This article suggests that the theory of language socialization could benefit from adopting some key concepts originally introduced by the philosopher Edmund Husserl in the first part of the twentieth century. In particular, it focuses on Husserl’s notion of “(phenomenological) modification,” to be understood as a change in “the natural attitude” that humans have toward the phenomenal world, their own actions included. After providing examples of different kinds of modifications in interpreting language and listening to music, Husserl’s notion of “theoretical attitude” (a modification of “the natural attitude”) is introduced and shown to be common in adult conversations as well as in interactions between adults and young children. A reanalysis of an exchange previously examined by Platt (1986) between a Samoan mother and her son is provided to show the benefits of an integration of phenomenological and interactional perspectives on adult-child discourse. Finally, it is suggested that the failure sometimes experienced by children and adults to adopt new ways of being may be due to the accumulated effects of modifications experienced earlier in life which make it difficult if not impossible to retrieve earlier, premodification ways of being. [language socialization, phenomenology, jazz aesthetics, Samoan child language]

In this article I will suggest that the theory of language socialization could benefit from adopting some of the concepts originally introduced by the philosopher Edmund Husserl in the first part of the twentieth century to account for changes in the phenomenal world, that is, the world as meaningful for us. In particular, I will be focusing on the relevance of Husserl’s theory to our understanding of the role of language in the socialization of attention and in the development of a “theoretical attitude.” At the end of the article, I will also speculate on how Husserl’s theory might help us to explain the resistance to certain changes of habitus.

A great deal of language socialization is centered on the language-mediated social organization of children’s attention. The interest in the role of language in guiding children’s attention first emerged in Elinor Ochs and Bambi B. Schieffelin’s joint work on attention-getting devices in talking to children ([Ochs] Keenan and Schieffelin 1976) and was later refined through their respective ethnographic experiences in (Western) Samoa (Ochs 1988) and Papua New Guinea (Schieffelin 1990)—the discussion of attention in Ochs and Schieffelin (1984) was based on their respective fieldwork experiences and predates the publication of the two just-mentioned monographs. The analysis of everyday face-to-face interaction between children and adults across societies showed that in the process of becoming acceptable members of their community, children are made to participate in a range of social acts realized (predominantly but never exclusively) through speaking that are explicitly aimed at directing and redirecting their social, emotional, and moral engagement with their surrounding world—a world made of people, animals, food, artifacts, things of
nature, and, at times, spirits or other kinds of supernatural beings. In describing the role of language in organizing a child’s attentive engagement with their surrounding world, Ochs and Schieffelin (1984) made use of a variety of analytical tools taken from sociolinguistics (e.g., register), child language acquisition (e.g., expansion), and the ethnography of communication (e.g., participation, situation). In this article, I propose to add to this list the concept of “modification” as introduced by Husserl in discussing different ways in which the phenomenal world changes for the perceiving, thinking, acting, and interacting Subject. Husserl combines the noun modification (Modifikation)—a term that bears a family resemblance with other terms used by Husserl, including Wandlung, Abwandlung, and Änderung—with a number of adjectives that are meant to express different experiences as well as different theoretical points of view. Thus, in the English translations of his writings we find such terms as “intentional modification,” “phenomenal modification” (Husserl 1970a), “phenomenological modification” (Husserl 1989), “noetic modification,” “logico-categorical modification” (Husserl 1931), “retentional modification” (Husserl 1991), “modification of attentiveness” (Husserl 2001), among others. In this article, I suggest that Husserl’s explorations of the various types of modifications help us capture some important aspects of what we informally call “attention” and the role performed by language in guiding children’s or novices’ attention. To illustrate how this works, I will first examine how music instructors in a university jazz program use language to socialize their students to attempt new ways of listening to recordings of famous jazz musicians. After introducing Husserl’s notion of “the natural attitude” and recasting it as “the cultural attitude,” I use an example of an interaction during a car ride to show how the natural attitude can be transformed into the “theoretical attitude” through a phenomenological modification. I also argue that such phenomenological modifications are quite common in child-adult verbal interactions. To illustrate this point, I introduce an exchange between a Samoan mother and her three-and-a-half year old son that had previously been analyzed from the point of view of its affective content. I argue that it can also be analyzed as a culturally rich example of a child’s assuming a theoretical, even reflective attitude. At the end of the article I briefly speculate on how the Husserl’s notion of the “natural attitude” and its modifications can help us make sense of some cases in which socialization fails.

Husserl and Linguistic Anthropology

Despite the recent revival of some of Husserl’s ideas within a number of fields, neuroscience in particular, and the importance of his work for such an influential theorist as Pierre Bourdieu (e.g., Bourdieu 1977, 2000, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992), until very recently linguistic anthropologists have largely ignored Husserl’s theoretical and methodological contributions (for some exceptions, see Berger and Del Negro 2002; Duranti 1999, 2006, 2008a; Throop and Murphy 2002). Husserl’s writings have been even less popular in the study of human development, an interdisciplinary field where a number of authors have made the notion of “intersubjectivity,” one of Husserl’s central concerns for over thirty years, into a main focus of empirical research (e.g., Tavris 1978, 1979, 1998; Tavris and Aitken 2001; Bruner 1996; Tomasello et al. 2005). I believe that a return to Husserl’s original formulations of how humans transform their social and natural environment into particular kinds of “phenomena” can help us sharpen the theoretical framework of all aspects of human development, language socialization included.

One of the contributions of Husserl’s theory is the articulation of the role that humans have in the constitution of the phenomenal world. Through the notion of intentionality, which he borrowed from one of his teachers, Franz Brentano, and then pushed in new directions, Husserl gives us an important analytical tool for thinking about how we give meaning to the world around us (or inside of us, e.g., in imagining or in remembering), that is, how we make it into a particular kind of phenomenal world. At the same time, he also makes us pay attention to the temporal dimensions...
of meaning-making. As we know from his lectures on inner time consciousness (Husserl 1991) and other writings, Husserl was very concerned with both temporal objects like tones, that is, objects that have their own duration, and temporality in general as a property of our way of experiencing the world. One key concept for connecting intentionality and temporality is the notion of attention or attentiveness, two equally possible translations of the German word Aufmerksamkeit. Husserl mentions Aufmerksamkeit throughout his writings, but, as remarked by the philosopher Natalie Depraz (2004:6), “the attentional experience is never considered by Husserl himself in a detailed way. . . . Attention remains in the background.” In this article I will suggest that Husserl’s work on attention can be brought to the foreground and made relevant to language socialization by examining how for him meaning-making always involves some kind of modification (Modifikation) or transformation (Wandlung). This perspective has a number of advantages. First, it highlights the fundamental temporal character of meaning; second, it makes language one of a series of transformative human activities; and third, it gives us a way of evaluating the specific properties of language vis-à-vis other human activities.

“Phenomenal Modification”: Putting Meaning into Words

For Husserl, language provides an excellent example of how we are constantly engaged in the process of experiencing modifications of the phenomenal world even though we are usually not aware of it.

Even though for Husserl we are normally aware of our sensations (Zahavi 2002:56–8), we are not aware of the role that we have in making sense or constituting our everyday world (Sokolowski 1964; Zahavi 1992). We are usually too busy living our lives to realize that we are the ones who give meaning to objects, people, and events—whether real or imaginary—through intentional acts and that such acts are in turn constituted by modifications of our ways of seeing, hearing, smelling, thinking, etc. Believing that language provides the clearest cases of our active role in meaning-making, Husserl used linguistic signs to explain how constitution works (see also Sokolowski 1964:57). In Logical Investigations he asks us to carefully examine the process whereby a physical “sign phenomenon” (Zeichenerscheinung) becomes an expression (Ausdruck), that is, something meaningful. In a few lines, Husserl sets up for us what amounts to a phenomenological experiment (Husserl 1901:40–41; English translation in Husserl 1970a:282–3). He asks us to consider “a sign in itself” or—as translated by J. N. Findlay—“a sign qua sign” (Husserl 1970a:282), that is, a sensible thing that does not have meaning yet. We are supposed to focus on a printed word without the “meaning intention” (Bedeutungsintention) that we normally associate with it. As we do this, we realize that the entity (the visible marks on a piece of paper) is still present, that is, “there” for us to see, but it no longer means what it meant a few seconds earlier. We apprehend it, but we no longer understand it as something endowed with linguistic meaning. It has acquired a new meaning-less, intention-less status. We no longer relate to it as a “word.” Only after we have made ourselves experience the modification of the “essence” of the word as a word phenomenon and changed it (for us) from meaning-full to meaning-less, we can come to see that ordinarily the directionality of the modification works the other way around. Before the object “printed mark” or any other object of the same kind can be a unit of meaning—an “expression” in Husserl’s terms, it typically “undergoes an essential phenomenal modification” (“eine wesentlich phänomenale Modifikation” [Husserl 1901:41]) whereby even though “what constitutes the object’s appearing remains unchanged, the intentional character of the experience alters” (Husserl 1970a: 283). The notion of “phenomenal modification” already in the 1900–01 edition of Logische Untersuchungen shows Husserl’s early use of the notion of modification.

Something similar to what happens in our understanding of a written word goes on when we encounter the spoken word. Just like for written language we must assume that the marks on paper are more than a “brute physical datum” (Sokolowski
1964:57), for linguistic sounds to be interpreted as such, we need to make them into something more than “mere sounds” (bloße Laute). According to Husserl, this “something more” includes a purpose for communicating about something, the imparting of a “sense” (Sinn) that comes from the speaker’s mind through an intentional (or meaning-imbuing) act that can be understood by the hearer.

Husserl’s theory of the constitution of linguistic meaning is meant to be part of a more general theory of how humans make sense of the surrounding world. As I will show in the rest of the article, this aspect of his work makes it easy to connect language with other meaningful human experiences.

Husserl’s Notion of Intentional Modification

As we live our everyday lives, we experience continuous shifts in the ways in which we understand the world, that is, in the ways we think of, feel about, or act toward objects, people, animals, and the events in which we participate or hear about through narrative. At one moment, while we are typing or reading in our study, we might be barely aware of the books that are on our desk even though they are in front of us and within our peripheral vision. But as we decide that we need to consult one of those books, we start to relate to them in a different way. As we glance at the books, we match each one against the memory that we have of the book that we are trying to find. We find ourselves quickly examining each book in terms of the color of its cover or in terms of its thickness. We also consider its place on the desk and its proximity to other books to assess their content or relevance to our current needs. We might also stop and think about the fact that one of those books is the one that is overdue at the university library and that another one is the book that someone gave us for our birthday and we haven’t read yet. We might notice the picture on the front cover of one of the books and think that it is poorly designed. We might pull one of them out, hold it in our hands and wonder what made it into a book that so many people buy but very few read. Throughout these moments, as our gaze moves from one book to the next and our hands grab one to then place it back where it was or put it aside for a future occasion, it is not just our attention that is continuously shifting. The way we are disposed toward what we see or touch also shifts. At any given moment, each of those books is the same object that was in front of us a few seconds earlier; in other words, that is, our perception of it as a physical object has not changed (e.g., its color, weight, or smell has not changed in any perceivable way), but our consideration of it, the way we direct our attention to it has changed. These shifts in our ways of thinking of, feeling about, or coming in contact with the same object is what Husserl called “intentional modifications” (Husserl 1931, 1989). A modification in our consciousness—often accompanied by or realized through a modification of our embodiment—may affect entities that were in the background and suddenly become the object of our attention (e.g., the book that was lying on our desk and now is examined to see whether it is the book we want to consult) as well as entities that we attend to in a different way (e.g., the cover of a book may change from source of information about its contents to target of an evaluation about its design).

The concept of intentional modification is important because it makes evident the role that human subjects play in meaning-making through intentionality. It is in this sense that Husserl (1931, 1970a, 1989) uses the verb constitute as well as its nominal and adjectival derivations (e.g., constitution, constitutive, constituting). Our way of relating to entities in the world, whether real or imaginary, does not “create” them out of nothing, but it “constitutes” them, that is, it “objectivates” them—makes them acquire objectivity—through distinct intentional acts, with distinct meanings (Sokolowski 1964:46). We can attend to the same “object” or “referent” as something (or someone) that we need, want, admire, feel curious about, despise, miss, judge, are repelled by, feel comfortable with, and so on. All of these ways of relating to a given entity in the imaginary or real world are made possible by intentionality, which is, for Husserl and, before him, for his teacher Franz Brentano (1973) and the Scholastics
from whom the latter took the concept, the property of our consciousness of being “directed toward” or “being about” something (hence the English term aboutness used as synonym of intentionality by some of Husserl’s interpreters). Figure 1 schematically represents the possibility of multiple (in this case, for simplicity, only two) ways of relating or “intending” the same Object.

When the type of intentional act we entertain toward something or someone changes, for example, from admiration to fear, from disapproval to approval, from seeing it as something alien to seeing it as a member of a familiar group, we are experiencing an intentional modification, that is, the “phenomenon”—in the sense of what it appears to be for us—changes as a result of our way of relating to it. We can schematically represent this event by adding a time variable \( t \) to the two intentional acts in Figure 2.

Some classic examples of this type of change in the domain of vision are provided by Gestalt psychology and have been discussed by other philosophers, among them Ludwig Wittgenstein. In his *Philosophical Investigations*, he used the example of the picture in Figure 3 (“the duck-rabbit” picture) to discuss the concept of “aspect seeing” or “seeing as” This is a kind of seeing that is different from mere perception.

I might have been looking at the picture in Figure 3 for years and only seen a rabbit. Suddenly I see a duck or, rather, I see it as a duck. The “it” as a picture (corresponding to what Husserl, following Aristotle, calls the “hyle”) has not changed but what I see it as has changed. Wittgenstein compares the ability of “seeing an aspect” to having a “musical ear” (1958:214) and to “experiencing the meaning of a word.” In all these cases, we are relying on an ability to go beyond mere perception. The similarity between Wittgenstein’s “aspect seeing” and Husserl’s intentional modification finds support in a terminological convergence. At one point, to express what he means by “aspect seeing,” Wittgenstein uses the German word *Einstellung*—translated as attitude by G.E.M. Anscombe (see below). He says that to “see as” is the same as to

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**Figure 1**

The same Subject (A) can be directed toward the same Object (G) through different intentional acts, for example, admiration, fear

**Figure 2**

The same Subject (A) is directed toward the same Object (G) at time \( t_1 \) in the intentional act of admiration and at time \( t_2 \) in the intentional act of fear
have an “attitude” toward something. For example, to see “an animal pierced by an arrow” is the same as saying that “this is my attitude to the figure ("dies ist meine Einstellung zur Figur.")” (Wittgenstein 1958:205). Husserl also used Einstellung in his 1913 Ideas (Engl. translation in Husserl 1931) to describe the way in which we relate to the world, for example, in his notion of natürliche Einstellung “natural attitude” (see below). Both authors were trying to capture how meaning-giving consists of a change in attitude or disposition toward something.

In what follows I will give some examples of the ways in which language can be used to get novices to modify their attitude toward something. In this case, the intentional modifications that are being promoted do not concern vision but aural perception. Drawing from the world of music education, instead of discussing cases of “seeing as,” I will discuss cases of “hearing as.” The cases in question will also give us an opportunity to appreciate the range of modifications that language is expected to encourage in order to socialize students to a professional way of hearing.

The discussion of music is here partly motivated by the fact that it was very important for Husserl’s theory of time consciousness (Husserl 1991). Stimulated by the work of Franz Brentano and of his thesis advisor Carl Stumpf, who wrote on the psychology of music and sounds, Husserl tried to answer the question of how we arrive from a succession of tones to hearing a melody. The succession must be united in our consciousness but, as Husserl wrote, “[w]e obviously do not have the tones all at once” (Husserl 1991:22). The problem of how we hear a melody became a model for understanding not only “temporal objects” like tones, that is, objects that have duration, but the very constitution of time in our consciousness, what Henri Bergson (1908) had called “la durée.”

**Instigating Intentional Modifications in Music Students**

It is well known that musicians’ ways of hearing music are distinct from non-musicians’. What is perhaps less well known is that each genre of music requires special kinds of “listening.” In the jazz tradition, musicians playing in a band are expected to respond on the spot to any change in rhythm, tempo, harmonic structure, or melodic lines initiated by the band leader (for large ensembles) or by one of the other musicians (in small ensembles) (e.g., Berliner 1997; Monson 1997; Reinholdsson 1998; Berger 1999; Sawyer 2001; Duranti and Burrell 2004). As documented by Paul Berliner (1994), jazz students “must depend greatly upon their ears” (1994:93) for a number of tasks, including the fact that “much of the jazz repertory remains part of the community’s oral tradition” (93) and the need “to apprehend the unique features of each rendition as they unfold during a performance, instantly adapting their parts to those of other players” (Berliner 1994:93–4).

In what follows I suggest that in trying to socialize their students to developing a “jazz way” of listening to music jazz instructors are asking those students to engage in “intentional modifications” of their ordinary or previous ways of listening. Further research is needed to document the effects of these experiences on students over developmental time.
The three examples that I discuss are taken from my video recordings of two jazz performance classes (called “Jazz Combo Classes”) at UCLA.9

In the first example, the four students in the class10 have just finished playing together “Lament,” a “ballad” (i.e., a song that is meant to be played at slow tempo) written and performed by J.J. Johnson, one of the most famous trombone players of modern jazz. The instructor, George Bohannon, himself a renowned trombonist, has quietly listened to the students play and now is providing feedback. He is talking in front of everyone but specifically addressing the student who played the trombone. Bohannon just mentioned the importance of following the chord structure of the song during the improvised part (the player’s “solo”), so that the notes played would fit in properly. Then, after conceding that playing “ballads” is hard, Bohannon reminds everyone that teaching alone cannot do it. Playing good solos comes from hearing the solos of great masters.

Example 1 (Jazz Combo Class, 2-10-2003)11

GB: [...] As uh we have said over and over. the more you listen. the more you’ll understand. you know because it’s. you can teach a lot of it but- a lot of it comes from your hearing. hearing good solos. hearing what J.J. ((Johnson)) has played on his-:- tune or- listening to:- you know some of the other great- trombone players you know- or not just trombone players anybody you know I’ve- I’ve listened to more of the trumpet players and piano players than I did to- [...] trombone players although I love what J.J.- his playing. [...]

The students here are told that they have to attend to the music of great players like J.J. Johnson and others in such a way as to detect what they are doing in their solos, that is, when they stop following the original melody and improvise, creating new melodic lines (and more). This is advice directed to younger players that is common in the jazz community, as documented by Paul Berliner (1994), among others.12 What I am interested in underscoring here is that this type of attending to jazz recordings constitutes a change in the ways in which one may otherwise attend to the recorded sounds. Bohannon’s choice of two distinct verbs, hear and listen, within a stretch of discourse that seems to be focused on the need for one particular activity (to learn from the ways in which recorded artists perform their solos), calls for reflection. Whereas listening (as in “listening to...[...] some of the other great trombone players”) is here reserved for the willful disposition to pay attention to how certain musicians play, hearing (as in “hearing good solos”) seems to refer to the ability to differentiate among those sounds and absorb them. The contrast is captured in the difference between expressions like “I’m listening but I can’t hear it” and “I’m hearing it but I am not listening.” In the first case I am making an effort but I cannot get to the phenomenon I am looking for. In the second case, I am being exposed to the sounds but I am not concentrating, paying attention.

Instructors may also give hints about a specific quality of playing that the students must be tuned in to. In the second example, the students in drummer Sherman Ferguson’s Jazz Combo have been rehearsing the song “Cain and Abel” written and performed by Branford and Wynton Marsalis, saxophone and trumpet player, respectively. After some discussion on how it should be played, they decide to listen to the recording by the Marsalis brothers’ band. While they are listening to the CD playing, Ferguson first gives some hints to the two students who play the saxophone and the trumpet, then he turns to the drummer and tells him to listen to the drummer Jeff “Tain” Watts in the recording. This time the listening must focus on how the drumming is done in an “interactive” way.

Example 2 (Jazz Combo Class; 4-22-2003, tape 1; SF= Sherman Ferguson)

SF: that’s Tain ((motions with his hands as if playing the drums))... (listen to how-) the way he plays... he’s in- interactive with them.
Musicians’ attentive listening to other musicians in their ensemble (no matter its size) is expected in any kind of music performance. In each tradition, however, attentiveness to other players is subordinated to higher order goals that are specific to its aesthetic canons and sociohistorical context. It is therefore with respect to the expectations specific to jazz music, and its improvisational qualities, that the instructor’s request in example 2 must be interpreted. In the language of Wittgenstein’s notion of “aspect seeing,” we can say that Ferguson is asking the drummer in his class to listen to Jeff “T ain” Watts not just as a drummer, but as an interactive drummer. To better understand what this might entail, we can go back to the jazz combo class from which example 1 was drawn. In this case (example 3), we find the instructor, trombonist George Bohannon, addressing the drummer in his class. The issue is how to achieve a collective clarity of sound. First, one needs to be listening in such a way to recognize the problem of the lack of clarity. To convey this idea, Bohannon uses the metaphor of a crowded room where everyone speaks so loudly that it is impossible to hear what people are saying.

Example 3 (same setting as example 1, but earlier; GB = George Bohannon)

GB; […] It’s a good idea when you know when… ((the bass player)) Aaron is playing to… bring it down ((in volume)) you know ‘cause he’s not amplified but he’s pulling, real well. […] we don’t wanna drown him out. so the contrasts are really what’s… what’s so- important. when everything is right here ((motions with hand)) […] it’s like- when you’re in a room full of people and everybody’s talking and you don’t hear- you can’t hear anything, but you hear a lot of chatter but there’s no definition. […] but soon as you drop it down a notch. Then, you know that he- he’s speaking and you’re accompanying him. and then y- you know- even if- there’s more chance of doing some interplay together you know, …you know if you just be- be aware… . be aware of that.

In this case Bohannon is telling the student drummer in his class to adjust his playing by (1) listening to the sound that the band is producing as a whole, (2) evaluating his own contribution to that sound (e.g., whether it is too loud), (3) listening to a particular instrument (in this case the bass), and (4) evaluating whether that instrument is being heard not only by the potential audience but by the other members of the band. Implicit in these recommendations are certain assumptions about the expected role that each instrument has, for example, the role of the bass lines to provide the rhythmic and harmonic foundations on which the horn players can improvise (Monson 1996), but the important point in each of these three cases is that the students are being encouraged to attend to the music of others as well as to their own music in new ways. These are activity-specific ways of paying attention. For Husserl, attention (Aufmerksamkeit) is nothing other than a kind of intentional modification, a characteristic that, in his view, the psychologists of his time were missing (Husserl 1931:250fn).

Music students can actually try to engage in this kind of listening because they already have the ability to engage in other kinds of modifications, including the “phenomenal modification” necessary for understanding language. We could say then that our speaking and listening in everyday life is always a speaking and listening in particular ways, or “speaking and listening as” in the sense of Wittgenstein’s notion of “aspect seeing.” We speak or listen as friends, lovers, teachers, colleagues, employers, parents, children, neighbors, customers, homeowners, and so on. All of these ways of speaking and listening require particular kinds of modifications of our way of relating to the elements in our surrounding world. We are usually not aware of such modifications. All together, they constitute what Husserl called the “natural attitude.”

Husserl’s Notion of the “Natural Attitude”

For Husserl, our everyday experience of the world is characterized by what he called “die natürliche Einstellung,” translated as “the natural standpoint” by Boyce Gibson
in Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (Husserl 1931) and as “the natural attitude” by subsequent translators of Husserl’s works (e.g., Husserl 1970b, Husserl 1989). In this type of attitude, our understanding of the world is practical rather than conceptual and reality is not problematized (Husserl 1931:91).

... this world is not there for me as a mere world of facts and affairs [Sachenwelt], but with the same immediacy, as a world of values, a world of goods, a practical world. Without further effort on my part I find the things before me furnished not only with the qualities that befit their positive nature, but with value-characters such as beautiful or ugly, agreeable or disagreeable, pleasant or unpleasant, and so forth. (Husserl 1931:92–3)

It should not be difficult for anthropologists to recognize this attitude as the kind of experience of the everyday world that we try to capture through ethnographic fieldwork. Even though we would call it “the cultural attitude” rather than the “natural attitude,” Husserl’s use of the term natural is not foreign to anthropologists. For example, we use it when we say that people “naturalize” their ways of acting, thinking, and feeling. By this expression we mean that they take those ways to be universal ways of being, instead of recognizing them for what they are: the product of a complex process of socialization in which “nature” (e.g., evolution, biology) plays a role but is always transformed and interpreted through human praxis. This explains old and new views of certain Others as “savages” or “uncivilized.” They are considered so not because they are different from us, but because they are different from the ways we expect a “person” to be. The concept of the “natural attitude” captures the practical, moral, and aesthetic stance that we ordinarily take toward the surrounding world, human beings included.

Husserl also points out that as human beings we do have the capacity to step out of the “natural attitude.” When we do step out, we have the possibility of taking on other attitudes. One class of such other attitudes is what Husserl called the “theoretical attitude.” As we shall see, to shift to this attitude we also need to engage in particular kinds of modifications.

Husserl’s Notion of “Theoretical Attitude”

According to Husserl, the capacity to step out of the “natural attitude” and enter the “theoretical attitude” is not something restricted to intellectuals or scientists. It is part of our everyday experience of the world (Husserl 1989, §4). We often transform pleasure or just seeing or judging something into the object of a theoretical attitude. This is made possible by what he called “a phenomenological modification”:

_This characteristic change of attitude belongs, as an ideal possibility, to all acts, and accompanying it is always the corresponding phenomenological modification. That is, all acts which are not already theoretical from the outset allow of being converted into such acts by means of a change in attitude._ (Husserl 1989:10)

We enter the “theoretical attitude” at any time when we make a particular experience into an object of our reflection (e.g., the object of an evaluation). Before examining how this concept can help us understand what happens between adults and children, I provide an example taken from a vast corpus of video recordings of ordinary and extraordinary moments in the life of someone who is running for political office. The example I have chosen is meant to be “ordinary” and yet, as I hope to show, revealing of the difference between being “in” an experience and stepping “out” of it to make it, through language, into the object of our reflection.

Example 1 below reproduces a short portion of a verbal exchange between two people who, together with the present author, on March 2, 1996, are driving Northbound along the California coast, on Highway 101, on the way to a political rally. The man at the steering wheel is Walter Capps (WC), a professor of Religious Studies at UCSB, who was then also a Democratic candidate for a seat in the U.S. Congress.

Next to him is the researcher, quietly filming, and in the back seat is a member of...
Capps’ family (here named “FM” for “family member”). Capps has just finished talking about the time he got tenure in relation to other relevant events in his family life (e.g., when his children were born, when his wife started to work)—a topic originally raised by the researcher and then further pursued by FM. Then follow seven seconds of no talk with Capps looking at the road ahead and on his left side (see Figure 4). What follows the seven-second pause is an example of a change of attitude with a corresponding phenomenological modification.

Example 4 ("Walter Capps for Congress”; March 2, 1996; on the road from Santa Barbara to Lompoc, California; WC = Walter Capps; FM = Family Member)

WC; [. . .] I got tenure before that. . . . I think that’s when I became full professor.
FM; Seventy-three.
WC; oh something like that.
(7 sec.)

WC; It’s a very nice ride over here.
FM; Yeah.
WC; m:::
FM; [This is the best. I love this ride.

From the point of view of its illocutionary force (Austin 1962), that is, in terms of what the speaker is conventionally aiming at, Capps’ utterance “It’s a very nice ride over here” is an assertion and, more specifically, an assessment.\textsuperscript{17} If we look at it from the point of view of its placement in a sequence of turns, as we have learned to do from conversation analysts, this type of speech act calls for a response by the co-participants, with the preferred response being agreement either immediately followed by or in the form of a second assessment (Pomerantz 1984; Sacks 1987; Goodwin and Goodwin 1992). FM follows this script perfectly by first agreeing with Capps’ assessment (“Yeah”) and then by producing a second assessment in the form of an “upgrade” (Pomerantz 1984:65): “This is the best.”\textsuperscript{18}

Capps’ initial assessment takes as an object of evaluation the so far unspoken about but perceptually available sensorial environment or, rather, makes the sensorial environment (in this case, what is seen from the driver’s point of view—see Figure 4) into an object of evaluation. With his assessment of the experience of the “ride,” Capps moves out of the practical relationship with the road and the surrounding. They are
no longer understood and utilized as a means to an end, or as “affordances,” in Jerome Gibson’s (1986) terms. That is, they are no longer or not only what allows Capps to easily drive to his destination, the town of Lompoc, where he will join a state senator and some Democratic supporters. The orientation toward such a practical goal and the practical relationship with the equipment (e.g., the car) and the built environment (e.g., the paved road) is in this segment momentarily abandoned in favor of the recognition and evaluation of the experience itself, which includes the pleasure one gets from looking at the place through which one is driving. The road itself and what defines it as a road, including the “nature things” on the sides (i.e., trees, bushes, the skyline) are recognized as having a value of their own, independent of their practical utilization. For all of this to happen, Capps first and then FM must engage in a phenomenal modification of their attitude toward their surrounding. The change from the “natural” to the “theoretical” attitude is thus both expressed and realized (or “performed”) through language, that is, in this case, English grammar and vocabulary.

The linguistic shape of Capps’ assessment (“It is a very nice ride over here”) objectifies the pleasure of the ride (which otherwise could have remained a lived but unexpressed and private “affective attitude”) and presents it as a potentially universal judgment that is explicitly about the here-and-now and is only implicitly linked to the speaker’s own pleasure. The same attitude remains in the first of FM’s following statements, namely, the upgrade “This is the best.” The second utterance by FM, “I love this ride,” with the first-person singular pronoun I and the verb love introduces a change in syntax and semantics that claims an assumption of responsibility. But, even with the personal touch, the “theoretical attitude” remains, just like when a guest says to the host “I love to come to your house,” or someone watching a Woody Allen movie says “I love Allen’s movies.”

These phenomena could also be described by using Bateson’s concept of “frame.” Bateson suggested that messages such as “this is play” or “this is a therapy session” (whether or not they are realized through language) are used to define the relevant frame for a given interaction. They are metacommunicative in the sense that they tell us how to communicate and more generally how to behave in a given situation. For Bateson, certain changes are made possible by the practice of moving in and out of frames. For example, therapists exploit the potential ambiguity between “therapy” and “life” by allowing patients to see that sometimes “fantasy contains truth” (Bateson 1972:192).

We could then say that in providing an assessment of his experience while driving, Capps has moved out of the frame established by the immediately prior narrative account and into another, in this case, metaframe (i.e., a higher-order frame), in which the ongoing activity of driving through a particular part of the country is being talked about.

There are, however, subtle differences between Bateson’s and Husserl’s theories. The notion of “frame” suggests a cognitive activity, whereas Husserl’s notion of “Einstellung,” imperfectly but effectively translated by “attitude,” evokes a way of standing or taking position with respect to our surrounding world (Umwelt), people included. Not surprisingly, given its intellectual sources including Bateson’s interest in cybernetics, the notion of “frame” seems to avoid reference to the Subject of the framing and concentrates on the presuppositions and effects of the encoding. Husserl, instead, is more concerned with what the perceiving-thinking Subject is achieving and the conditions of such an achievement.

The “Theoretical Attitude” in Talk to and by Children

If the “theoretical attitude” is indeed available to all human beings and not just to scientists involved in abstract argumentation, we should expect children to be exposed from an early age to phenomenological modifications that involve a shift from the “natural” to the “theoretical attitude,” and we should also expect language
to play an important role in these shifts. One place to look for cases in which children’s attention is being oriented in such a way is directives.

Transcripts of verbal interactions between children and adults in the literature on language acquisition and language socialization are full of directives, a class of speech acts that includes “imperatives” such as English *come here! Go there! Give it to me! Stop!* (e.g., Ervin-Tripp 1976; Ervin-Tripp and Gordon 1986; Clancy 1985; Rumsey 2003; Wootton 1997: chapter 3). In these transcripts, parents and children are shown to be involved in “request sequences” of varying length and complexity. By the time they go to school, where they are instructed on how to sit, stand, talk, read, and write, young children have had a protracted experience being the targets of requests. However, not all requests are the same from the point of view of the attitudes that they instantiate. For example, a request for information like the one in (1) requires a different kind of attitude from the request for information in (2):

(1) What’s that? (Bloom 1970:113)
(2) That machine scare you? Hm? (Peters and Boggs 1986:90)

In (1), the child is asked to focus on a given object as identified by the deictic term *that* and to respond by providing a description, a requirement that can be satisfied by the use of a linguistic expression, often a single word. In (2), the child is also asked to focus on a particular object characterized through an expression that contains both a deictic (*that*) and a common noun (*machine*). But this time the child must do something different from providing a description. She must provide information on whether the object caused (or is causing now, not clear because of the verb morphology) a particular emotion (fear). In order to answer, the child must engage in an evaluation of what is going on. Even though this does not mean that the child must have an awareness of the reflexive quality of the act, the “attitude”—in Husserl’s sense of *Einstellung* (see above)—that is required for understanding and answering (2) is different from the “attitude” that is required for understanding and answering (1). In addition, the request in (2) provides a model for self-reflection. In implying a child’s ability to both reflect and report on her emotional state, the request provides a model for what is reportable, in this case emotional states caused by encounters with machines.

All of this means that over time, in being directed, children are not only oriented to attend to objects or to perform certain actions on them. They are also exposed to ways of reflecting on their own experience of such objects and more generally on their life experiences. This in turn entails an ability to move from the “natural attitude” of the here-and-now to the “theoretical attitude” of evaluating the type of ongoing activity or the type of person that such an activity entails or invokes. In some cases, the “theoretical attitude” appears in situations in which children challenge or resist a particular request that is being made from them. It is, in other words, while they are being confrontational or argumentative, that children also practice or experiment with stepping back from the here-and-now to provide a typification of it.

To illustrate how children can engage in this kind of behavior and support the claim that it can be an occasion for engaging in “theoretical” action, I have chosen to reexamine an interaction between a Samoan mother and her child discussed by Martha Platt (1986). The example comes from a large corpus of transcripts of family interactions originally recorded in 1978–79 by Elinor Ochs and Martha Platt in a (Western) Samoan community as part of a longitudinal study sponsored by the National Science Foundation in which I also participated (see Duranti 1994:20–26).

Example 5 below corresponds to example 5 in Platt (1986:135–6). The layout of the example has been altered to be consistent with the format of the other examples in this article and the orthography for representing Samoan speech has been slightly changed to conform to (consistent) standard Samoan orthography. The English
glosses in (5) have been left as in Platt’s original example. A few minor revisions are suggested in the discussion that follows.

Example 5 Scene: Niulala (Niu), who is three and a half years old, is inside the house with his mother (whose name is here given in the abbreviated form “Ak”), his younger brother, Fineaso (Fine), and another small child, To’o. Ak is in the central room of the house and Niulala and To’o are in a side room. Throughout the whole interaction Ak remains seated while the children move back and forth between the side and center rooms.

Ak; ko’o mai ska masi.
‘To’o bring poor me a cracker.’
Se maiga ke a’u kago vaelu’a
‘So that I can divide it in half.’
((To’o gives cracker to Ak; she breaks off a piece and gives the rest to To’o))
((Niulala comes out of the side room))
Ak; Niulala.
Niulala.
Niu; uhh
Ak; sau mai sa’u masi.
‘Come bring me a cracker.’
Niu; leai!
‘No!’
Ak; ai se â?
‘why?’
Niu; laga ke ‘ai’û.
‘because I’m selfish.’
Ak; ke ‘ai’û iâ a’u?
‘Are you being selfish toward me?’
Niu; uhh.
Fine: ((laughs)) uhh.
((Niulala and Fineaso are running around the house))
Ak; se Niulala, (.) Fineaso
‘Please! Niulala, Fineaso!’
Niu; e!
‘hey!’
Fine; o!
Ak; sau lâ ‘oe mai ska masi ê!
‘Come here now and give me a cracker!’

The interaction starts with Ak (who is seated) asking a small child (presumably from a neighbor family) who is in the next room, To’o, to bring her a cracker. To’o complies and gives her the cracker, which she breaks in two, giving back to him one piece. Then Ak makes the same request to her (older) son, Niulala, who instead refuses with a straight ‘No!’ (leai.). When she asks him why (ai se â?), her son replies: laga ke ‘ai’û, which Platt, probably trying to stay close to a gloss given by a Samoan native speaker, translates as ‘because I’m selfish.’ A more literal translation would be ‘because I am unwilling to share food,’ as suggested by the fact that the word translated as selfish in the example, ‘ai’û, includes the verb ‘ai’eat’ (Milner 1966:10). At this point the mother asks “Are you being selfish toward me?” (ke ‘ai’û iâ a’u?) or, more literally, ‘Are you being unwilling to share food with me?’ After receiving no answer to her question and seeing that instead of complying with her request Niulala has started to run around the house with To’o, she uses another directive: “Come here now and give me a cracker” (sau lâ’oe mai ska masi ê).

As is always the case with communicative events, there are potentially many different ways of discussing this verbal exchange. Platt, for example, chose to highlight the mother’s use of the affective marker [ska] (from /si+ka:/), the combination of an affective article (/si/) and an affective first person possessive (/ka/) ( pronounced /ta/ in other contexts, see footnote 17) that is meant to make the listener feel
sorry for the speaker (see also Ochs 1986; Ochs and Schieffelin 1989). The mother first uses the affective form /ska/ with the To'o but does not use it with her son Niulala. After Niulala refuses to give her his cracker, she uses the /ska/ with him as well (as shown in the last line of example 5).

Another way of analyzing this example is from the point of view of Niulala’s defiant behavior. By bringing up a description of himself as someone who is unwilling to share his food with his own mother, Niulala is testing his mother’s patience and simultaneously asserting his own will. Within an interaction that is ostensibly about exchange and sharing, a common locus of socialization in Samoa and elsewhere (e.g., Schieffelin 1990), we see language being used also to reflect on and actually constitute the type of moral persons that participants are. Niulala’s verbal actions in example 5 are a clear case of what Samoans themselves would characterize as “cheeky behavior” (tautalalaitiiti) (Milner 1966:257; Ochs 1988:154).

As described by Ochs (1988) and, more recently, Ochs and Izquierdo (2009), Samoan children are socialized (and expected) to respect the local hierarchy by being attentive to and cooperative with older people, including their older siblings and their parents. If they do not comply, they are subject to shame or punishment. However, there are always exceptions to this amply documented cultural preference for being cooperative and respectful. As recently remarked by Ochs and Izquierdo, “adults support occasional cheekiness, noting that later in life untitled youth are sometimes called about to be ‘bad’ (e.g., react hostilely to an offender) in ways unbecoming to older titled persons.”

In what follows, I want to focus on what Niulala’s response entails from the point of view of his “attitude” toward what he has being asked to do, that is, to share his cracker with his mother. First, it should not be difficult to see that Niulala’s explanation for his refusal to comply with the request qualifies as an example of what Husserl called “the theoretical attitude.” In the response reproduced here below in example 5’, Niulala provides his mother (and whoever else happens to be listening, e.g., the researcher who is tape recording the interaction and taking notes) with a typification of his own behavior.

Example 5’

Ak:  ai se â?
    ‘why?’
Niu:  laga ke ‘ai’û.
    ‘because I’m selfish.’

Niulala is here able to “step out” of the flow of ongoing events and the world they constitute, which is in this case the “lifeworld” of kids running around the house eating crackers, parents making requests for them to do something, and kids complying or refusing to comply. Niulala’s stepping out is as good an example of “theoretical attitude” as we will ever find.

Second, when we look at Niulala’s utterance from the point of view of his sequential placement, we realize that it is the second pair part of an adjacency pair consisting, grammatically, of a question and an answer (Schegloff and Sacks 1973).

Example 5”

Ak:  ai se â?  First Pair Part (QUESTION)
    ‘why?’
Niu:  laga ke ‘ai’û.  Second Pair Part (ANSWER)
    ‘because I’m selfish.’

Hence, Niulala’s turn here translated as ‘because I’m selfish’ is an answer to his mother’s why-question. This means that in fact the shift to a “theoretical attitude” that Niulala makes here had been (just) set up by his mother, that is, it is AK’s why-question that lays the (interactional) ground for the phenomenological modification
verbally performed by the child. This in itself is as or more remarkable than the lack of respect entailed by Niulala’s response because Samoans have long been characterized by ethnographers (e.g., Mead 1937; Shore 1982) as not interested in motivations or psychological explanations. When prompted for such explanations through why-questions people often respond with the expression ta’ilo ‘who knows’ or ‘how should I know?’, a phrase that includes the above-mentioned affect-loaded pronoun ta (often pronounced /ka/) ‘poor me,’ which is meant to make the listener feel sorry for the speaker. By answering ta’ilo speakers simultaneously excuse themselves for not answering and discourage any further attempt to pursue that particular kind of questioning.

The fact that a mother asks for a reason that would explain her child’s refusal to satisfy her request is telling. Seen in this cultural context, Niulala’s “cheekiness” seems less as a surprise. We could hypothesize that he can be cheeky at least in part because his mother gives him a chance to be so. Furthermore, from the point of view of the attitude that he embodies and displays, his cheekiness is also evidence of cognitive and interactional abilities that are quite sophisticated for a three-and-a-half year old.

**Modifications and their Role in Socialization**

On the basis of the previous discussion, I propose to think of socialization as the accumulated effect of a number of recurrent modifications—in the sense given by Husserl to this term—in the ways in which novices are expected to relate to a particular phenomenon. These modifications give children and adults not only the power to act in novel ways but also to adopt, reflect upon, question, reject, and revise what is being perceived, reported on, proposed, or ordered.

In the world of music instruction, over time the sum of the different ways of hearing and listening that are encouraged and modeled by the instructor and experienced by the students become part of their musical competence and eventually contribute to the definition of their professional identity not just as musicians but as musicians of a certain type, in our case, jazz musicians (Jackson 2000, 2002; Dortier 2002; Black 2008). If they succeed, they will arrive to share what we might call a “professional ear” just like archaeologists share what Charles Goodwin (1994) called a “professional vision.” When archaeology students are asked to identify a “change of slope” in the ground surface (Goodwin 1994:613–4), they are being socialized to see the ground in new terms, according to a profession-specific categorization scheme. Similarly, when jazz students are asked to identity the “interactive” character of someone’s playing (see discussion of example 2 above), they are also being socialized to hear music (whether recorded or live) according to a jazz-specific category system, which includes emic paradigmatic oppositions such as interactive versus noninteractive or emic gradient differences, for example, from “more” interactive versus “less” interactive. In addition, since, as shown in example 3 above, the fact that one is “listening” must be demonstrated by the way one plays—a point well documented by Black (2008), any kind of categorization scheme must be activated and reproduced through specific actions, which in turn contribute to the constitution of particular kinds of moral persons (Day 2000; Duranti and Burrell 2004).

Language socialization research has shown that caregivers (of different ages depending on the social and cultural organization of families and communities) organize children’s attention to particular linguistic sounds, acts, and routines (Ochs and Schieffelin 1984; Schieffelin and Ochs 1986). Children and novices are constantly being “oriented” through talk and other semiotic resources toward specific tasks and specific Others, with noticeable cross-cultural differences (e.g., Ochs and Schieffelin 1984:297). Children are told to call out to certain people (e.g., Demuth 1986:58–9; Watson-Gegeo and Gegeo 1986; Ochs 1988) or to ask certain kinds of questions of others (e.g., Schieffelin 1986). They are also teased and instigated to defend themselves against present or future threats posed by imagined or real others (e.g.,
Eisenberg 1986; Schieffelin 1990). Language use, therefore, starts within a locally available set of activities where the child is monitored and directed to move and speak in certain ways. This means that when, later in life, children or adults participate in new activities, they have already had considerable experience speaking, acting, thinking, and feeling in specific ways; they have, in Bourdieu’s terms, acquired a “habitus.”23

Language socialization experts have argued that these earlier experiences may affect a person’s ability to change in the ways required by a new environment or a new activity (e.g., the classroom, the playground, the shop) (see Heath 1982, 1983; Kulick and Schieffelin 2004; Ochs, Solomon, and Sterponi 2005).

By relying on Husserl’s notion of modification, we can hypothesize that at least some of the problems encountered not only by students but also by educators (or therapists, as in the case discussed by Ochs et al. 2005) in adapting to new ways of being may be due to the accumulated effects of modifications experienced earlier in life which make it difficult if not impossible to retrieve earlier, premodification ways of being. As infants, we can assume body postures that are no longer possible when we grow older. As young children, we can develop a musical ear that is harder to achieve later in life as shown by the positive correlation between early exposure to music training and perfect pitch (Pressing 1984, 1987; Sacks 2007). After years of socialization, the way we do things has come to feel as if it is the only possible way (Dortier 2002:5). We cannot imagine another way of being and our mind and body just cannot “go there.” What we have been socialized to think, feel, and do has become part of what Husserl called “the natural attitude.” In addition to suggesting that we should read Husserl’s use of “natural” as corresponding to what anthropologists call the “cultural,” I have proposed to adopt Husserl’s concept of modification as an analytical tool for the documentation and theorization of how the process of “naturalization” is realized in the lives of children and novices across situations and communities.

Notes

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1. For a review of the vast literature on attention within psychology, see Pashler (1998).
2. See, for example, Petitot, Varela, Pachoud, and Roy (1999), Gallese, Ferrari, and Umiltà (2002), Gallese (2003).
3. Bourdieu is one of the most cited social theorists among contemporary linguistic anthropologists, as shown in the index of multi-authored books such as Key Terms in Language and Culture (Duranti 2001) and A Companion to Linguistic Anthropology (Duranti 2004).
4. Husserl’s notes on intersubjectivity are collected in three volumes of Husserlana (XIII, XIV, and XV), which have not yet been translated in English. The concept, however, is also found in books that appeared during his life and have been translated into English (e.g., Husserl 1931, 1960, 1969). The secondary literature on Husserl’s notion of intersubjectivity is vast and in many languages. In English, see, among others, Schutz (1966), Fink (1966), Zahavi (1996, 2001), Depraz (2001).
5. Husserl’s idea that speakers are directly involved in making a sign into something meaningful was a clear break with Frege’s theory of meaning, which avoided anything that might sound “psychological” in explaining sense and reference (see Sokolowski 1987).

6. The English translation sign qua sign for Husserl’s Zeichen für sich is potentially misleading to anyone familiar with C.S. Peirce’s writings or, more generally, with the discipline of semiotics but not familiar with Husserl’s work. In the section of Logische Untersuchungen titled “Auszdruck und Bedeutung” (Husserl 1901:23–60), translated as “Expression and Meaning” in Husserl (1970b:269–282), Zeichen does not correspond to what Peirce called sign. As made clear at the beginning of the original passage where the expression translated as “sign qua sign” appears (Husserl 1901:40; reproduced in Husserl 1984:46), for Husserl Zeichen can be something physical and perceptible and without meaning—as used by him in the expression sign-appearance (Zeichenerscheinung). For something that is perceivable and has meaning, Husserl uses two other terms: Anzeichen and Ausdruck, translated by J.N. Findlay as indication and expression, respectively.

7. One of the anonymous reviewers of this article suggested that the distinction between sounds as “brute physical datum” and sounds with a sense (Sinn) is reminiscent of Grice’s (1957) distinction between “natural” and “non-natural” meaning. There is, however, one crucial difference between the two conceptualizations, namely, that Grice’s examples of “natural meaning,” for example, smoke means fire, are anything but “brute physical data” given that they correspond to what Charles S. Peirce called “symptoms,” which are kinds of indices.

8. For Husserl’s own schematic representation of time consciousness, see Husserl (1991) and also Dodd (2005).

9. The following three examples from the Jazz Combo Classes are taken from a large corpus of video recordings of jazz classes, concerts, and interviews gathered over three years (2003–2006). I am very grateful to Kenny Burrell, director of the Jazz Program at UCLA, and the many jazz musicians and jazz students at UCLA and in the Los Angeles area who accepted to be recorded while playing or talking inside or outside of university settings. The jazz project was partly funded by the UCLA Office of Instructional Development (OID) and small grants from the UCLA Faculty Senate. For a description of the project, see: http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/duranti/jazzproject.htm.

10. On this occasion the class has fewer students than usual. Other times there were also a pianist and two saxophone players, one playing alto and the other playing tenor.

11. Transcription conventions: Three dots between brackets (\. . .\) indicate that some portion of what was said within the same turn or within the same stretch of talk by the same speaker has been omitted; underlining (e.g., teach) indicates emphasis or contrastive stress; colon (:) stands for the lengthening of a sound (e.g., to::); double parentheses contain contextually available information that is not expressed verbally by participants but might be necessary for readers to understand what is going on; parentheses mark uncertain transcription.

12. This attention to recorded music as opposed to the written scores is related to a number of characteristics in the history and culture of jazz aesthetics, including the complex relationship between orality and writing (Prouty 2006; Duranti 2008b) and the fact that the total “corpus” of jazz music is the discography of all jazz musicians as opposed to the written scores (Williams 2001:180).

13. The possible appeal of this notion for anthropology was unfortunately missed by Clifford Geertz (1973:110n) who rejected it because of “its subjectivist connotations.” I suspect that the translation of Einstellung into attitude had something to do with Geertz’s reaction.

14. The term Sachenwelt in the same passage was later translated as “world of mere things” by F. Kersten (Husserl 1983:53).

15. Later on, in his “Vienna Lecture,” Husserl will refer to this process of changing attitude as Umstellung ‘reorientation’ (Husserl 1970a:280).

16. For a discussion of Capps’ campaign and his political persona as performed through talk, see Duranti (2003, 2006).

17. As noted in a comment by one of the anonymous reviewers, this assessment is not a compliment (or as self-praise) because none of the participants have any “ownership” claims to what is being referred to as “here.”

18. Pomerantz (1984:65) wrote: “One type of agreement is the upgrade. An upgraded agreement is an assessment of the referent assessed in the prior that incorporates upgraded evaluation terms relative to the prior. Two common techniques for upgrading evaluations are:

   (1) A stronger evaluative term than the prior, given graded sets of descriptors, is selected [. . .]

   (2) An intensifier modifying the prior evaluative descriptor is included [. . .]”
19. Other kinds of connections between Husserl’s and Gibson’s theory of perception have been pointed out by Mulligan (1995) and Smith (1995).


21. For more information on the children in this family, see Ochs (1988:43–4).

22. The morpheme-by-morpheme gloss /si+ka/ is in the phonological register of the original example, which is in the so-called bad speech (tautala leaga) as opposed to the so-called good speech (tautala lelei), which would be /si+ta/. Contrary to what the names might suggest, the pronunciation with /k/ in place of /t/ is not an “informal register” (pace Milner 1966), but the way of pronouncing Samoan in both formal and informal situations that are not school- or church related (Duranti and Ochs 1986).

23. For a discussion of the connection between Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and Husserl’s theory, see Throop and Murphy (2002).

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