "Linguistic anthropol-
ogy" is part of anthropology, hence the term in my article.

Oral narrative ought not to be overlooked. On the one hand, it gives anthropologists insight into life in our own society and elsewhere (see Hymes 1996:pt.3; Ochs and Capps 2001). On the other hand, it connects the first paradigm with the upsurge of cooperation with Native American communities in preserving and restoring indigen-
ous language use. Often this takes the form of making available materials taken down generations ago (e.g., making Hoijer's Navajo texts available electronically [Eleanor Culley] or bringing out, as it were, Haida texts taken down by Swanton a century ago [Robert Bring-
hurst]). And recognition in narratives of implicit form, lines and sets of lines, found by now in dozens of lan-
guages, suggests that grammar is not the only dimension of language deeply rooted in human nature.

Such a range of comments is possible only because Duranti knows and synthesizes so much of both work and social contexts.

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Duranti's discussion should provide a useful introduc-
tion for newcomers to a range of problems and ap-
proaches that have been pursued under the rubric of lin-
guistic anthropology in the United States. He points out
his use of the term "paradigm shift" to account for
developments in this area over the past 120 years is
"slightly different" from Kuhn's in that he assumes that
"the advent of a new paradigm need not mean the com-
plete disappearance of the old one." Another, more basic
difference concerns the notion of "paradigm" itself.
Duranti's version of this notion presupposes that distinct
paradigms are commensurate and that "incompatibility
or lack of agreement across paradigms" presents a prob-
lem that can be resolved if we "come to terms with our
differences" and "reach a level of clarity about them that
would invite more researchers . . . to enter into a dialogue
with us as partners." But even with respect to the "hard"
sciences, where one might expect the observational data
to provide a more definitive basis for such clarification,
Kuhn argued that that was not the way science had ac-
tually developed. Kuhn invented the concept of "para-
digm shift" precisely in order to account for this finding
that "the normal scientific tradition that emerges from
a scientific revolution is not only incompatible but often
actually incommensurate with that which has gone be-
fore" [1970 [1962]:103]. For Kuhn, "the differences be-
tween successive paradigms are both necessary and
irreconcilable."

Fortunately for the state of linguistic anthropology, the
loose congeries of problems and methods which Duranti
describes as paradigms do not live up to that designation
in Kuhnian terms. Indeed, it seems to me doubtful that
Duranti's first and second paradigms need involve in-
compatible views of language at all, any more than do,
for example, phonetics and syntax as subdisciplines of
linguistics proper. It seems to me telling in this regard
that Dell Hymes, one of the originators of the ethnog-
raphy of communication—and hence of Duranti's second
paradigm—has in addition to his work in that area never
stopped doing straightforward descriptive linguistics and
grammatical analysis of the kind that belongs firmly
within Duranti's first paradigm. The same goes for many
other linguistic anthropologists who were trained in the
sixties, seventies, and eighties. It is true that researchers' views
of language structure tend to vary according to their views about how language functions in relation to
other aspects of human social life, but few if any "ethn-
ographers of speaking" or Labovian sociolinguists have
attempted to dissolve the notion of "grammar" entirely
or the need to main a level of analysis which treats it as
at least a semiautonomous formal system, without
thereby denying its status as an "interactional achieve-
ment" both in everyday acts of language use and in the
long term as languages change over time. Exemplary in
this regard is the work of Duranti himself, whose outstanding studies of language and politics in Samoa—aptly characterized by the title From Grammar to Politics (1994)—have been grounded in both detailed ethnography and rigorous grammatical analysis of verbatim transcriptions of Samoan oratory and disputation.

I share Duranti’s concern about the fact that, notwithstanding the burgeoning of linguistic anthropology over the past 10–15 years, fewer and fewer graduate students in the field are getting the kind of linguistic training that would enable them to undertake studies of this kind. Even if one’s research issues are not primarily about language per se but treat it as “an instrument for gaining access to complex social processes,” one’s ability to do so will be impoverished if one lacks a rigorous analytical grasp on the presumed “instrument.” Consider in this regard what Duranti takes to be the prime example of his third paradigm, namely, “the recent literature on language ideology.” While it is true that very little of the recent literature he cites on this topic engages with matters of language structure, this represents a considerable departure from the early work of Michael Silverstein (1979) on this topic—which I think most of the writers cited by Duranti would agree is foundational to their own—and indeed from much of Silverstein’s more recent work on the same topic. For Silverstein a good deal of the interest in linguistic ideologies has always been in how they refract and misrepresent aspects of language structure and in turn impact upon it in ways that may actually shape the course of language change (as for example in the loss of the pragmatically charged grammatical distinction between second person singular and plural in 18th-century English or the development of a gender-neutral singular indefinite use of “they” in late-20th-century “nonsexist” English [see Rumsey 1990 for other examples]). In light of these kinds of example, I would agree with Duranti that there is much to be gained through closer engagement among people working in all three of his paradigms not only to clarify differences among them but because the second and third can be enriched by renewing and reinvigorating their connections to the first.

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While Duranti provides a very informative and insightful discussion of the major trends in linguistic anthropology over the past century, his focus on distinct paradigms plays down important continuities across this period. In effect, this limits his ability to clarify what is at stake for linguistic anthropology, a position that he has been very forthright about in other venues (1997, 2001b). In addition, Duranti gives only brief attention to the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis despite the continued salience of this concept outside the subdiscipline. Finally, although he touches on the troubling issue of linguistic anthropology’s being construed by nonpractitioners as overly technical, it would be advantageous to engage this more—asking why it is the case and what solutions can be proposed—both to further an understanding of our intellectual history and to enhance the recruitment of students and dialogue with colleagues.

These topics may have been secondary in importance to Duranti’s goal of producing an intellectual history (which he does with great elegance and depth), but their exclusion leaves me wondering—to adapt a phrase from Hymes—when we are going to break through into dialogue. Hymes (1975) speaks of a “breakthrough into performance” with regard to the way a speaker switches from talking about a tale to the authentic performance of a tale. For the question at hand, the concern is breaking through into authentic dialogue not so much about the place of linguistic anthropology as about the place of theoretically informed and methodologically rigorous approaches to communicative practice in contemporary anthropology. This means a breakthrough into a different kind of relationship analogous to that achieved by the pronominal breakthroughs in the Russian novels analyzed by Friedrich (1966), from whom Hymes draws his inspiration. Like the pronominal shift from second person plural [vous] to second person singular [tu], it means a shift from the formal and distant to the more familiar and engaged.

The issue of dialogue does loom large in Duranti’s piece, but for the most part it is talked about rather than realized. His conclusion places responsibility for the lack of dialogue on the shoulders of linguistic anthropologists, but I think this is an overstatement. Linguistic anthropologists can speak with greater clarity and with larger signposts regarding what is at stake and where they are building bridges. But dialogue needs receptive addressees, colleagues who provide feedback and who help move discussion to new levels, and these are hard to find given the prevailing subdisciplinary and topical division of labor and the pressure to publish for peers.

Linguistic anthropology is not a unified field, but it does have some commonly held theoretical views and practices. Many have been consistent over time. Two obvious ones are the importance of learning a field language and the importance of collecting language data, understood broadly as anything from eliciting text to recording naturally occurring speech, for a variety of research aims. As for a “general model of language as culture,” there is a clear shared sense that language is structured and structuring—that it is a cultural practice both deriving from and helping to constitute society and culture. Linguistic phenomena have unconscious character (as Boas argued) as well as regularities of communicative practice and “certain persistent features of reference” (Sapir 1949b [1931]:104) that function in the production

1. One direct attempt can be found in Fabian’s (2002:775) argument for a “language-centered anthropology—understood . . . as anthropology that conceives of research as communicative and mediated above all by language.” Also see Mannheim and Tedlock (1995), Spitzer (2002), and Urban (1996).
of shared meaning or some approximation of it. Well before the linguistic anthropologists of Duranti’s third paradigm started thinking about practice theory and performativity, Sapir articulated this view: “While we often speak of society as though it were a static structure defined by tradition . . . it is only apparently a static sum of social institutions; actually it is being reanimated or creatively reaffirmed from day to day by particular acts of a communicative nature which obtain among the individuals participating in it.”

Focusing on this dynamism of language and communicative practice is one way of deepening the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. The core idea is that it is not just language-as-system [especially language-as-categorization-system] that shapes worldview and the horizons of the meaningful within a given culture or speech community but also daily habits of communicating analogous to what Whorf [1941] called the “habitual grooves of talking.” Because these habits are embedded within specific contexts and institutions (e.g., the mass media, education, families, courts, marketplaces, and the practice of anthropology), there is room for a fourth paradigm in which identification as a linguistic anthropologist is less important than placing the ethnography of communication at the center of any anthropological project. Duranti’s article provides a rich history of the scholarship that moves us in this direction.

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Duranti’s presentation of the three paradigms of the study of language and anthropology in the United States is useful not only for anthropologists but also for discourse analysts. Indeed, one source of modern discourse analysis coincides with the second paradigm described by Duranti, namely, the study of communicative events by Hymes, Gumperz, and others in the ethnography of communication. In fact, it was roughly in the same period [1964–74] that other developments took place that can be interpreted as new paradigms of discourse studies and as paradigm breaks with formal [structuralist or generative] linguistics, such as text grammar, semiotics, pragmatics, conversation analysis, and the psychology of text processing. In other words, the paradigm shift in anthropology is part of a much more general international movement in which interest has shifted from socially context-free formal grammar or fixed or elicited data to the more dynamic properties of talk, spontaneous everyday interaction, speech acts, strategic processing, nonverbal communication, and social context, that is, to actual language use and discourse.

However, what was an oppositional paradigm has now become a dominant one both in anthropology and in much of discourse studies. As was earlier the case for structuralism in linguistics and anthropology, such domination usually brings its own forms of inclusion and exclusion. Thus, the virtually exclusive interest in spontaneous talk unfortunately relegated the study of “text” to the study of literature, semiotics, postmodern philosophy, mass communication studies, or the psychology of text processing—as if writing and reading were less interesting aspects of language, communication, and culture than conversations. Besides everyday talk, we have everyday newspaper reading, among a host of other communicative practices, and both need our explicit attention in anthropology and discourse studies.

There is another, even more fundamental form of exclusion, again both in linguistic anthropology and in much of discourse and conversation studies: the study of cognition. There is a widespread misunderstanding, if not prejudice, that identifies cognition with an individual and therefore nonsocial approach to language and discourse. This is the case in ethnomethodology, ethnography, and sociolinguistics as well as in much critical discourse analysis. Duranti mentions cognitive anthropology only in passing, and although this may not be the best example of an integrated study of cognition, interaction, and social context in anthropology and discourse studies, a study of language and discourse without an explicit cognitive basis is empirically and theoretically reductionist and hence inadequate. Ignorance of cognitive and social psychology, artificial intelligence, and related disciplines leaves a prominent gap precisely where a link must be construed between societal structures, social situations, and interactions, on the one hand, and the structures and strategies of text and talk, on the other. Social situations, interactions, or context as such cannot possibly influence discourse [and vice versa] without a sociocognitive interface. And, as is obvious in the relevance of the study of knowledge, attitudes, social representations, and ideologies, cognitions may be as social as they are mental. In sum, cognition, especially social cognition, is too important and too interesting to be left to psychologists, and as much as social scientists and discourse analysts can and should learn from them, they should learn from a more sociocultural approach to language and discourse.

Some of what was lacking in the second paradigm in linguistic anthropology [and much of discourse studies] has been recovered or given new interest in the third paradigm described by Duranti. Unfortunately, apart from mentioning some issues [such as narrative, ideology, gender, racism], he does not detail this current paradigm as much as the second. This may be because the third paradigm is just beginning in anthropology or because unfortunately—because of space limitations—he has had to limit himself to the United States. The fact is that much of this work is being done in discourse studies [and related studies such as women’s studies and ethnic studies], especially in Europe, South America, and other parts of the world, often within a prominent ethnographic or cultural context that makes it directly relevant to anthropology. As is also the case in conversation analysis, much of this work reintegrates some of the “macro” categories earlier banned from interactional studies in sociology and anthropology, such as the role
of institutions, groups, power, and domination. Indeed, gender, race, and ethnicity, as well as the close integration of much talk and text with organizations and institutions, require both a local, micro approach and a global or macro approach that links discourse to the processes of societal reproduction and change. Both in linguistic anthropology and in discourse analysis, the consequent double integration of the local and the global and of the cognitive and the social means a real break with previous paradigms.

Reply

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Language is so ubiquitous in human affairs that we can never talk much about it. Yet, in the consolidations of the social sciences in Europe at the beginning of the 20th century, language tended to be taken for granted or reduced to the mere expression of already formed thoughts and social processes. The founders of anthropology in the United States, however, thought otherwise, and from the very beginning, by conceiving of language as culture they made it into a crucial resource for understanding how the social and the psychological could come together in human culture. The result was the constitution of linguistics as a subfield of anthropology (a development unparalleled outside of North America). My article is an attempt to reconstruct the history of a then-revolutionary idea and its realization over the past 100 years by adopting a modified (and operationally more precise) notion of “paradigm.” I am pleased (or, I should say, pleasantly surprised) to see that my conceptualization of such a history is largely shared by the commentators, who have generously provided additional information and, in some cases, raised some challenging issues. There is much to be learned from Hymes’s historical footnotes and clarifications, Darnell’s reflections on her own experience, and van Dijk’s expansion of the discussion to text analysis in other disciplines. Some commentators have also examined the premises and potential implications of some of my choices, offering alternative perspectives [e.g., allegedly unseen connections] or criticism of my interpretation. I have here organized what I see as the commentators’ main concerns in terms of four questions: [1] Is “paradigm” the right choice? [Ahearn, Cook-Gumperz and Gumperz], and have I used it correctly? [Rumsey]? [2] How sharp is the distinction between paradigms, especially between my second and third [Darnell]? [3] Did I overlook some relevant information and, in particular, possible points of continuity across paradigms [Darnell, Cook-Gumperz and Gumperz, Spitalnički]? [4] Are the paradigm shifts I identified for the study of language as culture in the United States of more general relevance, for example, to parallel shifts taking place in Europe and elsewhere in discourse analysis (van Dijk)? I will address these four questions in order:

1. Is “paradigm” the right choice, and have I used it correctly? There is always a risk in adopting a concept that comes from a different tradition. It is even riskier when we fiddle with it and stretch it to fit a set of data for which it was not designed as I have done. But I believe that the risk is warranted for two reasons. The first is that there is considerable confusion within and outside of anthropology regarding the nature of the anthropological study of language. The oscillation mentioned in the article among a number of labels, including “linguistic anthropology,” “anthropological linguistics,” “sociolinguistics,” and “ethnolinguistics,” is only the most superficial and yet telling example of the widespread lack of clarity as to what constitutes linguistic research from an anthropological perspective. Further evidence of confusion can be inferred from the typically partial and often clumsy attempts to represent the “linguistic” subfield (or the study of “language”) in sociocultural anthropology textbooks. I felt that it was time to come to terms with the fact that perhaps those of us inside the subfield had not been communicating to those outside as effectively as we thought we were. I then realized that to address this issue I needed a notion that by its very nature would force us to think in terms of broad trends rather than particular notions or hypotheses. The popular notions of “paradigm” and “paradigm shift” seemed to me the perfect candidates; they could force us to think in terms of the major features of our research projects. Cook-Gumperz and Gumperz are right when they write that “Kuhn’s approach gives a sense of structural containment to the flow of ideas that to those living with them appear much more fluid and overlapping.” [Their proposal to adopt Holton’s “themata” is a bit cryptic given that his model is not considered an improvement on Kuhn’s by most historians of science.] But my whole point was to find a way to go beyond our own experiential closeness to intellectual matters in order to reveal what we ordinarily do not perceive. Paradigms are good for helping us think about questions we often do not ask, for example: Do we all have the same goals, units of analysis, object of study, methods, etc.? And if we don’t, what does it mean for the enterprise? The choice of other terms would have taken me in a different direction. For example, the term “school” (mentioned by Ahearn) would not have allowed me to move at the general and abstract level I was aiming for. Given the need to be more ethnographically based and author-specific, it would have been difficult if not impossible to reach any kind of interesting generalization that could be challenged.

The second reason for adopting Kuhn’s notion is that it is intimately tied to the question of (in)commensurability. I found this idea appealing because I had been feeling for quite some time that, once we start digging deeper, we might find considerable disagreement among colleagues on what constitutes an appropriate way of studying language from an anthropological perspective. It was the hidden incommensurability that I found interesting and tried to make explicit. Pace Rumsey’s read-
ing, I never suggested that we should be looking for one shared or Ur-paradigm or that differences could be easily reconciled. Perhaps my call for a “dialogue” at the end of the article was misplaced and potentially misleading. I should then qualify it by saying that the call was never meant as a call for an ecumenical outcome. I take dialogue to mean the possibility of understanding, which may imply the recognition (as well as the achievement) of either agreement or disagreement.

Finally, I should reiterate that, contrary to what Cook-Gumperz and Gumperz’s summary of my claims might lead one to believe (“as a new set of concerns emerges and becomes established, earlier practices are replaced”), I do not think that a new paradigm completely replaces the old one. As I have tried to demonstrate, there are scholars who continue to work with theoretical concepts and methods that are characteristic of the first paradigm.

2. How sharp is the distinction between paradigms? As with any other form of narrative account—history is no exception—I am quite aware that I was an important agent in the construction of the historical realities I have been trying to depict. It is sufficient to read Murray’s (1998) discussion of what he calls [in the title but not throughout his book] “American sociolinguistics” to find a historical account based on some of the same sources I evoke that is somewhat different from mine. At the same time, I believe that there is sufficient evidence that something quite dramatic happened in the 1960s with the birth of sociolinguistics and the ethnography of communication and something equally dramatic happened in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the influx of new conceptual tools and the wider availability and adoption of new recording technologies.

Of course, there is no question that the closer we are to a given set of practices, the more difficult it is to see them in historical terms. Only in the future might we be able to see the third paradigm (or some variant of it) as something as distinct as the first and the second.

3. Did I overlook possible points of continuity across paradigms? The answer to this question relates to criteria for establishing continuity. The use of the same term, for example, does not mean that its meaning [extensionally or intensionally] is the same. Thus, Darnell’s suggestion that we all share “ethnography,” for example, is appealing, but I am not sure that “ethnography” means the same for all of those engaged in it, especially as more and more students are encouraged to work in their own communities and engage in urban [or suburban] fieldwork that often forces them to live the contradictions of an alienated native self or of a privileged fieldworker on the way to acquiring a professional multiple-personality disorder. Cook-Gumperz and Gumperz mention “narrative and narrativity.” It is difficult for me to see the narratives recorded by Boas as “the same thing” as the narratives collected and analyzed by Ochs and Capps (2001). They are both “texts,” but they were produced, recorded, and analyzed in such different ways that their similarities rapidly vanish as we expand the notion of teller to include the work done by participants in the narrative event. Finally, Spitzluk brings up “the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis” as a possible source of continuity across paradigms. This is the most challenging of the three proposals for a thematic link across paradigms because the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has almost mythical proportions in the public imagination. Together with the evolution of language [a topic that most linguists tend to avoid], the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is a must in anthropology textbooks and in introductory books on “language and culture.” But the semantic-in-determinacy problem is here even more serious than for “ethnography” and “narrative” given that, as Spitzluk knows [see her use of the qualifier “so-called”], there never was a Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, unless we take for it Hoijer’s [1954:93] rarely quoted informal and very general definition: “The central idea of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is that language functions, not simply as a device for reporting experience, but also, and more significantly, as a way of defining experience for its speakers.” The problem, of course, is where to go from there. One of my theses has been that the second paradigm did not focus on the issue of the relation between language and experience because its practitioners saw it as too closely associated with a psychological orientation toward communication and culture. Linguistic relativity, however, came back with Lucy’s [1992] experimental work and the Lucy-inspired research carried out in the Language and Cognition Group directed by Stephen Levinson at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics. But it is hard to see this line of research as part of either the second or the third paradigm. This work speaks to a series of concerns [e.g., in cognitive linguistics and experimental psychology] that have been largely ignored or avoided by the writers I reviewed in my article. The 1991 Wenner-Gren Symposium “Rethinking Linguistic Relativity” [Gumperz and Levinson 1996] opened up the discussion of linguistic relativity to interactional dimensions that are closer to the second and third paradigms. This was done by the inclusion of researchers strongly associated with the third paradigm [e.g., William Hanks, John Haviland, and Elinor Ochs]. To these contributions one might add Michael Silverstein’s work, which I discuss in the article. But the bottom line remains the same. The recurring interest in what people call “the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis” [or “linguistic relativity”] is no proof of continuity across paradigms, given that each paradigm has either embraced or rejected linguistic relativity on the basis of distinct presuppositions of what it is and how one could build upon it.

4. Are the paradigm shifts I identified for the study of language as culture in the United States of more general relevance? This possibility was also raised by psychologists in the audience when I presented an earlier draft of the article at the Università di Padova in October 2000. In the printed version I purposely left out my own speculations in this direction because I felt that I did not have the data and the expertise to venture into other fields, but this is a worthwhile project for others to pursue. After all, many of the writers I mentioned were or are part of wider networks of scholarship extending to other disciplines and other countries. One in fact might
see van Dijk's comments as the beginning of a widening of the discussion by a major figure in another field, namely, discourse studies. His complaints about what is typically left out of the analysis in linguistics and anthropology not only underscore the privileging of certain contexts for analysis [e.g., spontaneous talk], which is to be expected, but also remind us that "text" itself is one of those key terms that can be interpreted very differently across disciplines and, I would add, across paradigms. I suspect that a study of how the term "text" has been interpreted and used in the humanities and social sciences would be an equally exciting exercise, although it would be difficult to justify the same temporal restriction to the 20th century given the ancient hermeneutical traditions from which our contemporary notions of "text" derive.

Ahearn, always a perceptive writer, brings out a fear that many linguistic anthropologists have but rarely express—the fear of being assimilated to sociocultural anthropology and thus losing their identity through the forfeiting of their specificity. This is the flip side of William Labov's original wish that sociolinguistics might disappear once linguistics agreed to see language as a social phenomenon (that this has not happened is both an indictment of linguistics narrow-mindedness and a validation of Labov's and other sociolinguists' efforts to develop sociolinguistics into a vibrant independent field). The question then arises why we should worry about being assimilated. Shouldn't we, on the contrary, welcome such a possibility, to be seen as a validation of our work or as the mainstreaming of our concerns? The problem is not in the future, which cannot be predicted, but in the past. Everything we know from our earlier experiences warns us that an anthropology without a distinct group of language specialists is likely to be an anthropology with a naive understanding of communication. We have seen it happen already. When anthropology departments decide not to have a linguistic subfield, thinking that they don't need one, their students tend to take language for granted, identifying it with a vague notion of "discourse." It is for this reason that we need to sharpen our historical, theoretical, and methodological understanding of what it means to study language as culture. We owe it first to our students.

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